Matthews v. Weeks Marine, Inc.

Filing 39

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 5/25/16.(sek)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRIAN MATTHEWS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 15-1658

WEEKS MARINE, INC.

SECTION: “J” (2)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This litigation derives from an injury suffered by Plaintiff,
Brian Matthews, while working for Defendant, Weeks Marine, Inc.,
aboard the dredge RN WEEKS. On May 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed suit,
alleging that he was entitled to maintenance and cure, as well as
damages for Defendant’s negligence and the unseaworthiness of the
RN WEEKS. On May 23, 2016, the Court held a bench trial on the
issues. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the matter
under advisement. Upon consideration of all of the evidence and
the arguments of Counsel, the Court issues the following findings
of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 52(a).
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
Plaintiff is a resident of the state of Mississippi.
2.
Defendant hired Plaintiff on February 4, 2015 and assigned him
the position of cook on the RN WEEKS.
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3.
Plaintiff was at all time pertinent a seaman and member of the
crew of the RN WEEKS.
4.
At all times material hereto, Weeks owned and operated the RN
WEEKS.
5.
On or about March 20 or 21, 2015, Plaintiff injured his right
knee while working on the RN WEEKS. At approximately 4:30 a.m.,
Plaintiff left the galley, where he worked, and walked out to the
stern deck to smoke a cigarette. As he walked toward the stern,
Plaintiff described seeing water on the deck, and slipped on what
he

described

as

a

“slick

spot”

and

twisted

his

right

knee.

Although he testified at trial that he observed an oily substance
on his shoes once he walked back into the galley, this testimony
contradicts what Plaintiff reported to the Captain and what he
wrote on the accident report.
6.
The deck where Plaintiff slipped had been painted with non-skid
paint several years before the incident. At the time of the
accident, the deck had rusted, creating scale and blisters. There
is no evidence that this caused the deck to be unreasonably
slippery at the time of this accident.

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7.
Initially,

Plaintiff

did

not

report

his

injury.

Plaintiff

eventually reported the incident on April 6, 2015.
8.
On April 12, 2015, Plaintiff went to the emergency department
at Marion General Hospital near his home in Mississippi, where he
complained of pain in his right knee.
9.
Plaintiff underwent an x-ray of his knee, which showed joint
effusion and changes in the medial and patellofemoral compartment.
10.
Plaintiff advised Marion General of a prior knee injury twelve
years earlier in 2003, which he also reported to Weeks in his preemployment physical examination.
11.
Plaintiff had not experienced pain in his knee or received any
medical treatment for his right knee between 2004 and when he
injured his right knee again on the RN WEEKS.
12.
An MRI performed on Plaintiff’s right knee on April 22, 2015
showed a tear of the anterior horn of the lateral meniscus, as
well

as

loss

of

articular

cartilage

compartment of the knee and patella.

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involving

the

lateral

13.
Plaintiff sought medical treatment from Dr. Thomas Lyons, an
orthopedic surgeon located in Kenner, Louisiana.
14.
Dr.

Lyons

initially

recommended

conservative

treatment

consisting of anti-inflammatory medications, a steroid injection,
and a trial of viscosupplement injections.
15.
After the round of five separate injections was completed,
Plaintiff reported no improvement with his knee pain complaints,
and Dr. Lyons recommended a total knee replacement for Plaintiff’s
right knee.
16.
Dr.

Lyons

recommended

a

knee

replacement

rather

than

an

arthroscopic procedure because Plaintiff’s pain symptoms were less
mechanical in nature, and more consistent with an arthritic-type
constant dull pain.
17.
Dr. Lyons attributed his treatment and the recommendation for
a total knee replacement to the accident that Plaintiff sustained
aboard the R.N. WEEKS.

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18.
Plaintiff has incurred $4,650 in medical expenses, and the
proposed total knee replacement will cost approximately $45,885,
excluding any costs for post-surgical care.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Negligence
1.
The Jones Act provides a seaman a cause of action for injuries
sustained as a result of an employer's negligence. Gautreaux v.
Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
2.
A seaman is entitled to recover under the Jones Act if his
employer's negligence is the cause, in whole or in part, of his
injury. Id.
3.
In order to establish causation for a Jones Act claim, the
plaintiff bears a “featherweight” burden of proof. Gavagan v.
United States, 955 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1992). The plaintiff
need only establish that the actions of the defendant contributed
to the injury even in the slightest degree. Id.
4.
“Under the Jones Act, a defendant must bear the responsibility
for any negligence, however slight, that played a part in producing
the plaintiff's injury.” In re Cooper/T. Smith, 929 F.2d 1073,
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1076-77 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Landry v. Oceanic Contractors,
Inc., 731 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir.1984)).
5.
The Court finds as a matter of law that Defendant exercised
ordinary prudence and took reasonable care in providing Plaintiff
with a safe place to work. Plaintiff failed to carry his burden of
proof to establish the nature of the substance on which he slipped,
or that there was any foreign substance on the deck other than
water, which is a normal expected condition in a seagoing vessel.
Further, Plaintiff failed to establish whether the accident was
caused by any act or omission of a person or party for whom
Defendant is responsible.
B. Unseaworthiness
6.
Unseaworthiness is a condition of a vessel that presents an
unreasonable risk of harm to the seaman. Park v. Stockstill Boat
Rentals, Inc., 492 F.3d 600, 604 (5th Cir. 2007).
7.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving unseaworthiness at
trial. See Phillips v. Western Co. of North America, 953 F.2d 923,
928 (5th Cir. 1992).
8.
The vessel owner is not “obligated to furnish an accident-free
ship.” Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
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9.
The elements of an unseaworthiness claim are (1) that the
defendant provided a vessel or equipment that was not reasonably
fit

for

its

intended

purpose

and

(2)

that

“the

unseaworthy

condition played a substantial part in bringing about or actually
causing the injury and that the injury was either a direct result
or a reasonably probable consequence of the unseaworthiness.” Id.
10.
There is no requirement that a plaintiff show negligence, but
the “substantial” causation requirement is more stringent than the
causation in a Jones Act negligence claim. Id.
11.
The Court finds as a matter of law that Defendant provided a
seaworthy vessel and thus is not liable to Plaintiff. Plaintiff
failed to introduce sufficient evidence to show any unseaworthy
conditions aboard the RN WEEKS that played a substantial part in
bringing about, or actually causing, his right knee injury.
C. Maintenance and Cure
12.
“Maintenance and cure is an obligation imposed upon a shipowner
to provide for a seaman who becomes ill or injured during his
service to the ship.” Boudreaux v. United States, 280 F.3d 461,
468 (5th Cir. 2002).

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13.
To receive maintenance and cure, a plaintiff must prove (1) his
employment as a seaman; (2) that his illness or injury “occurred,
was aggravated or manifested itself while in the ship's service,”
(3)

the

wages

to

which

he

may

be

entitled;

and

(4)

“the

expenditures or liability incurred by him for medicines, nursing
care, board and lodging.” Smith v. Fla. Marine Transporters, Inc.,
No. 10-889, 2011 WL 2580625, at *2 (E.D. La. June 29, 2011)
(Lemmon, J.).
14.
“[A]mbiguities or doubts in the application of the law of
maintenance and cure are resolved in favor of the seaman.” Gaspard
v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 649 F.2d 372, 374 n. 2 (5th Cir.
1981).
15.
“Cure involves the payment of therapeutic, medical, and hospital
expenses not otherwise furnished to the seaman . . . until the
point of ‘maximum cure.’” Pelotto v. L & N Towing Co., 604 F.2d
396, 400 (5th Cir. 1979).
16.
A seaman reaches maximum cure when “it appears probable that
further treatment will result in no betterment of the seaman’s
condition.” Id. When “it appears that the seaman’s condition is
incurable, or that future treatment will merely relieve pain and
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suffering

but

not

otherwise

improve

the

seaman’s

physical

condition, it is proper to declare that the point of maximum cure
has been achieved.” Id. Thus, “when a particular medical procedure
is merely palliative in nature or serves only to relieve pain and
suffering, no duty to provide payments for cure exists.” Barto v.
Shore Const., L.L.C., 801 F.3d 465, 476 (5th Cir. 2015).
17.
When the evidence shows that “further rehabilitation would be
more than simply palliative, and would improve [the plaintiff’s]
medical condition,” the court may award maintenance and cure “in
aid of permanent improvement short of a complete cure.” In re RJF
Int'l Corp. for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liab., 354 F.3d
104, 107 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
18.
A seaman may recover punitive damages from his employer for
willful and wanton failure to pay maintenance and cure. Atl.
Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424 (2009).
19.
A second opinion contrary to the treating doctor’s opinions
regarding diagnosis or prognosis of an injured seaman does not
provide

the

unequivocal

evidence

required

for

termination

of

maintenance and cure benefits. Tullos v. Resource Drilling, Inc.,
750 F.2d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1985); Gorum v. Ensco Offshore, Co.,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21992 (E.D. La. November 14, 2002). Indeed,
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absent

an

unequivocal

justification

to

terminate

a

seaman’s

maintenance and cure, a ship owner may subject itself to liability
for punitive damages and attorney’s fees if it terminates benefits
nonetheless. Rowan v. Chem Carrier Towing, LLC, No. 12-712, 2015
WL 2097572 (E.D. La May 5, 2015). “When there are conflicting
diagnoses

and

prognoses

from

various

physicians,

there

is

a

question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact as to a
plaintiff's entitlement to maintenance and cure benefits and as to
whether an employer's termination of maintenance and cure benefits
was arbitrary or capricious.” Bland v. Omega Protein Inc., No. CV
14-0127, 2016 WL 280403, at *4 (W.D. La. Jan. 21, 2016) (citing
Tullos, 750 F.2d at 388).
20.
The Court finds as a matter of law that Plaintiff has not reached
maximum medical improvement and is entitled to maintenance and
cure from Weeks Marine.
21.
Plaintiff was a seaman, and his pre-existing condition was
aggravated while in the ship’s service.
22.
Although the condition seen in Plaintiff’s knee is degenerative
in nature, it only became symptomatic as a result of his slip on
the RN WEEKS.

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23.
Dr.

Lyons’

proposed

total

knee

replacement

will

improve

Plaintiff’s physical condition and the functioning of his knee,
not merely relieve or alleviate his pain.
24.
Plaintiff is entitled to recover all medical expenses relating
to the treatment and surgery on his right knee.
25.
Plaintiff is also entitled to maintenance benefits at the rate
of $20 per day from April 8, 2015 through the current date, and at
the rate of $35 per day from the date of this order until he has
reached maximum medical improvement.
26.
There is no evidence that Weeks’ failure to pay maintenance and
cure was willful or wanton, and thus Plaintiff is not entitled to
punitive damages.

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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and based on all the foregoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law,
Judgment will hereafter be entered in favor of Defendant and
against Plaintiff as to Plaintiff’s negligence and unseaworthiness
claims. Judgment will be entered in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendant as to Plaintiff’s maintenance and cure claim.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 25th day of May, 2016.

____________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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