Continental Insurance Company et al v. L&L Marine Transportation, Inc. et al

Filing 184

ORDER AND REASONS granting 165 Motion to Bifurcate. The parties will first adjudicate the issue of liability as a bench trial. After the conclusion of that trial, the Court will reconsider whether Deranger's claims shall be heard in state or federal court, and whether Colombs damages claims heard in federal court will be conducted as a bench or jury trial. FURTHER ORDERED that the proposed case management order as to the liability issues to be tried is ADOPTED. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 2/8/2018. (Reference: 15-1870, 15-1942)(clc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CONTINENTAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

V.

NO. 14-2967

L&L MARINE TRANSPORTATION
INC., ET AL.

SECTION "F"

ORDER AND REASONS
Before

the

Court

is

the

parties’

proposed

joint

case

management order and Joshua Deranger’s motion to bifurcate the
trial. For the following reasons, the case management order is
ADOPTED and the motion to bifurcate is GRANTED consistent with
this Order and Reasons. The liability portion of the case will be
tried as a bench trial, but the damages portion, if any, will be
tried at a later date to be set by the Court. The Court defers
rulings on what forum will hear Deranger’s damages claims, and
whether remaining damages issues tried in this Court will be tried
to the bench or to a jury.
Background
Three vessels were tasked to transport one barge on the
Mississippi River. One of those vessels allided with a bridge and
sank,

rendering

it

a

total

loss.

Now,

the

vessels’

owners,

insurers, and those personally injured during the allision are
seeking to determine whether the other two vessels were negligent
and unseaworthy, and thus liable for the resulting losses and

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injuries. These issues are scheduled to be tried on March 5, 2018.
In an effort to clarify the trial issues, the Court ordered the
parties to submit a joint case management order and invited them
to

file

a

motion

to

bifurcate,

if

needed.

The parties submitted a joint case management order and Joshua
Deranger filed a contested motion to bifurcate.
The issues before the Court stem back to December 29, 2013,
when three vessels, M/V MISS DOROTHY, M/V ANGELA RAE, and M/V
FREEDOM transported a barge, FSP 101, southbound on the Mississippi
River. FSB 101 is owned by Consolidated Grain & Barge, Inc. CGB
hired the vessels to transport the barge and its cargo from
Reserve, LA to Convent, LA. The vessels successfully navigated the
barge to Convent and had offloaded the cargo.
While heading southbound to LaPlace, the master of MISS
DOROTHY, Captain Joseph Colomb, instructed his deckhands, Joshua
Deranger

and

Matt

Lynch,

to

change

the

fuel

filters

of

the

starboard and port engines. When Deranger and Lynch changed the
filters of the starboard engine, they shut it down, allegedly
causing a drag on the flotilla. When the flotilla attempted to
pass under the Sunshine Bride, MISS DOROTHY allided with the
bridge. The vessel sustained a puncture in the hull, which caused
water to rapidly enter the engine room, ceasing operation of the
port engine and the generator, eventually resulting in a total
loss for the vessel. The bridge was also damaged. Joshua Deranger,
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the deckhand on the MISS DOROTHY, was still in the engine room
during the allision. When the water flooded the room, it moved a
storage box, trapping Deranger’s leg between the box and the
starboard engine. Matt Lynch helped to free him, but Deranger’s
lower right leg was injured. He sustained a compound fracture of
his tibia and fibula, and ultimately underwent surgery that placed
a rod and screws in his tibia. Captain Colomb also alleges personal
injuries. Following the allision, the vessel owners and insurers,
as well as those injured, filed a number of claims against each
other in five separate actions (14-2967, 15-1473, 15-1870, 151942, 15-4423), which have been consolidated into one lead case,
14-2967.
The insurers of the owner (Western Rivers Boat Management,
Inc.) of the sunken MISS DOROTHY initiated the present case on
December 29, 2014. The insurers—Continental Insurance Company,
National Union Fire Insurance Company, and Starr Liability and
Indemnity—filed a complaint in this Court against L&L Marine
Transportation, Inc. (operator of Angela), C.J.L., Inc. (owner of
Angela), River Ventures, LLC (owner and operator FREEDOM), M/V
ANGELA RAE in rem, M/V FREEDOM in rem, and FSB 101 in rem. They
alleged that the defendants caused the allision, were unseaworthy,
and were negligent in their training of the master and crew,
equipping the vessels with proper navigational tools, and in their
navigation. In a separate action, C.J.L. and L&L filed a complaint
3

for

exoneration

from,

or

in

the

alternative

limitation

of

liability, of M/V ANGELA RAE. Five days later, River Ventures did
the

same

for

M/V

FREEDOM.

Immediately,

the

Court

issued

an

injunction restraining the prosecution of any claims involving
ANGELA RAE or FREEDOM, or their insurers and underwriters, until
the Court determined whether the vessels’ liability should be
limited or exonerated. Shortly thereafter, the Court consolidated
these claims into the master case (14-2967).
In response to the limitations actions, the other parties
filed answers, complaints, and counterclaims. 1 Notably, Joshua
Deranger, the MISS DOROTHY deckhand injured during the collision,
answered the complaints and filed counter-claims and third-party
complaints against the other parties alleging that his injuries
were the product of all three vessels’ negligence in either causing
or failing to prevent the allision. Previous to the limitation
proceedings, Deranger filed his complaint for damages in Louisiana
state court at the Twenty-Third Judicial District Court for the
Parish of St. James, invoking the state court’s jurisdiction
pursuant to the “saving to suitors” clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)
and requested a trial by jury. When the vessel owners filed
limitation actions in this Court, the state court proceedings were
stayed

(and

still

are,

pending

1

resolution

of

the

limitation

See the Court’s Order and Reasons, dated 10/26/17, for a detailed outline of
the procedural history in this case.

4

actions). In his responses to the limitation complaint, he again
requested a jury and asked to adjudicate the claims between him
and his Jones Act employer in state court. He also filed a separate
request for a jury trial on December 18, 2015. Likewise, in his
answer to the limitation actions, Captain Joseph Colomb sued the
other

vessel

interests,

claiming

negligence

for

his

personal

injuries. He also requested a jury trial.
The issues before the Court are of two different characters:
liability and damages. In an effort to clarify the issues to be
presented at trial on March 5, 2018 and to better understand the
parties’ positions, the Court ordered that the parties submit a
joint

proposed

case

management

order

by

January

26,

2018,

accompanied by a memorandum, that outline the issues the parties’
anticipate to present at trial. The Court also invited the parties’
to submit any motions to bifurcate. Accordingly, the parties
submitted their joint case management order, and outlined the
liability issues to be tried. The parties are in agreement that
the liability issues will be tried by the Court. The parties
disagree, however, on the manner in which damages will be tried.
They contest whether the trial should be bifurcated, whether some
of the damages issues will be tried in state court, and if the
damages are tried in federal court, whether there will be a jury
or bench trial.

5

I.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) provides that “[f]or
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the
court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues,
claims,

crossclaims,

counterclaims,

or

third-party

claims.”

However, district courts must be mindful that bifurcation is only
appropriate if the issues are “so distinct and separable from the
others that a trial of it alone may be had without injustice.”
Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 791 F. Supp. 113, 115 (E.D.
La. 1992) (quoting Swofford v. B&W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 415 (5th
Cir. 1964)). Even if bifurcation would promote judicial economy,
it is still inappropriate if it would cause unnecessarily delay or
additional expense. Id. Nonetheless, it is not unusual for a court
to bifurcate the trial between the liability and damage issue. See
Swofford, 336 F.2d at 415 (5th Cir. 1964); State of Ala. V. Blue
Bird Body Co., Inc., 573 F.2d 309, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1978).
II.
A.
The parties agree on the issues to be adjudicated in the
liability phase of the litigation. All are in agreement that those
issues are to be tried to the Court. Accordingly, the Court adopts
that portion of the case management order (discussed in detail
below).

6

The parties disagree as to whether or not damages will be
tried as a bench or jury trial, or possibly even referred to state
court. In his motion to bifurcate, Deranger requests that in the
event the vessel owners cannot limit their liability, his damages
claim should be tried in state court. Deranger points to the Saving
to Suitors clause, which permits claimants to adjudicate their
claims in state court through a jury trial. Deranger contends that
the liability portion of the trial is in federal court because of
the limitation action, but if the Court has determined that the
vessel interests are not entitled to limit their liability, the
justification to remain in federal court disappears. In the event
the

vessel

owners

are

entitled

to

limit

their

liability,

he

originally requested that damages would be tried in federal court
to a jury. But he has changed his position. In the interests of
judicial

efficiency

and

economy,

Deranger

now

consents

to

conducting the damages portion of the case as a bench trial (if
the damages portion of the case remains in federal court after a
determination of the liability). He also filed a motion to strike
his jury demand.
Joseph Colomb, the other personal injury claimant, did not
move to bifurcate the trial. But in his memorandum accompanying
the proposed joint case management order, he repeated his initial
request that the damages issue be tried to a jury. In the event
the vessel owners are not entitled to limit their liability, he
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requests that the case be de-consolidated, and that he return to
Section G, where he initiated a complaint for damages against the
vessel interests, for further proceedings.
The vessel interests (the owners and operators for the three
vessels) oppose bifurcation. They contend that all of the issues
should be a bench trial presented to the Court in a single
proceeding, including all aspects of liability and damages. The
vessel interests point to the Limitation of Liability Act, the
statute under which these liability proceedings are brought, which
permits the Court to adjudicate all limitation proceedings and
subsequent proceedings through a federal bench trial. The vessel
interests contend that because this matter concerns complicated
issues of liability and apportionment of liability between several
distinct interests, only one fact finder should adjudicate the
entire matter. Further, allowing multiple trials with different
triers of fact is inefficient and confusing.
Both Deranger and the vessel interests recognize that the
decision to bifurcate and to determine the fact finder for the
damages portion of the trial addresses the Court’s discretion.
Their arguments insofar as they debate the tension between the
Limitation of Liability Act and the Saving to Suitors clause are
considered below.
B.

8

The Saving to Suitors clause and the Limitation of Liability
Act inform competing interests the Court must consider. See In re
Tetra

Applied

Techs.

LP,

362

F.3d

338,

340

(5th

Cir.

2004)

(“Tension exists between the saving to suitors clause and the
Limitation Act because the former affords suitors a choice of
remedies, while the latter gives shipowners the right to seek
limitation of their liability exclusively in federal court.”). The
Limitation of Liability Act, of course, allows a vessel owner to
limit its liability for a damage or injury to the value of the
vessel or its interest in the vessel in federal court. Lewis v.
Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 446 (5th Cir. 2001).
“The purpose of limitation proceedings is . . . to provide a
marshalling of assets-the distribution pro rata of an inadequate
fund among claimants, none of whom can be paid in full.” Kattelman
v. Otis Eng’g Corp., 696 F. Supp. 1111, 1113 (E.D. La. 1988) (J.
Feldman). It promotes the equitable distribution of the limitation
funds, and thus “protects the vessel owner’s commercial risk.” Id.
The Saving to Suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) provides
that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the courts of the States, of any civil case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases
all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” The
clause provides claimants the ability to pursue their claims in
state court. See In re Tetra Applied Techs. LP, 362 F.3d at 340.
9

It “was designed to protect remedies available at common law.”
Lewis, 531 U.S. at 446. Moreover, while a federal court sitting in
admiralty is entitled to “adjudicate the whole case and grant full
relief even though limitation is denied,” it is not required to.
Pershing Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Gaffney, 279 F.3d 546, 552 (5th
Cir. 1960). The Court may permit claimants to pursue their claims
in state court so as to not “compel[] [them] to litigate in an
unchosen forum” by the law. Id.
The appropriateness of adjudicating the damages in federal
court, or allowing Deranger to pursue his personal injury claims
in state court, depends on several factors, not all of which are
ripe for the Court’s determination. If the liability portion of
the trial is completed and the Court finds that the parties are
not entitled to limit their liability, the purpose of adjudicating
the limitation action in federal court is largely satisfied; there
are no assets in the limitation fund to distribute. The claimants’
right to pursue their claims in the forum of choice, however, would
not have diminished. Without compelling competing interests, there
is little reason for the Court to deny the claimant their choice
of forum. The Court defers decision on whether Deranger may pursue
his damages claims in a state court until the liability issues
have been decided. Likewise, the Court will defer ruling on whether
the damages issues will be heard by a jury if the personal injury
claims proceed in federal court.
10

Even

without

determining

the

forum

and

jury

issues

for

damages, the Court finds that bifurcating the issues of liability
and damages will achieve convenience, efficiency, and clarity, far
outweighing

any

minor

prejudice

the

delay

may

inflict.

The

liability issues present largely different facts and issues than
the damages portion. Although there is naturally some cross-over,
as all issues concern the 2013 voyage, the first will consider the
roles of the ships in causing the collision where the damages
portion will focus on the claimants’ injuries. This case presents
complicated facts and issues, and bifurcation will allow the Court
and the parties to entirely address one type of issue before
turning to another. Although separating the trials will delay final
adjudication of this matter by a few months, this litigation began
three years ago; an additional few months will not overly burden
the parties given the benefits of bifurcation.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: that the motion to bifurcate is
GRANTED in part. The parties will first adjudicate the issue of
liability as a bench trial. After the conclusion of that trial,
the Court will reconsider whether Deranger’s claims shall be heard
in state or federal court, and whether Colomb’s damages claims
heard in federal court will be conducted as a bench or jury trial.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: that the proposed case management order
as to the liability issues to be tried is ADOPTED. Accordingly,

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the liability issues to be determined in the initial bench trial
are:
•

Determination
limitation

of

apportionment

of

liability

liability
of

fault

of
of

as

any
any

party,
vessel

between

any

the

right

interest,

and

all

to
and

parties

(including personal injury claimants);
•

The issues of negligence, unseaworthiness, and causation of
the vessel interests;

•

Upon showing of a prima facie case of negligence and/or
unseaworthiness and causation against any vessel, any such
vessel’s right to exoneration from or limitation of liability
will be tried including each such vessels’ proof that any
basis for liability was outside of its privity and knowledge;

•

Any party contesting a vessel interest’s right to exoneration
from or limitation of liability will then offer evidence
against any vessel interest’s right to exoneration from or
limitation of liability;

•

If necessary, any additional proof regarding apportionment of
fault.

New Orleans, Louisiana, February 8, 2018

______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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