Max Access, Incorporated v. Gee Cee Company of LA., Inc. et al
Filing
36
ORDER AND REASONS denying 13 Motion to Strike; granting 12 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; granting in part and denying in part 11 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle. (ijg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MAX ACCESS, INC.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 15-1728
THE GEE CEE COMPANY
OF LA, INC., ET AL
SECTION “B”(1)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are three motions: 1) a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss the fraud claims of plaintiff Max Access, Inc. (“Max
Access”) by defendants The Gee Cee Company of LA, Inc. and Gibson
Chigbu (“defendants”); 2) plaintiff’s motion to strike defendants’
Rule 12(b)(6) motion as untimely; and 3) plaintiff’s Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss defendants’ counterclaims. See Rec. Docs. 11–
13. For the following reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to strike (Rec. Doc. 13)
is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss (Rec.
Doc. 12) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to dismiss (Rec.
Doc. 11) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I.
BACKGROUND
The following is a brief summary of
the allegations in
plaintiff’s May 21, 2015, complaint. Plaintiff and defendants
entered an agreement for the supply of scaffolding equipment, along
with an application for credit, related to a construction project
1
in Orleans Parish. See Rec. Doc. 1 at 3. Starting at some point in
2013, defendant failed to pay for and/or return certain equipment
supplied by plaintiff. See id. at 4. In March 2014, the parties
attempted
returns;
to
settle
however,
all
the
outstanding
defendants
balances
failed
to
and
equipment
actually
return
equipment, such that plaintiff issued a number of additional
invoices through September 2014. See id. at 4–5. Plaintiff claims
that the total amount due by defendants is $78,196.38. See id. at
5. Plaintiff asserts a variety of contract claims. See id. at 5–
10. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants committed fraud by
concealing
equipment
and
held
making
by
misrepresentations
defendants
and
then
about
attempting
plaintiff’s
to
induce
plaintiff into waiving plaintiff’s rights and remedies. See id. at
6–7.
On July 23, 2015, defendants filed an answer and on July 27,
2015,—before any party took further action in the case—filed an
amended answer. See Rec. Docs. 9 and 10. The amended answer
includes a number of defenses, including lack of subject matter
jurisdiction1 and failure to state a claim. See Rec. Doc. 10 at 1–
2. The later defense makes reference to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
The Court notes that defendants’ amended answer contends that the “real amount in controversy” is
under $75,000; however, defendants do not seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Rec. Doc. 10 at 1. The Court notes some irregularities in the invoices attached by
plaintiff to support their claim for $78,196.38. See Rec. Doc. 1-5 at 21, 29 (total amounts due not stated in
invoice). However, in the absence of a motion by defendants offering proof otherwise, the Court is
satisfied that the pleadings facially reflect an amount in controversy over $75,000.
1
2
dismiss plaintiff’s fraud claims for failing to comply with Rule
9(b). See id. The amended answer also contains a counterclaim
against plaintiff. See id. at 6–7. The counterclaim alleges that
plaintiff not only breached a March 12, 2014, settlement agreement,
but also thereafter submitted numerous invoices to defendants over
a six-month span, knowing they were frivolous. See id. Defendants
contend that plaintiff is subject to Rule 11(b) sanctions, has
committed “abuses of process,” and violated Louisiana unfair trade
practices law. See id.
On July 28, 2015, plaintiff and defendants each filed a motion
to dismiss. See Rec. Docs. 11 and 12. Plaintiff seeks dismissal of
all defendants’ counterclaims. See Rec. Doc. 11. Defendants seek
dismissal of all of plaintiff’s claims sounding in fraud. See Rec.
Doc. 12. On July 28, 2015, defendants filed a motion to dismiss
all fraud claims for failure to meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity
requirement. See Rec. Doc. 12. The following day, plaintiff filed
a Rule 12(f) motion to strike defendant’s motion to dismiss as
untimely. See Rec. Doc. 13.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Rule 12(f) Motions to Strike
Rule 12(f) permits a Court to strike from a pleading “an
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.” FED. R. CIV. P 12(f). A motion to strike will
be granted when allegations in a pleading are prejudicial or
3
immaterial to the case. See Jolie Design & Décor, Inc. v. Cece
Caldwell’s Paints, LLC, Civ. A. 12-2387, 2013 WL 3293691 *2
(E.D.La. June 28, 2013) (J. Berrigan). A district court exercises
reasonable discretion in considering motions to strike. See Estate
of Thompson v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 354 Fed.Appx. 183,
189 (5th Cir. 2009) (“We review a motion to strike for abuse of
discretion”) (citing Cambridge Toxicology Group, Inc. v. Exnicios,
495 F.3d 169, 178 (5th Cir. 2007)).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motions to Dismiss
Generally speaking, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted
when the complaint does not state a viable claim for relief. See
Great Plains, 313 F.3d at 312. The complaint must be plausible on
its face. See Doe, 528 F.3d at 418 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombley,
550
U.S.
544,
570
(2007)).
A
court
construes
the
pleadings liberally and accepts all well pleaded facts as true.
See Great Plains, 313 F.3d at 312–13. A court disregards conclusory
allegations and unwarranted deductions of fact. See id. at 313.
For claims alleging fraud, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be
granted if the complaint fails to plead the conduct constituting
fraud with particularity. FED. R. CIV. P 9(b). “Malice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged
generally.” Id. The claim, at a minimum, must set forth the “who,
what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraud. See U.S. ex rel.
Shupe v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 759 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2014).
4
A claim need not provide the level of detail necessary to prevail
at trial. See U.S. ex rel. McLain v. Flour Enterprises, Inc., Civ.
A. 06-11229, 2013 WL 3899889 *4 (E.D.La. July 29, 2013) (citing
U.S. ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti. 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir.
2009). “Rule 9(b) supplements but does not supplant Rule 8(a)’s
notice pleading.” See Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 186.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike
As an initial matter, the Court considers plaintiff’s motion
to strike. Plaintiff contends that defendant’s motion to dismiss
was untimely, because it was filed one day after it filed an
amended answer that itself had been filed four days following
defendant’s initial filing of an answer. See Rec. Doc. 13-1 at 1–
2. The Court agrees with defendants that plaintiff’s motion to
strike borders on frivolous. See Rec. Doc. 19. The grounds for
defendants’ motion to dismiss are explicitly stated as a defense
in defendants’ amended answer, which also makes reference to “the
motion
to
dismiss
under
Rule
12(b)(6).”
Rec.
Doc.
10
at
1.
Defendants filed the motion to dismiss within a day of filing the
amended answer. See Rec. Docs. 10 and 12.
While the text of Rule 12(b) apparently requires all 12(b)
motions to be filed before a responsive pleading, courts have
permitted deviations in the context of Rule 12(b)(6) motions
centered on Rule 9(b). See Shushany v. Allwaste, Inc., 992 F.2d
5
517, 250 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993). The Court finds plaintiff’s motion
meritless where defendants at least effectively complied with Rule
12(b)’s
requirements,
defendants’
amended
answer
clearly
put
plaintiff on notice of defendants’ Rule 9(b) defense, and the
amended answer also references a motion to dismiss based on Rule
9(b). As always, the Court advises the parties to carefully review
and follow applicable rules of procedure; however, the Court will
not
delay
consideration
of
defendants’
motion
due
to
an
insubstantial procedural error of this kind. Accordingly, the
Court denies plaintiff’s motion to strike.
B. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Moving
plaintiff’s
to
the
fraud
merits
claims,
of
defendants’
the
Court
motion
looks
to
to
dismiss
see
whether
plaintiff’s complaint adequately alleges the “who, what, when,
where, and how” of the fraud claim. Here, the complaint states
that in March 2014 the defendants promised to return outstanding
equipment supplies and pay one lump sum to satisfy all plaintiff’s
claims. See Rec. Doc. 1 at 4. Plaintiff alleges that defendants
did so “in exchange for various consideration from [plaintiff], in
an apparent effort to induce [plaintiff] into an agreement.” See
id. at 4–5. Plaintiff alleges that defendants presented documents
to plaintiff in furtherance of that agreement “purporting to
extinguish or limit [plaintiff’s] rights in exchange for return of
[plaintiff’s] property, specifically including but not limited to
6
a baseless writing purporting to remit [plaintiff’s] rights to
assert a privilege against the [construction] project in view of
Defendants’
nonperformance
and
outstanding
obligations
to
[plaintiff].” See id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that it reasonably
relied
upon
defendant’s
promises
and
representations,
but
defendant did not follow through, nor did it ever intend to. See
id.
The
complaint
later
provides
the
additional
factual
allegations that defendants were fraudulent in: a) convening a
meeting with plaintiff to convince plaintiff that defendants had
less
of
plaintiff’s
intentionally
equipment
concealing
than
and
they
actually
misrepresenting
did;
much
how
b)
of
plaintiff’s property was lost, stolen, or destroyed while in
defendant’s
possession;
c)
drafting
a
“fraudulently
induced
agreement” to strip plaintiff of its rights under the contract; d)
engaging
in
a
“knowing
scheme”
to
defraud
plaintiff
by
not
performing under the settlement agreement; and e) engaging in
“predatory and exploitive practices.” See Rec. Doc. 6–7.
The
Court
concludes
that
plaintiff’s
complaint
fails
to
particularly plead the alleged fraud of defendants. The complaint
provides too vague a summary of the supposedly fraudulent conduct
of defendants to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. It
references
meetings
without
providing
dates,
names,
or
what
occurred during the meeting––information plaintiff would likely
7
know since its employees presumably attended. The complaint makes
only vague references to misrepresentations, without stating what
the
misrepresentations
were
and
who
made
them.
Simply
put,
plaintiff’s complaint does not sufficiently put defendants on
notice of the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the fraud claim.
The Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s
fraud claims; however, it notes that defendants’ did not specify
whether they sought dismissal with or without prejudice. The Court
will
dismiss
the
fraud
claims
without
prejudice
and
afford
plaintiff the opportunity to amend its complaint, if appropriate.
C. Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss
Finally, the Court turns to plaintiff’s motion to dismiss
defendants’ counterclaims. The essence of defendants’ counterclaim
is that the March 2014 settlement agreement in fact settled all
disputes
between
the
parties
and
that
plaintiff’s
subsequent
invoicing and lawsuit were frivolous and constituted an unfair
trade practice. See Rec. Doc. 10 at 6–7. Defendants’ counterclaim
seeks relief for Rule 11(b) violations, “abuses of process,” and
violation of Louisiana unfair trade practices law. See id.
Defendants’ briefing on the motion states that they “will
voluntarily dismiss the Rule 11(b) claim and believe that the abuse
of process claim is subsumed within the Unfair Trade Practices Act
allegations.” See Rec. Doc. 25 at 1. While defendants have not
formally sought to voluntarily dismiss their Rule 11(b) and abuse
8
of process claims, the Court understands defendants’ as offering
no opposition to plaintiff’s motion to dismiss with prejudice as
to the two claims. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Rule
11(b) and abuse of process claims with prejudice.
Defendants do, however, stand by their state law claim,
contending they have adequately pleaded a claim under the Louisiana
Unfair
Trade
Practices
Act
(“LUTPA”).2
See
id.
Plaintiff
essentially puts forward four independent grounds for dismissing
the claim: 1) that defendants lack standing to bring a claim under
LUTPA; 2) that the defendants have failed to state a claim under
LUTPA; 3) that the claim is perempted; and 4) that the Louisiana
Attorney General has not taken needed action in order for treble
damages to be available. See Rec. Doc. 11-1 at 8. The Court
considers each in turn.
i. Standing
Plaintiff
initially
argued
that
defendants
do
not
have
standing to raise a LUTPA claim, because plaintiff’s alleged
misconduct ties to a commercial, not consumer transaction. See
Rec. Doc. 11-1 at 10. A subsequent filing by plaintiff retreats
somewhat on the argument, clarifying that there is, in fact a
Defendants’ memorandum opposing plaintiff’s motion to dismiss contains two affidavits of employees
of The Gee Cee Company of LA, Inc. See Rec. Docs. 25-1 and 25-2. Plaintiff correctly contends that is
inappropriate for the Court to reference either of these affidavits, as “[g]enerally, when ruling on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the district court may not look beyond the pleadings.” Stockwell v. Kanan, 442
Fed.Appx. 911, 913 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Accordingly, the Court assesses the merits of plaintiff’s motion to dismiss without reference to the
affidavits.
2
9
Louisiana circuit split on the issue and that a plurality opinion
of the Louisiana Supreme Court advocates a broad reading of who
may sue under LUTPA . See Rec. Doc. 23 at 1–2 (citing Cheramie
Services v. Shell Deepwater Production, 2009-1633, 35 So. 3d 1053
(La. 4/23/10)). Plaintiff argues, however, that the unsettled
shift in Louisiana law should not disturb existing Fifth Circuit
precedent on the issue. See id. at 3–4.
Over two decades ago, the Fifth Circuit ruled that LUTPA
provides a cause of action only to business competitors and those
injured by transactions involving consumers buying for personal,
family, or household use. See Orthopedic & Sports Injury Clinic v.
Wang Labs., Inc., 922 F.2d 220, 226 (5th Cir. 1991). While the
Fifth Circuit has generally reiterated this interpretation of
LUTPA, only lower federal courts have directly reaffirmed the
ongoing validity of Wang Labs. See Tubos de Acero de Mexico, S.A.
v. Amer. Intern. Inv. Corp, Inc., 292 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2002);
see also, e.g., Lambert v. Bd. Of Comm’rs, Civ. A. No. 05-5931,
2009 WL 152668 *8 (E.D.La. Jan. 22, 2009) (J. Vance).
In 2010,
a plurality of the Louisiana Supreme Court
in
Cheramie reasoned that LUTPA is meant to provide relief to more
than just business competitors and direct consumers. See 35 So.3d
at 1058. The Cheramie court specifically noted the existence of a
lower court split on exactly who is covered by LUTPA. See id. at
1056. The Fifth Circuit has not had occasion to revisit its holding
10
in Wang Labs. Since Cheramie; however, federal district courts
have split on whether Cheramie broadens the applicability of LUTPA
to dealings between businesses. Compare Nola Fine Art, Inc. v.
Ducks Unlimited, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 3d 602 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2015)
(J. Vance) (finding that a business owner has standing to sue a
hunting organization under LUTPA) and Burgers v. Bickford, Civ. A.
No. 12-2009, 2014 WL 4186757 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2014) (J. Zainey)
(finding that a construction lender has standing to sue developers
under
LUTPA),
with
Baba
Lodging,
LLC
v.
Wyndham
Worldwide
Operations, Inc., Et al, Civ. A. No. 10-1750, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
36891 (W.D. La. Mar. 19, 2012) (finding that a franchisee of a
hotel does not have standing to sue a corporation managing a
nationwide reservation system for the franchisor). Additionally,
it appears that at least some Louisiana state courts of appeals
have reconsidered their prior interpretations of LUTPA standing in
the wake of Cheramie. See Bogues v. Louisiana Energy Consultants,
Inc., 46,434, 71 So.3d 1128 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/10/11); see also
Granger v. Christus Health Cent. La., 2011-85, 97 So.3d 604 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 7/20/12).
Though Cheramie
may not be binding upon the Court, the
plurality opinion, the on-going circuit split in Louisiana courts
of appeals, and recent decisions of this District Court lead the
Court to conclude that defendants have standing to sue under LUTPA
11
in this case.3 Defendants were in a contractual relationship for
the provision of scaffolding equipment with plaintiff. See Rec.
Doc. 1. Defendants essentially claim that plaintiff engaged in an
unfair
billing
practice,
by
first
purporting
to
settle
all
outstanding claims and then soon thereafter submitting additional
bills for substantial sums on a regular basis. See Rec. Doc. 6–7.
Under the expanded understanding of LUTPA standing signaled to in
Cheramie, it would seem the statute applies to defendants’ claim.
ii.
Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiff contends that defendants have failed to state a
LUTPA claim, because they do not allege an “ascertainable loss.”
See Rec. Doc. 11-1 at 10–11. Here, defendants’ complaint alleges
that plaintiff engaged in an unfair practice by submitting repeated
frivolous bills to defendants and later initiating litigation. See
Rec.
Doc.
“articulate
10
no
at
6–7.
facts
Plaintiff
whatsoever
counters
describing
these
any
allegations
violation
of
[LUTPA], and present no claim of an ascertainable loss.” Rec. Doc.
11-1 at 10. Plaintiff offers no precedent to support the assertion
that an allegation of over $75,000 in frivolous invoicing does not
constitute an ascertainable loss under LUTPA. While plaintiff
The Court notes that plaintiff’s initial memorandum addresses the LUTPA claims of The Gee Cee
Company of LA, Inc. and Gibson Chigbu separately; however, its supplemental memorandum clarifying
the state of LUTPA law does not. Compare Rec. Doc. 11-1 at 10–11, with Rec. Doc. 23 at 1–4.
Defendants’ memorandum in opposition addresses the merits of each LUTPA claim in cursory fashion.
See generally Rec. Doc. 25. In the absence of sufficient briefing and particularly at this early stage in the
litigation, the Court leaves aside for now the issue of whether both defendants may assert a LUTPA cause
of action.
3
12
further argues in its memorandum that the dispute constitutes a
normal business pursuit and that plaintiff acted in good faith
throughout
the
dispute,
these
contentions
are
outside
the
pleadings and not appropriately addressed on a motion to dismiss.
iii.
Peremption
Plaintiff next argues that the time period for defendant to
file a LUTPA claim has passed. Defendants’ complaint alleges that
plaintiff engaged in an unfair practice by breaching a March 12,
2014, settlement agreement and thereafter submitting repeated
frivolous bills to defendants, followed by the initiation of
litigation. See Rec. Doc. 10 at 6–7. Because defendants’ claim
centers on an alleged breach of a March 12, 2014, settlement
agreement and because defendants did not raise their LUTPA claim
until July 23, 2015, plaintiff argues that defendants’ claim
clearly falls outside LUTPA’s one-year peremption period. See Rec.
Docs. 11-1 at 16–17 and 23 at 5–7. Defendants counter that the
prescriptive period never ran, because plaintiff continued to
“trot[] out its invoices” after breaching the March 12, 2014,
agreement and filed the instant lawsuit. See Rec. Doc. 25 at 6–7.
Furthermore, defendants contend that even if March 12, 2014, was
the
start
of
the
prescriptive
period,
under
Louisiana
civil
procedure, defendants filed their counterclaim within 90 days of
plaintiff filing its complaint and thereby filed their claim within
the extended “prescriptive/peremption period.” See id. at 7–9.
13
LUTPA provides that “[t]he action provided by this section
shall be prescribed by one year running from the time of the
transaction or act which gave rise to this right of action.” La.
R.S. § 51:1409(E). The Louisiana Supreme Court has not ruled as to
whether this provision implicates preemption or prescription;
however, most lower state courts and decisions of this District
Court interpret § 51:1409(E) as a peremptory provision. See Miller
v. ConAgra, Inc., 2008-0021, 991 So.2d 445, 456 (La. 9/8/08); see
generally Melancon v. Countrywide Bank, Civ. A. No. 10-1723 2011
WL 692051 *8 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 2011). This means the limitation
period in LUTPA cannot be suspended or interrupted. See Melancon,
2011 WL 692051 at *8.
Louisiana
lower
courts
have
recognized,
however,
that
a
peremptory period does not begin where the alleged violation of
LUTPA is continuous. See id. In Miller v. ConAgra, Inc., the
Louisiana Supreme Court noted that “a continuing tort is occasioned
by unlawful acts, not the continuation of the ill effects of an
original, wrongful act.” 2008-0021 at *16, 991 So.2d 445, 456.
Instances where courts have found continuous torts in a business
transaction
setting
typically
involve
one
party
continuously
violating a duty owed to another party. See Fox v. Dupree, 93 CA
0120, 633 So.2d 612 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/29/1993); see also
Carriere v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Service Inc., 750 F.Supp.2d 694,
707–08 (E.D.La. 2010) (J. Vance) (and cases cited therein).
14
In this case, the LUTPA violations alleged by defendants
include the breach of the March 12, 2014, settlement agreement,
the frivolous invoices sent through September 2014 by plaintiff
after the breach through September 2014, and the initiation of
this lawsuit. See Rec. Doc. 10 at 7. Plaintiff contends all of its
alleged
conduct
following
March
12,
2014,
merely
constituted
efforts to enforce a disputed settlement agreement and therefore
the
continuing
tort
doctrine
does
not
apply
to
defendants’
counterclaim. See Rec. Docs. 23 at 6–7 and 31 at 2–3.
The Court is unable to conclude from the pleadings that
defendants have not alleged a continuous tort and therefore finds
dismissal on the grounds of peremption inappropriate, at least at
this time. The parties offer competing descriptions of the March
2014 settlement agreement and how it was breached. For the purpose
of pleadings, defendants have alleged an unfair practice that not
only includes a breached settlement agreement, but also subsequent
frivolous billing. See Rec. Doc. 10 at 7. It is clear from the
pleadings that plaintiff continued to bill defendants through
September 2014, with by far the largest invoices submitted after
July 23, 2014—one year before defendants filed their counterclaim.
See Rec. Doc. 1-4 at 15–16. At this time, the Court is unwilling
to dismiss defendants’ LUTPA counterclaim on the grounds that the
only alleged LUTPA violation predated defendants’ counterclaim by
one year.
15
iv.
Attorney General Action
Finally,
plaintiff
argues
that
defendants
cannot
obtain
treble damages, because they did not first bring their complaint
to the Louisiana Attorney General. See Rec. Doc. 11-1 at 12–13.
This very well may be; however, as far as the Court is aware, this
fact would go to the question of damages, not whether or not
defendants’ claim should be dismissed altogether. See La. R.S.
§ 51:1409. Accordingly, the issue need not be addressed on a Rule
12(b)(6)
motion.
See
Landrieu
Const.,
Inc.
v.
DRC
Emergency
Services, LLC, Civ. A. No. 09-3418, 2010 WL 1817768 (E.D. La. Apr.
30, 2010) (J. Fallon) (treble damages issue addressed at summary
judgment). Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to strike is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss is
GRANTED
and
plaintiff’s
fraud
claims
are
DISMISSED
without
prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to dismiss
with prejudice is GRANTED IN PART as to defendants’ Rule 11(b)
and abuse of process counterclaims and DENIED IN PART as to
defendants’ LUTPA counterclaim; defendants’ Rule 11(b) and abuse
of process claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 5th day of February, 2016.
____________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16
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