West v. Rieth et al
Filing
129
ORDER AND REASONS: IT IS ORDERED that the 122 Motion for Rule 60(b) Relief from Judgment is DENIED. Signed by Judge Lance M Africk on August 19, 2019. (mp) Modified text on 8/19/2019 (mp).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LUKE T. WEST
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
No. 15-2512
CARRIE L. REITH ET AL.
SECTION I
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff Luke T. West’s (“West”) motion 1 for relief from
this Court’s December 22, 2015 order and reasons 2 pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant, the United States of America, filed a
response in opposition to the motion. 3 For the following reasons, the motion is denied.
I.
On July 9, 2015, West filed this lawsuit against defendants Carrie L. Reith
(“Reith”), Erin E. Parrott (“Parrott”), Rachel J. Allen (“Allen”), and Kendra L. Johnson
(“Johnson”) (collectively, the “individual defendants”). 4 At all times relevant to the
Court’s order and reasons, West was a member of the United States Marine Corps. 5
In his complaint, West alleged that the individual defendants, who were also
members of the United States Marine Corps, conspired and falsely accused West of
sexual assault and sexual harassment. 6 As a result of the allegations, investigations
R. Doc. No. 122.
See R. Doc. No. 57; see also West v. Reith, 152 F. Supp. 3d 538 (E.D. La. 2015).
3 R. Doc. No. 127.
4 See R. Doc. No. 1.
5 R. Doc. No. 57, at 1.
6 R. Doc. No. 1, at 5–10.
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ensued, and West was court-martialed with respect to the allegations lodged by Reith,
Parrott, and Allen. 7 West was found not guilty of the sexual assault and harassment
charges arising out of the allegations, but he was found guilty of obstruction of justice
and maltreatment of a subordinate. 8
On August 27, 2015, the individual defendants filed a motion 9 to dismiss
West’s claims against them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and to substitute
the United States as the sole federal defendant pursuant to the Westfall Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2679(a), which gives federal employees “absolute immunity from commonlaw tort claims arising out of the acts they undertake in the course of their official
duties.” 10
Specifically, the individual defendants argued that they were federal
employees “operating in the course and scope of their federal employment at the time
of the incidents complained of.” 11 Former United States Attorney for the Eastern
District of Louisiana Kenneth Allen Polite, Jr., certified, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2679(d)(2) and 28 C.F.R. § 15.4, that the individual defendants were acting in the
course and scope of their employment. 12
West filed an opposition to the motion, along with over 300 pages of exhibits,
arguing that the individual defendants were not acting within the course and scope
of their employment because their alleged tortious acts were not “employment rooted”
R. Doc. No. 57, at 1. The allegations made by Johnson were dismissed as not credible.
Id.
8 Id. at 2; R. Doc. No. 122-1, at 2.
9 R. Doc. No. 6, at 1.
10 R. Doc. No. 57, at 3 (quoting Osborn v. Haley, 594 U.S. 225, 229 (2007)).
11 R. Doc. No. 6-1, at 2.
12 Id. at 3; R. Doc. No. 6-3.
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or incidental to the performance of their duties as service members of the United
States Marine Corps. 13 West further argued that the individual defendants’ alleged
actions fell outside of the Westfall Act’s immunity provisions, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680, which excepts “claims arising out of assault, battery, . . . malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, [and] deceit . . . .” 14
The individual defendants filed a reply to West’s opposition, specifically
asserting that the U.S. Attorney’s certification was appropriate because “a
determination had been made by the appropriate federal officials that there was
enough credible evidence that the [individual defendants] were the victims of
workplace sexual harassment and/or sexual assault to refer charges to the General
Court martial.” 15 West filed a sur-reply, specifically arguing that he made “specific
and detailed factual allegations” in his complaint that support his claims that the
individual defendants falsely accused him of sexual assault and sexual harassment. 16
On December 22, 2015, after considering the parties’ extensive briefing, the
Court issued its order and reasons, granting the individual defendants’ motion to
dismiss and allowing the individual defendants to substitute the United States as the
sole federal defendant. 17 The Court specifically addressed West’s contention that the
individual defendants’ alleged tortious conduct was outside the course and scope of
R. Doc. No. 10, at 20–21; see R. Doc. Nos. 10-1–10-24.
R. Doc. No. 10, at 23–24 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)).
15 R. Doc. No. 23, at 5.
16 R. Doc. No. 27, at 4.
17 R. Doc. No. 57, at 15.
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their employment because their allegations were false. 18 The Court found that West
had not met his burden “to establish that, as a factual matter, the allegations against
him were false,” such that the alleged conduct would fall outside of the course and
scope of the individual defendants’ employment. 19
On January 5, 2016, West filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s
order and reasons and, specifically, its finding that West did not meet his burden as
set forth above. 20
Along with his motion for reconsideration, West submitted
“additional evidence to specifically contest the Government’s implicit position that a
proper determination by the appropriate federal officials, as well as a reporting
requirement contained within the Federal sexual assault/sexual harassment policy
amongst its employees, implicitly suggests the credible nature of the allegations.” 21
West also requested an evidentiary hearing and limited discovery in connection with
his motion. 22 The United States filed a response in opposition to West’s motion for
reconsideration. 23
On March 14, 2016, the Court denied West’s motion for reconsideration,
finding that West had not identified any manifest error of law in the Court’s order
and reasons. 24
The Court also observed that West was using the motion for
reconsideration as an opportunity to submit additional evidence when West knew
R. Doc. No. 57, at 8 (citing R. Doc. No. 10, at 20–21).
Id. at 8–9.
20 See R. Doc. No. 61.
21 Id. at 2.
22 R. Doc. No. 61-1, at 19–23.
23 See R. Doc. No. 64.
24 R. Doc. No. 80, at 3.
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that he had the burden of establishing that the individual defendants’ conduct was
not in the course and scope of their employment, and that he had ample opportunity
to do so, while the motion to dismiss was pending. 25 This Court denied West a “second
bite at the apple.” 26
Subsequently, with respect to the remaining claims asserted against them, the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 27 On June 24, 2016, the Court
granted the motion to dismiss. 28 On July 7, 2016, the United States, as the only
remaining defendant, moved the Court to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. 29 At a July 11, 2016 status conference, West represented to the Court
that he had no opposition to the United States’ motion to dismiss and, therefore, the
Court granted the United States’ motion to dismiss without prejudice, reserving West
the right to appeal all previous orders of the Court. 30 Thereafter, on July 12, 2016,
the Court issued its final judgment in favor of all defendants and against West. 31 On
August 11, 2016, West filed a notice of appeal specifically asking the United States
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
27 R. Doc. No. 85. West had amended his complaint twice to assert Bivens claims
against additional defendants Peggy Cuevas, Lindsay Bartucco, and Shanda Stucker,
R. Doc. No. 17, at 7, as well as Reith and Parrot. R. Doc. No. 59, at 2.
28 See R. Doc. No. 102.
29 See R. Doc. No. 103.
30 R. Doc. No. 104, at 1.
31 See R. Doc. No. 105.
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Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to review this Court’s December 22, 2015 order and
reasons. 32
While his appeal of the above-captioned matter was pending, on May 5, 2017,
West filed a separate lawsuit against the United States Department of Defense
seeking collateral review of West’s military courts-martial convictions. 33
That
lawsuit was transferred from another section of this Court to the undersigned as it
related to the above-captioned matter. 34
On May 9, 2017, West moved this Court to again reconsider its December 22,
2015 order and reasons. 35 However, he withdrew the motion two days later. 36
On July 10, 2017, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion affirming this Court’s
judgment. See West v. Reith, 705 F. App’x 211 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138 S. Ct.
1546 (2018). The Fifth Circuit specifically affirmed the Court’s December 22, 2015
order and reasons, stating that “[t]he district court correctly determined that West
had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the U.S. Attorney’s
certification was incorrect.” Id. at 213. The Fifth Circuit further held that this Court
did not abuse its discretion when it denied West’s motion for reconsideration. Id. at
215.
See R. Doc. No. 106. West also appealed the Court’s denial of his motion for
reconsideration, as well as the Court’s order as to the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. Id. Curiously, West does not mention his motion for
reconsideration or his appeal of this Court’s December 22, 2015 order and reasons
when discussing the procedural history of this case in his motion.
33 West v. Dep’t of Defense, No. 17-4746, R. Doc. No. 1, at 1–2 (E.D. La.).
34 West v. Dep’t of Defense, No. 17-4746, R. Doc. No. 3.
35 R. Doc. No. 111.
36 See R. Doc. Nos. 115 & 116.
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On August 8, 2017, in West’s second lawsuit before this Court, the Department
of Defense filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or, alternatively, for failure
to state a claim. 37 After extensive briefing by both parties, the parties consented to
transferring the case to the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Court of Federal
Claims”). 38 The case was transferred on October 20, 2017. 39
On September 7, 2018, the United States of America filed a motion for
summary judgment and a motion for judgment on the administrative record before
the Court of Federal Claims. 40 The United States specifically argued, in part, that
West was precluded from relitigating whether the individual defendants in the abovecaptioned matter falsely accused him of sexual assault and harassment based on this
Court’s order and reasons and the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 41
West
subsequently filed a cross motion for judgment on the administrative record and an
opposition to the United States’ motion. 42
On July 26, 2019, the Court of Federal Claims granted the United States’
motion for summary judgment and its motion for judgment on the administrative
record, and it denied West’s motion for judgment on the administrative record. 43
Relevant to the instant motion, the Court of Federal Claims held that West was
West v. Dep’t of Defense, No. 17-4746, R. Doc. No. 12.
West v. Dep’t of Defense, No. 17-4746, R. Doc. Nos. 33, 35, & 38; see West v. United
States, No. 17-2052 (Fed. Cl.).
39 West v. Dep’t of Defense, No. 17-4746, R. Doc. Nos. 38 & 39; see West v. United States,
No. 17-2052 (Fed. Cl.).
40 See West v. United States, No. 17-2052, R. Doc. No. 40 (sealed).
41 Id. at 26–30 (sealed).
42 See West v. United States, No. 17-2052, R. Doc. No. 53 (sealed).
43 See West v. United States, No. 17-2052, R. Doc. No. 79 (sealed).
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collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether he was falsely accused of
sexual assault and harassment by the individual defendants, finding that West had
fully litigated said issue before this Court. 44
West now moves this Court for a third bite at the apple, this time pursuant to
Rule 60(b), seeking relief from the Court’s almost four-year-old order and reasons. 45
II.
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for relief from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding in the following limited circumstances:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
West v. United States, No. 17-2052, R. Doc. No. 79, at 19 (citing West, 152 F. Supp.
3d at 541–546) (sealed).
45 The Court questions whether West’s motion is timely filed. Motions brought
pursuant to Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c).
The Court’s order and reasons was issued over three-and-a-half years ago. The Court
also questions whether West could have anticipated that the Court of Federal Claims
would find this Court’s reasoning to have a preclusive effect on the lawsuit before
that court and whether West could have filed an earlier motion. However, the United
States did not brief this issue in its response to West’s motion, so the Court will not
decide this issue.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) relief is “uncommon” and “will be afforded only in
‘unique circumstances.’” Lowry Dev., L.L.C. v. Groves & Assocs. Ins., Inc., 690 F.3d
382, 385 (5th Cir. 2012); Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 1985)
(quoting Wilson v. Atwood Group, 725 F.2d 255, 257, 258 (5th Cir. 1984)). “The Rule
is to be ‘liberally construed in order to do substantial justice,’ but at the same time,
‘final judgments should [not] be lightly reopened.’” Lowry Dev., L.L.C., 690 F.3d at
385 (citation omitted).
When deciding whether to grant relief under Rule 60(b), the Court may
consider several factors:
(1) that final judgments should not lightly be disturbed; (2)
that the Rule 60(b) motion is not to be used as a substitute
for appeal; (3) that the rule should be liberally construed in
order to do substantial justice; (4) whether the motion was
made within a reasonable time; (5) whether—if the
judgement was a default or a dismissal in which there was
no consideration of the merits—the interest in deciding
cases on the merits outweighs, in the particular case, the
interest in the finality of judgments, and there is merit in
the movant's claim or defense; (6) whether there are any
intervening equities that would make it inequitable to
grant relief; and (7) any other factors relevant to the justice
of the judgment under attack.
Edward H. Bohlin Co., Inc. v. Banning Co., Inc., 6 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981)).
West specifically seeks relief from this Court’s order and reasons pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(6), which permits a court to grant relief from an earlier judgment for “any
other reason that justifies relief” besides those articulated in clauses (1) through (5).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). This clause “provides a grand reservoir of equitable power to
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do justice in a particular case.” Gov’t Fin. Servs. One Ltd. P’ship v. Peyton Place, Inc.,
62 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). However, relief may only be
granted “if extraordinary circumstances are present.” Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212,
216 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Batts v. Tow–Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743, 747 (5th
Cir. 1995)). “[T]he movant must show ‘the initial judgment to have been manifestly
unjust.’” Edward H. Bohlin, 6 F.3d at 357.
III.
West argues that relief is warranted under Rule 60(b)(6) for three reasons.
First, he argues that the Court of Federal Claims’ decision in West v. United States
“made a patent error in its interpretation of this Court’s” order and reasons. 46
Second, he argues that relief from this Court’s order and reasons will not have an
effect on the finality of this Court’s final judgment in this matter. 47 Finally, West
asserts that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) will not cause any unfair prejudice to the
United States. 48 West has failed to show that any one of these reasons justifies relief
under Rule 60(b)(6).
A.
West asserts that this Court should provide him relief from the “preclusive
effects” of its order and reasons because the Court of Federal Claims “made a patent
error in its interpretation” of this Court’s order and reasons. West does not argue,
however, that this Court erred in its order and reasons and, in fact, admits that the
R. Doc. No. 122-2, at 10.
Id.; see R. Doc. No. 105.
48 R. Doc. No. 122-1, at 11.
46
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individual defendants’ alleged tortious conduct, i.e. their allegations, “were arguably
within the scope of the accusers’ employment under applicable Louisiana law.” 49
West makes the conclusory assertion that extraordinary circumstances exist, and
that manifest injustice will occur if this Court does not revisit its order and reasons.
West argues that an appeal of the Court of Federal Claims’ judgment, of which
he intends to avail himself, would be “unduly burdensome.” 50 However, he fails to
explain how such an appeal would be more burdensome than any other appeal
customarily filed by any aggrieved party. West’s grievances are more appropriately
directed at the Court of Federal Claims or its reviewing court, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. As stated previously, Rule 60(b) is not to be
used as a substitute for appeal.
West has not demonstrated extraordinary
circumstances or manifest injustice in connection with his first argument that would
entitle him to relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
B.
Second, West argues that relief from this Court’s order and reasons will not
have any effect on the finality of this Court’s July 12, 2016 judgment. The Court
disagrees.
West argues that, “after re-opening and re-considering all of the evidence put
before the Court in this matter,” this Court can maintain its judgment by finding the
basis of its dismissal “on factors other than any factual determination of the truth or
49
50
Id.
Id.
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falsity of the allegations of sexual assault and sexual harassment.” 51 However, West
has not articulated how the Court might reach the same conclusion without
considering the truth or falsity of the individual defendants’ allegations, he has not
directed the Court to specific evidence that it might reconsider, and West has not
specifically challenged this Court’s reasoning or its conclusion. 52
As mentioned
previously, this Court’s order and reasons has already been revisited twice, once by
this Court on West’s motion for reconsideration and later by the Fifth Circuit
affirming this Court’s decision.
For reasons articulated by the government, as well as those reasons stated
herein, “Rule 60(b)(6) will not be used to relieve a party from the ‘free, calculated, and
deliberate choices he has made.’” Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, 727 F.3d 356, 363
(5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Edward H. Bohlin, 6 F.3d at 357). West’s second basis for
relief is unavailing as he has not demonstrated manifest injustice or extraordinary
circumstances that would warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
C.
Finally, West argues that no unfair prejudice would befall the United States
if he is granted relief under Rule 60(b). West asserts that relief in his favor would
simply require the United States to “fairly contest” the issue of whether the
Id.
“At this point, after further consideration of all of the evidence, plaintiff hereby
acknowledges that, notwithstanding the clear falsity of allegations of sexual assault
and sexual harassment against him, said allegations were arguably within the scope
of the accusers’ employment under applicable Louisiana law.” Id. at 10–11.
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individual defendants’ allegations were false.53
As previously demonstrated,
West has involved the United States in years of litigation, repeatedly
challenging this Court’s determination that West did not meet his burden of
demonstrating that the individual
defendants’
outside the scope of their employment.
the United States in the first instance.
allegations
were
false
and
These issues were fully briefed by
West does not provide any legitimate
argument or legal authority to demonstrate how or why this Court could or
should modify its order and reasons. West, not respecting the finality of judgment,
seeks to reopen issues that have been fully litigated and which would require the
United States to expend additional resources defending this Court’s order and
reasons already affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. The Court finds that such request
would cause unfair prejudice to the United States.
IV.
Having considered each of West’s arguments and all of the relevant Rule 60(b)
factors, the Court is unpersuaded that West has provided any persuasive reasons for
the Court to exercise its discretion and grant him relief from its December 22, 2015
order and reasons.
53
Id. at 8–9.
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Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that West’s motion is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, August 19, 2019.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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