Champagne v. Houma Terrebonne Carnival Club Inc. et al
Filing
23
ORDER AND REASONS: It is ORDERED that Defendants' 12 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that oral argument, set for January 27, 2016, is CANCELED. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier. (gec)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BARRY CHAMPAGNE
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 15-648
HOUMA TERREBONNE CARNIVAL CLUB,
INC., ET AL.
SECTION: “J”(4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc.
12) filed by Defendants and an opposition thereto (Rec. Doc. 17)
filed by Plaintiff. Defendants requested oral argument before this
Court
on
January
27.
Having
considered
the
motion
and
legal
memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds
that the motion should be GRANTED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation derives from personal injuries sustained by
Plaintiff Barry Champagne (“Plaintiff”) while riding in the Krewe
of Houmas Mardi Gras Parade in Houma, Louisiana, on March 4, 2014.
The Houma Terrebone Carnival Club, Inc., doing business as the
Krewe of Houmas (“the Krewe”), is a Louisiana nonprofit corporation
that sponsors the annual Krewe of Houmas Mardi Gras parade. (Rec.
Doc. 12-6.) Each year, the Krewe distributes safety and conduct
guidelines to its members, which include the stipulation that each
rider must wear a harness during the parade. Id. The Krewe rules
also provide that members should limit their alcohol intake “to a
1
respectable limit that allows them to control their own acts.”
(Rec. Doc. 12-3, at 40.)
Plaintiff, a resident of Spring, Texas, and a native of Houma,
rode in the 2014 parade on a float captained by Charles Pitre, Jr.
(“Pitre”). The night before the parade, the Krewe hosted a ball
and provided its members with vodka, beer, and whiskey. The next
day, the unconsumed alcohol was loaded onto the floats. On the day
of the parade, the riders faced inclement weather, including rain
and
near-freezing
temperatures,
rendering
the
float
and
its
contents wet. Because of the weather conditions, few spectators
attended the parade, and the riders threw very few throws. As a
result, the top of the float was covered with bags of beads
throughout the parade.
Dylan Brunet (“Brunet”), a twenty-year-old member of the
Krewe, rode on the same float as Plaintiff, alongside his father.
According to Brunet, he wore a safety harness for the duration of
the ride, except when he unharnessed himself to use the bathroom.
He did this approximately two or three times without incident.
Later, while the float was stopped, Brunet again unharnessed
himself to use the bathroom. As he walked to the rear of the float,
he slipped on a wet bag of beads and fell into the bead rack on
the first level of the float. His feet and legs slammed into
Plaintiff. According to Plaintiff, his injuries were severe and
required surgery.
2
On March 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court against
the
Krewe
and
Brunet
(collectively
“Defendants”).
Plaintiff
alleged negligence and claimed that Brunet was not wearing a
harness, either because Brunet negligently failed to do so or
because the Krewe did not provide one. Plaintiff also claimed that
float captain Pitre was intoxicated “to the point of vomiting” and
did not ensure that the riders were wearing harnesses. Defendants
filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on January 12, 2016.
Plaintiff opposed the motion on January 19.
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
In their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff must show
that Defendants acted with gross negligence in order to recover.
A Louisiana statute provides limited immunity for Mardi Gras krewes
and their members and holds them responsible only for injuries
caused
by
gross
negligence.
Defendants
claim
that
the
uncontroverted evidence shows that Defendants did not act with
gross negligence. The evidence shows that Brunet and the other
riders wore harnesses and that Brunet only removed his harness to
use the bathroom. Brunet and another witness testified that Brunet
slipped on a wet bag of beads, causing him to fall and strike
Plaintiff. Further, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to
adduce
evidence
showing
that
Brunet’s
intoxication.
3
fall
was
caused
by
In his opposition, Plaintiff focuses on Brunet’s and Pitre’s
alcohol consumption. At the time of the accident, Brunet was twenty
years old. Plaintiff argues that Brunet drank heavily the night
before the parade and continued drinking during the parade. He
claims that the Krewe knew about and sanctioned Brunet’s underage
drinking. The Krewe also provided alcoholic beverages before and
during the parade. According to Plaintiff, the Krewe does not have
any rules regarding underage drinking. Plaintiff also argues that
Pitre was heavily intoxicated and was unable to properly supervise
the
riders.
Further,
Plaintiff
compares
the
gross
negligence
standard to the criminal negligence standard. In criminal cases,
courts
have
found
that
criminal negligence.
driving
Thus,
while
Plaintiff
intoxicated
claims
that
constitutes
intoxication
constitutes gross negligence for purposes of imposing liability
under to Mardi Gras immunity statute.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Little v.
Liquid
Air
Corp.,
37
F.3d
1069,
1075
(5th
Cir.
1994).
When
assessing whether a dispute as to any material fact exists, the
Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrains
4
from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”
Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530
F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn
in favor of the nonmoving party, but a party cannot defeat summary
judgment
with
conclusory
allegations
or
unsubstantiated
assertions. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. A court ultimately must be
satisfied that “a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Delta, 530 F.3d at 399.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party
will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must
come forward with evidence which would ‘entitle it to a directed
verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” Int’l
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir.
1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the motion by either
countering with sufficient evidence of its own, or “showing that
the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade
the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the
moving party.” Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party
will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may
satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the
record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden
then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or
5
referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a
genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest
upon the pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish
a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., id. at 325; Little, 37 F.3d
at 1075.
DISCUSSION
Louisiana law expressly limits the liability of Mardi Gras
krewes and their members as follows:
[N]o person shall have a cause of action against any
krewe or organization, . . . or any member thereof, which
presents Mardi Gras parades . . . for any loss or damage
caused by any member thereof, during or in conjunction
with or related to the parades or courirs presented by
such krewe or organization, unless said loss or damage
was caused by the deliberate and wanton act or gross
negligence of the krewe or organization, or any member
thereof as the case may be . . . .
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2796 (emphasis added). In this context,
“gross negligence” is defined as a “want of even slight care and
diligence” or an “entire absence of care,” amounting to “wanton or
reckless behavior.” Palmer v. Zulu Social Aid and Pleasure Club,
Inc., 63 So.3d 131, 138 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Ambrose v. New
Orleans Police Dept. Ambulance Serv., 639 So. 2d 216 (La. 1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted). In Ambrose, the Louisiana
Supreme
Court
provided
an
extensive
definition
of
gross
negligence:
Gross negligence has been defined as the “want of even
slight care and diligence” and the “want of that
diligence which even careless men are accustomed to
6
exercise.” Gross negligence has also been termed the
“entire absence of care” and the “utter disregard of the
dictates of prudence, amounting to complete neglect of
the rights of others.” Additionally, gross negligence
has been described as an “extreme departure from
ordinary care or the want of even scant care.” “There is
often no clear distinction between such [willful,
wanton, or reckless] conduct and ‘gross' negligence, and
the two have tended to merge and take on the same
meaning.” Gross negligence, therefore, has a welldefined
legal
meaning
distinctly
separate,
and
different, from ordinary negligence.
Ambrose, 639 So. 2d at 219-20 (internal citations omitted).
In cases arising under the Mardi Gras immunity statute, courts
have rarely found that parade sponsors or krewe members acted with
gross negligence. The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to gross
negligence when a krewe member threw a coconut a “considerable
distance in an overhand fashion from a Mardi Gras float as it
turned a corner.” Brown v. Lee, 929 So. 2d 775, 778 (La. Ct. App.
2006). However, this Court could not find any other decision
holding a krewe or its members liable for gross negligence. In one
notable case, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held
that a krewe was not grossly negligent when one of its drivers
drank alcohol before driving in the parade, even though the driver
had a medical condition that caused him to occasionally lose
consciousness. Binkley v. Landry, 811 So. 2d 18, 26 (La. Ct. App.
2001).
7
In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations of gross negligence
center on the intoxication of Pitre and the underage Brunet.
Louisiana courts have recognized a strong state policy against
underage drinking. The state has a “significant interest” in
regulating “underage drinking in order to protect the public health
and general welfare.” Stewart v. Daiquiri Affair, Inc., 20 So. 3d
1041, 1046 (La. Ct. App. 2009). The Louisiana Supreme Court has
recognized:
[T]he difference between selling and serving alcohol to
an adult and a minor is tremendous. Legislation has been
enacted specifically pertaining to the sale of alcohol
to minors . . . . It further evidences the public policy
of this state to prohibit the sale of alcohol to minors
and to protect minors and the general public from the
effects of a minor's intoxication, particularly when the
minor is operating an automobile.
Berg v. Zummo, 786 So. 2d 708, 715 (La. 2001). However, Louisiana
law allows a person under twenty-one to drink when accompanied by
a parent, legal guardian, or spouse who is over twenty-one. La.
Rev. Stat. § 14:93.10. A parent, legal guardian, or spouse can
also purchase alcohol for a person under twenty-one. La. Rev. Stat.
§ 14:93.13. Given this policy determination made by the state,
Brunet was not grossly negligent merely for drinking alcoholic
beverages while accompanied by his father. On that same token, the
Krewe was not grossly or wantonly negligent simply for allowing an
underage member to drink alcohol in his parent’s presence.
8
Moreover, the facts of this case do not support Plaintiff’s
claims that Brunet’s or Pitre’s intoxication caused his injuries.
First, the evidence does not reveal that Brunet was seriously
intoxicated. Brunet testified in a deposition that he drank two
beers between about 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. He drank another beer
while untarping the float. The parade began to roll at 11:00 a.m.,
and Brunet testified that he drank three beers during the route.
The accident occurred sometime in the afternoon.
Despite
Brunet’s
admission
to
consuming
beer,
Plaintiff
introduced no evidence showing that Brunet was heavily intoxicated
or that he fell from the float due to intoxication. Instead,
Plaintiff points out that Brunet used the bathroom two or three
times before the accident and speculates that he had been drinking
excessively. This speculation does not create a genuine issue of
material fact. Further, Plaintiff’s drinking was neither wanton
nor reckless. Plaintiff wore his harness for the duration of the
parade, only removing it to use the bathroom. He waited until the
float had stopped to unharness himself. Also, he had successfully
reached the bathroom two or three times before the accident, which
suggests that his fall was not caused by the consumption of
alcohol. The criminal negligence cases cited by Plaintiff are not
on point. In each of those cases, the intoxicated person engaged
in reckless, wantonly careless activity by driving while heavily
intoxicated.
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Second, the evidence does not show that Pitre’s intoxication
caused Plaintiff’s injuries, much less that Pitre was grossly
negligent. The uncontroverted evidence shows that Pitre drank
vodka and beer during the parade. At the time of the accident, he
was sitting down and drifting in and out of consciousness. However,
despite
the
uncontroverted
fact
that
Pitre
was
intoxicated,
Plaintiff introduced no evidence to show that Pitre’s intoxication
caused his injuries. The evidence shows that Brunet slipped on a
bag
of
beads,
which
caused
him
to
fall.
Given
the
weather
conditions and the fact that the float did not have a roof, Pitre
could not have prevented the accident even if he had been sober.
Thus,
his
intoxication
was
not
a
legal
cause
of
Plaintiff’s
injuries.
Plaintiff failed to show that Defendants acted with gross
negligence, or that Pitre’s intoxication caused his injuries.
Therefore, Defendants are shielded from liability pursuant to the
Mardi Gras immunity statute.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Rec. Doc. 12) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that oral argument, set for January 27,
2016, is CANCELED.
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New Orleans, Louisiana, this 26th day of January, 2016.
____________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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