Petroplex International, LLC et al v. St. James Parish et al

Filing 130

ORDER AND REASONS granting in part 60 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Constitutionality of St. James Parish Ordinance 14-03. Plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims challenging the validity of the Land Use Ordinance are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and Plaintiffs' state law challenges to the ordinance are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm)

.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

PETROPLEX INTERNATIONAL ET AL

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 15-140

ST. JAMES PARISH ET AL

SECTION: “H”(4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on the Constitutionality of St. James Parish Ordinance 14-03 (Doc. 60). For
the following reasons the Motion is GRANTED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case have been outlined at length in the Court’s earlier
Order and Reasons. The Court will, therefore, only review the facts relevant
1

to the instant motion. In 2007, Plaintiffs1 purchased land in St. James Parish
fronting the West Bank of the Mississippi River for the purpose of building a
petroleum tank farm. Plaintiffs began the process of acquiring necessary state
and federal permits in 2008. While this process was ongoing, St. James Parish
was developing and implementing a comprehensive land use plan for the
Parish.
In 2013, as Plaintiffs were nearing the end of the planning process, the
Parish adopted a parish-wide Master Land Use Plan (the “Land Use
Ordinance”), under which the tank farm was not a permissible use of the
property. Plaintiffs’ Complaint mounts a challenge to, inter alia, the validity
of the Land Use Ordinance under both state and federal law.2 Defendants filed
the instant Motion, seeking partial summary judgment that the Land Use
Ordinance is permissible and dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims attacking its
validity.

There are three Plaintiffs in this litigation: Mainline Energy Partners No. 2, LLC
(“Mainline”); Homeplace Ventures No. 2, LLC (“Homeplace”); and Petroplex International,
LLC (“Petroplex”). Mainline and Homeplace are the sole members of Petroplex.
2 Specifically, Count 1 of the Complaint avers that the Land Use ordinance lacks
sufficient standards under the Louisiana Constitution, Count 2 argues that it is
unconstitutionally vague in violation of state and federal constitutional protections, Count 3
argues that the ordinance is arbitrary and capricious in violation of federal substantive due
process protections, and Count 4 avers that it is an unreasonable exercise of the police power
provision of the Louisiana constitution.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”3 A genuine issue
of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.”4
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,
the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws
all reasonable inferences in his favor.5 “If the moving party meets the initial
burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” 6 Summary judgment is
appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.”7 “In response to a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must
identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that
evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to
sustain a finding in favor of the non-movant on all issues as to which the non-

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2012).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
5 Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 1997).
6 Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
7 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
3
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movant would bear the burden of proof at trial.”8 “We do not . . . in the absence
of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the
necessary facts.”9

Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual

dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.”10
LAW AND ANALYSIS
This Motion seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims attacking the validity of
the Land Use Ordinance. Initially, the Court will address the claims arising
under federal law, as they are unquestionably within its jurisdiction. The
Court will then address its jurisdiction to entertain the state law claims.
I. Federal Claims
Plaintiffs’ Complaint mounts two constitutional challenges to the Land
Use Ordinance. First, they argue in Count 2 of the Complaint that the Land
Use Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Federal
Constitution. Second, they assert in Count 3 that the Land Use Ordinance is
arbitrary and capricious, thereby asserting a violation of substantive due
process. The Court will address these claims in turn.
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that, in making their
constitutional arguments, Plaintiffs cite the Court to various Louisiana state

John v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th
Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
9 Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
10 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).
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court cases. These citations, however, ignore the standard of review applicable
to federal constitutional challenges of land use plans. Federal review of land
use decisions is “quite different from the review to which they may be subjected
in state court.”11 Violations of state law do not necessarily give rise to a
cognizable federal constitutional claim.12

“Indeed, ‘[c]onverting alleged

violations of state law into federal . . . due process claims improperly bootstraps
state law into the Constitution.’”13 Accordingly, the Court considers only those
claims based in federal constitutional law.
A. Vagueness Claims
Plaintiffs assert that the Land Use Ordinance is unconstitutionally
vague in violation of the Federal Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue
that the maps adopted lack sufficiently detailed boundaries and that the Land
Use Ordinance provides insufficient standards to guide the establishment of
buffer zones, allowance of nonconforming uses, and establishment of conditions
on nonconforming uses.
Under federal law, “[a] civil statute that is not concerned with the First
Amendment is only unconstitutionally vague if it is so vague and indefinite as
really to be no rule at all or if it is substantially incomprehensible.”14 A Court

Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 482–83 (5th Cir.1986).
See, e.g. Jackson Court Condominiums Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 665 F. Supp.
1235, 1241; Brian B. Brown Const. Co v. St. Tammany Parish, 17 F.Supp. 2d 586, 589 (E.D.
La. 1998).
13 FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 93 F.3d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Stern v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 778 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. 1985).
14 Chavez v. Hous. Auth. of City of El Paso, 973 F.2d 1245, 1249 (5th Cir. 1992).
11
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should uphold such a challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague
in all of its applications.15 “A provision need not . . . be cast in terms that are
mathematically precise; it need only give fair warning of the conduct
proscribed, in light of common understanding and practices.”16 “A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.”17
Plaintiffs concede that federal courts rarely invalidate zoning ordinances
for vagueness and have cited to only one district court case where a federal
court did so.18 In that case, however, the ordinance the court struck down was
an uncodified road policy that gave the planning commission unfettered
discretion to grant exemption to the policy on an ad hoc basis.19 Here, unlike
the policy at issue in Everett, the Land Use Ordinance provides sufficient
guidelines to the planning commission in considering the establishment of
buffer zones, the allowance of nonconforming uses, and the establishment of
conditions on nonconforming use of the property. With regard to buffer zones,
the ordinance directs the planning commission to establish buffer zones “based
on the nature of the use for which the buffer zone is established, and shall be
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
See also Duplantis v. Bonvillan, 675 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. La. 1987).
16 Stansberry v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285, 1289 (5th Cir. 1980).
17 Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495.
18 Everett v. City of Tallahassee, 840 F. Supp. 1528, 1546 (N.D. Fla. 1992). In the other
case cited by Plaintiffs in support of their argument that the court should strike down the
law for vagueness turned on qualified immunity, and therefore a final determination as to
the vagueness of the statute was not made. Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure, 225 F. Supp. 2d 647,
663 (W.D.N.C. 2002).
19 Everett, 840 F. Supp. at 1546.
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based on commonly recognized regulatory, trade group, or manufacturing and
industrial standards.”20 With regard to approval of nonconforming uses of
property, the Land Use Ordinance directs the planning commission to consider
approval “where there is a compelling public benefit, when the use is
compatible with surrounding uses and adverse impacts of the use are
inconsequential; or where required to as a matter of constitutional imperative
or other vested legal right superior to this ordinance.”21 With regard to the
establishment of conditions on nonconforming uses, the ordinance provides
that such conditions may be established that “minimize adverse impacts and
[are] beneficial to the public.”22 The Court finds that these standards are
sufficient. Accordingly, the Land Use Ordinance provides sufficient standards
to indicate what conduct is proscribed. The Land Use Ordinance is therefore
not impermissibly vague in this regard.
Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding deficiencies in the maps referenced by
the ordinance are likewise not persuasive. There is no dispute that Plaintiffs
themselves were well aware that the Petroplex property fell under residential
grown and agricultural categories. The ordinance is, therefore, necessarily not
vague in all of its applications, as required to render it excessively vague under
federal law.23

Furthermore, the maps attached to the ordinance are

illustrative, scaled-down versions of parcel level maps that the Parish can

Land Use Ordinance, Doc. 60-1 at 3.
Land Use Ordinance, Doc. 60-1 at 2.
22 Land Use Ordinance, Doc. 60-1 at 2.
23 See Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495.
20
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provide to any interested party. Plaintiffs’ vagueness challenges therefore fail
under federal law and are dismissed with prejudice.
B.

“Arbitrary

and

Capricious”

Substantive

Due

Process

Challenges
In Count 3 of the Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that the Land Use
Ordinance is arbitrary and capricious in violation of federal substantive due
process protections.

Plaintiffs argue that the ordinance is arbitrary and

capricious because it relies on a master plan to implement a parish-wide zoning
ordinance. Plaintiffs further argue that the designation of large swaths of the
Parish’s downriver land for either “Residential Growth” or “Agriculture” is
unreasonable and without justification.
Before they can be declared unconstitutional, however, zoning
ordinances must be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and have no
substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.24 Such
regulations are presumed valid and are upheld unless the plaintiff can show
that the legislation bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government
interest.25 Put differently, the standard of review of zoning ordinances is
“limited to the question [of[ whether the action is arbitrary and capricious,
having no substantial relation to the general welfare.”26 Requirements of

Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Reality Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See also Shelton,
780 F.2d at 480.
25 Shelton, 780 F.2d at 480
26 Stansberry v. Holmes, 613 F.2d 1285, 1289 (5th Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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substantive due process are met “if there [is] any conceivable rational basis for
the zoning decision.”27 “An attack against a zoning decision can succeed only
with a showing that the legislative facts on which the classification is
apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the
governmental decisionmaker.”28
The Land Use Ordinance provides that it was enacted to guide the future
development of St. James Parish.29

Rational basis review is an extremely

lenient standard of review; therefore, “[a]ttacks against zoning ordinances
under this test are rarely successful.”30 The record indicates that the Council
based its decision on the findings outlined in the draft comprehensive plan
generated by the planning commission.31 Though Plaintiffs may disagree with
Defendants’ response to the facts outlined in the comprehensive plan, the
Court cannot find that this response was devoid of any conceivable rational
basis.

Plaintiffs’ argue that the Land Use Ordinance is arbitrary and

capricious because it violates state law; however, this is precisely the type of
challenge that this Court may not consider in a federal constitutional
analysis.32 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims challenging the validity of the Land

Shelton, 780 F.2d at 476.
Texas Manufactured Hous. Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1106 (5th
Cir. 1996).
29 Land Use Ordinance, Doc. 60-1 at 1.
30 Wood Marine Service, Inc. v. City of Harahan, 858 F.2d 1061, 1066 (5th Cir. 1988)
(citing Shelton, 780 F.2d at 479).
31 Land Use Ordinance, Doc. 60-1 at 1.
32 See FM Properties Operating Co., 93 F.3d at 174.
27
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Use Ordinance based on federal substantive due process provisions are
dismissed with prejudice.
II. Jurisdiction to Entertain State Law Claims
Having determined that Plaintiff’s federal law challenges to the Land
Use Ordinance fail, the Court must turn to the issue of its jurisdiction to
entertain those challenges grounded in state law. Plaintiffs urge the Court to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims, while
Defendants argue that federal court review of state land use statutes is limited
to claims cognizable as federal constitutional challenges.
Defendants point the Court to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Shelton v.
City of College Station. There, the court stated
We have long insisted that review of municipal zoning is
within the domain of the states, the business of their own
legislatures, agencies, and judiciaries, and should seldom be the
concern of federal courts. A person disappointed with a zoning
decision ordinarily can interest the federal courts only in a
substantial claim that the state has deprived him of a property
right without due process of law. In the absence of invidious
discrimination, suspect classifying criteria, or infringement of
fundamental interests, our review of these quasi-legislative
decisions is confined to whether the decisions were “arbitrary and
capricious.”33
This pronouncement would seem to facially bar the Court from consideration
of Plaintiffs’ state law claims. That case was, however, decided prior to the
codification of the concept of supplemental jurisdiction. It involves no direct

33

Shelton, 780 F.2d at 477.

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discussion of whether the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
state law challenges to land use plans that are the subject of federal challenges
properly before it under federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiffs cite the Court
to City of Chicago v. College of Surgeons in support of the proposition that the
Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim; 34 however, the
Court finds that case distinguishable. There, the question before the Supreme
Court was limited to whether it was proper to remove a case that included a
state law claim challenging an administrative decision under deferential
review.35 Though state law challenges to land use decisions were present in
that action, the Court made no determination regarding whether their
presence was appropriate.36 Accordingly, the Court is without a clear mandate
on the applicability of supplemental jurisdiction to state law claims regarding
land use plans. The Court need not resolve this dispute, however, as it finds
that even if supplemental jurisdiction were applicable, it would, in its
discretion, decline to exercise it.
In determining whether to relinquish jurisdiction over state law claims,
the Court must look to both the statutory factors set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)
and to the common law factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity.37 The statutory factors are: (1) whether the state law claim raises a
novel or complex issue of state law, (2) whether the state law claim substantial

522 U.S. 156 (1997).
Id.
36 Id.
37 Enochs v. Lampasas County, 641 F.3d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 2011).
34
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predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original
jurisdiction (3) whether the district court has dismissed all the claims over
which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are
other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.38
The factors weigh in favor of the Court declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.

First and foremost, the remaining claims

challenging the propriety of the Land Use Ordinance involve complex issues of
state land use law and interpretation of the Louisiana Constitution on which
there is not clear guidance from the Louisiana Supreme Court. Matters such
as land use are of local concern and are best left to the province of the states to
decide.39

Secondly, the Court has dismissed the related federal claims

challenging the validity of the Land Use Ordinance. Further, courts have
routinely

declined

to

exercise

supplemental

jurisdiction

in

similar

circumstances.40 Therefore, even if supplemental jurisdiction may apply to

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
See Shelton, 780 F.2d at 477.
40 See, e.g., Clark v. City of Gig Harbor, No. C09-5099 FDB, 2009 WL 1046032, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 20, 2009) (remanding state law land use challenges and noting that local
zoning and land use disputes are an area upon which federal courts ought not intrude);
Camp v. City of Charlevoix, No. 1:07-CV-980, 2008 WL 4185954, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 8,
2008) (declining supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where the state court
would be more familiar with state zoning and land use law); McKinnie v. Estate of Adrian,
No. CIV. 07-5082-KES, 2008 WL 4425880, at *7 (D.S.D. Sept. 24, 2008) (declining
supplemental jurisdiction “[b]ecause the state courts are in a much better position to decide
issues related to local land use decisions); Trustees of Marion Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's
Witnesses v. City of Marion, 638 F. Supp. 2d 962, 980 (S.D. Ill. 2007) (declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law land use claims after similar federal
claims were dismissed).
38
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Plaintiffs’ state law claims challenging the validity of the land use ordinance,
the Court would, in its discretion, decline to exercise jurisdiction. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs’ state law challenges to the Land Use Ordinance found in Counts 14 of the Complaint are dismissed without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED IN PART.
Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims challenging the validity of the Land
Use Ordinance are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and Plaintiffs’ state
law challenges to the ordinance are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 22nd day of January, 2016.

____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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