Knight v. Henderson International Technologies, Inc. et al

Filing 87

ORDER & REASONS denying as premature 44 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 1/13/2016. (caa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SIMON KNIGHT

CIVIL ACTION

V.

NO. 14-2307

HENDERSON INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGIES INC., ET AL.

SECTION "F"

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Baldor Electric Co.’s motion for summary
judgment. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
Background
This personal injury action arises from an explosion of a
helium compressor that caused a flying object to pierce a hole
through the plaintiff’s ankle. The accident occurred while the
plaintiff,

Simon

Knight,

was

working

for

Air

Gas

Inc.

at

a

compressor station near Houma, Louisiana.
Knight brings this action against multiple defendants who
manufactured and serviced the compressor and its component parts.
Baldor Electric Co. manufactured an electric motor that provided
power to the compressor. Knight asserts claims against Baldor under
the Louisiana Products Liability Act and under a general theory of
negligence.
Baldor

contends

that

the

plaintiff’s

initial

discovery

disclosures fail to supply any facts supporting the plaintiff’s
claims

against

Baldor.

Likewise,

Baldor

claims

that

the

plaintiff’s responses to interrogatories and documents requests
1

have been equally lacking. Representatives of Baldor have visually
inspected the compressor and have found no apparent defects with
its motor. According to Baldor, the plaintiff has offered no
evidence of Baldor’s negligence or liability under the Louisiana
Products Liability Act.
Knight

responds

that

he

has

been

working

diligently

to

schedule the necessary testing of the compressor to determine the
liability of the various manufacturers. He admits that, until
destructive testing has been performed on the compressor, the
parties will be unable to determine which part of the compressor
malfunctioned causing the explosion. Knight requests that the
Court

postpone

consideration

of

Baldor’s

motion

for

summary

judgment until his experts can perform the necessary destructive
testing. The Court agrees.
I.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs that summary
judgment is proper if the record discloses no genuine dispute as
to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

No genuine dispute of fact exists if

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

A genuine dispute

of fact exists only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable

2

jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."

Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Court emphasizes that the mere argued existence of a
factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion. See id. Therefore, "[i]f the evidence is merely colorable,
or

is

not

appropriate.

significantly

probative,"

summary

Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

judgment

is

Summary judgment

is also proper if the party opposing the motion fails to establish
an essential element of his case.
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

In this regard, the non-moving party

must do more than simply deny the allegations raised by the moving
party.

See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d

646, 649 (5 Cir. 1992). Rather, he must come forward with competent
evidence, such as affidavits or depositions, to buttress his claim.
Id. Hearsay evidence and unsworn documents that cannot be presented
in a form that would be admissible in evidence at trial do not
qualify as competent opposing evidence.

Martin v. John W. Stone

Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5 Cir. 1987); FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(c)(2).

Finally, in evaluating the summary judgment motion,

the Court must read the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
II.

Discovery is ongoing in this case. All parties agree that
destructive testing of the compressor is necessary to determine
3

the liability of the defendants. Destructive testing was initially
scheduled

for

January

6,

2016

after

the

Court

granted

the

plaintiff’s motion to extend his expert report deadlines. However,
on January 30, 2015, the defendant who owns the compressor, Atlas
Copco Compressors, LLC, filed a motion to quash the scheduled
destructive testing for fear that the testing would cause the
compressor

to

explode

again.

(An

interesting

inference

that

someone is responsible for what happened). On January 5, 2016, the
Court quashed the destructive testing that was scheduled for the
following day, but ordered the parties to perform non-destructive
testing so as to determine a safe protocol for any necessary
destructive testing. Further, the Court ordered the parties to
conduct any and all necessary destructive testing by February 5,
2016. The Court extended the parties’ expert report deadlines to
allow them time to form their opinions of the destructive testing
before the March 28, 2016 trial.
While Baldor’s frustrations about the delays in the necessary
testing of the compressor may be warranted, there remain material
issues of fact as to what caused the compressor to explode.
Although the plaintiff has clearly not yet articulated a specific
theory of liability against Baldor, the plaintiff has not withheld
required disclosures in violation of the discovery rules. Rather,
the plaintiff is unable to identify the cause of the explosion at

4

this time due to delays in the necessary testing.1 Accordingly,
Baldor’s request for summary judgment is premature.
To avoid prejudice to Baldor in light of the recent changes
to the discovery schedule, the parties may submit pre-trial motions
in accordance with the Court’s January 13, 2016 order extending
the scheduling order deadlines.2
IT IS ORDERED that Baldor Electric Co.’s motion for summary
judgment is DENIED as premature. The motion is hereby dismissed
without prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana, January 13, 2016
______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

From the record, it appears that the delays in the necessary
testing are not solely the fault of the plaintiff. According to
the plaintiff, he has been trying to coordinate the testing since
September of 2015. On the record, it appears that the delays have
been caused by conflicting schedules of the numerous defendants
and experts. Adding to the delays, the compressor is located at
the facility of a company who is not a party to this suit.
1

2

And all parties are reminded of the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
5