Peralta v. James D Caldwell, et al

Filing 37

ORDER AND REASONS granting defendants' MOTION 18 to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and granting defendants' MOTION 19 to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 11/23/15. (jjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DAVID PERALTA

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 15-1385

LOUISIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAMES D. “BUDDY” CALDWELL,
ET AL.

SECTION: R(5)

ORDER AND REASONS
Defendants James D. “Buddy” Caldwell, David Caldwell, Matthew
Derbes, David Weilbaecher, Molly Lancaster, and the Office of the Louisiana
Attorney General move the Court to dismiss plaintiff’s civil rights and statelaw complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).1 For
the following reasons, the Court grants the motions.

I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Parties

Plaintiff David Peralta currently serves as President of St. Bernard
Parish. Peralta sues Louisiana Attorney General James D. “Buddy” Caldwell
and Assistant Attorneys General David Caldwell, Matthew Derbes, David
1

R. Doc. 18; R. Doc. 19.

Weilbaecher, and Molly Lancaster, in both their individual and official
capacities, for their alleged failure to prosecute former St. Bernard Parish
President Craig Taffaro and for their alleged conduct in prosecuting Peralta
instead. Peralta also sues the Office of the Louisiana Attorney General.2
B.

Factual Background

When Peralta took office as St. Bernard Parish President in January
2012, he began investigating former Parish President Craig Taffaro.
Acccording to Peralta, he uncovered that Taffaro had “extensive[ly] misuse[d]
parish resources[.]”3 Peralta reported Taffaro’s misconduct to the Louisiana
Attorney General’s Office and expected the Attorney General to prosecute
Taffaro. Instead, “[t]he Attorney General turned on Peralta for political
reasons” and brought criminal charges against Peralta “to cover up for
Taffaro.”4 According to Peralta, during the state grand jury proceedings, the
Attorney General’s Office knowingly relied on perjured testimony to obtain an
indictment against Peralta and deliberately discredited Peralta as a witness
against Taffaro.5 Peralta alleges that defendants engaged in “fraud upon the
2

See R. Doc. 1 at 2, 5-7.

3

Id. at 2.

4

Id. at 3.

5

Id. at 3-4.
2

court” by “knowingly allow[ing] the presentation of false evidence and
perjured testimony,” “us[ing] perjured testimony fabricated by Peralta’s exwife,” and “allow[ing] perjured testimony to go uncorrected.”6
Peralta filed this action on April 28, 2015, asserting haphazardly
numerous constitutional and state-law violations. To summarize, Peralta sues
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 for defendants’ purported
violations of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, et seq., and Peralta’s Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Peralta alleges that

defendants violated the Louisiana Constitution as well. Finally, Peralta alleges
that defendants engaged in malicious prosecution and conspiracy to commit
malicious prosecution, as well as fraud upon the court and conspiracy to
commit fraud upon the court. According to Peralta, this conduct also gives rise
to violations of the Louisiana Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Louisiana
Rules of Professional Conduct.

6

Id. at 1, 3-4, 8-9.
3

C.

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

Defendants move the Court to dismiss Peralta’s civil rights and state-law
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).7
In response to defendants’ 12(b)(1) motion, Peralta consents to the
Court’s dismissing all claims against the Office of the Louisiana Attorney
General and all official-capacity claims for monetary relief against all other
defendants.8 Accordingly, the Court dismisses without prejudice all claims
against the Office of the Louisiana Attorney General and all claims for
monetary relief against Buddy Caldwell, David Caldwell, Matthew Derbes,
David Weilbaecher, and Molly Lancaster, in their official capacities.
Regarding his official-capacity claims for injunctive relief, Peralta argues that
the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies.9
In response to defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion, Peralta consents to the
Court’s dismissing his claims that purportedly arise under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985
and 1986, the Fifth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment, against all

7

R. Doc. 18; R. Doc. 19.

8

R. Doc. 30 at 1.

9

Id. at 2.
4

defendants.10 Peralta also concedes that neither the Hobbs Act, the Louisiana
Canons of Judicial Ethics, nor the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct
provide a private right of action.11 Accordingly, the Court dismisses these
claims with prejudice without further discussion.
Peralta’s remaining claims are as follows:
•

section 1983 official-capacity claims, grounded in the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, for prospective injunctive relief against
Buddy Caldwell, David Caldwell, Matthew Derbes, David
Weilbaecher, and Molly Lancaster, along with a derivative section
1988 claim for attorneys’ fees;

•

section 1983 individual-capacity claims, grounded in the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, for monetary damages and
injunctive relief against Buddy Caldwell, David Caldwell, Matthew
Derbes, David Weilbaecher, and Molly Lancaster, along with a
derivative section 1988 claim for attorneys’ fees;

•

Louisiana state-law claims for alleged violations of the Louisiana
Constitution against Buddy Caldwell, David Caldwell, Matthew
Derbes, David Weilbaecher, and Molly Lancaster;

10

R. Doc. 31 at 1.

11

Id. at 4.
5

•

Louisiana state-law claims for malicious prosecution and
conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution against Buddy
Caldwell, David Caldwell, Matthew Derbes, David Weilbaecher,
and Molly Lancaster; and

•

Louisiana state-law claims for fraud upon the court and
conspiracy to commit fraud upon the court Buddy Caldwell, David
Caldwell, Matthew Derbes, David Weilbaecher, and Molly
Lancaster.

Defendants move to dismiss Peralta’s section 1983 official-capacity claim
for prospective injunctive relief for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).12 Defendants move to dismiss the
remaining claims for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).13

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Under Rule 12(b)(1), “[a] case is properly dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power
12

See R. Doc. 18.

13

See R. Doc. 19.
6

to adjudicate the case.” Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison,
143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6
Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion to dismiss, the Court may rely on (1) the complaint alone, presuming
the allegations to be true; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed
facts; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts and the court’s
resolution of disputed facts. Den Norske Stats Ojeselskap As v. HeereMac
Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 2001); Barrera–Montenegro v. United States,
74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996). The party asserting jurisdiction bears the
burden of establishing that the court possesses jurisdiction. Ramming v.
United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).
When, as here, grounds for dismissal may exist under both Rule 12(b)(1)
and Rule 12(b)(6), the Court should, if necessary, dismiss only under the
former without reaching the question of failure to state a claim. See Hitt v.
City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977). A court’s dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits and does not
prevent the plaintiff from pursuing the claim in another forum. See id.
B.

Stating a Claim upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead enough
facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
7

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that
allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. A court must accept all well-pleaded
facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239 (5th Cir. 2009); Baker v.
Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a “sheer
possibility” that the plaintiff’s claim is true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need not
contain detailed factual allegations, but it must go beyond labels, legal
conclusions, or formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Id.
In other words, the face of the complaint must contain enough factual matter
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each
element of the plaintiff’s claim. Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257. If there are
insufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an
insuperable bar to relief, the claim must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555.

8

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Younger Abstention Precludes the Court from Enjoining
Ongoing State Court Criminal Proceedings

Initially, the Court notes that defendants originally moved to dismiss
Peralta’s official-capacity claims against all defendants because the Eleventh
Amendment immunizes the Attorney General and Assistant Attorneys General
from suit.14 In response, Peralta conceded that the Eleventh Amendment
barred his official-capacity claims for monetary relief, but argued that the Ex
parte Young doctrine excepted from Eleventh Amendment immunity his
claims for prospective injunctive relief against all defendants.15 See Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979) (“[U]nder the landmark decision in Ex parte
Young, a federal court, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin
state officials to conform their future conduct to the requirements of federal
law . . . .”). Defendants neglected to reply to Peralta’s opposing arguments.
Beyond the parties’ immunity arguments, Peralta’s claims for injunctive
relief against the defendants in their official capacities, as well as their
individual capacities, are still problematic. Peralta asks the Court to enjoin
any ongoing criminal prosecution casting him as a defendant in state court and

14

R. Doc. 18-1 at 4.

15

R. Doc 30-2.
9

to set aside the grand jury indictment because, according to Peralta, it is based
on false evidence. In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that federal
courts may not enjoin pending state court criminal proceedings absent
“extraordinary circumstances.” 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971). Courts should abstain
under Younger when (1) there is an “ongoing state judicial proceeding,” (2) the
proceeding “implicate[s] important state interests, and (3) the complaining
party has “an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding[] to raise
constitutional challenges.” Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); La. Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New
Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1490 (5th Cir. 1995). An ongoing state criminal
proceeding, such as the one Peralta asks this Court to enjoin, is the
quintessential example of a state judicial proceeding subject to Younger
abstention. See 401 U.S. at 41 (reversing the district court’s injunction of a
state criminal prosecution).
The only potential exception to Younger abstention relevant here is for
bad-faith state prosecutions. According to the Supreme Court, a “bad-faith
state prosecution” occurs when state officials prosecute someone “without a
reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.” Kugler v. Helfant, 421
U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975). Importantly, the Supreme Court suggests that the
bad-faith prosecution exception does not apply unless the complaining party
10

can show that the state judicial proceedings as a whole are unfair. See Juidice
v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977) (refusing to apply the bad faith prosecution
exception because the plaintiff did not allege that state court judges were
enforcing judicial procedures in bad faith).
Peralta has not shown that the bad-faith state prosecution exception to
Younger abstention applies here. Peralta alleges in conclusory fashion that
defendants “knowingly allowed the presentation of false evidence and perjured
testimony,” “used [] perjured testimony fabricated by Peralta’s ex-wife,” or
“allowed perjured testimony to go uncorrected” and thus engaged in “fraud
upon the court.”16 That defendants may have “defrauded” the court indicates
that the state court is not complicit in the alleged misconduct. Indeed, Peralta
has not alleged that the state court itself is biased or unfair. See id. Thus,
Peralta may raise his concerns about prosecutorial misconduct to the court in
which the alleged misconduct has occurred. See Middlesex Cty, 457 U.S. at
435-36 (emphasizing the importance of having “an adequate opportunity” to
raise one’s claims in the state tribunal). The Court will not enjoin the ongoing
proceedings. Therefore, the Court dismisses Peralta’s claims for injunctive
relief against all defendants, in both their official and individual capacities,
without prejudice. See Spooner v. Gauxtreaux, 459 F. App’x 436, 2012 WL
16

R. Doc. 1 at 1, 3-4, 8-9.
11

278011, at *1 (5th Cir. 2012) (dismissing without prejudice under Younger
abstention).
B.

Peralta Fails to Allege Plausibly Claims for Violations of
Federal Law
1.

Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity Protects Defendants from
Section 1983 Monetary Liability

Defendants argue that Peralta’s section 1983 claim for monetary
damages against Louisiana Attorney General Buddy Caldwell and Assistant
Attorneys General David Caldwell, Matthew Derbes, David Weilbaecher, and
Molly Lancaster, in their individual capacities, must be dismissed on the
ground of prosecutorial immunity.17

In opposition, Peralta argues that

absolute prosecutorial immunity does not apply because defendants engaged
in “significant improprieties.”18
Prosecutors are absolutely immune from section 1983 liability for
damages when the conduct complained of is “intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S.
335, 341 (2009) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). In
other words, absolute immunity applies when a prosecutor acts as an “officer
of the court,” but may not apply when he is “engaged in other . . . investigative
17

R. Doc. 19-1 at 22.

18

R. Doc. 31 at 8.
12

or administrative tasks.” Id. at 342 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33).
Judicial tasks traditionally protected by prosecutorial immunity include
deciding to file or not file criminal charges, Quinn v. Roach, 326 F. App’x 280,
292 (5th Cir. 2009) and presenting witness testimony to a grand jury. See
Cook v. Hous. Post, 616 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1980). Absolute prosecutorial
immunity also protects prosecutors accused of intentional misconduct,
including “knowingly us[ing] perjured testimony, deliberately withh[olding]
exculpatory information, or fail[ing] to make full disclosure of all facts.”
Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Prince v.
Wallace, 568 F.2d 1176, 1178-79 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (“To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely
wronged defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious
or dishonest action deprives him of liberty.”); Harris v. Dallas Cty. Dist.
Attorney’s Office, 196 F.3d 1256, 1999 WL 8000003, at *1 (5th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that prosecutorial immunity protects prosecutors from liability for
intentional misconduct).
Here, Peralta alleges that defendants are liable under section 1983 for
deliberately refusing to prosecute former St. Bernard Parish President Craig
Taffaro despite knowing about his misconduct in office; prosecuting Peralta

13

“for political reasons and . . . to cover-up for Taffaro”;19 and knowingly
presenting the allegedly perjured testimony of Peralta’s ex-wife to the state
grand jury to obtain an indictment against Peralta. All of defendants’ conduct
is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process because
it directly relates to the Louisiana Attorney General’s criminal prosecution of
Peralta. Even if Peralta’s allegations of knowing misconduct were true,
absolute prosecutorial immunity protects defendants from section 1983
liability. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427; Henzel, 608 F.2d at 657. Accordingly,
the Court dismisses Peralta’s claims against defendants for monetary relief
under section 1983 as a matter of law.
C.

The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental
Jurisdiction Over Peralta’s State-Law Claims

Peralta’s remaining claims are Louisiana state-law claims.

In his

complaint, Peralta invoked the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1367 to hear these claims. Under subsection 1367(c)(3), a court may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim if the court
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3). Having dismissed all of Peralta’s federal law claims, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any and all remaining

19

R. Doc. 1 at 3.
14

state-law claims and dismisses these claims without prejudice. See Hicks v.
Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 564 F. App’x 747, 748 (5th Cir. 2014) (“The general
rule is that a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over remaining statelaw claims when all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial.”)

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.20 The Court DISMISSES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Peralta’s section 1983 claims, as well as the derivative
section 1988 claims, against the Office of the Louisiana Attorney General,
against all defendants in their official capacities for both monetary and
injunctive relief, and against all defendants in their individual capacities for
injunctive relief.
In addition, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim21 and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Peralta’s claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 1986, the Fifth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the
Hobbs Act, the Louisiana Canons of Judicial Ethics, and the Louisiana Rules
of Professional for failure to state a claim as a matter of law. The Court also
20

R. Doc. 18.

21

R. Doc. 19 at 1.
15

DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Peralta’s section 1983 claim against all
defendants in their individual capacity for monetary relief and the derivative
section 1988 claim for failure to state a claim as a matter of law.
Finally, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Peralta’s
Louisiana constitutional claims and his Louisiana state-law claims for
malicious prosecution and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution and
fraud upon the court and conspiracy to commit fraud upon the court.

23rd
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _______ day of November, 2015.

___________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

16