Miller v. Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana

Filing 15

ORDER granting 12 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown. (jrc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GARLAND MILLER

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

CASE NO. 15-1805

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
LOUISIANA, et al.

SECTION: G(1)

ORDER
In this litigation, Plaintiff Garland Miller (“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant Supreme Court
of the State of Louisiana (“Louisiana Supreme Court”) and Defendant State of Louisiana violated
his constitutional rights when he appealed his case to the Louisiana Supreme Court and the court
“did not hear the case and on May 23, 2014 refused a [rehearing].”1 Pending before the Court is
Louisiana Supreme Court’s “Motion to Dismiss.”2 Having reviewed the motion, memorandum in
support, memorandum in opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court will grant the
motion.
I. Background
A.

Factual Background
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff requests relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982,

1983, 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988.3 Plaintiff claims that in 2005, he was charged with theft by
fraud, but that his case was dismissed on May 16, 2011, prior to trial.4 Plaintiff alleges that he filed
a lawsuit in the 11th Judicial District for the Parish of Sabine, bringing a claim for malicious

1

Rec. Doc. 10.

2

Rec. Doc. 12.

3

Rec. Doc. 10 at p. 1.

4

Id. at p. 2.

prosecution.5 Plaintiff asserts that his lawsuit was “denied by Judge Stephen Beasley without reason”
and that he then appealed his case to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals, where the court
stated that, in order to succeed on his malicious prosecution claim, he must prove that he is
innocent.6 According to Plaintiff, when he appealed his case to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the
Louisiana Supreme Court “did not hear the case and on May 23, 2014, refused a [rehearing].7
B.

Procedural Background
On May 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint, pro se, in this Court against the Supreme Court

of the State of Louisiana.8 On December 11, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an
amended complaint in order to add the State of Louisiana as a defendant.9 On December 16, 2015,
the Louisiana Supreme Court filed a “Motion to Dismiss.”10 On January 5, 2016, Plaintiff filed his
opposition.11

5

Id. at p. 1.

6

Id. at p. 2.

7

Id. at p. 1.

8

Rec. Doc. 1.

9

Rec. Doc. 9.

10

Rec. Doc. 12.

11

Rec. Doc. 14.

2

II. Parties’ Arguments
A.

Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court’s Arguments in Support of Dismissal
Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court moves for dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint asserting:

(1) that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case; and (2) that Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.12
Citing two cases from other sections of the Eastern District of Louisiana, Leclerc v. Webb
and Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana,
Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court asserts that it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and
therefore this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear and decide Plaintiff’s claims.13
Furthermore, Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court contends that it is readily apparent that Plaintiff’s
claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.14 Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court asserts
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over
challenges to state court decisions.15 According to Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court, the doctrine
bars “cases brought by state court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.”16 Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court contends that Plaintiff’s
requested relief requires this Court to review the state court judgment; however, if Plaintiff is

12

Rec. Doc. 12 at p. 1.

13
Rec. Doc. 12-1 at p. 1 (citing Leclerc v. Webb, 270 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. La. 2003); S. Christian
Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of the State of La., 61 F. Supp. 2d 499, 506 (E.D. La. 1999)).
14

Id. at p. 2.

15

Id. (citing Stabler v. Ryan, 949 F. Supp. 2d 633 (E.D. La. 2013)).

16

Id. at pp. 2–3 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 284 (2005)).

3

dissatisfied with the decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court, his recourse at the federal level is
limited to an application for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.17
Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court also moves for dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the Louisiana Supreme Court lacks judicial capacity
and therefore cannot sue or be sued.18 Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court asserts that whether an
entity has the capacity to sue or be sued is governed by the law of the state where the court is
located.19 Citing a Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal case, Dejoie v. Medley, Defendant
Louisiana Supreme Court contends that, pursuant to Louisiana law, in order to possess the
procedural legal capacity for suit, an entity must qualify as a “juridical person” which is defined as
“an entity to which the law attributes a personality, such as a corporation or partnership.”20
Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court asserts that whether an entity is a juridical person is determined
using a functional approach and will depend upon an analysis of what the entity is legally
empowered to do.21 Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court states that there is no law conferring upon
it the authority to sue or be sued and therefore the claims against it must be dismissed.22

17

Id. at p. 3 (citing Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F. 3d 613, 614 (5th Cir. 2000)).

18

Id. at p. 2.

19

Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)).

20

Id. (citing La. Civ. Code art. 24; Dejoie v. Medley, 41,333 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/20/06); 945 So. 2d 968,

21

Id. (citing Roberts v. Sewerage and Water Bd. of New Orleans, 92-2048 (La. 3/21/94); 634 So. 2d 341,

982).

347).
22

Id. (citing Hall v. Louisiana, 974 F. Supp. 2d 957 (M.D. La. 2013); Griffith v. Louisiana, 808 F. Supp. 2d
926 (E.D. La. 2010)).

4

B.

Plaintiff’s Arguments in Opposition to Dismissal
In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that this Court has jurisdiction in all cases concerning “Law

and Equity.”23 Plaintiff contends that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply because the
United States Constitution guarantees equal justice under the law.24 Plaintiff asserts that when a
criminal case is dismissed prior to trial, both state and federal courts in Louisiana recognize that a
cause of action for malicious prosecution exists and that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant.25
Plaintiff asserts that he sued the Louisiana Supreme Court “both individually and collectively
because each justice is responsible for violating Plaintiff’s federally guaranted [sic] constitutional
right of access to the court system.”26 Plaintiff states:
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that because the then Defendant did not
PROVE his INNOCENCE He should be denied access to court. Precisely they stated
that no BONAFIDE TERMINATION existed because the then Defendant did not go
to trial. Case law and treatise state that any termination prior to trial is a Bonafide
Termination; with the exception of pretrial agreements which did not exist in this
case. The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana Did not protect the now Plaintiff’s
federally guaranted [sic] Constitutional Rights Access to the court system is
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and Congress (the first continental congress)[.]
The State of Louisiana and the Louisiana Supreme Court and its justices refused to
grant defendant access to court.27
Plaintiff asserts that the case cited by Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court, Leclerc v. Webb,
“deals with foreign immigrants who may or may not have Constitutional protection.”28 Plaintiff

23

Rec. Doc. 14 at p. 2 (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1).

24

Id. at p. 3.

25

Id. at p. 1.

26

Id. The Court notes that only the Louisiana Supreme Court and the State of Louisiana are listed as
Defendants in Plaintiff’s amended complaint. Rec. Doc. 10.
27

Id. at pp. 1–2.

28

Id. at p. 3.

5

contends that Southern Christian Leadership Conference, another case cited by Defendant Louisiana
Supreme Court, “deals with state law guarantees.”29 Plaintiff asserts that the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar a federal court from granting prospective injunctive relief against state officials whose
enforcement of particular laws would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.30
In opposition to Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court’s assertion that Plaintiff’s claims are
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Plaintiff contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
not apply in this case because the Louisiana Supreme Court violated his “federally guaranteed
constitutional right of access to courts and would be subject to Exparte young [sic] exception.”31
Plaintiff asserts that he did not receive equal justice under the law.32
In opposition to Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court’s claim that it lacks judicial capacity,
Plaintiff quotes Louisiana Civil Code article 24, which states that “A juridical person is an entity to
which the law attributes personality, such as a corporation or a partnership. The personality of a
juridical person is distinct from that of its members.”33 Plaintiff contends that in Dejoie v. Medley,
a case cited by Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court, the court considered “whether the city court
sitting en banc could be considered a Judicial Person.”34

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Id. at p. 6 (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).

32

Id.

33

Id. at p. 4.

34

Id. at p. 5.

6

III. Law and Analysis
A.

Legal Standard on a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and on the grounds that it has Eleventh Amendment
immunity.35 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and “possess only that power
authorized by the Constitution and statute,”36 and it is a “first principle of federal jurisdiction” that
a federal court must dismiss an action “whenever it appears that subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking.”37 Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue,38 and the Fifth Circuit directs that
when a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “is filed in conjunction with other
Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing
any attack on the merits.”39 This practice “prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely
dismissing a case with prejudice.”40 When opposing a 12(b)(1) motion, as at all other times, the party
asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proof.41 Since Plaintiff is pro se, the Court will

35

Rec. Doc. 12-1 at pp. 1–2.

36

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

37

Stockman v. Fed. Election Com’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998).

38

See 5B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1350 (3d ed. 2014).

39

Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2001).

40

In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig. (Mississippi Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 286–87 (5th

Cir. 2012).
41

Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.

7

construe his complaint liberally.42 Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and Eleventh Amendment
immunity are jurisdictional issues, the Court must address these issues first.43
B.

Analysis
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine denies federal courts subject matter jurisdiction to review or

modify the final decisions of state courts unless there is a federal statute that specifically permits
such a review.44 In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,45 the plaintiff filed suit in federal district court,
claiming that the state court, in a case in which the plaintiff was a party, had given effect to a state
statute alleged to be in conflict with the contract clause of the Constitution and the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 The Supreme Court held that “[i]f the
constitutional questions stated in the bill actually arose in the cause, it was the province and duty
of the state courts to decide them; and their decision, whether right to wrong, was an exercise of
jurisdiction.”47 The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction because “no court
of the United States other than [the Supreme Court] could entertain a proceeding to reverse or
modify the judgment for errors of that character.”48

42

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

43

Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 381–82 (5th Cir. 2013); Green v. State Bar of Tex., 27 F.3d
1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994).
44

Pease v. First Nat’l Bank, 335 F. App’x 412, 415 (5th Cir. 2009).

45

263 U.S. 413 (1923).

46

Id. at 414–15.

47

Id. at 415.

48

Id. at 416.

8

In District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,49 two plaintiffs brought suit in federal
court challenging the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ refusal to waive a court rule requiring
District of Columbia bar applicants to have graduated from an accredited law school.50 The Supreme
Court held that the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were judicial in
nature and the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their claims.51 The Supreme
Court found that district courts do not have jurisdiction “over challenges to state court decisions in
particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings, even if those challenges allege that the state
court’s action was unconstitutional.”52
Although the Supreme Court has cautioned that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is “confined
to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name,” it is fully applicable in such cases.53
The doctrine prevents federal courts from entertaining “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the federal district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”54
In Truong v. Bank of America, N.A., the Fifth Circuit explained that the two hallmarks of the
Rooker-Feldman inquiry are: (1) “what the federal court is being asked to review and reject;” and
(2) “the source of the federal plaintiff’s alleged injury.”55 In this case, Plaintiff requests relief

49

460 U.S. 462 (1983).

50

Id. at 464–65.

51

Id. at 482.

52

Id. at 486.

53

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

54

Id.

55

Id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284).

9

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, which provide federal causes
of action for violations of constitutional rights.56
The allegations against Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court are that the Louisiana Supreme
Court violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by declining to hear his case and denying his request
for a rehearing.57 Plaintiff asserts that this Court has jurisdiction to resolve the following question:
“Given the requirements for a Malicious Prosecution Suit under Louisiana Law that a bonafide
Termination in a criminal case is dismissed prior to trial (without any pre trial agreements or
pleadings to a lesser offense) even failure to prosecute constitutes a bona fide termination.”58 In
essence, it appears that Plaintiff is asking this Court to review and reject the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s decision to deny his writ application because, he asserts, his malicious prosecution suit was
wrongly dismissed by the lower courts. Pursuant to the Rules of Supreme Court of Louisiana, “The
grant or denial of an application for writs rests within the sound judicial discretion of [the Supreme
Court of Louisiana].”59 Rule X of the Rules of Supreme Court of Louisiana states that the Supreme
Court of Louisiana will consider several factors in deciding whether to grant a writ application, but
states that the factors are “neither controlling nor fully measuring the court’s discretion.”60 Plaintiff
requests that this Court review and reject the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision to deny his writ
application. As noted above, the Court lacks jurisdiction “over challenges to state court decisions

56

Rec. Doc. 10 at p. 1.

57

Id. at p. 1.

58

Rec. Doc. 14 at p. 6.

59

Rules of Supreme Court of Louisiana, Rule 10 § 1(a).

60

Id.

10

in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state
court’s action was unconstitutional.”61
The second hallmark of the Rooker-Feldman inquiry is the source of the federal plaintiff’s
alleged injury.62 The Fifth Circuit has found that
[i]f a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a
state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision,
Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court. If, on the
other hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or
omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.63
Plaintiff seeks damages of “12 million dollars considering loss of income and cancellation of
contracts.”64 However, the allegations in this case are that Plaintiff was harmed as a result of the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision to not hear his case because, he asserts, his case was wrongly
decided by the lower courts. Plaintiff’s only allegations in this case are wrongs allegedly committed
by the courts themselves. Therefore, the source of the alleged injury is the state court judgment
itself.
Although the Court construes pro se complaints liberally, Plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction. In his opposition, Plaintiff asserts that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not apply in this case because “the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana violated the
Plaintiff’s federally guaranteed constitutional right of access to courts and would be subject to
Exparte young [sic] exception.”65 However, “[in] Ex parte Young[,] [the United States Supreme
61

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983).

62

Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382–83 (5th Cir. 2013).

63

Id. at 383 (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)).

64

Rec. Doc. 10 at p. 6.

65

Rec. Doc. 14 at p. 6.

11

Court] held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit against a state official who is alleged
to be acting in violation of federal law.”66 The Ex parte Young doctrine is therefore an exception to
Eleventh Amendment immunity, not an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Fifth Circuit
has found that “[c]onstitutional questions arising in state court proceedings are to be resolved by the
state courts. If a state trial court errs the judgment is not void, it is to be reviewed and corrected by
the appropriate state appellate court. Thereafter, recourse at the federal level is limited solely to an
application for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.”67 Accordingly, the Court
finds that because Plaintiff seeks review and relief from the state court judgment, pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.
Therefore, the Court may not reach Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court’s other arguments in
support of dismissal.
It does not appear from the record that Defendant State of Louisiana has yet been served in
this case. However, the allegations against the State of Louisiana are the same as those against the
Louisiana Supreme Court. Plaintiff alleges that the “State of Louisiana knew or should have known
of these proceedings since employees for the state of Louisiana were involved and were party to the
original suit.”68 Therefore, for the reasons discussed above, the Court lacks jurisdiction over both
the claims against Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court and the claims against Defendant State of
Louisiana.

66

Cox v. City of Dallas, Texas, 256 F.3d 281, 307 (5th Cir. 2001).

67

Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994).

68

Rec. Doc. 10 at p. 6.

12

IV. Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Louisiana Supreme Court’s “Motion to
Dismiss”69 is GRANTED.
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA this 20th day of January, 2016.

NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

69

Rec. Doc. 12.

13