Bickerstaff et al v. Bickerstaff et al

Filing 16

ORDER AND REASONS granting 8 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Party Jule R. Herbert, Jr and Jule R. Herbert, Jr., P.C. dismissed. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/7/16. (jjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LORETTA LOIS BICKERSTAFF
APPEARING HEREIN THROUGH HER
LEGALLY APPOINTED AGENT IN FACT
AND MANDATARY, GERALD GREGORY
BICKERSTAFF

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 15-3639

CAROLYN KRIDER BICKERSTAFF, ET AL.

SECTION “R” (3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff Loretta Bickerstaff filed this state-law property dispute against her sisterin-law Carolyn Bickerstaff, attorney Jule Herbert, and Jule R. Herbert, Jr., P.C. 1
Defendants Jule Herbert and Jule R. Herbert, Jr., P.C. move the Court to dismiss
plaintiff’s claims against them for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2). 2 Herbert, the individual, is an Alabama resident. Herbert, the
professional corporation, is incorporated and has its principal place of business in
Alabama.

Because neither defendant has the requisite minimum contacts with

Louisiana, the Court grants the motion to dismiss.

I.

BACKGROUND
This diversity action, for defendants’ alleged negligence, fraud, and breach of

fiduciary duties, arises out of a property ownership dispute. Plaintiff Loretta Bickerstaff
contends that she is the valid legal owner of a beach house in Gulf Shores, Alabama. The

1

See generally R. Doc. 1.

2

R. Doc. 8.

facts, as alleged in plaintiff’s complaint and supplemented by the parties’ briefs and
exhibits, are as follows.
Plaintiff purchased the Alabama beach house in July 1993.3 In February 2010,
plaintiff granted her brother, Richard Bickerstaff, power of attorney, giving him
management and control of her affairs. 4 A November 13, 2010 “Assumption Warranty
Deed,” prepared by defendant Jule Herbert in Alabama, but executed before Roxana Ross
in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, appears to transfer ownership of the beach house from
plaintiff to Richard Bickerstaff

for ten dollars. 5

Herbert contends that Richard

Bickerstaff’s son-in-law, Charles “Benny” Hausknecht, Jr., asked him to prepare the
Assumption Warranty Deed. 6

According to Herbert, his office (defendant Jule R.

Herbert, Jr., P.C.) prepared the Assumption Warranty Deed and forwarded it to
Hausknecht in Louisiana. 7 Plaintiff and Richard Bickerstaff executed the contract before
Roxanna Ross in Louisiana on November 13. Herbert’s office then recorded the contract
in the public records of Baldwin County, Alabama on December 7, 2010. 8 According to

3

R. Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 13.

4

Id. at ¶ 14.

5

R. Doc. 10, Exhibit A-1.

6

R. Doc. 8-2 at 1 ¶ 3.

7

Id. at 1-2 ¶ 4.

8

Id. at 2 ¶ 5.

plaintiff, she did not knowingly transfer ownership of the beach house in November 2010
or receive any money from the alleged transfer. 9
Following the 2010 explosion of British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon drilling
rig in the Gulf of Mexico, Richard Bickerstaff allegedly filed a BP claim and attempted to
collect settlement proceeds for the loss of rental revenue and diminished value of the
beach house. According to plaintiff, on October 24, 2013, Herbert assisted Richard
Bickerstaff in pursuing his BP claim by writing a letter to Richard, which stated,
In writing this letter, I am confirming that my office prepared an
Assumption Warranty Deed for the property referenced below. . . . Although
the stated consideration was minimal, the appraised value at the time of this
transaction—and actual consideration for the transfer[—]was $413,100.00,
and the transfer deed tax was duly reported and paid based on that
amount. 10
Hausknecht appears to have used this letter in his communications with a BP claims
reviewer. 11 According to plaintiff, the BP claim records also show two “HUD-1 Settlement
Statements” that Herbert prepared. These settlement statements reflect the purported
transfer of the beach house from plaintiff to Richard Bickerstaff in November 2010. 12
Plaintiff sued Richard Bickerstaff in Louisiana state court on May 16, 2014,
attacking the November 2010 Assumption Warranty Deed as invalid. One week later, on
May 23, 2014, Richard Bickerstaff and his wife, defendant Carolyn Bickerstaff, executed
a “Second Mortgage” on the beach house. By the Second Mortgage, Richard Bickerstaff,
as mortgagor, purported to grant an interest in the beach house to Carolyn Bickerstaff, as

9

R. Doc. 10, Exhibit A.

10

R. Doc. 10, Exhibit A-3.

11

R. Doc. 10, Exhibit A-8.

12

R. Doc. 10, Exhibits A-4, A-5.

mortgagee, to secure prompt payment of a $241,534 debt Richard allegedly owed to
Carolyn. Herbert also prepared this Second Mortgage, and Richard and Carolyn executed
the contract in Herbert’s office in Baldwin County, Alabama on May 23, 2014. 13
According to Herbert, he drafted this contract again at the insistence of Benny
Hausknecht. 14 Herbert recorded the Second Mortgage in the Baldwin County public
records on June 6, 2014. 15 According to plaintiff, this Second Mortgage is a sham and
“part of [a] scheme to deprive [plaintiff] of the beach house.” 16
On August 19, 2015, plaintiff, through her current legally appointed agent-in-fact
and mandatary Gerald Gregory Bickerstaff, filed this lawsuit, alleging defendants Carolyn
Bickerstaff, Jule Herbert, and Jule Herbert’s professional corporation are liable to her for
“negligence, fraud, collusion, breach of fiduciary duties, and breach of contract.”17
Plaintiff, considering herself to be Herbert’s client, contends that Herbert “completely
disregarded” their attorney-client relationship and breached the “fiduciary, legal, and
ethical duties” he owed to plaintiff by repeatedly engaging in conflicted transactions
regarding her beach house property. 18 Plaintiff asks the Court to rescind the Second

13

R. Doc. 10, Exhibit A-6.

14

R. Doc. 8-2 at 2 ¶ 6-7.

15

Id. at ¶ 8.

16

R. Doc. 1 at 4 ¶ 21.

17

Id. at 3.

18

See id. at 3-6.

Mortgage, order defendants to cancel the Second Mortgage from the Baldwin County
public records, and award plaintiff damages, including pain and suffering. 19
Defendants Herbert and Herbert’s professional corporation, both citizens of
Alabama, 20 now move the Court to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against them for lack of
personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). 21 Herbert submits
an affidavit, in which he declares, among other things:
•

Herbert is not licensed to practice law in Louisiana;

•

Herbert does not solicit business in Louisiana and did not solicit Benny
Hausknecht’s referral of work for the contracts at issue here;

•

The services provided by Herbert’s office for the contracts at issue were performed
and carried out in Alabama; and

•

Herbert has no knowledge that the Second Mortgage executed in favor of Carolyn
Bickerstaff is a sham or that Richard Bickerstaff is not the legal owner of the beach
house by virtue of the November 2010 Assumption Warranty Deed. 22
In opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff submits her own affidavit. Plaintiff

declares, among other things:
•

Plaintiff did not knowingly transfer ownership of her beach house in November
2010 and did not learn about the purported transfer until “several years” later;

19

R. Doc. 1 at 4, 10.

20

See id. at 2.

21

See R. Doc. 8.

22

R. Doc. 8-2 at 2-3.

•

Plaintiff “thought defendant Jule R. Herbert should have contacted [her]” about
the legal services he rendered to others in connection with the beach house;

•

“The Herbert defendants knew or should have known that the Second Mortgage
executed in favor of Carolyn Bickerstaff was a sham”; and

•

“The Herbert defendants knew or should have known that Richard Bickerstaff was
not the legal owner of the property transferred in the Assumption Warranty Deed
in 2010 and that [plaintiff has] been the legal owner of the beach house since . . .
1993.”

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Personal jurisdiction is essential to the jurisdiction of a district court—without it,

the court is “powerless to proceed to . . . adjudication.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,
526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (quoting Emp'rs Reinsurance Corp. v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374,
382 (1937)). When a nonresident defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden to show that personal jurisdiction exists.
Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2002). When the court rules on a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction without holding an evidentiary hearing, as in this
case, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie case that jurisdiction exists; “[p]roof by a
preponderance of the evidence is not required.” Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int'l Corp.,
523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008).

The allegations of the complaint, except as

controverted by opposing affidavits, are taken as true, and all conflicts in the facts are
resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Id.; Revell, 317 F.3d at 469. In making its determination,
the court may consider “affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any

combination of the recognized methods of discovery.” Revell, 317 F.3d at 469 (quoting
Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1985)).
A court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant if (1) the forum state's long-arm
statute confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and (2) the forum state's exercise
of jurisdiction complies with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
Because Louisiana's long-arm statute, La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3201, et seq., extends
jurisdiction to the full limits of due process, the Court's inquiry collapses into a single
question: whether the exercise of its jurisdiction in this case satisfies federal due process
requirements. Dickson Mar. Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 1999)
(citing La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3201(B)); Alonso v. Line, 846 So. 2d 745, 750 (La. 2003). The
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant satisfies due process when (1) the
defendant “has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum
state by establishing 'minimum contacts' with the forum state;” and (2) the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Revell, 317 F.3d at 470 (quoting Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d
333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999)).
There are two ways to establish minimum contacts: specific jurisdiction and
general jurisdiction.

See id.

General jurisdiction is not at issue here. 23

Specific

jurisdiction exists when a nonresident defendant “has purposefully directed its activities
at the forum state and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate
to those activities.” Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865,
868 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco A.B., 205 F.3d 208, 215 (5th

23

R. Doc. 10 at 3 (arguing only specific jurisdiction).

Cir. 2000)); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
414 n.8 (1984). Minimum contacts may be established by actions, or even a single act, by
the nonresident defendant whereby it “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). “The non-resident's ‘purposeful availment’ must
be such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the
forum state.” Ruston Gas Turbines Inc. v. Donaldson Co., 9 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1993)
(quoting World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
Importantly, “[t]he unilateral activity of [a plaintiff] who claim[s] some relationship with
a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.”
Pervasive Software Inc. v. Lexware GmbH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
The Fifth Circuit has synthesized the test for specific jurisdiction into a three-step
inquiry:
(1) whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, i.e.,
whether it purposely directed its activities toward the forum state or
purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities there; (2)
whether the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or results from the
defendant's forum-related contacts; and (3) whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.
Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nuovo
Pignone, SpA v. STORMAN ASIA M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)). “If the plaintiff
successfully satisfies the first two prongs, the burden shifts to the defendant to defeat
jurisdiction by showing that its exercise would be unfair or unreasonable.” Id.

III.

DISCUSSION
Having reviewed plaintiff’s complaint, the parties’ briefs, and the affidavits and

exhibits submitted with those briefs, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction
over defendants Jule R. Herbert and his professional corporation. The extent of Herbert’s
contacts with the state of Louisiana are as follows. 24
In 2010, Benny Hausknecht, a Louisiana resident, 25 contacted Herbert, in
Alabama, about preparing an assumption warranty deed regarding the beach house,
which is located in Alabama. 26 Hausknecht contacted Herbert on behalf of Hausknecht’s
father-in-law, Richard Bickerstaff, another Louisiana resident. 27 Herbert prepared the
Assumption Warranty deed in Alabama and mailed it to Hausknecht in Louisiana. 28 After
the Assumption Warranty Deed was executed before a notary in Louisiana, someone
(presumably Hausknecht or Richard Bickerstaff) sent the executed deed back to Herbert

24

Plaintiff does not contend that anyone employed by Jule R. Hebert, Jr., P.C. other
than Herbert acted as the corporation’s agent in its contacts with Louisiana. Thus, the
Court’s analysis of Herbert’s contacts addresses whether the Court has personal
jurisdiction over him and his professional corporation.
Though plaintiff fails to explicitly state that Hausknecht is a Louisiana resident,
plaintiff notes that “Hausknecht lives next door to defendant Carolyn Bickerstaff,” R. Doc.
10 at 7, and according to plaintiff’s complaint, Carolyn Bickerstaff is domiciled in the
Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. R. Doc. 1 at 2. ¶ 2.
25

26

R. Doc. 8-2 at 1 ¶ 3.

27

R. Doc. 10-2 at 3 (listing Richard Bickerstaff’s address).

28

R. Doc. 8-2 at 1 ¶ 4.

in Alabama. At some point, Herbert prepared “HUD-1 Settlement Statements” regarding
the property transfer. 29
Three years later, on October 24, 2013, Herbert mailed a letter from his office in
Alabama to Richard Bickerstaff in Louisiana. 30 The letter states that Herbert prepared
the November 2010 Assumption Warranty Deed and that the “actual consideration for
the transfer [of ownership] was $413,100.00.” 31 Hausknecht then attached Herbert’s
letter to Richard Bickerstaff to a letter Hausknecht wrote a claims reviewer for the BP
settlement. 32
In May 2014, Hausknecht again contacted Herbert on behalf of Richard
Bickerstaff. 33 Hausknecht asked Herbert to draft a second mortgage on the beach house
in Alabama in favor of Richard’s wife, Carolyn Bickerstaff. 34 Herbert prepared the
contract, and Richard and Carolyn Bickerstaff executed the Second Mortgage in Herbert’s
office in Baldwin County, Alabama. 35
Under similar circumstances, courts have found that the nonresident defendants
lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state to give rise to personal jurisdiction. For
example, in Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, the Fifth Circuit found that the defendant,
29

R. Doc. 10, Exhibits A-4, A-5.

30

R. Doc. 10, Exhibit A-3.

31

Id.

32

R. Doc. 10, Exhibit A-8.

33

R. Doc. 8-2 at 2 ¶ 6.

34

Id.

35

Id. at ¶ 7; R. Doc. 10, Exhibit A-6, at 4.

an Oklahoma resident, had (1) contracted with a Texas resident, (2) mailed the parties’
final contract to Texas, (3) mailed three contractual payments to Texas, and (4) “engaged
in extensive telephonic and written communications” with the Texas plaintiff. 801 F.2d
773, 777-78 (5th Cir. 1986). In holding that these contacts were insufficient to vest the
Texas district court with personal jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit explained:
[M]erely contracting with a resident of the forum state is insufficient to
subject the nonresident to the forum’s jurisdiction. . . . Our conclusion is
further bolstered by the fact that performance of the contract was centered
in Oklahoma rather than Texas. Given that the material performance
occurred in Oklahoma, the fact that [the defendant] mailed payments to
Texas does not weigh heavily in our determination. Finally, the exchange
of communications between Texas and Oklahoma in the course of
developing and carrying out the contract was in itself also insufficient to
constitute purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of Texas
law. These communications to Texas rested on nothing but “the mere
fortuity that [the plaintiff] happens to be a resident of the forum.”
Id. at 778 (citations omitted).
The Fifth Circuit recently relied on its holding in Holt Oil in finding that a Texas
partnership and limited liability company did not have sufficient contacts with Louisiana
to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Brammer Eng’g, Inc. v. E. Wright
Mountain Ltd. P’ship, 307 F. App’x 845 (5th Cir. 2009). In Brammer Engineering, the
Fifth Circuit reiterated that “the fact that defendants may have been parties to contracts
with Louisiana residents, including [the plaintiff], does not give rise to jurisdiction.” Id.
at 847-48. The court also held that the defendants’ communications with Louisiana
residents and requests for information to be sent to the defendants were “at most, merely
incidental to performance of the Texas-centered contract and resulted only from the
coincidence that [plaintiff] is a Louisiana resident. Such incidental requests . . . do not
evidence defendants’ purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of Louisiana
law.” Id. at 848.

In Advance Petroleum Services, Inc. v. Cucullu, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court
of Appeal held that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over a Texas attorney who
represented a Louisiana resident and allegedly committed malpractice. 614 So. 2d 878,
879 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1993). The court explained that the attorney was hired by a Louisiana
resident while the attorney lived and practiced in Texas, the attorney did not advertise in
Louisiana or solicit work there, and the attorney performed all of the work associated with
the Louisiana resident in Texas. Id. at 880. These contacts were insufficient to allow the
state trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction.
The material facts of this case are indistinguishable from those in Holt Oil,
Brammer Engineering, and Advance Petroleum. Plaintiff does not dispute that Herbert
lives and works in Alabama. Plaintiff also does not dispute that Herbert is not licensed to
practice in Louisiana. Herbert does not solicit business in Louisiana. Here, Herbert was
solicited by a Louisiana resident, Hausknecht, to perform legal work in Alabama
regarding property located in Alabama. Though plaintiff alleges that Herbert directed
communications to Louisiana on two occasions (mailing the warranty deed to
Hausknecht in November 2010 and mailing the letter about his work on the warranty
deed to Richard Bickerstaff in October 2013), this is insufficient to constitute purposeful
availment of Louisiana law. See Holt Oil, 801 F.2d at 778; Brammer Eng’g, 307 F. App’x
at 848.

If the mere exchange of communication sufficed, a court could exercise

jurisdiction “based only on the fortuity that one of the parties happens to reside in the
forum state.” Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 481 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2007).
But as noted, “fortuitous[] or attenuated contacts are not sufficient to establish
jurisdiction.” Id.

Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unintelligible or otherwise meritless.
Plaintiff appears to argue that, notwithstanding well-established rules of professional
conduct, merely because Herbert drafted the Assumption Warranty Deed and the Second
Mortgage of the beach house, every person involved in those contracts was or is Herbert’s
client. In other words, plaintiff contends that plaintiff is Herbert’s client—even though
plaintiff did not know who Herbert was until “several years” later—because she owned the
beach house before the purported transfer to Richard Bickerstaff;36 that Richard
Bickerstaff is Herbert’s client because “it was on [Richard’s] behalf that the Warranty
Deed was drafted”; 37 that “defendant Carolyn Bickerstaff is Herbert’s client [because] she
was the ‘mortgagee’ on the beach house” in the Second Mortgage; and finally, that Benny
Hausknecht is Herbert’s client because he originally asked Herbert to prepare the beach
house contracts. 38 Thus, according to plaintiff, Herbert has four clients in Louisiana.
Even if this is true, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Herbert. In
analyzing jurisdiction, the Court must focus on “the defendant’s contacts with the forum
state itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden v. Fiore,
134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014). When the only basis for personal jurisdiction is a defendant’s
“relationship with a plaintiff or third party,” personal jurisdiction does not exist. Id. at
1123.

36

R. Doc. 1 at 3 ¶ 11 (“Loretta . . . was owed fiduciary, legal, and ethical duties by the
Herbert defendants, as the Herbert defendants took multiple actions concerning property
she owned . . . .”); R. Doc. 10, Exhibit A at 2 ¶¶ 3, 8 (“After discovering what legal services
were rendered by the Herbert defendants concerning my beach house to others . . . I
thought Jule R. Herbert should have contacted me about said legal services.”).
37

Id. at 6.

38

Id. at 7.

Plaintiff also emphasizes Herbert’s “role” in Richard Bickerstaff’s filing allegedly
fraudulent BP claims. Plaintiff’s arguments here go more toward the merits of her claims
than whether this Court may exercise jurisdiction over Herbert. These arguments are
therefore not helpful to the Court’s analysis. For example, plaintiff notes that Herbert
prepared HUD-1 Settlement Statements, but does not contend that he prepared these
documents anywhere other than in Alabama.

Plaintiff also highlights purported

discrepancies between two settlement statements, contending that this reveals Herbert’s
“efforts to violate established real estate laws.” 39 Regardless, these alleged discrepancies
do not confer personal jurisdiction over Herbert in Louisiana.
Finally, plaintiff appears to argue that the method by which Herbert, along with
Richard and Carolyn Bickerstaff, executed the Second Mortgage on the beach house
supports this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Mischaracterizing Herbert’s arguments for
dismissal, plaintiff argues, “Herbert relies upon the fact that the Warranty Deed was
executed in Louisiana to attempt to escape the Court’s jurisdictional reach; does the
opposite apply if another Herbert document, the Second Mortgage, was executed in
Alabama?” 40 As repeatedly noted, the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction depends
on Herbert’s contacts with Louisiana. That Herbert oversaw the execution of the Second
Mortgage in Alabama, rather than Louisiana, supports Herbert’s argument that his work
was limited to his home state and that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction. 41

39

Id. at 9.

40

Id. at 11.

Even though plaintiff does not argue it, the Court has considered Calder v. Jones,
465 U.S. 783 (1984), and concludes that it does not warrant finding personal jurisdiction
over Herbert. Again, there is no evidence that Herbert’s actions were targeted at
Louisiana, rather than Alabama. “The ‘effects’ test in Calder does not supplant the need
41

Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has not made a prima facie case that
jurisdiction exists.

Because plaintiff has not shown that Herbert has the requisite

minimum contacts with Louisiana, the Court need not consider whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss. The

Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE plaintiff’s claims against Jule R. Herbert, and
Jule R. Herbert, Jr., P.C. for lack of personal jurisdiction.

7th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this ___ day of April, 2016.

___________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

to demonstrate minimum contacts that constitute purposeful availment[,]” see Mullins v.
TestAmerica, Inc., 564 F.3d 386, 400 (5th Cir. 2009), and “the focal point . . . of the harm
suffered” by plaintiff is Alabama, because the property of which she was allegedly
fraudulently deprived is located there. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.