Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC

Filing 33

ORDERED that Plaintiff's 32 MOTION for APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Court is DENIED. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier. (gec)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

BROUSSARD

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 15-1161

FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC

SECTION: “J” (4)

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Review of the
Magistrate Judge's May 26, 2015 Order. (Rec. Doc. 32) In the
motion, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying
six motions to appear pro hac vice in the above-captioned matter.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that a court's ability to deny an
application to appear pro hac vice is limited to cases where the
applicant has been guilty of unethical conduct that would support
disbarment of that applicant if he were admitted to the bar of the
court. (Rec. Doc. 32, pp. 3-4) Otherwise, Plaintiff argues that the
court must not substitute its judgment for that of the litigant
even if, in the court's opinion, the applicants' services would be
unnecessary or duplicative. Id. at 5-6 (citing Sanders v. Russell,
401 F.2d 241, 246 (5th Cir. 1968)).
The Magistrate Judge denied the motions at issue because
granting

them

Plaintiff's

would

behalf

in

result
what

in

nine

appears

attorneys
to

be

an

appearing

on

uncomplicated

employment discrimination case pursuant to Title VII. The Court

concurs

in

this

assessment

and

finds

that

the

caselaw

that

Plaintiff cites to the contrary is distinguishable.1 Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 11th day of June, 2015.

____________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1

In Sanders, the issue was whether a court could create a rule
restricting nonresident lawyers' ability to practice in the state by
subjecting them to greater requirements than the attorneys admitted to the
court's bar, such as a rule (1) requiring pro hac vice applicants to have been
barred for five years before submitting an application whereas those admitted
to the court's bar only had to have a license, (2) limiting pro hac vice
admissions to one annually, or (3) prohibiting attorneys temporarily residing
in the state from being admitted pro hac vice. Sanders, 401 F.2d at 243, 24546. Here, the Court does not place any such general limitations on pro hac
vice admissions, but rather denies the applications to promote the fair and
efficient administration of justice. To read Sanders to stand for the broad
proposition that a court may never deny a pro hac vice application absent a
severe ethical violation is untenable; such a rule would require the court to
accept limitless applications, robbing it of its inherent power to control the
disposition of its docket. Furthermore, here, unlike in Sanders, the Court's
actions are not contrary to an act of Congress, because the Court's decision
will not hinder proceedings in vindication of Plaintiff's rights.

2