Hall v. Delgado Community College et al

Filing 10

ORDER AND REASONS granting 5 MOTION to Dismiss; Delgado and LCTCS are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff's ADA reasonable accommodations claim and due process claim against the Movant Board of Supervisors for the Louisiana Community an d Technical College System are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiff's ADA reasonable accommodations claim and due process claim are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to all other defendants. Plaintiff is given leave to amend her Complaint within 20 days of this order to remedy the deficiencies identified herein and plausibly state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 5/18/2015.(blg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ANNA HALL

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 15-67

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF COMMUNITY
AND TECHNICAL COLLEGES ET AL.

SECTION "H"

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant the Board of Supervisors of Community and
Technical Colleges' Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 5). For the following reasons, the
Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the termination of Plaintiff, Dr. Anna Hall, from her
job as a professor at Delgado Community College. Plaintiff alleges that she
began working as an instructor at Delgado in August of 1997. In September of
2013, Dr. Hall took sick leave for a period of six days. She alleges that she was
then suspended from her duties in November of 2013 when her medical issues
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resurfaced and was terminated in December of 2013. She states that she was
not given a written explanation of her suspension and that the written reason
indicated for her termination was "poor performance." She further alleges that
Delgado failed to follow its own internal procedures in her termination, including
its professor evaluation policy, its formal grievance policy, and its notice
provisions. Her Complaint states that she "was an unclassified employee whose
termination could only be implemented for cause. She was not an 'at-will'
employee." Plaintiff's chief complaints appear to be wrongful termination, denial
of due process rights, and failure to provide reasonable accommodations for her
disability. Plaintiff first filed her Complaint in state court against Delgado
Community College ("Delgado"), the Louisiana Community and Technical
College System ("LCTCS"), the Board of Supervisors of Community and
Technical Colleges,1 the Louisiana Board of Regents, and FARA.
Defendant the Board of Supervisors of Community and Technical Colleges
removed the case to this Court and then filed the instant Motion to Dismiss.
Movant is the only defendant currently joined in this action. Movant asserts
that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege any cause of action for which relief can
be granted and should be dismissed with prejudice. Specifically, it argues that:
(1) two of the other defendants in this action do not have the procedural capacity
to be sued; (2) Movant has sovereign immunity from Plaintiff's claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); and (3) Movant is not a "person" under
the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and thus cannot be sued for violations of due
1

Plaintiff's state court Complaint incorrectly referred to this Defendant as the Board
of Supervisors of the Louisiana Community and Technical College System.

2

process. This Court will address each of Movant's arguments in turn.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough
facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."2 A claim is "plausible
on its face" when the pleaded facts allow the court to "[d]raw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."3 A court must
accept the complaint's factual allegations as true and must "draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff's favor."4 The Court need not, however, accept as true
legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.5
To be legally sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a "sheer
possibility" that the plaintiff's claims are true.6 "A pleading that offers 'labels
and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action'"
will not suffice.7 Rather, the complaint must contain enough factual allegations
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each
element of the plaintiffs' claim.8

2

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
3

Id.

4

Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir.2009).

5

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 667.

6

Id.

7

Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

8

Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57.

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LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Procedural Capacity of Delgado and LCTCS
Movant's first ground for dismissal is that Defendants Delgado and the
LCTCS are not juridical entities with the procedural capacity to sue and be sued.
Movant states that both Delgado and LCTCS are simply the names of a school
and a collection of schools, respectively.
According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure17:
Capacity to sue or be sued is determined as follows: (1) for an
individual who is not acting in a representative capacity, by the law
of the individual's domicile; (2) for a corporation, by the law under
which it was organized; and (3) for all other parties, by the law of
the state where the court is located . . . .
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges only that Delgado and LCTCS are agencies or
instrumentalities of the government. Accordingly, they are neither individuals
nor corporations, and their procedural capacity should be determined by the law
of Louisiana, where this Court is located.
Under Louisiana law, "[a]n entity must qualify as a juridical person to
have the capacity to be sued."9 "A juridical person is an entity to which the law
attributes personality, such as a corporation or a partnership."10 The Louisiana
Supreme Court has stated that:
The important determination with respect to the juridical status or
legal capacity of an entity is not its creator, nor its size, shape, or
label. Rather the determination that must be made in each
particular case is whether the entity can appropriately be regarded
9

Dejoie v. Medley, 945 So. 2d 968, 972 (La. Ct. App. 2 Cir. 2006).

10

La. Civ. Code art. 24.

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as an additional and separate government unit for the particular
purpose at issue. In the absence of positive law to the contrary, a
local government unit may be deemed to be a juridical person
separate and distinct from other government entities, when the
organic law grants it the legal capacity to function independently
and not just as the agency or division of another governmental
entity. Such a determination will depend on an analysis of
specifically what the entity is legally empowered to do.11
Plaintiff points this Court's attention to Louisiana Revised Statute section
17:1871 to support her argument that Delgado and LCTCS have procedural
capacity because this statute grants them the authority to manage and supervise
their own systems. To the contrary, section 17:1871 provides for the creation of
the Board of Supervisors of Community and Technical Colleges, the Movant
herein, and grants the Board the power to supervise and manage certain
institutions of higher education. Indeed, nowhere in this statute, or any other
located by this Court, is Delgado or LCTCS granted the authority to do anything.
Louisiana Revised Statute section 17:3217.2 states that "[e]ffective July 1, 1999,
Delgado Community College . . . is transferred to the [LCTCS] under the
management of the Board of Supervisors of Community and Technical Colleges."
Louisiana Revised Statute section 17:3217.1 further states that "the [LCTCS] is
composed of the institutions under the supervision and management of the
Board of Supervisors of Community and Technical Colleges as follows: . . . (4)
Delgado Community College." Accordingly, it seems clear that Delgado and the
LCTCS do not function independently but are merely agencies or divisions under
11

Roberts v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 634 So. 2d 341, 346–47 (La. 1994)
(internal citations omitted).

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the management of another governmental entity—the Board of Supervisors of
Community and Technical Colleges. Therefore, this Court holds that Delgado
and LCTCS are not juridical entities and thus do not have the capacity to be
sued.12 They are dismissed from this suit with prejudice.
II. ADA Reasonable Accommodations Claim
In her Complaint, Plaintiff attempts to bring a claim for the denial of
reasonable accommodations for her disability under the ADA. "Under the ADA,
it is unlawful for an employer to fail to accommodate the known limitations of
an employee's disability."13 Movant has identified three grounds on which this
claim should be dismissed, and this Court holds that each of them has merit.
A. Failure to State a Claim
First, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim under the ADA. It fails
to even identify her disability or what accommodation should have been
provided. Indeed, Plaintiff merely makes the conclusory allegation that the
defendants failed to make "reasonable accommodations for a disability." A
"threshold requirement in any case brought under the ADA is a showing that the

12

See also Okuarume v. S. Univ. of New Orleans, No. 95-1500, 1995 WL 755589, at *3
(E.D. La. Dec. 19, 1995) ("Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's complaint insofar as it names
Southern University of New Orleans as a defendant. Indeed, defendants contend that La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 17:3216 provides that Southern University of New Orleans is not a juridical person
but rather, an entity under the supervision of the Board of Supervisors of Southern University.
The Board of Supervisors of Southern University, not Southern University, has the corporate
authority, internal and otherwise, to supervise and manage the university system under its
jurisdiction. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:3218. Thus, Southern University does not have the
capacity to be sued in this case.").
13

Griffin v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 2011).

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plaintiff suffers from a disability protected under the Act."14 Plaintiff's
Complaint is woefully insufficient as she has plead no facts upon which this
Court could grant relief.
Second, Plaintiff has not alleged that she has exhausted her
administrative remedies by first filing with the EEOC. It is well-settled that
before bringing suit, a "plaintiff must comply with the ADA's administrative
prerequisites, which include the timely filing of a disability discrimination
charge with the EEOC."15 In her defense, Plaintiff argues that because Movant
removed the case to this Court, it should not be allowed to argue that Plaintiff
has not exhausted her administrative remedies. Plaintiff erroneously states that
she "had a right to file her lawsuit in state court without filing an EEOC claim."
Plaintiff has not provided, nor can this Court find, any law or case stating such.
State courts and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over ADA claims,16
and Plaintiff would have been required to comply with the ADA's exhaustion
requirement to bring a claim in either court. If she intended to bring a claim
only under Louisiana's disability discrimination laws, Plaintiff would still have
been required to give Defendants written notice of her intent to file suit at least
thirty days before initiating court action, detail the alleged discrimination, and
make a good faith effort to resolve the dispute.17 Plaintiff's Complaint does not
14

Bennett v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp., 324 F. Supp. 2d 815, 825 (E.D. Tex. 2004)
aff'd, 126 F. App'x 171 (5th Cir. 2005).
15

Crawford v. Harris Cnty. Juvenile Prob. Dep't, 31 F. App'x 159 (5th Cir. 2001); Dao
v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996).
16

Hapgood v. City of Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir. 1997).

17

La. Rev. Stat. § 23:303.

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indicate that either requirement was met. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff is granted
leave to amend her Complaint to remedy the deficiencies identified herein and
state a claim on which relief can be granted.
B. Movant's Sovereign Immunity
In addition, Movant argues that it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit under the ADA.

"The Eleventh Amendment bars an

individual from suing a state in federal court unless the state consents to suit or
Congress has clearly and validly abrogated the state's sovereign immunity.18
The Supreme Court has held that Congress did not validly abrogate the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting Title I of the ADA,19 and the Fifth
Circuit extended this analysis to Title II of the ADA.20 Therefore, Plaintiff's
vague assertion that her claim could fall under either title is without
consequence. The State is entitled to immunity in either case.
The Fifth Circuit has stated that:
Even in cases where the State itself is not a named defendant, the
State's Eleventh Amendment immunity will extend to any state
agency or other political entity that is deemed the “alter ego” or an
“arm” of the State. In other words, the Eleventh Amendment will
bar a suit if the defendant state agency is so closely connected to the
State that the State itself is the real, substantial party in interest.
The Eleventh Amendment will not bar a suit, though, if the political
entity possesses an identity sufficiently distinct from that of the
18

Henry v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 57 F. App'x 212 (5th Cir. 2003).

19

Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).

20

Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 978 (5th Cir. 2001).

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State.21
It is well-settled in the Fifth Circuit that institutions of higher education and
their boards are arms of the state entitled to immunity.22 Indeed, this district
has already held that, as a state agency, Movant is entitled to sovereign
immunity.23 This Court reaches the same result here and holds that Movant is
entitled to sovereign immunity from Plaintiff's claims under the ADA.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's ADA claims against Movant are dismissed with
prejudice.
21

Vogt v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 294 F.3d 684, 688–89 (5th Cir. 2002)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
22

Johnson-Blount v. Bd. of Sup'rs for S. Univ., 994 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784 (M.D. La. 2014)
(noting that the "Fifth Circuit has directly held that Southern University and its Board of
Supervisors qualify as an arm of the State of Louisiana and, as such, are entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity"); Mathai v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Louisiana State Univ. & Agr. & Mech.
Coll., 959 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 (E.D. La.) aff'd, 551 F. App'x 101 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that
"[c]ourts consider the LSU Board of Supervisors to be an arm of the state for purposes of
Eleventh Amendment immunity").
23

Robinett v. Delgado Cmty. Coll., No. 99-2545, 2000 WL 798407, at *3 (E.D. La. June
19, 2000); see also Sternberger v. Jones, No. 95-115, 1995 WL 377057, at *2 (E.D. La. June 23,
1995) ("The State characterizes Delgado Community College as a state agency. La. Rev. Stat.
§ 13:5102. The school is under the supervision and management of a board of trustees, all of
whom are appointed by the governor and serve at the pleasure of the governor. La. Rev. Stat.
§ 3217. While the school is located in New Orleans, Louisiana, it is part of a state-wide system
of higher public education and is open to all residents of Louisiana. Finally, school property is
held in the name of the board of trustees, and the school lacks capacity under Louisiana law
to sue or be sued. La. Rev. Stat. § 3351. Under these circumstances, the school is an arm of the
state, and the Eleventh Amendment prohibits plaintiff from maintaining an action directly
against Delgado in federal court."); Folse v. Delgado Cmty. Coll., 776 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (E.D.
La. 1991) (holding that state was real party in interest in suit against Delgado Community
College because college was created by state law, state would pay judgment against college,
state government appointed members of board of trustees, and board of trustees had authority
to supervise and manage the community college).

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III. Violation of Due Process Claim
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that she was denied due process during her
termination from Delgado. In order to bring a claim for the violation of a
constitutional right, Plaintiff must do so through the vehicle of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
A. Failure to State a Claim
Movant first argues that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim for a
violation of due process because she did not establish a property interest in her
employment. "In a section 1983 cause of action asserting a due process violation,
a plaintiff must first identify a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment and then identify a state action that resulted in a
deprivation of that interest."24 "A public employee has a property interest in her
job if she has a legitimate claim of entitlement to it, a claim which would limit
the employer's ability to terminate the employment. That claim of entitlement,
however, must be determined by reference to state law."25
Under Louisiana law, a public employee can have a property
interest in their job if: (1) the employer contracted with the
employee to fire him only for cause, or (2) the employee is a
permanent classified employee under the Louisiana Civil Service
system. Wallace v. Shreve Mem'l Library, 79 F.3d 427, 429 (5th Cir.
1996). Louisiana law recognizes a presumption that an individual's
employment is “at will” unless there is a specific statutory
requirement or the relationship has been altered by either express
contract limiting the conditions of termination. La. Civ. Code art.
2747; Jackson v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Indigent Defender's Bd.,
353 So.2d 344, 345 (La.App. 1 Cir.1977). Unclassified public
24

Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 935 (5th Cir. 1995).

25

Johnson v. Sw. Mississippi Reg'l Med. Ctr., 878 F.2d 856, 858 (5th Cir. 1989).

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employees may be discharged without cause. Guillory v. St. Landry
Parish Police Jury, 802 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir.1986). Furthermore,
a terminated at-will employee cannot claim any due process
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Griffith v. Louisiana,
808 F. Supp. 2d 926, 940-41 (E.D. La. 2011).26
Accordingly, in order for Plaintiff to establish that "she has a property
interest in her job, she must establish that she is not an employee at will."27
Plaintiff's Complaint confusingly and contradictorily states that she "was an
unclassified employee whose termination could only be implemented for cause.
She was not an 'at-will' employee." She does not, however, allege to have had a
contract with Delgado that provided she could only be fired for cause. In fact,
her Complaint admits that she did not have tenure. In addition, Article X,
Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution specifically lists teachers at state colleges
and universities as unclassified employees. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Complaint
does not adequately allege a property interest in her employment and thus does
not support a claim for the violation of due process. Plaintiff's due process
claims are dismissed without prejudice, and she is granted leave to amend.
B. Movant Is Not a "Person" Under the Terms of § 1983
Movant next argues that the due process claims against it should be
dismissed because it is not a "person" under the terms of § 1983. Section 1983
provides a civil remedy in federal court for violations by any "person," under
color of state law, of another's constitutionally recognized rights, privileges, or

26

Griffith v. Louisiana, 808 F. Supp. 2d 926, 940 (E.D. La. 2011).

27

Wallace v. Shreve Mem'l Library, 79 F.3d 427, 429–30 (5th Cir. 1996).

11

immunities.28 The Supreme Court has held that "neither a State nor its officials
acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983."29

Having

established above that Movant is an arm of the state, the due process claims
against it are easily dismissed as well. Indeed the Fifth Circuit has expressly
held that "state universities, as 'arms of the state,' are not 'persons' under §
1983."30 Accordingly, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Movant must be dismissed
with prejudice.

28

Klingler v. Univ. of S. Mississippi, USM, No. 14-60007, 2015 WL 2169323, at *2 (5th
Cir. May 11, 2015).
29
30

Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Klingler, 2015 WL 2169323, at *2.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Movant's Motion is GRANTED. Delgado and
LCTCS are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff's ADA reasonable

accommodations claim and due process claim against the Movant Board of
Supervisors for the Louisiana Community and Technical College System are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff's ADA reasonable accommodations claim and due process claim
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to all other defendants. Plaintiff
is given leave to amend her Complaint within 20 days of this order to remedy the
deficiencies identified herein and plausibly state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 18th day of May, 2015.

___________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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