Gahagan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Filing
31
ORDER AND REASONS denying 26 Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 6/2/2016. (ijg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MICHAEL W. GAHAGAN
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 15-796
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES
SECTION "B"(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s (“Gahagan” or “Plaintiff”)
“Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act.” Rec. Doc. 26. Defendant, the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), timely filed a
memorandum in opposition. Rec. Doc. 27. The Court then granted
leave for Gahagan to file a reply memorandum. Rec. Doc. 30.
For the reasons set forth below,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed this suit under the Freedom of Information
Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. He claims to have brought suit “due
to the government’s refusal to adequately search for and produce
one (1) specific page of responsive agency record,” a Form I-485
Receipt Notice, that Plaintiff needed to effectively represent his
client in removal proceedings. Rec. Doc. 1 at 2. On June 11, 2015,
this Court denied Gahagan’s motion for summary judgment because
the agency acted reasonably in conducting its original search and
the document he originally sought had been provided to him since
the filing of the motion for summary judgment. See Rec. Doc. 10.
However, the Court also required USCIS to ensure that its referrals
to
Immigration
and
Customs
Enforcement
(“ICE”)
were
being
processed in a timely manner. Id. Subsequently, the Court twice
required
Defendant
to
provide
further
justifications
for
the
redactions to and withholdings of documents supplied by ICE. See
Rec. Docs. 15, 22. Once USCIS provided this Court with a sufficient
Vaughn Index that justified all redactions and withholdings, the
Court issued judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims. See Rec.
Docs. 24, 25. Nevertheless, Gahagan claims that he is eligible for
and entitled to attorney’s fees and costs.
II.
THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
Gahagan urges this Court to grant him $12,092.79 in attorney’s
fees and costs. Rec. Doc. 26 at 1. He claims that he is eligible
for attorney’s fees and costs under FOIA because he substantially
prevailed in the litigation by forcing USCIS to search for and
produce the requested 1-485 Receipt Notice. Rec. Doc. 26-2 at 5.
Plaintiff further contends that he substantially prevailed by
forcing USCIS to produce the referred records and a legallyadequate Vaughn index. Id. at 8-11. Gahagan also argues that he is
entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under the applicable fourfactor test. Id. at 12. Finally, he maintains that the requested
$12,092.79 is the result of reasonable hours billed at a reasonable
rate plus actual costs. Id. at 18-24.
2
USCIS asks this Court to deny Plaintiff’s motion in its
entirety. First, Defendant contends that Gahagan is not entitled
to attorney’s fees and costs because he was not successful on his
claims. Rec. Doc. 27 at 4. Further, Defendant claims that Gahagan
has failed to meet any of the four factors needed to establish
that he is entitled to attorney’s fees. Id. at 8. Finally, in the
event that the Court determines Gahagan is both eligible and
entitled to attorney’s fees, Defendant argues that the number of
hours and hourly rate underlying his request for attorney’s fees
are
unreasonable.
Id.
at
10-14.
Plaintiff’s
reply
memorandum
rehashes his original arguments. See Rec. Doc. 30.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Under FOIA, a “court may assess against the United States
reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant
has substantially prevailed.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i). The
determination of whether the complainant substantially prevailed
is known as the eligibility prong. Batton v. I.R.S., 718 F.3d 522,
525 (5th Cir. 2013). If the complainant demonstrates eligibility,
the court then considers a variety of factors to determine whether
the
complainant
prong.
Id.
should
(quoting
receive
Brayton
fees—known
v.
Office
as
of
the
the
entitlement
U.S.
Trade
Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001). A complainant
3
must meet both prongs to receive attorneys’ fees. Accordingly,
this Court begins with the eligibility prong.
a. Eligibility
FOIA explains that a complainant substantially prevails, and
thus becomes eligible for fees, when he or she obtains relief
through: (1) a judicial order or an enforceable written agreement
or consent decree; or (2) a voluntary or unilateral change in
position by the agency so long as the underlying claim is not
insubstantial. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). Gahagan argues that he
is eligible for attorney’s fees because his lawsuit led to USCIS
releasing the requested I-485 release form, producing the referred
records, and preparing a Vaughn Index to justify their redactions
and withholdings. Rec. Doc. 26-2 at 6-11. USCIS maintains that
Gahagan is not eligible for fees because this Court already found
that USCIS performed a reasonable search calculated to yield
responsive documents. Rec. Doc. 27 at 5. Further, it claims that
it only found the I-485 form because it conducted a supplemental
search beyond its required duties in order to bring resolution to
this matter. Id. at 6.
While this Court did find that USCIS originally conducted a
reasonable search and found no FOIA violations, a complainant need
not obtain relief through a judicial order or decree to become
eligible for attorney’s fees. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). Rather,
a voluntary disclosure by the agency can provide grounds for
4
attorneys’ fees. Id. A party seeking fees on this ground must show
that “prosecution of the action could reasonably be regarded as
necessary to obtain the information and that a causal nexus exists
between the action and the agency’s surrender of the information.”
Fund for Constitutional Gov’t v. Nat’l Archives & Records Serv.,
656 F.2d 856, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Cox. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (internal citations
omitted). “It is not enough to merely allege that because the
documents were divulged after a lawsuit was filed, said information
was released as a result of that suit.” Gahagan v. U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Servs., No. 14-1268, 2014 WL 4930479, at *2 (E.D.
La. Oct. 1, 2014) (quoting Arevalo-Franco v. I.N.S., 772 F. Supp.
959, 961 (W.D. Tex. 1991)).
Here, the government seemingly acknowledges that the present
lawsuit was the catalyst for the release of the I-485 form by
claiming that it found and released the form after conducting a
supplemental search “in an effort to bring resolution to this
matter.” USCIS essentially admits that, but for this lawsuit, it
would not have conducted the supplemental search that located the
requested document. Accordingly, there appears to be a causal nexus
between this action and the agency’s release of the requested I485 receipt notice. Thus, it seems that the eligibility prong is
met. However, this Court need not decide that issue because it is
clear that Gahagan is not entitled to attorney’s fees.
5
b. Entitlement
This Court must consider four factors in deciding a FOIA
complainant’s entitlement to attorney’s fees: “(1) the benefit to
the public deriving from the case; (2) the commercial benefit to
the complainant; (3) the nature of the complainant’s interest in
the records sought; and (4) whether the government’s withholding
of the records had a reasonable basis in law.” Batton, 718 F.3d at
527 (quoting Texas v. ICC, 935 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1991). “The
public benefit factor has been described as perhaps to most
important factor in determining entitlement to a fee award.”
Hernandez v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency, No. 104602, 2012 WL 398328, at *8 (E.D. La. 2012) (citing Miller v. U.S.
Dep’t of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1389 (8th Cir. 1985)).
1. The Public Benefit
Gahagan maintains that there is “no doubt” that that the
public benefitted from this litigation, citing to three cases he
deems “legally identical” to the case at hand. Rec. Doc. 26-2 at
12 (citing Mayock v. I.N.S., 736 F. Supp. 1561 (N.D. Cal. 1990);
Jarno v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 365 F. Supp. 2d 733 (E.D. Va.
2005); and Hernandez, 2012 WL 398328). While the courts in those
cases all found a public benefit entitling the complainant to
attorney’s fees, Gahagan is keenly aware of the major distinctions
between those cases and his current case because Judge Brown of
Section “G” of this Court rejected the identical argument from him
6
in a similar case just a few months ago. Gahagan, 2016 WL 1110229,
at * 10-11 (hereinafter “Gahagan, Section “G”). In that case, Judge
Brown found that:
In all three of those cases, however, the
plaintiff either sought information outside of
that which was only relevant to his own case,
or the requested documents were broadly
disseminated to the public. . . . Here,
Gahagan’s requested records pertain solely to
his
client
for
use
in
a
deportation
proceeding. Therefore, Gahagan’s case is not
analogous to Mayock, Jarno, or Hernandez.
Id. at *11.
In
Jarno, the complainant sought information to
disseminate to the public concerning the Department of Homeland
Security’s handling of a high-profile political asylum case. 365
F. Supp. 2d at 738. In Hernandez, the complainant sought general
information relating to the United States Customs and Border
Protection Agency’s enforcement actions in the city of New Orleans
“to establish an ongoing pattern of unlawful surveillance and
suspicionless
raids
of
immigrant
construction
workers
on
day
laborer corners in New Orleans.” 2012 WL 398328 at *1. Similarly,
the Mayock complainant continued his FOIA suit after receiving the
information sought by his clients so that he could prove that “the
INS had a pattern and practice of not complying with FOIA in
immigration cases.” 736 F. Supp. at 1562. As in his case before
Judge Brown, Gahagan here only sought a single record for use in
his client’s removal proceedings. He had no larger purpose aimed
at benefitting the public as the complainants did in
7
Jargo,
Hernandez,
and
Mayock.
Accordingly,
Judge
Brown
correctly
concluded that those cases are not instructive in this context.
Further, Gahagan, citing primarily to Jarno, uses boilerplate
language and canned arguments1 to claim that the information he
obtained provided a public benefit by shedding light on immigration
policies,
contributed
to
the
legitimacy
of
the
immigration
process, and added to the fairness of his client’s immigration
proceeding. Rec. Doc. 26-2 at 13-14. Plaintiff sought one I-485
receipt notice so that he could terminate his client’s removal
proceedings by showing that he is in the process of applying for
permanent residence as a relative of a U.S. citizen. Rec. Doc. 1
at 7. This Court cannot fathom any way in which that request sheds
light on immigration policies. The process and policy here are
quite apparent—all Gahagan needed was proof that his client had
taken the step of applying for permanent resident status. Moreover,
even if Gahagan’s request contributed
in some manner
to the
legitimacy or fairness of his client’s immigration proceeding by
ensuring that USCIS issued the Form I-485 receipt notice, the
benefit to the public is tenuous. The release of the form here
only served to help Gahagan’s client, Mr. Patterson, and Gahagan
himself. Plaintiff has not alleged and this Court has no reason to
The arguments contained in Gahagan’s motion here are nearly identical to,
and copied almost verbatim from, those used in his motion for attorney’s fees
in his case before Judge Brown. Compare Rec. Doc. 27 with Rec. Doc. 49 in 14CV-2233.
1
8
believe the USCIS has a history of withholding Form I-485 receipt
notices that it should have already mailed to applicants. Movant
fails to show a public benefit deriving from this lawsuit.
Finally, in Jarno, the case Gahagan relies on most heavily
for his argument, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia relied on the preservation of fairness and
legitimacy in immigration proceedings as only one among several
grounds
for
finding
a
public
benefit.
Here,
Gahagan
has
no
justifiable grounds for claiming a public benefit other than some
minor role in maintaining the fairness of a single immigration
proceeding. “The public-benefit prong speaks for an award of
attorney’s fees where the complainant’s victory is likely to add
to the fund of information that citizens may use in making vital
political choices.” Cotton v. Heyman, 63 F.3d 1115, 1120 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (quoting Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 744 (D.C. Cir.
1979)) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). Here,
the I-485 receipt notice will not assist citizens in making vital
political choices in any conceivable way. Accordingly, the public
benefit here has not been shown and the first and most important
factor weighs against awarding attorney’s fees.
2. The Commercial Benefit
Gahagan contends that he is not using the requested record
for any reason other than to effectively represent his client,
meaning there is no commercial benefit to him. Rec. Doc. 26-2 at
9
15. USCIS does not meaningfully challenge this assertion. See Rec.
Doc. 27 at 9. Instead, Defendant argues that the lack of commercial
interest is outweighed by Gahagan’s personal interest. Rec. Doc.
27
at
9.
It
is
evident
that
Gahagan
received
some
indirect
commercial benefit through receipt of the document because he is
now able to more effectively advocate for his client and maintain
the
reputation
commercial
of
his
endeavor.
law
practice,
However,
that
which
is
commercial
undeniably
a
benefit
is
insubstantial, meaning this factor militates in favor of awarding
Plaintiff attorney’s fees. See also Gahagan, 2016 WL 1110229 at
*12 (finding that this factor weighed in Gahagan’s favor because
USCIS did not truly contest it).
3. Complainant’s Interest
Gahagan claims that his interest in requesting the documents
was only to ensure that his client received a fair hearing in the
pending removal proceedings. Rec. Doc. 26-2 at 15. USCIS claims
that Gahagan only used FOIA as a discovery tool and that his
interest was thus wholly personal. Rec. Doc. 27 at 9. In Gahagan,
Section
“G,”
Judge
Brown
found
that
Plaintiff’s
interest
in
obtaining his client’s alien file to assist in removal proceedings
did not implicate a personal interest. Id. at *12. Further, Judge
Brown found Defendant’s discovery argument unpersuasive because
there is no right to discovery in deportation proceedings; thus
Gahagan had no other option than to use FOIA to obtain the
10
requested records. Id. at 13. While acknowledging that Gahagan had
some personal interest in ensuring that he represented his client
effectively so as to maintain the reputation of his law practice,
this Court agrees with Judge Brown’s ultimate conclusion. The
primary
interest
here
was
obtaining
a
fair
hearing
for
Mr.
Patterson by presenting all relevant documentation. And while that
interest does not confer a significant public benefit (as discussed
above), it does show that Gahagan did not enter into this lawsuit
solely for personal reasons. Therefore, this factor also weighs in
favor of granting attorney’s fees.
4. The Government’s Basis for Withholding
Gahagan
argues
that
this
factor
favors
granting
him
attorney’s fees because USCIS’s initial search for the I-485
receipt notice was unreasonable and because it was forced to issue
a Vaughn Index. Rec. Doc. 26-2 at 16-18. As USCIS points out, these
arguments clearly lack merit. Rec. Doc. 27 at 10. This Court
already found USCIS’s initial search for the I-485 receipt form
reasonable. Rec. Doc. 10. Moreover, the Vaughn Index supplied by
USCIS, though only submitted after Court order, demonstrated that
all redactions and withholdings were proper. See Rec. Doc. 24.
Though Gahagan did not obtain the I-485 receipt notice until after
this litigation ensued, this Court found no FOIA violations by
USCIS. Accordingly, there were no unreasonable withholdings by the
11
government and this fourth factor militates in favor of denying
attorney’s fees.
Unlike
attorney’s
Gahagan,
fees
Section
after
“G,”
finding
where
that
Judge
three
Brown
factors
awarded
leaned
in
Gahagan’s favor, only two factors here favor Plaintiff. The first
and fourth factors indicate that Gahagan is not entitled to
attorney’s fees, while the second and third factors indicate that
he is so entitled. Because the first factor is arguably the most
significant, Hernandez, 2012 WL 398328 at *8, and because USCIS
did not employ “the sort of dilatory litigation tactics that [the
attorneys’ fees] provision was aimed to prevent,” Mobley v. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 908 F. Supp. 2d 42, 49 (D.D.C. 2012), this Court
finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney’s
fees.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, Gahagan is not entitled to
attorney’s fees under FOIA. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for fees and costs is
DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 2nd day of June, 2016.
____________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?