Crain v. Schlumberger Technology Corporation
Filing
74
ORDER AND REASONS granting in part 32 , 52 Motions in Limine; denying 44 , 65 Motions for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GREGORY CRAIN
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 15-1777
SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CO.
SECTION: “H”(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 44),
Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 65), and Defendant’s Motions in
Limine (Docs. 32, 52). For the following reasons, the Motions for
Reconsideration are DENIED, and the Motions in Limine are GRANTED IN
PART.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s
Complaint
alleges
that
he
worked
for
Defendant
Schlumberger Technology Corporation (“Schlumberger”) and its predecessor
for ten years as a regional sales manager. Schlumberger is a global oil field
services provider. A few weeks prior to his termination, Plaintiff learned that
he would have to have ankle surgery, which would restrict his ability to drive
for a short period of time. He alleges that he alerted his supervisor and the
human resources department about the surgery. On February 9, 2015—just
1
four days before the surgery—Plaintiff was informed that he would be
terminated from his employment with Defendant. Defendant alleges that
Plaintiff was terminated pursuant to a reduction in force resulting from the
decline in oil prices.
Plaintiff, a fifty-nine-year-old man, brought suit against his employer,
alleging age and disability discrimination and interference and retaliation
pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). On summary judgment, this Court
dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims, save his FMLA interference claim. 1 Both
parties have asked this Court to reconsider that ruling.
LEGAL STANDARD
Although styled as Motions for Reconsideration, such a motion is not
specifically recognized under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When a
movant seeks review of an order, such as in the present case, courts consider a
motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b), 59, or 60. 2 Because Rules 59 and
60 only apply to final judgments, a motion to reconsider that challenges an
interlocutory order, as here, is analyzed pursuant to Rule 54(b). 3 Courts in
this District generally analyze motions to reconsider interlocutory orders
under Rule 59(e). 4
A Rule 59(e) motion “[i]s not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence,
legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the
Doc. 38.
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Verizon Commc'ns Inc., No. 3:10–CV–1842–G, 2012 WL
3034707, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2012).
3 Gulf Fleet Tiger Acquisition, LLC v. Thoma–Sea Ship Builders, LLC, Nos. 10–1440,
10–1802, 282 F.R.D. 146, 151–52 (E.D. La. 2012).
4 See Castrillo v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. 09–4369, 2010 WL 1424398, at
*4 n.54 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2010) (collecting cases); Gulf Fleet, 282 F.R.D. at 152 n.40 (same).
1
2
2
entry of judgment.” 5
Instead, Rule 59(e) serves the narrow purpose of
correcting “‘manifest error[s] of law or fact or . . . presenting newly discovered
evidence.’“ 6 “‘Manifest error’ is one that ‘is plain and indisputable, and that
amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law.’” 7 In the Fifth Circuit,
altering, amending, or reconsidering a judgment under Rule 59(e) “[i]s an
extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.” 8 While district courts
have “considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to
alter a judgment,” denial is favored. 9
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its dismissal of his ERISA
retaliation, ERISA interference, and FMLA retaliation claims, arguing that he
has offered substantial evidence of pretext. In its order of dismissal, this Court
held that Plaintiff could not succeed on the aforementioned claims because he
could not show an issue of fact to establish that Defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination—a reduction in force precipitated by
the oil crisis—was pretextual. Plaintiff’s motion claims that the Court’s prior
order was “inaccurate” and that he has “offered substantial and compelling
evidence of pretext.”
As previously stated, however, a motion for reconsideration is not an
opportunity to rehash evidence and arguments already espoused.
Such a
Templet v. HydroChem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Simon v.
United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)).
6 Advocare Int’l, LP v. Horizon Labs., Inc., 524 F.3d 679, 691 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863 (5th Cir. 2003)).
7 Guy v. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Venegas–
Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d 183, 195 (1st Cir. 2004)).
8 Templet, 367 F.3d at 479 (citations omitted).
9 Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 921 (5th Cir. 1995).
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motion is appropriate only to correct manifest errors of law or fact or present
newly discovered evidence. Plaintiff’s motion fails to provide this Court with
any new evidence, instead reiterating evidence already presented on summary
judgment. Further, Plaintiff has not revealed any manifest error of law or fact
made by this Court. Plaintiff does not point to any controlling law that this
Court ignored and cites only to opinions from other district courts—many of
which this Court had already considered in the first instance. Nothing in
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration could serve as grounds for reversal, and
nothing causes this Court to question the veracity of its prior holdings.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
B. Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration
Next, Defendant asks this Court to reconsider its maintenance of
Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim for three reasons. First, Defendant argues
that Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim should be dismissed because it is
merely an attempt to relitigate the FMLA retaliation claim that this Court
dismissed. Plaintiff has stated that the interference with his FMLA rights was
his termination.
Defendant argues that, therefore, Plaintiff’s interference
claim is no different than an FMLA retaliation claim. Next, Defendant argues
that Plaintiff’s termination does not constitute unlawful interference with his
rights because, in light of the reduction in force, he was not entitled to FMLA
benefits because he would have been laid off. Finally, Defendant argues that
Plaintiff cannot show that he suffered any damages as a result of Defendant’s
interference with his FMLA rights.
Merits aside, this Court sees no reason why Defendant could not have
espoused these arguments in its summary judgment motion. Motions for
reconsideration “cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should,
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have been made before the judgment issued.” 10 Despite Defendant’s assertion
that it was unclear regarding the basis for Plaintiff’s interference claim until
after this Court ruled on its summary judgment motion, Plaintiff’s Complaint
clearly alleges that “by terminating Plaintiff from his employment three days
before his surgery, Defendant . . . unlawfully interfered” with Plaintiff’s rights
under the FMLA. Plaintiff has clearly claimed at all times in this litigation
that the FMLA interference was his termination. Accordingly, each of these
arguments could have, and should have, been raised on summary judgment.
Consideration of them at this stage is inappropriate.
C. Defendant’s Motion in Limine Regarding Dismissed Claims
After this Court granted summary judgment, Defendant filed the instant
Motion in Limine seeking a judgment excluding evidence related to the
dismissed claims. Having reviewed the arguments of both parties, this Court
rules as follows:
1. Defendant’s request to exclude evidence regarding violations of the
FMLA notice requirements is GRANTED. This evidence is irrelevant
as those claims have been dismissed.
2. Defendant’s request to exclude testimony and medical records from
Dr. Margaret L. Hagan is GRANTED. Emotional distress damages
are no longer at issue in this case.
3. Defendant’s request to exclude evidence of Defendant’s decision to
terminate Plaintiff and of the damages related to his termination are
DENIED. As discussed above, termination remains a relevant issue
in this matter.
10
E.g., Schiller v. Physicians Res. Grp. Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2003).
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4. Defendant’s remaining requests for relief are DEFERRED. Defendant
has failed to provide this Court with sufficient specificity to allow it
to rule on its remaining requests. Defendant’s requests are overly
broad. The Federal Rules of Evidence “cannot be applied except in
the context of specific evidence.” 11 In addition, this Court cannot
make a ruling as to an expert report that it has not been provided.
D. Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony and
Evidence
Finally, Defendant has filed a Motion in Limine requesting the exclusion of
specific pieces of testimony and evidence. Having reviewed the arguments of
both parties, this Court rules as follows:
1. Defendant’s request to exclude testimony and evidence of alleged
stray remarks regarding Plaintiff’s age is GRANTED.
Having
dismissed Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim, these remarks are
irrelevant and hearsay.
2. Defendant’s request to exclude testimony and evidence regarding an
employee who volunteered to be laid off is GRANTED.
Such
testimony is irrelevant to the remaining claim.
3. Defendant’s request to exclude evidence regarding whether a human
resources employee was present during his termination meeting is
DEFERRED. Defendant may reassert this argument at trial.
4. Defendant’s request to exclude testimony of Charlie Vise as irrelevant
is DEFERRED. Defendant may reassert this argument at trial.
11
2012).
Garcia v. Hackman, No. CA C-10-311, 2012 WL 401042, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6,
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED,
and the Motions in Limine are GRANTED IN PART.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 26th day of August, 2016.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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