D'Aquin v. Rodriguez et al

Filing 47

ORDER and REASONS re 18 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction filed by the defendants. IT IS ORDERED that the Federal Defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 18) is GRANTED, and the Complaint is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. This ruling considered, the Court declines to address grounds for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated within document. Signed by Chief Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt on 11/3/2016. (cbs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

THOMAS L. D'AQUIN

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 15-2637

LEON RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.

SECTION “N” (4)

ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 18), filed by the defendants, United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) and Leon Rodriquez, in his capacity as
Director of USCIS (together, “Federal Defendants”). The plaintiff, Thomas L. D’Aquin
(“D’Aquin” or “Plaintiff”) has filed a memorandum in opposition, and the Federal Defendants
have filed a reply. (See Rec. Docs. 26 & 37). Now, having considered the submissions of the
parties, the record, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS the Motion for the reasons stated
herein.
I.

BACKGROUND

Proceeding pro se, D’Aquin sues the Federal Defendants for violating unspecified
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, D’Aquin contends that:
On June 15, 2015, Plaintiff and spouse presented Advance Parole application
because of need of surgery needed for ankle repair. Unknown [] Employees of the
USCIS New Orleans office denied application in nine minutes. Unknown

Employees of New Orleans determined that denial was based on the fact [that]
Plaintiff was white and his spouse did not need to leave the country.

(Rec. Doc. 1 at p. 1). Elsewhere in the Complaint, Plaintiff charges that the denial of his spouse’s
“Advance Parole application” constituted a discriminatory act based on “the race and ethnicity of
his spouse.” (Rec. Doc. 1 at p. 1).
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the Federal Defendants
now move for dismissal, arguing that: (1) D’Aquin lacks standing to sue, (2) the Federal
Defendants are immune from suit, and (3) D’Aquin has failed to plead a facially plausible claim.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(1) provides for the dismissal of an action upon a finding by the court that it
does not have subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Subsection (6) of the same rule
provides for dismissal based on a party’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Where “a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12
motions,” including one brought under Rule 12(b)(6), “the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1)
jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming v. United States, 281
F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977)
(“Ordinarily, where both [Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)] grounds for dismissal apply, the court
should dismiss only on the jurisdictional ground . . . without reaching the question of failure to
state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”)). This approach ensures that a court without
jurisdiction is prevented “from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice.” Ramming, 281 F.3d
at 161.

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The court must grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when it
does not have the requisite statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. See Home
Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1998) (quoting
Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2nd Cir.1996)). As the party
invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that
jurisdiction exists. Dow v. Agrosciences, LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 2003).
III.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

1. Standing
Ingrained in the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III is the “irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing,” which “consists of three elements: (1) an injury in fact, by
which is meant an invasion of a legally protected interest; (2) a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.” Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition to these three
constitutional limitations, there exists prudential limitations on the exercise of federal-court
jurisdiction, which “closely relate[ ] to Art. III concerns but [are] essentially matters of judicial
self-governance.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). One such limitation is that “the
plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief
on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Id. at 499. In the context of a claim for deprivation
of constitutional rights, the Fifth Circuit has held that plaintiffs “[are] required to prove some
violation of their personal rights.” Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing
Dohaish v. Tooley, 670 F.2d 934 (10th Cir.) (right to bring action under Civil Rights Act is personal
in nature and does not accrue to a relative), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982)).
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In the present case, D’Aquin alleges that USCIS employees discriminated against both him
and his spouse when they denied her advanced parole application. To the extent that his civil rights
claim is based on discrimination against his spouse, D’Aquin lacks standing to bring suit on her
behalf. To the extent the claim is based on the deprivation of his own rights, however, D’Aquin
indeed has standing to press his suit.
2. Sovereign Immunity
Similar to standing, invocation of the sovereign immunity defense is a challenge to the
court’s jurisdiction. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). “A party may not bring suit
against the United States absent an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress. This
immunity extends to the government’s officers and agencies.” Drake v. Panama Canal Com’n,
907 F.2d 532, 534 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted).
Here, the Federal Defendants consist of the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services and its Director, Leon Rodriquez. As a federal agency and officer, the Federal Defendants
are protected by principles of sovereign immunity. As the party invoking the jurisdiction of this
Court, the burden rests on D’Aquin to identify a waiver of the Federal Defendants’ immunity.
Because he has failed to carry this burden, the Court must dismiss the case for jurisdictional
deficiencies.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Federal Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1)
Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 18) is GRANTED, and the Complaint is hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. This ruling considered, the Court declines to address grounds for
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 3rd day of November 2016.

________________________________
KURT D. ENGELHARDT
United States District Judge

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