Thompson v. Yellow Fin Marine Services, LLC

Filing 77

ORDER & REASONS denying 69 Motion for New Trial. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 1/23/2017. (mmm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
RICHARD J. THOMPSON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 15-311

YELLOW FIN MARINE SERVICES,
LLC.

SECTION “R” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff Richard J. Thompson moves for a new trial under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). In support of his motion, Thompson argues
that the jury’s interrogatory responses are inconsistent. The Court finds that
the responses may be reconciled if the jury found that Thompson and Yellow
Fin Marine Services, LLC were both partially responsible for the collision of
the K-MARINE XI, but that Thompson’s alleged medical issues were not
caused by the collision. Thompson’s motion is therefore denied.

I.

BACKGROUND
On August 1, 2014, the K-MARINE XI, a ship operated by defendant

Yellow Fin Marine Services, LLC, struck an energy platform in the Gulf of
Mexico. Plaintiff Richard J. Thompson is a former Yellow Fin employee and
served as captain aboard the K-MARINE XI at the time of the collision.

Another Yellow Fin employee, deckhand Joseph Tucker, was at the KMARINE XI’s wheel at the time of the collision.
Thompson sued Yellow Fin, alleging that he sustained injuries in the
collision. Yellow Fin counterclaimed for damage to the K-MARINE XI. On
August 1 through 3, 2016, the Court held a jury trial. At trial, Yellow Fin
argued in its defense: (1) that Thompson, rather than Yellow Fin, was
responsible for the collision; and (2) that Thompson was not injured in the
collision, and that Thompson’s alleged health issues in fact predate the
accident.
In its verdict form, the jury found that Yellow Fin was not responsible
for any injuries to Thompson.1 As to Yellow Fin’s counterclaims, the jury
found Thompson liable, but found that Thompson was only 50 percent at
fault for the collision.2 The jury assigned the remaining 50 percent of fault
to Yellow Fin.3 Thompson now argues that these findings are inconsistent,
and that Thompson is therefore entitled to a new trial.

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2
3

R. Doc. 65.
Id.
Id.
2

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) provides that a district court may

grant a new trial “on all or some of the issues . . . after a jury trial, for any
reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law
in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). The decision to grant or deny a
motion for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See
Pryor v. Trane Company, 138 F.3d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1998). Although
Rule 59(a) does not enumerate grounds for a new trial, a district court may
grant a new trial if the court finds that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence, the damages awarded are excessive or inadequate, the trial was
unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course. See Smith v.
Transworld Drilling Co., 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1985).
Additionally, a new trial must be granted when the Court is unable
logically to reconcile an inconsistent jury verdict. See Willard v. The John
Hayward, 577 F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1978) (“If the jury gives inconsistent
answers to special interrogatories, the case must be remanded for a new trial
. . . only if there is no way to reconcile them.”). But, in keeping with the
“federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions” embodied
in the Seventh Amendment, before ordering a new trial the Court “must
attempt to reconcile the jury’s findings, by exegesis if necessary.” Carr v.

3

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 312 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations
and modifications omitted).

III. DISCUSSION
Thompson, as noted, argues that the jury’s interrogatory responses are
inconsistent, and therefore he is entitled to a new trial. On the verdict form,
the jury gave the following answers:
1. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Yellow Fin
Marine Services, LLC was negligent under the Jones Act and that
such negligence was a legal cause of Mr. Thompson's injuries?
Answer: Yes _____ No __X___
2. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
KMARINE XI was unseaworthy and that such unseaworthiness
was a proximate cause of Mr. Thompson’s injuries?
Answer: Yes _____ No __X___
...
6. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr.
Thompson was negligent and that such negligence was a legal
cause of damage to the K-MARINE XI and/or the Fieldwood
Energy Platform?
Answer: Yes __X__ No _____
...
7. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Yellow
Fin Marine Services, LLC was negligent and that its negligence
was a legal cause of damage to the K-MARINE XI and/or the
Fieldwood Energy Platform?
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Answer: Yes __X__ No _____
...
8. State the percentage of fault for each party whose fault you
have found to have caused damage to the K-MARINE XI and/or
the Fieldwood Energy Platform. (Note: The total of the
percentages given in your answer must equal 100%)
Richard J. Thompson

50 %

Yellow Fin Marine Services, LLC

50 %

TOTAL

100%4

In arguing that these responses are inconsistent, Thompson ignores
Yellow Fin’s defense that Thompson was not in fact injured by the collision.
If the jury credited this defense, then the answers are completely consistent.
Interrogatory one is asks both whether Yellow Fin was negligent and whether
that negligence caused Thompson’s injuries. Interrogatory two poses the
same questions with regard to unseaworthiness.

Therefore, if the jury

believed that Thompson suffered no injury in the collision, both questions
must be answered in the negative. This answer is perfectly consistent with
the jury’s findings in interrogatories six, seven, and eight that Yellow Fin and
Thompson were both partially responsible for the collision. Because
Thompson’s claimed inconsistencies can be reconciled, his motion for a new

4

R. Doc. 65.
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trial is properly denied. See Ellis v. Weasler Eng’g Inc., 258 F.3d 326, 345
(5th Cir. 2001).

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Richard J. Thompson’s Motion for New
Trial is DENIED.

23rd
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of January, 2017.
_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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