Wright's Well Control Services, LLC v. Oceaneering International, Inc. et al

Filing 428

ORDER AND REASONS granting 381 Motion for Summary Judgment, as set forth in document. Oceaneering's counterclaims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court further DENIES Oceaneering's request to dismiss WWCS's breach of contract and fraudulent inducement claims as untimely. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/20/2018. (jls)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
WRIGHT’S WELL CONTROL
SERVICES, LLC
VERSUS

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 15-1720

OCEANEERING INTERNATIONAL,
INC.

SECTION “R” (3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff Wright’s Well Control Services, LLC moves for summary
judgment on defendant Oceaneering International, Inc.’s counterclaims. 1
For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion.

I.

BACKGROUND
The facts and allegations that follow are limited to what is relevant to

the motion before the Court. 2 Plaintiff Wright’s Well Control Services, LLC
(WWCS) and defendant Oceaneering International, Inc. (Oceaneering) both
provide hydrate remediation services for the oil and gas industry. A hydrate
is an ice-like solid that forms when water becomes mixed with oil and/or gas

R. Doc. 381.
A more in-depth discussion of the facts underlying this dispute can be
found in the Court’s April 19, 2018 order. See R. Doc. 427.
1

2

at high pressure and low temperature. 3 Hydrates can cause a pipeline to
become blocked by “hydrate plugs,” resulting in a loss of production. 4 This
dispute concerns systems developed by both parties for removing hydrates
from subsea, deepwater pipelines.
In 2008, ATP Oil and Gas Corporation contracted with Oceaneering to
remove hydrates from a pipeline. 5 At the time, Oceaneering had a hydrate
remediation skid designed to clear hydrate plugs in smaller tubing;
Oceaneering had not yet used it on a pipeline. 6 Oceaneering successfully
cleared some, but not all, of the hydrate plugs from ATP’s pipeline in early
2009.7

ATP then contracted with WWCS to conduct further hydrate

remediation in ATP’s pipeline, even though WWCS did not yet have a
complete hydrate remediation system.8

WWCS developed its hydrate

remediation system specifically for high-volume, deepwater applications. 9
The parties worked together on this job for ATP, and allegedly executed a

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

R. Doc. 147 at 3 ¶ 12.
Id. at 3-4 ¶¶ 12-13.
Id. at 7 ¶¶ 22-23.
See R. Doc. 300-10 at 13-14; R. Doc. 300-46 at 4.
R. Doc. 300-12 at 11.
Id. at 6-15.
See id. at 7-8; R. Doc. 300-13 at 3.
2

Reciprocal Nondisclosure of Confidential and Proprietary Information
Agreement (NDA) on December 11, 2009. 10
WWCS asserts that it completed the design and manufacture of its
hydrate remediation system by early 2010.11 WWCS’s system successfully
cleared the remaining hydrates in ATP’s pipeline by March 2010.12 The
parties worked together on several additional jobs using WWCS’s system.
According to WWCS, it has not used its hydrate remediation system since
January 2011. 13 Oceaneering developed its Flowline Remediation System
(FRS) from 2009 to 2011. WWCS alleges that Oceaneering developed the
FRS using confidential information disclosed under the NDA. 14
WWCS filed its initial complaint on May 21, 2015.15

The fourth

amended complaint, which is the operative complaint, was filed on February
27, 2017.16 Oceaneering filed its answer and counterclaims on March 16,
2017.17 Oceaneering counterclaimed for unfair competition under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125, Texas state law unfair competition, breach of contract, unjust

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

R. Doc. 381-14.
R. Doc. 381-1 at 2.
R. Doc. 300-15 at 5.
R. Doc. 381-1 at 2.
R. Doc. 147 at 12 ¶ 39.
R. Doc. 1.
R. Doc. 147.
R. Doc. 161.
3

enrichment, and attorney’s fees.

The Court dismissed Oceaneering’s

counterclaim for attorney’s fees on November 20, 2017. 18 WWCS now moves
for summary judgment on Oceaneering’s remaining counterclaims.19

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069,
1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When assessing whether a dispute as to any material
fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s]
from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta &
Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99
(5th Cir. 2008).

All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the

nonmoving party, but “unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth
‘ultimate or conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either
support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Galindo v. Precision
Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Little, 37 F.3d at

18
19

R. Doc. 318.
R. Doc. 381.
4

1075. A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the
burden of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence
which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went
uncontroverted at trial.” Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257,
1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving party can then defeat the motion by
either countering with evidence sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact, or “showing that the moving party’s
evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the reasonable fact-finder to
return a verdict in favor of the moving party.” Id. at 1265.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear
the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by
merely pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with
respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. See Celotex,
477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must,
by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a
genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may not rest upon the
pleadings, but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine issue for
5

trial. See, e.g., id.; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (“Rule 56 mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322)).

III. DISCUSSION
WWCS moves for summary judgment on Oceaneering’s counterclaims
on the ground that insufficient evidence supports these claims. In addition
to arguing that there is sufficient evidence in support of its counterclaims,
Oceaneering urges the Court to strike WWCS’s motion and to dismiss
WWCS’s breach of contract claim as untimely.
The Court further notes that each party’s briefs are full of vitriol and
accusations of ethical violations by the other party. Such vitriolic statements
and unfounded accusations add nothing to the parties’ arguments. The
parties shall refrain from this type of argumentation in any oral or written
statements to this Court.

6

A.

Untimeliness of WWCS’s Motion

Oceaneering first argues that WWCS’s motion should be stricken for
untimeliness. 20 Under the Court’s scheduling order, the deadline to file nonevidentiary pretrial motions—including summary judgment motions—was
March 13, 2018. 21 WWCS filed its motion for summary judgment one week
later, on March 20. Thus, WWCS’s motion is untimely.
The Court nevertheless declines to strike WWCS’s motion. A district
court has broad discretion to extend filing deadlines and to accept late-filed
motion papers. See Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 367 (5th
Cir. 1995). Moreover, Oceaneering fails to explain how it is prejudiced by the
one-week delay in the filing of WWCS’s motion.

Therefore, the Court

proceeds to the merits of the summary judgment motion.
B.

Oceaneering’s Counterclaims
1.

Unfair Competition in Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125

Oceaneering’s first counterclaim alleges that WWCS violated Section
43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, by falsely designating the origin of an
Oceaneering schematic. 22 Specifically, WWCS allegedly instructed a third
party, Gulf Coast Manufacturing, to replace Oceaneering’s logo on a

20
21
22

R. Doc. 406 at 6.
R. Doc. 223 at 2.
R. Doc. 161 at 46 ¶¶ 229-230.
7

schematic with WWCS’s logo. 23 According to Oceaneering, “WWCS passed
off this derivative work as its own to third parties when advertising and
bidding on remediation projects.”24
Section 43 of the Lanham Act provides in relevant part:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
. . . uses in commerce . . . any false designation of origin, . . .
which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive . . . as to the origin . . . of his or her goods, . . . or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin
of his or her or another person’s goods, . . .
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he
or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). Oceaneering’s claim asserts reverse passing off, or
reverse palming off, which involves “selling or offering for sale another’s
product that has been modified slightly and then labeled with a different
name.” Roho, Inc. v. Marquis, 902 F.2d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 1990); see also
Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes, Inc., 789 F.3d 573, 588 (5th Cir. 2015). This
claim requires evidence of both “use of false designation of origin and false
representation in interstate commerce.”

Roho, 902 F.2d at 358.

Oceaneering provides neither. First, Oceaneering cites no evidence that

23
24

Id. at 44 ¶ 219.
Id. ¶ 220.
8

WWCS used its modified schematic in interstate commerce. Second, the
schematic portrays WWCS’s system, including the separator with the
internal ball valve. 25 Of course, the use of WWCS’s logo on the schematic
does not falsely designate the origin of the WWCS system.
Oceaneering raises an additional allegation in support of its § 1125
claim in response to WWCS’s summary judgment motion: that WWCS
passed off Oceaneering’s ROV as its own by removing Oceaneering’s logo
from photographs of the ROV and publishing those photographs in
presentations and industry journals. 26 This allegation is not properly before
the Court because it was not included in Oceaneering’s pleadings. See
Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir.
2005) (“A claim which is not raised in the complaint but, rather, is raised
only in response to a motion for summary judgment is not properly before
the court.”).

Moreover, Oceaneering fails to point to any evidence of

damages it sustained because of WWCS’s purported violations of the
Lanham Act. For these reasons, WWCS is entitled summary judgment on
Oceaneering’s Lanham Act counterclaim. 27

See R. Doc. 161-2 at 3-11.
R. Doc. 406 at 13.
27
To the extent Oceaneering asserts unfair competition under Texas law
based on this conduct, see R. Doc. 406 at 14, the claim fails for the same
reasons Oceaneering’s Lanham Act claim fails. See Amazing Spaces, Inc. v.
9
25

26

2.

Unfair Competition in Violation of Texas Law

Oceaneering’s state law unfair competition claim is based on two
alleged actions: (1) a WWCS employee “snooped” on Oceaneering’s FRS, and
WWCS incorporated, or plans to incorporate, information obtained by
snooping into its own system; and (2) WWCS obtained and misused
information about Oceaneering’s bid on the BP project. 28
In support of its allegations of snooping, Oceaneering cites a January
2011 email chain between Ben Comperry, purportedly a WWCS employee,
and David Wright, WWCS’s founder. Comperry sent three photographs of
Oceaneering’s “new skid” and relayed information about the skid, including
that it had “cameras all over it.”29 Comperry explained in another email that
he was “snooping” on Oceaneering. 30 In response, Wright stated that WWCS
“will be adding camera and ROV arms to ours,” and told Comperry: “Do not
snoop to[o] much. We do not need any conflict with Oceaneering on subsea
tools. The[ir]s and ours.”31

Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225, 236 n.7 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that the
same analysis applies to unfair competition claims under both Texas law and
the Lanham Act).
28
R. Doc. 161 at 49 ¶¶ 245-246.
29
R. Doc. 406-1.
30
Id.
31
Id.
10

To show that WWCS obtained and misused Oceaneering’s bid
information, Oceaneering first points to an email chain between Wright and
JP Kenny employee Michael Dohm. Wright asked Dohm to send him the
“Oceaneering gas separator” on October 25, 2012. 32

At the time,

Oceaneering and WWCS were bidding against each other on a hydrate
remediation project for BP.

Dohm sent Wright a presentation and a

document describing Oceaneering’s FRS.33

According to Oceaneering,

WWCS then modified its bid. 34
Texas unfair competition “requires that the plaintiff show an illegal act
by the defendant which interfered with the plaintiff’s ability to conduct its
business. Although the illegal act need not necessarily violate criminal law,
it must at least be an independent tort.” Taylor Publ’g Co. v. Jostens, Inc.,
216 F.3d 465, 486 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Oceaneering does not
identify the independent tort upon which its state law unfair competition
claim relies, but its allegations sound in misappropriation of trade secrets
and tortious interference with potential business relations. “A trade secret
misappropriation in Texas requires: (a) the existence of a trade secret; (b) a
breach of a confidential relationship or improper discovery of the trade

32
33
34

R. Doc. 406-5.
Id.
R. Doc. 406 at 11; R. Doc. 406-9.
11

secret; (c) use of the trade secret; and (d) damages.” Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc.
v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1123 (5th Cir. 1991). Tortious interference
with prospective business relations requires: “(1) a reasonable probability or
expectation of entering into a contractual relationship; (2) intentional and
malicious conduct by the defendant that prevents consummation of the
contract; (3) no justification or privilege shields the defendant; and (4) actual
harm or damages caused by defendant’s conduct.” Small Bus. Assistance
Corp. v. Clear Channel Broad., Inc., 210 F.3d 278, 281 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000).
Regarding misappropriation of trade secrets, Oceaneering has pointed
to evidence that WWCS improperly obtained photographs and information
about Oceaneering’s new skid from Comperry. It is disingenuous for WWCS
to argue that Wright told Comperry not to snoop; the email clearly states:
“Do not snoop to[o] much.”35 Nevertheless, Oceaneering has failed to offer
evidence of misuse or damages in support of its misappropriation
allegations.
Regarding tortious interference with prospective business relations, it
is clear that both parties were in contention for the BP project. 36
Oceaneering has introduced evidence showing that WWCS asked third party

35
36

R. Doc. 406-1 (emphasis added).
See R. Doc. 406-14.
12

JP Kenny for information about Oceaneering’s separator. 37 JP Kenny sent
back documents describing the FRS, and Oceaneering characterizes these
documents as information related to its bid on the BP project. Even if these
facts suffice to raise a genuine dispute as to WWCS’s intentional and
malicious conduct, however, there is no evidence suggesting that WWCS’s
subsequent modification of its bid was related to the documents it received
from JP Kenny. Moreover, WWCS lost the BP bid, and Oceaneering has not
pointed to any other injury it suffered by virtue of WWCS’s possession and
purported misuse of Oceaneering’s bid information. Thus, WWCS is entitled
summary judgment on Oceaneering’s state law unfair competition
counterclaim.
3.

Breach of Contract

Oceaneering’s breach of contract counterclaim asserts that WWCS
violated the NDA by misusing and improperly disclosing confidential
information.38
(1) Oceaneering’s

37
38

This allegedly confidential information comprises:
Emergency

Quick

R. Doc. 406-5.
R. Doc. 161 at 47 ¶¶ 235-236.
13

Disconnect

Operations

and

Maintenance Manual (EQD Manual); 39 and (2) the documents describing the
FRS that WWCS obtained from JP Kenny. 40
Oceaneering sent the EQD Manual to WWCS on March 17, 2010. 41
WWCS provided the EQD Manual to Gulf Coast Manufacturing on June 15,
2010.42 According to Oceaneering, WWCS provided the EQD Manual so that
Gulf Coast Manufacturing could modify Oceaneering’s EQDs.43 Oceaneering
appears to argue that this was improper disclosure under the NDA. As to the
second type of confidential information, as the Court explained earlier,
WWCS obtained documents describing Oceaneering’s FRS in connection
with Oceaneering’s bid on the BP project. Oceaneering asserts that WWCS
misused this information by altering its bid after receiving the documents
describing the FRS.44

In addition, Oceaneering argues that WWCS

improperly disclosed these documents to Gulf Coast Manufacturing on
December 11, 2012. 45

39
40
41
42
43
44
45

R. Doc. 406-3.
R. Doc. 406-5.
R. Doc. 420-10 at 2.
R. Doc. 406-3.
See R. Doc. 406 at 13.
R. Doc. 406 at 11.
R. Doc. 406-4.
14

Texas law governs the NDA. 46 Under Texas law, “[t]he elements of a
claim for breach of contract are: (1) the existence of a valid contract;
(2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the
contract by the defendant; and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulting from
that breach.” Hunn, 789 F.3d at 579 (quoting Foley v. Daniel, 346 S.W.3d
687, 690 (Tex. App. 2009)).
Oceaneering has pointed to no evidence of damages it sustained
because of WWCS’s alleged breach of the NDA. Notably, WWCS lost the BP
bid to Oceaneering, and Oceaneering cites no other type of harm that
WWCS’s purported misuse of Oceaneering’s bid information caused
Oceaneering.
In addition, Oceaneering has failed to raise a genuine dispute as to
whether WWCS’s disclosure of the EQD Manual to Gulf Coast Manufacturing
violated the NDA. Two sections of the NDA are relevant to this counterclaim.
First, Section Two of the NDA forbids disclosure of confidential information
“to any third party unless[] further disclosure is previously approved in

For a more in-depth analysis of the NDA, see the Court’s orders dated
February 5, 2018, and April 19, 2018, R. Docs. 350, 427.
15
46

writing.”47 Second, Section Four of the NDA prohibits disclosure “for any
purpose not connected with the effort contemplated by the [NDA].”48
The purpose for which WWCS allegedly sent the EQD Manual to Gulf
Coast Manufacturing—to modify the EQDs for a WWCS project with
Oceaneering—was clearly connected with the effort contemplated by the
NDA.

Additionally, under the terms of WWCS’s September 15, 2009

purchase order for Oceaneering’s EQDs, Oceaneering granted “a royaltyfree, non-exclusive license . . . to use and reproduce any INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY of [Oceaneering] provided to [WWCS].” 49 This purchase order
gave WWCS Oceaneering’s consent, in writing, to disclose the EQD Manual
to Gulf Coast Manufacturing.

Oceaneering fails to offer any evidence

showing that WWCS’s disclosure was not connected with the effort
contemplated by the NDA, or that the purchase order did not provide
effective consent. Thus, there is no evidence that WWCS’s disclosure of the
EQD Manual violated the NDA, and WWCS is entitled summary judgment
on Oceaneering’s breach of contract counterclaim.

47
48
49

R. Doc. 381-14 at 2.
Id. at 3.
R. Doc. 420-11 at 10.
16

4.

Unjust Enrichment

Oceaneering’s final counterclaim seeks restitution for WWCS’s use of
Oceaneering’s schematics and drawings.50 “An action for unjust enrichment
is based upon the equitable principle that a person receiving benefits which
were unjust for him to retain ought to make restitution.” Streamline Prod.
Sys., Inc. v. Streamline Mfg., Inc., 851 F.3d 440, 461 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Bransom v. Standard Hardware, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 919, 927 (Tex. App.
1994)). “A party may recover under the unjust enrichment theory when one
person has obtained a benefit from another by fraud, duress, or the taking of
an undue advantage.” Id. at 462 (quoting Heldenfels Bros., Inc. v. City of
Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992)).
Oceaneering fails to articulate what benefit WWCS obtained from
using Oceaneering’s schematics and drawings.

Indeed, Oceaneering’s

argument on its unjust enrichment counterclaim is limited to one footnote
in which it states: “Oceaneering has provided ampl[e] facts which entitle
Oceaneering to bring its cause of action under the theory of unjust
enrichment.”51 Oceaneering cannot carry its summary judgment burden
with this cursory statement. See McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571

50
51

R. Doc. 161 at 48 ¶ 241.
R. Doc. 406 at 14 n.26.
17

(5th Cir. 2012) (“Summary judgment may not be thwarted by conclusional
allegations, unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of
evidence.”).

Moreover, there is no genuine dispute either that these

schematics and drawings actually portrayed WWCS’s system, or that Gulf
Coast Manufacturing simply redrew the system after receiving the
Oceaneering schematics.52

WWCS is entitled summary judgment on

Oceaneering’s unjust enrichment counterclaim.
C.

Oceaneering’s Statute of Limitations Defense

Oceaneering further argues in its opposition to WWCS’s motion that
the Court should sua sponte dismiss WWCS’s breach of contract and
fraudulent inducement claims as untimely. 53 Oceaneering’s assertion of a
statute of limitations defense at this point is untimely. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(c)(1) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any
avoidance or affirmative defense, including . . . statute of limitations . . . .”);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (“Every defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must
be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required.”). But “a defendant
does not waive an affirmative defense if it is raised at a ‘pragmatically
sufficient time, and [the plaintiff] was not prejudiced in its ability to

52
53

R. Doc. 381-32 (Gulf Coast Manufacturing Rule 30(b)(6) deposition).
R. Doc. 406 at 7.
18

respond.’” Arismendez v. Nightingale Home Health Care, Inc., 493 F.3d
602, 610 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 418
(5th Cir. 1986)). Just as Oceaneering is not prejudiced by WWCS’s untimely
motion for summary judgment, WWCS is not prejudiced by Oceaneering’s
untimely assertion of a statute of limitations defense. Accordingly, the Court
will address this defense.
The statute of limitations for both claims is four years. See Beavers v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 566 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Texas applies a fouryear statute of limitations to breach of contract claims.” (citing Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code § 16.051)); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004(a)(4) (fouryear statute of limitations period for actions based on fraud). But the
discovery rule “operates to defer accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff
knows or, by exercising reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts
giving rise to the claim.” Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732,
734 (Tex. 2001).

The rule is “a very limited exception to statutes of

limitations,” and applies “only when the nature of plaintiff’s injury is both
inherently undiscoverable and objectively verifiable.”

Id.

An injury is

inherently undiscoverable if it is, “by its nature, unlikely to be discovered
within the prescribed limitations period despite due diligence.” Id. at 73435 (citing S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1996)). Whether someone, by
19

exercising reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to
his or her claim is generally a question of fact for the jury. See, e.g., Sw.
Energy Prod. Co. v. Berry-Helfand, 491 S.W.3d 699, 722 (Tex. 2016).
According to Oceaneering, WWCS must have learned about
Oceaneering’s alleged violations of the NDA no later than January 2011,
when Comperry sent photographs of, and information about, Oceaneering’s
FRS to Wright. If WWCS’s causes of action for breach of contract and
fraudulent inducement accrued at that time, then the filing of its initial
complaint in May 2015 would be untimely.
Oceaneering has failed to come forward with evidence that would
entitle it to a directed verdict on its statute of limitations defense if the
evidence went uncontradicted at trial. See Int’l Shortstop, 939 F.2d at 126465. In the email cited by Oceaneering, Comperry states:
I was told the[irs] was all elect[r]ic motors, cameras all over it,
and that a majority of it was elect[r]onic and operated via a
control van. All the [ROVs] would have to do is hook up the
E.F.L.’s and flying leads. That the[ir] system could self monitor
its self, actuate its own valves. 54
This information reveals no clear similarities between WWCS’s system and
the recently developed FRS such that WWCS would have been put on notice
of Oceaneering’s misuse of confidential information. See Slusser v. Union

54

R. Doc. 406-1.
20

Bankers Ins. Co., 72 S.W.3d 713, 717 (Tex. App. 2002) (“A cause of action for
breach of contract is generally regarded as accruing when the contract is
breached or when the claimant has notice of facts sufficient to place him on
notice of the breach.” (emphasis added)); see also Berry-Helfand, 491
S.W.3d at 722 (“Because the discovery rule applies to trade-secret
misappropriation claims, however, the limitations period did not begin to
run until [plaintiff] knew or should have known of facts that in the exercise
of

reasonable

diligence

would

have

led

to

discovery

of

the

misappropriation.”). In addition, the photographs taken by Comperry show
Oceaneering’s pump (the Subsea Hydraulic Power Unit, or SHPU), not the
FRS itself. 55 As Oceaneering itself explains in its motion for summary
judgment, the SHPU predated WWCS’s system.56 Moreover, Oceaneering’s
pump differs significantly from WWCS’s in that the SHPU is ROV-powered,
while WWCS’s pump is powered by pressurized seawater.57 Oceaneering
fails to explain how Comperry’s photographs of the SHPU would have put
WWCS on notice of Oceaneering’s alleged misuse of confidential information
under the NDA. Thus, Oceaneering is not entitled summary judgment on its
statute of limitations defense.

55
56
57

R. Doc. 420-7.
R. Doc. 374-1 at 11.
Id.; see also R. Doc. 420-8.
21

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS WWCS’s motion for

summary judgment. Oceaneering’s counterclaims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. The Court further DENIES Oceaneering’s request to dismiss
WWCS’s breach of contract and fraudulent inducement claims as untimely.

20th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of April, 2018.

_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

22