Hewitt et al v. Noble Drilling US, LLC et al
Filing
163
ORDER AND REASONS granting 151 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The claims against Frank's International, LLC are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WALTER HEWITT ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 15-1197
NOBLE DRILLING US, LLC ET AL.
SECTION: “H”(5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Frank’s International, LLC’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 151). For the following reasons, the Motion is
GRANTED, and the claims against Frank’s International, LLC are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Walter Hewitt filed this suit alleging that he was injured while
working aboard a drilling vessel, the FRONTIER DRILLER, 1 when a gust of
wind caused the lid of a tool box to close on his head. At the time, Plaintiff was
employed as a member of a casing crew by Defendant Frank’s International,
LLC (“Franks”). The FRONTIER DRILLER was owned by Defendant Noble
1
Also referred to in briefings as the NOBLE DRILLER.
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Drilling U.S., LLC (“Noble”) and operated by Defendant Shell Offshore, Inc.
(“Shell”). Plaintiff alleges that the tool box lacked certain safety measures,
specifically a hydraulic closure system, which would have prevented it from
closing on his head. Plaintiff’s only remaining claim is for negligence under 33
U.S.C. § 905(b) of the Longshore Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (LHWCA)
against Franks. Defendant Franks has moved for summary judgment on this
claim.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 2 A genuine issue
of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” 3
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,
the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws
all reasonable inferences in his favor. 4 “If the moving party meets the initial
burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” 5 Summary judgment is
appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2012).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
4 Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1997).
5 Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
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the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.” 6 “In response to a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must
identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that
evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to
sustain a finding in favor of the non-movant on all issues as to which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial.” 7 “We do not . . . in the absence
of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the
necessary facts.” 8 Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual
dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.” 9
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) of the LHWCA, an injured worker may bring a
claim against a vessel owner for vessel negligence. Plaintiff has brought an
LHWCA claim against his employer Franks. Franks alleges that Plaintiff
cannot succeed on this claim because Franks did not own the FRONTIER
DRILLER aboard which Plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff has offered no evidence
to the contrary. It has been undisputed in this matter that the FRONTIER
DRILLER was owned by Noble and operated by Shell. Accordingly, Plaintiff
cannot succeed on a § 905(b) claim against Franks.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
John v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th
Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
8 Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
9 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ LHWCA claim against Franks is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 17th day of May, 2016.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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