Jones v. Department of Health and Hospitals et al

Filing 25

ORDER AND REASONS granting in part and denying in part 6 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle. (ijg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DESIREE JONES

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO:

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HOSPITALS, ET AL.

SECTION: "B" (4)

15-2356

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants,
the State of Louisiana, through its Department of Health and
Hospitals ("DHH"), and Jeanette Cage ("Cage"). Rec. Doc. 6. Pro se
plaintiff, Desiree S. Jones ("Jones"), opposes the motion, and
defendants

filed

respectively.
argument.

a

reply

memorandum.

Rec.

Docs.

20

&

23,

The motion is submitted on the papers without oral

Having considered the parties' memoranda, the record,

and the applicable law,
IT IS ORDERED that the defendants' Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, dismissing the instant action
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I.

BACKGROUND
Jones was employed on a probationary basis by DHH as a

Medicaid analyst, and Cage was her supervisor. Rec. Doc. 1.

Jones

claims that she filed a complaint regarding Cage's "refusal to
allow reasonable accommodation to several disabled employees," and
cooperated in the ensuing investigation. Id.
she

was

fired

in

retaliation

for

her

Jones alleges that

participation

in

the

investigation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Id. Defendants filed a motion
to dismiss, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arguing that Jones
has not stated claim against them under the ADA because DHH, as an
arm of the State of Louisiana, enjoys sovereign immunity from
Jones' ADA claim and Cage, an individual, is not an employer
subject to liability under the statute.1 Rec. Doc. 6.

Jones

opposes the motion arguing that DHH does not enjoy sovereign
immunity regarding her claim because Medicaid is a program that
receives

federal

funding.

Rec.

Doc.

20.

Although

Jones

acknowledges that she cannot maintain a claim against Cage under
the ADA,2 she argues that she has stated a claim for defamation
against DHH and Cage. Id.
II.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss Standard
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that it interprets

1

Defendants also moved to dismiss for insufficient service of process
under Rule 12(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rec. Doc. 6. In
their reply memorandum, defendants acknowledge that the argument is moot because
Jones effected proper service on them. Rec. Doc. 23; see also Rec. Docs. 15-19.
2

An employee or supervisor cannot be held individually liable under the
ADA. Wellington v. Tex. Guaranteed, 2014 WL 2114832, at *4 (W.D. Tex. 5/20/2014)
(collecting cases).

2

pleadings of pro se litigants liberally "to afford all reasonable
inferences which can be drawn from them."3 In re Tex. Pig Stands,
Inc., 610 F.3d 937, 941 n. 4 (5th Cir. 2010).

A motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted when a complaint fails to allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,

556

U.S.

662,

678

(2009).

The

well-pleaded

factual

allegations of the complaint, taken as true, must raise the
plaintiff's right to recover above the speculative level. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555-56. Facts from which the court could infer the mere
possibility of liability will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2)). However, “a well-pleaded complaint
may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of
these facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and
unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
On a motion to dismiss, a court must take all well-pleaded
factual

allegations

of

the

complaint

as

true

and

draw

all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. In re Katrina
Canal

Breaches

Litig.,

495

F.3d

3

191,

205

(5th

Cir.

2007).

Jones filed the complaint pro se.
Rec. Doc. 1. Thereafter, Jones
retained counsel, who prepared the opposition to the motion to dismiss. Rec. Doc.
20.

3

Nevertheless, “conclusory allegations and unwarranted deductions of
fact are not admitted as true, especially when such conclusions are
contradicted by facts disclosed by a document appended to the
complaint.” Associated Builders, Inc. v. Ala. Power Co., 505 F.2d
97, 100 (5th Cir. 1974) (internal citations omitted).
B. DHH's Sovereign Immunity Regarding Jones' ADA Claim
DHH argues that it is entitled to sovereign immunity regarding
Jones' ADA retaliation claim raised under Title I of the ADA, which
addresses discrimination in employment.
The Eleventh Amendment bars citizens’ suits in federal court
against states, their alter egos, and state officials acting in
their

official

capacities,

unless

the

state

has

waived

its

sovereign immunity. Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office,
188 F.3d 312, 313 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Voisin’s Oyster House v.
Guidry, 799 F.2d 183, 185 (5th Cir. 1986)); Cozzo v. Tangipahoa
Parish Council, 279 F.3d 273, 280 (5th Cir. 2002).

This sovereign

immunity extends to actions against state agencies or entities that
are classified as "arms of the state." Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. John Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 428 (1997).

The DHH is a department

within the Louisiana state government, and is considered an arm of
the state. LA. REV. STAT. § 36:251; Darlak v. Bobear, 814 F.2d 1055,
1059 (5th Cir. 1987).
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted:
By statute, Louisiana has refused any such
4

waiver of its Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity regarding suits in federal court. See
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §13:5106(A).
Furthermore, Congress may only abrogate a
state’s
Eleventh
Amendment
immunity
by
unequivocally expressing its intent to do so
and by acting pursuant to a valid exercise of
power.
Cozzo, 279 F.3d at 281 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 374 (2001), the Supreme Court of the United States held
that Congress failed to validly abrogate state sovereign immunity
when it enacted Title I of the ADA, and suits by employees against
States for money damages under Title I of the ADA are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.

Jones, a former DHH employee, alleges a cause

of action under Title I of the ADA against DHH, an arm of the State
of Louisiana.4

Thus, Jones' ADA claim for retaliation against DHH

4

In her opposition memorandum, Jones says that she alleged a claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Rec. Doc. 20. Title VII is mentioned in her
complaint:
My Title VII rights were violated under the protections
of the Americans with Disability Act.
*

*

*

As a result of my malicious termination, I am filing a
civil action in federal court against DHH . . . and Cage
for violation of my Title VII rights protecting persons
or employees from retaliation discrimination under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, when cooperating in an
investigation into (ADA) violations.
*

*

*

I am also requesting compensation for . . . violation of
my civil rights, protected under Title VII and the
Americans with Disabilities Act from retaliation
discrimination.
Rec. Doc. 1. Clearly, these mentions of Title VII were meant to convey a claim
under the ADA, especially considering that there are no facts alleged in the

5

is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
C. Jones' Defamation of Character Claim
Jones argues that the complaint cannot be dismissed because
she alleged a defamation claim against DHH and Cage. Rec. Doc. 20.
Without reaching the merits of Jones' defamation claim and even
setting aside available Eleventh Amendment protections, it is
possible to conclude that the Court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction over Jones' defamation claims. The Court could only
hear Jones' defamation claims, which are state and not federal law
claims,5 if it had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 or supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Besides the fact that Jones' pro se complaint does not invoke
diversity jurisdiction, it is reasonable to conclude that the Court
does not have diversity jurisdiction for two reasons. First, there
does not appear to be complete diversity of citizenship, given that
both Jones and Cage are apparently citizens of Louisiana.6

See 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (requiring that diversity jurisdiction suits be
between citizens of different states). Second, it is not clear from
Jones' complaint that the amount in controversy in this case
exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Given the dismissal of Jones' federal law claims against

compliant supporting a claim under Title VII. Id.
5

See Rec. Doc. 20 at 8—9.

6

See Rec. Docs. 1 at 2 & 3.

6

defendants, it would not be appropriate for the Court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction either. Even assuming that the Court at
some point had supplemental jurisdiction over Jones' defamation
claims, district courts are given statutory authority to decline to
exercise that jurisdiction in the case that the Court has dismissed
all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). Given that the Eleventh Amendment bars the Court from
hearing Jones' ADA claim—Jones' only claim over which the Court
could

have

had

original

jurisdiction7—the

Court

declines

to

continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Jones' remaining
state law claims.
Because the Court concludes that it does not have subject
matter jurisdiction over Jones' defamation claims, dismissal of
Jones' entire suit is appropriate. However, the Court's dismissal
is without prejudice, meaning Jones is free to seek any available
relief in state court.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Dismiss
(Rec. Doc. 6) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART in that Jones'

7

The Court acknowledges, and disregards, plaintiff's unsupported and bare
assertion that "the defendants have been put on sufficient notice of claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and La. R.S. 9:2798.1 for conspiracy by Jeannette Cage while
acting under the color of title with the DHH." See Rec. Doc. 20 at 9. Upon review
of the complaint, the Court finds nothing adequately outlining a conspiracy claim
giving rise to a § 1983 claim. The complaint alleges wrongful conduct by
Jeannette Cage and states that the DHH ignored Jones' request for intervention
in Cage's decision to terminate Jones' employment, but those allegations alone
do not support the assertion that Jones' termination involved a conspiracy. See
Rec. Doc. 1 at 3—4. Given that the Court finds no valid § 1983 claim in the
complaint and that the Court has already determined that it is not appropriate
to continue the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Jones' state law
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), plaintiff's contention regarding a
claim under La. R.S. 9:2798.1 is moot.

7

Complaint (Rec. Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of January, 2016.

____________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8