Borne et al v. Chevron U.S.A. Holdings, Inc. et al
Filing
48
ORDER & REASONS: granting 22 Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 5/26/15. (sek)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SANDRA COUVILLON BORNE
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 15-631
CHEVRON U.S.A. HOLDINGS, INC.,
SECTION: J(3)
ET AL
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Remand (Rec. Doc. 22) filed
by Plaintiffs, Sandra Couvillon Borne, et al (“Plaintiffs”), an
Opposition thereto (Rec. Doc. 36) by Defendants, Chevron U.S.A.
Holdings,
(Rec.
Inc.,
Doc.
submissions,
et
41).
al
(“Defendants”),
the
Having
considered
record,
and
the
the
and
Plaintiffs’
motion,
applicable
the
law,
Reply
parties’
the
Court
finds, for the reasons expressed below, that the motion should
be GRANTED.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This matter is one of a number of lawsuits removed to this
Court,
commonly
known
as
the
“Oil
Patch
Cases.”
In
2013,
Jefferson and Plaquemines Parishes filed a total of twenty-eight
(28)
lawsuits
in
state
court
against
various
oil
and
gas
exploration and production companies, on behalf of themselves
1
and
the
State
of
Louisiana.
The
parishes
claimed
that
the
defendant companies violated state law and caused severe damage
to Coastal Zones located throughout Jefferson and Plaquemines
Parishes. The defendant companies subsequently removed all of
these lawsuits to this Court.
On December 1, 2014, Judge Zainey issued an Order remanding
the first Oil Patch Case, finding that the Court lacked federal
jurisdiction to hear the matter. Parish of Plaquemines v. Total
Petrochemical & Refining USA, Inc., No. 13-6693, 2014 WL 6750649
(E.D. La. Dec. 1, 2014) (Zainey, J.). In his order, Judge Zainey
determined that OCSLA jurisdiction did not provide a basis for
federal jurisdiction, as defendants had not conducted any of
their
alleged
Shelf
(“OCS”).
concluded
injurious
that
Id.
in
at
activities
*15.
“saving
to
Judge
on
the
Zainey
suitors”
Outer
also
cases
Continental
specifically
filed
in
state
court, a basis for federal jurisdiction independent of general
maritime
law
is
required
for
removal.
Id.
at
*20.
Because
Defendants failed to prove any other basis for jurisdiction,
general
maritime
law
did
not
allow
removal.
Following
Judge
Zainey’s rulings, a number of judges within the Eastern District
2
followed suit, remanding the Oil Patch Cases before them for
essentially the same reasons. 1
The
matter
at
hand
differs
from
the
previous
Oil
Patch
Cases remanded by this Court in that it is brought by individual
land owners. Here, Plaintiffs are individuals who possess joint
ownership interests in three tracts of land located in Jefferson
and Plaquemines Parishes. 2 In November 2014, Plaintiffs filed the
present
lawsuit
in
the
24th
Judicial
District
Court
for
the
Parish of Jefferson against eleven (11) separate defendants, all
of whom are oil and gas exploration and production companies
that
operate
wells
and
facilities
in
and
around
Plaintiffs’
property. In their petition for damages, Plaintiffs first allege
that
Defendants’
facilities
were
in
operations
violation
of
of
these
the
various
State
and
wells
Local
and
Coastal
Resources Management Act of 1978, La. R.S. § 49:214.21, et seq,
(“SLCRMA”),
which
regulates
the
use
of
the
Coastal
Zone
of
1
Judge Africk remanded the case before him. See Plaquemines Parish v. Rozel
Operating Co., et al, No. 13-6722 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2015). Judge Lemelle
remanded the four cases before him. See Jefferson Parish v. Anadarko E&P
Onshore LLC, et al, No. 13-6701 (E.D. La. Mar. 9, 2015). Judge Feldman
remanded the five cases before him. See Plaquemines Parish v. HilCorp Energy
Co., et al, No. 13-6727 2015 WL 1954640 (E.D. La. Apr. 29, 2015). Judge
Barbier remanded the two cases before him. See Jefferson Parish v. Chevron
U.S.A. Holdings, Inc., et al, No. 13-6738 (E.D. La. May 12, 2015). Judge
Morgan also remanded the case before her. See Plaquemines Parish v. Linder
Oil Company, et al, No. 13-6706 (E.D. La. May 15, 2015).
2
The land at issue in the instant matter is within and adjacent to the land
that forms the subject of Jefferson Parish v. Chevron U.S.A. Holdings, Inc,
et al, No. 13-6738 (E.D. La. May 12, 2015) (Barbier, J.).
3
Louisiana through a permitting system. Plaintiffs further allege
that Defendants’ violation of SLCRMA caused substantial damage
to their land as well as waterbodies located in the “Coastal
Zone” in Jefferson Parish. Plaintiffs also set forth several
additional
causes
including:
(1)
of
action
negligence;
pursuant
(2)
to
strict
Louisiana
liability;
state
(3)
law
public
nuisance; (4) private nuisance; and (5) third party beneficiary
breach of contract. Plaintiffs first seek injunctive relief in
the form of abatement and restoration of the coastal land that
they
allege
has
been
damaged
by
Defendants.
Plaintiffs
also
request monetary damages for the amount of land which they have
allegedly lost as a result of Defendants’ operations, as well as
the cost of all future activities dependent on this lost land.
Defendants removed the present matter before this Court on
February
27,
2015,
alleging
three
bases
for
federal
jurisdiction: (1) federal question jurisdiction; (2) the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA); and (3) general maritime
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs subsequently filed the instant motion
seeking remand of this matter to state court, arguing that none
of these three sources of law serve as a valid basis for federal
jurisdiction.
LEGAL STANDARD
4
A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court
if a federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the
action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The removing party bears the
burden
of
proving
by
a
preponderance
of
the
evidence
that
federal jurisdiction exists at the time of removal. DeAguilar v.
Boeing
Co.,
47
F.3d
1404,
1408
(5th
Cir.
1995).
The
jurisdictional facts supporting removal are examined as of the
time of removal. Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880,
883 (5th Cir. 2000). Ambiguities are construed against removal
and
in
favor
of
remand,
because
removal
statutes
are
to
be
strictly construed. Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins., 276
F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002).
DISCUSSION
Defendants assert that removal is proper pursuant to three
sources of law: (1) federal question jurisdiction; (2) OCSLA;
and (3) general maritime law. The Court will consider each of
these grounds for jurisdiction in turn.
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction
As
grounds
for
removal,
Defendants
first
contend
that
Plaintiffs’ petition for damages raises a federal question. A
civil action originally filed in state court may be removed to
federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction if
that matter is “founded on a claim or right arising under the
5
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In determining whether a
matter has federal question jurisdiction, courts are to apply
the
“well-pleaded
federal
question
complaint
is
rule,”
presented
on
which
the
considers
face
of
a
whether
a
plaintiff’s
“well-pleaded complaint.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S.
470,
475,
118
S.Ct.
921
(1998)
(citing
Caterpillar
Inc.
v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (1987); Louisville &
N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42 (1908)).
Because
the
well-pleaded
complaint
rule
focuses
solely
on
whether a plaintiff has “affirmatively alleged” a federal claim,
“potential defenses . . . do not provide a basis for federal
question
jurisdiction.”
New
Orleans
&
Gulf
Coast
Ry.
Co.
v.
Barrois, 533 F.3d 321, 328 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing PCI Transp.,
Inc. v. Fort Worth & Western R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 543 (5th Cir.
2005)). In fact, removal is not warranted pursuant to federal
question jurisdiction “on the basis of a federal defense . . .
even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint,
and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only
question truly at issue in the case.” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.
v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for So. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 13,
103 S.Ct. 2841 (1983).
6
Despite
the
applicability
of
the
well-pleaded
complaint
rule, a claim which has origins in state law may still be found
to arise under federal law if it falls within a “special and
small category” of cases. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1064
(2013) (citing Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh,
547 U.S. 677, 699, 126 S.Ct. 2121 (2006)). In Grable & Sons
Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308,
125 S.Ct. 2363 (2005), the Supreme Court articulated the test
for
determining
whether
a
claim
falls
within
this
narrow
category, finding that federal question jurisdiction attaches to
state law claims where:
(1) resolving a federal issue is necessary to
resolution of the state-law claim; (2) the federal
issue is actually disputed; (3) the federal issue is
substantial; and (4) federal jurisdiction will not
disturb the balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities.
Singh v. Duane Morris LLP, 538 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing
Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, 125 S.Ct. 2363)). However, the category
of
cases
envisioned
in
Grable
is
a
“slim”
one.
Empire
Healthchoice Assurance, Inc., 547 U.S. at 701, 126 S.Ct. 2121.
Moreover,
the
“mere
presence”
of
a
federal
issue
or
the
necessity of interpreting federal law “does not automatically
confer federal-question jurisdiction.” St. Bernard Port, Harbor
& Terminal Dist. v. Violet Dock Port, Inc., LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d
524, 536 (E.D. La. 2011) (Vance, J.) (citing Merrell Dow Pharm.
7
Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813, 106 S.Ct. 3229 (1986); Fla.
Marine Transporters, Inc. v. Trinity Marine Prods., Inc., No.
02-1902, 2002 WL 31246765, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2002)).
Here, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint sets forth only state
law causes of action and includes no reliance on federal law or
regulations. Despite the notable absence of federal claims from
the
face
of
Plaintiffs’
pleadings,
Defendants
assert
that
Plaintiffs’ claim for negligence “necessarily raise[s] questions
of federal law.” (Rec. Doc. 36, p. 6). Defendants note that in
order for Plaintiffs to prevail on their claim for negligence,
they must prove that Defendants owed Plaintiffs a duty of care,
which they breached. In order to establish said duty for claims
arising
after
1978,
Defendants
submit
that
Plaintiffs
will
likely rely on SLCRMA. However, prior to 1978, the year SLCRMA
was enacted, Defendants note that the only regulations governing
activities
affecting
Coastal
Zones
were
contained
in
an
exclusively federal regulatory scheme, consisting of the federal
Clean Water Act, the federal Rivers and Harbors Act, and the
federal
Coastal
Zone
Management
Act.
(Rec.
Doc.
36,
p.
7).
Because Plaintiffs will be forced to rely on these federal laws
in order to establish that Defendants breached a duty prior to
1978, Defendants assert that the Court will need to apply and
interpret
federal
law.
Defendants
8
further
maintain
that
the
federal
issue
implicated
by
Plaintiffs’
negligence
claim
for
damages sustained prior to 1978 is so pervasive and substantial
as
to
satisfy
the
four
Grable
factors
and
implicate
federal
question jurisdiction. The Court is not persuaded.
Nowhere in Plaintiffs’ petition for damages is it alleged
that
Defendants
breached
a
duty
imposed
by
a
purely
federal
regulatory scheme governing coastal activities prior to 1978.
Instead,
in
their
original
petition,
Plaintiffs
allege
that
Defendants violated “the standard of care as prescribed in the
regulatory framework outlined above.” (Rec. Doc. 1-3, p. 6).
However,
prior
to
this
allegation
in
the
petition,
the
only
mention of a regulatory framework governing coastal activities
in
the
petition
is
in
regard
to
SCLRMA.
Plaintiffs
make
no
mention of any federal law or regulation which Defendants may
have violated. Moreover, Plaintiffs clarify the exact regulatory
scheme to which they are alluding in their amended petition for
damages. In this amended petition, Plaintiffs specify that “the
complained-of operations and activities were prohibited prior to
1978 by various provisions of the Louisiana Statewide Orders 29,
29-A, and 29-B, various field wide orders, as well as various
orders of the Louisiana Stream Control Commission.” (Rec. Doc.
1-24,
p.
5).
It
is
apparent
that
these
are
all
state
regulations, which directly contradicts Defendants’ contention
9
that “no state statutory law provided a duty or standard of care
for Defendants’ pre-1978 activities.” (Rec. Doc. 36, p. 11).
Defendants
make
no
mention
of
this
portion
of
Plaintiffs’
amended petition in their Notice of Removal, and, instead, lead
the Court to believe that Plaintiffs are required to rely solely
on federal law in order to prove a breach of the duty of care.
Because
Defendants
base
their
entire
argument
for
the
existence of federal question jurisdiction on their contention
that Plaintiffs fail to allege violations of state law prior to
1978, which the Court has found to be incorrect, an in-depth
consideration of the various Grable factors is unnecessary. No
federal issue has been raised by either Plaintiff’s original
petition or their amended petition, least of all one the Court
would
deem
arise
“substantial.”
under
federal
law,
Because
this
none
matter
of
Plaintiffs’
lacks
federal
claims
question
jurisdiction.
B. OCSLA
Defendants next assert that OCSLA provides an independent
basis for federal jurisdiction because this matter arises out of
operations
which
were
conducted
on
the
OCS.
This
matter
is
controlled by the test for OCSLA jurisdiction articulated in In
re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157 (5th Cir. 2014):
10
Courts typically assess jurisdiction under [OCSLA] in
terms of whether (1) the activities that caused the
injury constituted an “operation” “conducted on the
Outer Continental Shelf” that involved the exploration
and production of minerals, and (2) the case “arises
out of, or in connection with” the operation.
Id. at 163 (emphasis added). In Total, Judge Zainey thoroughly
and extensively considered whether OCSLA jurisdiction attached
to the Oil Patch cases. See Total, 2014 WL 6750649, at *14-19.
Because none of the defendants’ allegedly injurious activities
occurred on the OCS, Judge Zainey ultimately concluded that the
defendants
failed
to
satisfy
the
first
prong
of
the
In
re
Deepwater Horizon test, and OCSLA jurisdiction did not attach.
Id.
at
*16.
Moreover,
in
Jefferson
Parish
v.
Chevron
U.S.A.
Holdings, Inc, et al, in which the claims and land at issue is
indistinguishable from the current matter, this Court concluded
that OCSLA jurisdiction did not attach, because “the undisputed
evidence shows that the activities causing the complained of
injuries
were
conducted
on
land
as
opposed
to
on
the
Outer
Continental Shelf.” No. 13-6738 (Rec. Doc. 73) (E.D. La. May 12,
2015).
Because Defendants have raised essentially no new arguments
to
effectively
distinguish
this
matter
from
the
previous
holdings of this Court, the Court finds no reason to depart from
these prior holdings.
11
C. General Maritime Law
Thirdly
and
jurisdiction
maritime
finally,
attaches
law.
As
Defendants
to
the
with
this
issue
assert
matter
of
that
federal
to
general
pursuant
OCSLA
jurisdiction,
this
issue has already been extensively and thoroughly considered by
the Court in Total and its progeny. Defendants recognize that
this Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that the 2011
amendments
to
the
federal
removal
statute
rendered
maritime
claims independently removable. (Rec. Doc. 36). Despite these
repeated holdings, including those in Total, etc., Defendants
continue
to
assert
that
the
2011
amendments
allow
for
such
removability and request that this Court certify the issue for
appeal
to
the
distinguish
Rozel.
finds
their
Circuit.
arguments
Defendants
from
those
make
no
raised
in
attempt
Total
to
and
As such, the Court agrees with the holding in Rozel, and
that
standing
other
Fifth
the
rule
2011
that
non-admiralty
Rozel,
2015
WL
amendments
general
source
403791,
at
have
maritime
not
law
altered
claims
of
jurisdiction
*4
(citing
to
“long-
require
be
Gregoire
the
v.
some
removable.”
Enterprise
Marine Servs., LLC, 38 F. Supp. 3d 749, 764 (E.D. La. 2014)
(Duval,
J.)
(internal
quotations
omitted)).
The
Court
also
declines to exercise its discretion to certify this question for
appeal.
12
Because
general
maritime
law
does
not
provide
an
independent basis for removal of this matter, it is unnecessary
to consider Defendants’ arguments regarding whether this action
meets the prerequisites for maritime jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT
IS
HEREBY
ORDERED
that
Plaintiffs’
Motion
to
Remand
(Rec. Doc. 22) is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 26th day of May, 2015.
________________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?