Bey v. Jefferson Parish

Filing 24

ORDER AND REASONS granting 14 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The Court GRANTS Bey leave to amend her complaint within twenty-one (21) days of the entry of this order. Failure to timely amend will result in dismissal of Beys claims with prejudice. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 6/29/15. (jjs) Modified on 6/29/2015 (jjs).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
AMOURE AMUN BEY

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 14-2455

JEFFERSON PARISH

SECTION: R(3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Defendant Jefferson Parish moves to dismiss plaintiff’s
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1

For the

following reasons, the Court grants the motion.

I.

BACKGROUND
On October 23, 2014, pro se plaintiff Amoure Amun Bey filed

suit

alleging

a

number

of

constitutional

violations

against

defendant Jefferson Parish (the Parish) after she was arrested
while attending a proceeding at the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District
Court in Gretna, Louisiana.2

The facts surrounding the incident,

as alleged in Bey’s complaint, are as follows.
On July 10, 2014, Bey went to the Twenty-Fourth Judicial
District

Court

to

observe

a

court

proceeding.3

During

the

proceeding, a courtroom official told a police officer that Bey had

1

R. Doc. 14.

2

R. Doc. 1.

3

Id. at 1.

a cell phone.4

The officer tried to take away Bey’s phone and

apparently called other officers for help.5
courtroom and was promptly arrested.6

Bey then exited the

The officers searched Bey’s

purse, removed her phone, and began accessing Bey’s personal photos
and videos saved on the phone.7

The officers believed Bey had

recorded the judicial proceeding.8
Still in handcuffs, Bey was returned to the courtroom, where
she was sentenced to thirty days in prison.9

When the officers

transported Bey to jail, they “roughly jerked her around” and
ridiculed and harassed her.10 One of the jail officers also removed
Bey’s traditional headdress and said, “No religious hats in here.”11
While in jail, Bey received a shot of “unknown chemicals” in
her arm.12

She was also denied vegetarian food despite alerting

prison deputies that her religion mandated a special diet.13

4

Id. at 2.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id. at 2-3.

9

Id. at 3.

10

Id. at 3.

11

Id. at 3.

12

Id. at 4.

13

Id.
2

Bey

spent 30 days in jail, where she noticed black mold throughout the
showers and bathrooms.14

As a result, Bey allegedly suffered high

blood pressure, migraines, and a number of body pains.15

Bey

alleges that the Parish, by and through Second Parish Court,
Twenty-Fourth

Judicial

District

Court,

Jefferson

Parish

Correctional Center, and others, violated the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth and Eighth Amendments; the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples; and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.16
The Parish now moves the Court to dismiss Bey’s claim on the
ground that it is not liable for the actions of Second Parish
Court, Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court, or the Jefferson
Parish Correctional Center.17

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff

must plead enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is

14

Id. at 5.

15

Id. at 4-5.

16

Id. at 5-7.

17

R. Doc. 14. In support of its motion, the Parish
attached an affidavit signed by the Deputy Chief of the Jefferson
Parish Sheriff’s Office. Because the affidavit is not necessary
to resolve the motion, the Court will not consider it, and the
motion to dismiss need not be considered as one for summary
judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
3

plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)).

A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads

facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id. at 678.

A court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

Lormand v.

U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 2009); Baker v.
Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a
“sheer possibility” that the plaintiff's claim is true. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. It need not contain detailed factual allegations, but
it

must

go

beyond

labels,

legal

conclusions,

recitations of the elements of a cause of action.

or

formulaic

Id.

In other

words, the face of the complaint must contain enough factual matter
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of each element of the plaintiff's claim.
F.3d at 257.

Lormand, 565

If there are insufficient factual allegations to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level, or if it is
apparent

from

the

face

of

the

complaint

that

there

insuperable bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed.
550 U.S. at 555.

4

is

an

Twombly,

III. DISCUSSION
The Court construes Bey’s complaint liberally because of her
pro se status.

See Davison v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 712 F.3d

884, 885 (5th Cir. 2013).

The Court infers that Bey’s claim

against a municipality for civil rights violations falls under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
To state a claim against a municipality under section 1983,
the plaintiff must allege that the Parish has either adopted “an
official

policy

or

custom

that

deprives

citizens

of

their

constitutional rights” or has engaged in “persistent, widespread
practice which, although not official promulgated, is so common and
well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents
municipal policy.”

Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 677 (5th Cir.

1997) (quoting Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th
Cir. 1984)); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

A municipality or local government unit

cannot be held liable under section 1983 on a theory of respondeat
superior merely because it employs a tortfeasor.

Monell, 436 U.S.

at 694; Esteves, 106 F.3d at 677.
Bey’s complaint is devoid of any allegations that the Parish
maintains either an official policy or unofficial practice that
deprives citizens of their constitutional rights.

Instead, her

claims are entirely based on actions taken by other people.

Bey

asserts that she suffered unlawful treatment at the hands of her
5

arresting officers, the sentencing judge, and prison officials, for
whom the Parish should be held liable.

Indeed, in opposition to

the Parish’s motion, Bey argues the Parish “as owner [of the
Jefferson Parish Correctional Center], is fully responsible for
what takes place while it is owner.

The defendant . . . hire[d]

the personnel whom it alleges to be responsible [and] employed the
deputies that placed the petitioner [in prison.]”18 This is plainly
a claim for liability under a theory of respondeat superior.

As

previously stated, a municipality like Jefferson Parish cannot be
liable under section 1983 merely because it employs a tortfeasor.
See Esteves, 106 F.3d at 677.
Because Bey has failed to allege that her injuries resulted
from an official policy or custom that deprives citizens of their
constitutional rights, her section 1983 claim against the Parish
fails as a matter of law.
694.

See id.; see also Monell, 436 U.S. at

Accordingly, Bey’s claims against Jefferson Parish must be

dismissed.

IV.

LEAVE TO AMEND
The Court should “freely give” leave to amend “when justice so

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Leal v. McHugh, 731 F.3d 405,
417 (5th Cir. 2013).

Ordinarily, “a court should grant a pro se

party every reasonable opportunity to amend.”
18

R.

Doc. 16 at 2.
6

Hale v. King, 642

F.3d 492, 503 n. 36 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pena v. United States,
157 F.3d 984, 987 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1998)).

Therefore, the Court

grants Bey leave to amend her civil rights claim within twenty-one
(21) days of the entry of this order.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Jefferson Parish’s

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and dismisses Amoure Amun
Bey’s civil rights claim against the Parish.

The Court GRANTS Bey

leave to amend her complaint within twenty-one (21) days of the
entry of this order.

Failure to timely amend will result in

dismissal of Bey’s claims with prejudice.

29th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _______ day of June, 2015.

___________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7