Cooper v. Gusman et al
Filing
60
ORDER AND REASONS - It is ordered that the claims of Plaintiff, Lawrence Jackson, against the Defendants are dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and Local Rule 41.3.1. Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael North.(bwn)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IREN GRAY COOPER, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NUMBER: 15-1238
MARLIN GUSMAN, ET AL.
SECTION: “I”(5)
ORDER AND REASONS
The complaint in this 42 U.S.C. §1983 proceeding was drafted by pro se Plaintiff, Iren
Gray Cooper (“Cooper”), and included the names of 12 other purported co-Plaintiffs, all of
whom were inmates of the Orleans Justice Center (“OJC”) at the time. (Rec. doc. 1, pp. 7-8).
Because none of those 12 individuals had actually signed the complaint or submitted
separate applications to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), they were not considered to be
proper party plaintiffs in this case. (Rec. doc. 4). Ultimately, one of those 12 individuals,
Lawrence Jackson (“Jackson”), submitted a duly-completed IFP application and was allowed
to so proceed as a co-Plaintiff herein. (Rec. docs. 21, 26).
In due course, a preliminary conference was convened via telephone on January 4,
2016, with Plaintiffs and counsel for Defendants participating, during which all parties
agreed to proceed to trial before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). (Rec. doc.
38). To memorialize the parties’ election in that regard, and as was discussed during the
course of the preliminary conference, Plaintiffs were mailed, along with a copy of the Court’s
minute entry from January 4, 2016, the required form patterned after that prescribed by
Rule 84, Form 81, Fed. R. Civ. P., for their execution and return to the Court. (Id.). Shortly
thereafter, Jackson returned his properly-executed §636(c) consent form to the Court in
which he also advised that he had been transferred to the Riverbend Detention Center
(“RDC”) in Lake Providence, Louisiana. (Rec. doc. 39). Once the consent issue was finalized,
the preliminary conference was reconvened via telephone on March 21, 2016 and a trial date
was established along with other pertinent deadlines. (Rec. doc. 43). The minute entry from
that reconvened conference specifically instructed the Plaintiffs, as did their original
complaint, that they were to promptly notify the Court if there was any change in their
mailing addresses as required by Local Rule 11.1. (Rec. docs. 43, p. 2; 1, p. 6). Pursuant to
the terms of the scheduling order, Defendants timely-filed their witness and exhibit list on
September 2, 2016. (Rec. doc. 45). Defendants subsequently moved for and were granted
leave to depose the Plaintiffs as required by Rule 30(a)(2)(B), Fed. R. Civ. P. (Rec. docs. 46,
47, 48, 49). Copies of the orders granting Defendants such leave that were mailed to Jackson
at his address of record, RDD, were returned to the Court as undeliverable on September 22,
2016 with a notation that he was no longer housed there. (Rec. doc. 53). Another order that
was mailed to Jackson at RDC has also been returned as undeliverable on October 7, 2016.
(Rec. doc. 57). It has now been over 35 days since those pieces of mail were returned to the
Court as undeliverable and no address correction has been made by Jackson.
Local Rule 11.1 provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]ach attorney and pro se litigant
has a continuing obligation to promptly notify the court of any address … change.” The
practical considerations that the Local Rule was intended to address were touched upon by
the Fifth Circuit years ago, as follows:
“It is neither feasible nor legally required that the clerks of the
district courts undertake independently to maintain current
addresses on all parties to pending actions. It is incumbent upon
litigants to inform the court of address changes, for it is manifest
that communications between the clerk and the parties or their
counsel will be conducted principally by mail. In addition to
keeping the clerk informed of any change of address, parties are
obliged to make timely status inquiries. Address changes
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normally would be reflected by those inquiries if made in
writing.”
State v. Shannon, No. 87-CV-3951,
1988 WL 54768 at *1 (E.D. La. May 23, 1988)
(quoting Perkins v. King, No. 84-3310,
slip. op. at *4 (5th Cir. May 19, 1985)).
Simply put, Local Rule 11.1 imposes an affirmative obligation on parties like Jackson
to keep the Court apprised of their current mailing addresses and relieves court personnel
of that burden. 1/ See Lewis v. Hardy, 248 Fed.Appx. 589, 593 n. 1 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
552 U.S. 1246, 128 S.Ct. 1479 (2008); St. Juniors v. Burgess, No. 15-CV-0350, 2016 WL
4368230 (E.D. La. Aug. 16, 2016); Thomas v. Parker, No. 07-CV-9450, 2008 WL 782547 (E.D.
La. Mar. 19, 2008); Batiste v. Gusman, No. 07-CV-1136, 2007 WL 1852026 (E.D. La. June 26,
2007). Local Rule 41.3.1 further provides that “[t]he failure of a[] … pro se litigant to notify
the court of a current postal address may be considered cause for dismissal for failure to
prosecute when a notice is returned to the court because of an incorrect address and no
correction is made to the address for a period of 35 days from the return.” Finally, pursuant
to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an action may be dismissed based on
the failure of a plaintiff to prosecute his case or to comply with a court order. Larson v. Scott,
157 F.3d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1998); Lopez v. Aransas County Independent School District, 570
F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978).
As noted above, Plaintiff Jackson has failed to keep the Court apprised of a current
mailing address as is required by Local Rule 11.1. Plaintiff has also failed to heed the specific
advice that he do so that was provided to him during the course of the reconvened
While the vast amount of court-generated information is transmitted to litigants electronically via the
CM/ECF system, communications with pro se plaintiffs are still conducted primarily by mail.
1/
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preliminary conference and as set forth in the Court’s scheduling order. (Rec. doc. 43, p. 2).
Plaintiff’s inaction in this regard has deprived the Court of the ability to communicate with
him and, consequently, to advance his case on the docket. As Jackson is proceeding pro se,
these failures are attributable to him alone. Accordingly it is ordered that the claims of
Plaintiff, Lawrence Jackson, against the Defendants are dismissed for failure to prosecute
pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and Local Rule 41.3.1.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 17th day of
November
, 2016.
MICHAEL B. NORTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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