Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Scott et al

Filing 39

ORDER & REASONS that default judgment be entered in favor of Terrell McMaster and against Lynda Scott. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 12/10/2015.(caa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

CIVIL ACTION

v.

NO. 15-362

LYNDA TORRY SCOTT, ET AL.

SECTION "F"

ORDER AND REASONS
On December 10, 2015, the Court held a rule to show cause
hearing to afford defendant Lynda Torry Scott one last opportunity
to explain her conduct and why default judgment should not be
entered against her pursuant to Rule 16(f).

Mrs. Scott has once

again failed to appear in total disregard of the courtesy and
indulgence of this Court and the parties. For this reason, and for
those reasons articulated in the Court's November 13, 2015 Order
and Reasons, the Court hereby enters a default judgment against
Mrs. Scott and in favor of Terrell McMaster.
Background
This civil interpleader action calls on the Court to determine
whether a widow murdered her husband without justification such
that

she

is

disqualified

from

receiving

his

life

insurance

proceeds.
On October 13, 2012, Cornelius Scott was killed by a "lethal
stab wound to the chest."

Mr. Scott is survived by his widow,

Lynda Torry Scott, and his son, Terrell McMaster.
1

Before his

death, Mr. Scott worked for Laitram, L.L.C., an ERISA-regulated
employee welfare benefit plan sponsored by Laitram and funded by
group life insurance policies issued by Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company.

At the time of his death, Mr. Scott was enrolled under

the Plan for life insurance and accidental death and dismemberment
coverage totaling $482,000.00.
The latest beneficiary designation on file with the Plan for
Mr. Scott names Mrs. Scott as the sole primary beneficiary of the
life insurance benefits, and Mrs. Scott initiated the application
process to claim the Plan benefits.

However, Mrs. Scott has not

been ruled out as a suspect in Mr. Scott's death.

Unable to

determine the proper beneficiary or beneficiaries of the group life
insurance policy it issued and administers as claim fiduciary for
Laitram, MetLife filed a complaint in interpleader in this Court on
February 5, 2015.1

On February 11, 2015, the Court granted

MetLife's motion to deposit funds in the amount of $565,775.56 into
the Court's registry.
On May 18, 2015, Mr. McMaster, pro se, requested summary

1

MetLife could not determine whether a court would find
that Mrs. Scott is disqualified from receiving the Plan benefits
based on federal common law and state laws that preclude an
individual from receiving funds if that person is convicted in the
death of the insured. If Mrs. Scott is disqualified, then the Plan
benefits are payable to Mr. McMaster under the Plan's facility of
payment provision. Accordingly, MetLife filed this interpleader
action as a mere stakeholder that is ready, willing, and able to
pay the Plan benefits to whomever the Court determines benefits
should be paid.
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relief in his favor and against Mrs. Scott; he submitted that Mrs.
Scott is precluded from receiving his father's benefits because she
murdered him.

No opposition to Mr. McMaster's motion was filed.

On June 3, 2015, the Court denied the motion, without prejudice, as
premature.

In so doing, the Court noted generally that, under the

so-called Slayer Rule invoked by Mr. McMaster, "conviction triggers
forfeiture."

The Court noted that "Mr. McMaster may re-file a

motion for summary judgment that can be supported by additional
factual evidence, such as proof of conviction, or if he can direct
the Court to binding or persuasive case law that holds that one
suspected [as opposed to convicted] of murder is disqualified from
receiving the decedent's benefits."
relief for a second time.

Mr. McMaster sought summary

Even though no response or opposition

papers were filed, on September 2, 2015, the Court denied the
motion because the summary judgment record was "insufficient for
the Court to enter judgment as a matter of law that Mrs. Scott
intentionally and without justification killed Mr. Scott."
On September 17, 2015, the Court issued a scheduling order
setting a bench trial for February 6, 2016.

Meanwhile, MetLife

moved for summary judgment and attorney's fees and costs and Mr.
McMaster moved for sanctions against Mrs. Scott.

On November 13,

2015, the Court granted Mr. McMaster's motion for sanctions; in so
doing, the Court struck the answer filed by Mrs. Scott pursuant to
Rule 16(f), ordered Mrs. Scott to file an answer within 14 days,

3

and ordered Mrs. Scott to appear on December 10, 2015 at 1:30 p.m.
to show cause as to why default judgment should not be entered
against her.2

On November 24, 2015, the Court granted MetLife's

motion for summary judgment and motion for attorney's fees and
costs; MetLife was dismissed from the case with prejudice.

The

Court now considers whether a default judgment against Ms. Scott in
favor of Mr. McMaster is warranted.
I.
When a party fails to appear at a scheduling or other pretrial
conference, or fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) empowers the Court to impose
sanctions including those authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(A) (ii)(vii).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f).

Rule 37 sanctions include striking

a party’s pleading and entering a default judgment against a
disobedient party.

2

The Court reasoned:

Defendant Lynda Scott has not participated in
the proceedings for over seven months.
She
failed to file an opposition to either of Mr.
McMaster's motions for summary judgment. More
significantly, she has twice failed to
participate in scheduling conferences and has
failed to comply with the Court's related
pretrial management orders dating back to July
20, 2015, showing a disregard for these
proceedings. The Court accordingly finds that
a record of delay and contumacious conduct
exists.
See Order and Reasons dated 11/13/15.
4

Given that dismissal and default are harsh sanctions, the
Fifth Circuit has instructed that it will affirm dismissal or
default under Rule 16(f) “only if a ‘clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct by the plaintiff’ exists and ‘lesser sanctions
would

not

serve

the

best

interests

of

justice.’”

Price

v.

McGlathery, 792 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Rogers v.
Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1982)); see also Dockum v.
Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LP, 220 Fed.App’x 335, 336 (5th Cir. 2007)
(providing that the standard of review for dismissal under 16(f)
also applies to review of the entry of default against a defendant
under 16(f)).

Before entering default under Rule 16(f), district

courts must either (a) consider alternative sanctions and determine
that they would not be sufficient to prompt diligent prosecution or
(b) employ lesser sanctions prior to entry of default. Callip v.
Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep't, 757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir.
1985).
II.
This Court has employed lesser sanctions than default, to no
avail. After the Court struck Ms. Scott's answer as a sanction for
her contumacious conduct, the Court gave her an opportunity to refile an answer.

Ms. Scott failed to do so.

The Court ordered Ms.

Scott to appear to show cause why default judgment should not be
entered against her.
show cause hearing.

Ms. Scott failed to appear at the rule to
Her willful failure to participate in these

5

proceedings justifies entry of a default judgment against her and
in favor of the only remaining defendant, Mr. McMaster.

The Plan

benefits shall be payable to Mr. McMaster.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: that default judgment be entered
in favor of Terrell McMaster and against Lynda Scott.

New Orleans, Louisiana, December 10, 2015

______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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