Matthew v. Housing Authority of New Orleans et al

Filing 11

ORDER AND REASONS denying 4 Motion by Plaintiff for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary Injunction. Signed by Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance on 8/7/15. (jjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LYNETTE MATTHEW

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 15-1770

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF NEW ORLEANS,
ET AL.

SECTION: R(4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff Lynette Matthew moves ex parte for a declaratory
judgment and preliminary injunction1 against defendant Housing
Authority of New Orleans.2

For the following reasons, the Court

denies the motion.

I.

Background
On May 27, 2015, pro se plaintiff Lynette Matthew sued

defendants Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO), Arthur Waller,
Colisha Butler, and Simone R. Moore for alleged constitutional and
civil rights violations, as well as violations of the Louisiana
Civil Code.3

Specifically, Matthew alleges that under her Housing

Assistance Payments Contract (HAP Contract) with HANO,4 she agreed
to provide housing to public housing tenants in exchange for rental
1

In Part II, infra, the Court determines that Matthew’s
motion is more properly characterized as one for preliminary
injunction and summary judgment.
2

R. Doc. 4.

3

R. Doc. 1.

4

R. Doc. 7-1.

payments from HANO on behalf of those tenants.5

Matthew further

alleges that one of tenants, Chanell Carter, for whom HANO paid
$950 per month in housing assistance rental payments, vacated
Matthew’s rental unit without notice.6

HANO continued to pay

Carter’s rental payments until it independently discovered she no
longer lived there.7

HANO then notified Matthew that it overpaid

her $5,100.00 for the time period Carter’s rental unit was vacant
and would withhold housing assistance rental payments for Matthew’s
other public housing tenants until the debt was paid.8

HANO cites

Section 7(f) of the HAP Contract to support its authority to do so:
“If the [Public Housing Agency--HANO] determines that the owner is
not entitled to the housing assistance payment or any part of it,
[HANO], in addition to other remedies, may deduct the amount of the
overpayment from any amounts due the owner (including amounts due
under any other Section 8 assistance contract).”
Matthew contends that she requested a grievance hearing with
HANO, but her request was denied.9

Matthew asserts that HANO’s

withholding of other housing assistance rental payments constitutes
a

breach

of

contract

and

an

unconstitutional

5

R. Doc. 1 at 2.

6

Id. at 2-3; R. Doc. 4 at 2.

7

R. Doc. 1 at 3; R. Doc. 4 at 2.

8

R. Doc. 1 at 3.

9

Id.
2

deprivation

of

property.10

Matthew seeks compensation for her economic losses, as

well as damages she allegedly incurred as a result of Carter’s
damaging her rental unit beyond normal wear and tear.11
Matthew filed an ex parte motion for declaratory judgment and
preliminary

injunction,

realleging

the

allegations

of

her

complaint.12
II.

Discussion
To begin, the Court notes that it must broadly construe

Matthew’s ex parte motion because she is a pro se litigant.

See

Gondola v. Gonzales, 178 F. App’x 410, 412 n.4 (5th Cir. 2006).
Doing

so,

the

Court

finds

that

although

Matthew

requests

a

declaratory judgment, her motion is more appropriately considered
as one for summary judgment.

“The purpose of a declaratory

judgment is to declare future rights of a party and not to remedy
past harms.”

Integral Dev. Corp. v. Tolat, No. C 12-06575, 2013 WL

5781581, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013) (collecting cases).

In

addition to preliminarily enjoining HANO from withholding future
rental payments, Matthew seeks to require HANO to pay her the total
amount of those rental payments that it has already withheld.13

10

Id. at 3-4.

11

Id. at 4.

12

R. Doc. 4.

13

Id. at 2 (“[P]laintiff prays that this Honorable Court
[will] issue [a] declaratory judgment against defendant . . .
enjoining [it] from withholding and releas[ing] funds in [its]
3

Accordingly, the Court will treat Matthew’s filing as a motion for
preliminary injunction and for summary judgment.
A.

Preliminary Injunction

A party may obtain a preliminary injunction only if: (1) there
is a substantial likelihood that the movant will prevail on the
merits; (2) there is a substantial threat the movant will suffer
irreparable

harm

if

the

injunction

is

not

granted;

(3)

the

threatened injury to the movant outweighs the potential injury to
the defendant; and (4) granting the preliminary injunction will not
disserve the public interest.

Guy Carpenter & Co., Inc. v.

Provenzale, 334 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 2003).

“A preliminary

injunction is an extraordinary remedy which courts grant only if
the movant has clearly carried the burden as to all four elements.”
Id. The primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve
the Court’s ability to hear the case on the merits.

Atwood Turnkey

Drilling, Inc. v. Petroleo Brasilerio, S.A., 875 F.2d 1174, 1178
(5th Cir. 1989).
Without addressing all four requirements, the Court finds that
Matthew has failed to prove that there is a substantial threat she
will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted.

As

the Fifth Circuit holds, “[t]here can be no irreparable injury were
money damages would adequately compensate a plaintiff.”

DFW Metro

Line Servs. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1267, 1269 (5th Cir.
possession, control and custody belonging to Ms. Matthew.”).
4

1990). Matthew alleges that she is suffering “economic losses” due
to HANO’s withholding Matthew’s other public housing tenants’
rental payments and that Carter damaged Matthew’s rental unit
beyond normal tenant wear and tear.

Indeed, Matthew has not

argued, let alone demonstrated, that this case presents any special
circumstances that would make an award of money damages--should she
ultimately prevail--inadequate.

See id.

Accordingly, the Court

denies the motion for preliminary injunction.
B.

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
56(a);

see

also

Celotex

Corp.

v.

Catrett,

Fed. R. Civ. P.
477

U.S.

317,

322–23(1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1994).

When assessing whether a dispute as to any material

fact exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record
but refrain[s] from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.”

Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness

Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2008).
inferences

are

drawn

in

favor

of

the

All reasonable

nonmoving

party,

but

“unsupported allegations or affidavits setting forth ‘ultimate or
conclusory facts and conclusions of law’ are insufficient to either
support or defeat a motion for summary judgment.”

5

Galindo v.

Precision Am. Corp., 754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985); see also
Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.
The Court also finds that summary judgment is inappropriate
because Matthew has failed to demonstrate that there is no genuine
dispute of material fact.

Matthew alleges that HANO breached the

HAP Contract by failing to pay rental assistance for the unit
leased by Chanel Carter and unconstitutionally deprived Matthew of
her property by withholding her other housing tenants’ monthly
rent.14 In opposition, HANO argues that the HAP Contract explicitly
entitles it to “deduct the amount of [an] overpayment from any
amounts due the owner (including amounts due under any other
Section 8 assistance contract).”15

Accordingly, the Court cannot

conclude that Matthew is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law.

Therefore, Matthew’s motion for summary judgment is

denied.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Matthew’s Ex Parte
Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Preliminary Injunction.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _______ day of August, 2015.
7th
___________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14

R. Doc. 1 at 4.

15

R. Doc. 7-1 at 5 § 7(f).
6