Cain et al v. New Orleans City et al

Filing 109

ORDER AND REASONS denying 52 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 4/21/16. (jjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALANA CAIN, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 15-4479

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL.

SECTION: R(2)

ORDER AND REASONS
Named plaintiffs Alana Cain, Ashton Brown, Reynaud Variste,
Reynajia Variste, Thaddeus Long, and Vanessa Maxwell filed this civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to declare the manner in which the
Orleans Parish Criminal District Court collects post-judgment court costs
from indigent debtors unconstitutional. According to plaintiffs, the Criminal
District Court and other, related actors maintain a policy of jailing criminal
defendants who fail to pay their court costs solely because of their indigence.1
The “judicial defendants” move the Court to dismiss this case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.2 Although defendants concede that this Court
has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ constitutional claims arising

See generally R. Doc. 7 (Plaintiffs’ First Amended Class Action
Complaint).
1

R. Doc. 52. The “judicial defendants” are the Orleans Parish Criminal
District Court, its thirteen judges, and the judicial administrator, Robert
Kazik. Originally, plaintiffs also sued the Criminal District Court clerk,
Arthur Morell, but he has been voluntarily dismissed. R. Doc. 65.

2

1

under section 1983, they argue that the facts and circumstances presented
here demand the Court’s abstaining from jurisdiction.3 For the following
reasons, the Court denies the motion.

I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Allegations

In this section 1983 civil rights lawsuit, plaintiffs allege, on behalf of
themselves and those similarly situated, that the City of New Orleans, the
Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, its judges and judicial administrator,
and Orleans Parish Sheriff Marlin Gusman maintain an unconstitutional
scheme of jailing indigent criminal defendants and imposing excessive bail
amounts for nonpayment “offenses” in an effort to collect unpaid court
courts. According to plaintiffs, the Criminal District Court maintains an
internal “Collections Department,” informally called the “fines and fees”
department, that oversees the collection of court debts from former criminal
defendants. The “typical” case allegedly proceeds as follows.
When a person is charged with a crime, the Criminal District Court
judges first determine whether the criminal defendant is legally “indigent,”

3

R. Doc. 52-1 at 1.
2

meaning they qualify for appointment of counsel through the Orleans Public
Defenders under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:175.

According to

plaintiffs, eight-five percent of the criminal defendants in Orleans Parish are
legally indigent.4 With assistance of counsel, the defendants either plead
guilty to their criminal charges or proceed to trial. If convicted, the criminal
defendants must appear before a judge at the Criminal District Court for
sentencing.
At sentencing, in addition to imposing a term of imprisonment or
probation, the court may assess against the criminal defendants various
“court costs.” These costs may include restitution to any victim, a statutory
fine, fees, or other costs imposed at the judge’s discretion. According to
plaintiffs, the discretionary assessments “fund the District Attorney’s office,
the Public Defender, and the Court[,]” which rely on these collections “to
fund their operations and to pay employee salaries and extra benefits.”5
Plaintiffs allege that the Criminal District Court judges impose court costs
without inquiring into the criminal defendants’ ability to pay.6

4

R. Doc. 7 at 5.

5

Id. at 22-23 ¶ 88.

6

Id. at 23 ¶ 91.
3

If the criminal defendants cannot immediately pay in full immediately,
the Criminal District Court judges direct them to the Collections
Department, or “fines and fees.” There, a Collections Department employee
imposes, at his discretion and without inquiring into a defendant’s ability to
pay, a payment schedule—usually requiring a certain amount per month.7
Collections Department employees also warn the defendants that failure to
pay the monthly amount, in full, will result in their arrests. Collections
Department employees refuse to accept anything less than full payment.8
When criminal defendants fail to pay, a Collections Department
employee allegedly issues a pre-printed warrant for the defendant’s arrest by
forging a judge’s name.9 According to plaintiffs, the Collections Department
often issues these warrants “years after a purported nonpayment,” and the
warrants are “routinely issued in error” or without regard to a debtor’s
indigence.10
Plaintiffs also allege that each Collections Department arrest warrant
is “accompanied by a preset $20,000 secured money bond required for

7

Id. at 27-28 ¶103.

8

Id. at 28 ¶ 106.

9

Id. at 29 ¶ 109.

10

Id. at ¶ 110.
4

release.”11 According to plaintiffs, defendants’ unwavering adherence to this
“automatic $20,000 secured money bond” requirement results from
defendants’ financial interest in state-court arrestees’ paying for their
release.12 Plaintiffs contend that the Criminal District Court judges collect
1.8% of each bond, while the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office, the
Orleans Public Defenders’ office, and the Orleans Parish Sheriff each collect
0.4% of each bond.13
When criminal defendants are arrested for nonpayment, they are
“routinely told” that to be released from prison, they must pay for the
$20,000 secured money bond, the entirety of their outstanding court debts,
or some other amount “unilaterally determine[d]” by the Collections
Department.14

As a result, these indigent debtors “languish” in prison

“indefinite[ly]” because they cannot afford to pay any of the foregoing
amounts.15 Although “arrestees are eventually brought to court,” the Sheriff,
the Criminal District Court, and the judges “have no set policy or practice”

11

Id. at ¶ 113.

12

Id. at 21-22 ¶88.

13

Id. at 22 ¶88.

14

Id. at 30 ¶114.

15

Id. at ¶115.
5

regarding how long arrestees must wait for a hearing. According to plaintiffs,
indigent debtors “routinely” spend a week or more in prison.16

Some

arrestees, with help from family and friends, pay for their release without
ever having a hearing and thus have “no opportunity to contest the debt or
the jailing.”17
When criminal defendants are brought to court, the Criminal District
Court judges allegedly send them back to prison if they are unable to pay
their debts or release them “on threat of future arrest and incarceration” if
they do not promptly pay the Collections Department.18 At these brief
“failure-to-pay hearings,” the judges do not consider the debtors’ abilities to
pay. 19
Plaintiffs contend that these practices are unconstitutional and have
created “a local debtors’ prison” in Orleans Parish.20

16

Id.

17

Id. at ¶114.

18

Id. at ¶116.

19

Id.

20

See R. Doc. 7 at 3.
6

B.

Parties

The named plaintiffs in the First Amended Complaint are six
individuals who were defendants in the Orleans Parish Criminal District
Court—Alana Cain, Ashton Brown, Reynaud Variste, Reynajia Variste,
Thaddeus Long, and Vanessa Maxwell.21 The facts pertaining to the named
plaintiffs, as alleged in their complaint, are as follows.
The Criminal District Court appointed counsel from the Orleans Public
Defenders to represent each of the named plaintiffs, except Reynaud Variste,
during their criminal proceedings.22 Thus, the court must have determined
Cain, Brown, Reynajia Variste, Long, and Maxwell to be legally indigent
21

R. Doc. 7 at 7 ¶7.

R. Doc. 59-3 at 1 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet, entry for 12/04/2012)
(“Court appointed Alex Liu, OPD.”), 5 (Ashton Brown Docket Sheet, entry for
10/02/2013) (“Court appointed Seth Wayne, OPD.”), 9 (Reynajia Variste
Docket Sheet, entry for 10/02/2014) (“Court appointed Lindsey Samuel,
OPD.”) 23 (Vanessa Maxwell Docket Sheet, entry for 12/14/2011) (“Court
appointed Jerrod Thompson-Hicks, OIPD.”); R. Doc.95-7 at 1 (Thaddeus
Long Docket Sheet, entry for 06/02/2011) (“Court appointed Anna Fecker,
OIDP).

22

On December 3, 2015, the Court took judicial notice of the facts
contained in the Criminal District Court docket sheets, signed guilty pleas,
sentencing hearing transcripts of certain named plaintiffs. R. Doc. 74. Since
then, defendants moved the Court to take judicial notice of the facts
contained in additional records, including court docket sheets, signed guilty
pleas, and sentencing hearing transcripts for other named plaintiffs. R. Doc.
95. To the extent the Court relies on these documents throughout this order,
defendants’ second motion to take judicial notice is granted in part.
7

under Louisiana Revised Statutes §15:175.23 Reynaud Variste appears to
have retained private counsel.24
With the assistance of counsel, all of the named plaintiffs pleaded
guilty to their respective criminal charges, which include theft,25 battery,26
drug possession,27 “simple criminal damage,”28 and disturbing the peace.29
At plaintiffs’ sentencings, the presiding judges imposed terms of
imprisonment, which were often suspended, as well as terms of active or
inactive probation. In addition, the judges assessed against plaintiffs various
court costs—whether restitution, fines, and/or discretionary fees and costs.30

23

See R. Doc. 7 at 5.

R. Doc. 59-3 at 14 (Reynaud Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 9/25/2012)
(“Defendant must retain private counsel.”).

24

25

Id. at 4 (Alana Cain Guilty Plea), 8 (Ashton Brown Guilty Plea).

26

Id. at 12 (Reynajia Variste Guilty Plea).

27

Id. at 22 (Reynaud Variste Guilty Plea).

28

Id. at 28 (Vanessa Maxwell Guilty Plea).

29

R. Doc. 95-7 at 5 (Thaddeus Long Guilty Plea).

R. Doc. 59-3 at 2 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet, entry for 5/30/2013), 6
(Ashton Brown Docket Sheet, entry for 12/16/2013), 9 (Reynajia Variste
Docket Sheet, entry for 10/21/2014), 18 (Reynaud Variste Docket Sheet,
entry for 10/31/2013), 23 (Vanessa Maxwell Docket Sheet, entry for
3/06/2012); R. Doc. 95-7 at 1 (Thaddeus Long Docket Sheet, entry for
7/29/2011).
30

8

At some point, all of the named plaintiffs were arrested for failing to pay
outstanding court costs.
For example, plaintiffs allege that on one occasion, Alana Cain
explained to a Collections Department supervisor that she could not satisfy
the full amount of her expected monthly payment.

The Collections

Department supervisor warned Cain that if she could not afford her monthly
payment, he would issue a warrant for her arrest.31 In March 2015, Cain was
arrested for failing to pay her court debts.32 Jail staff told Cain that her bail
was set at “a $20,000 secured bond pursuant to standard policy” and that
“there was no way to find out when her court date would be.”33 When Cain
eventually attended a hearing, the presiding judge told her that “if she ever
missed a payment again, she would have to spend 90 days in jail.”34 The
judge did not inquire into Cain’s ability to meet the monthly payments
imposed by the Collections Department.
According to plaintiffs, in July and August 2015, Ashton Brown spent
twenty-nine days in prison solely because of unpaid debts stemming from a

31

R. Doc. 7 at 10 ¶ 18.

32

Id. at ¶¶20-22.

33

Id. at 10-11 ¶¶22-23.

34

Id. at 11 ¶27.
9

2013 conviction.35 When Brown finally received a hearing on the issue of his
nonpayment, the presiding judge refused to release Brown, “unless he paid
at least $100.”36 Because Brown could not afford to pay, the judge set
another hearing for several days later and warned Brown “that he would be
kept in jail unless he got a family member to pay.”37 Eventually, Brown’s
family “scrape[d] together $100,” and Brown was released.38 Collections
Department employees have since threatened arrest and jail time if Brown
does not continue making monthly payments.39
Reynaud Variste was allegedly arrested for nonpayment in January
2015 when police “stormed [Variste’s] home with assault rifles and military
gear.”40 These officers told Variste “not to worry . . . because he simply owed
some old court costs.”41 In prison, jail staff allegedly told Variste that they

35

Id. at 12-13 ¶¶ 33-38.

36

Id. at 13 ¶ 38.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 14 ¶40.

39

Id.

40

Id. at ¶41.

41

Id. at ¶42.
10

“had no idea when or whether [he] would be taken to court.”42 A bail
bondsman told Variste that “he would probably not be released . . . until he
paid his entire court debts, which would be cheaper than paying the $20,000
money bond” imposed upon him.43 Eventually, Variste’s girlfriend paid “the
entire debt amount.” Variste was released from prison without a hearing.44
Reynajia Variste was arrested in May 2015 for failing to pay her court
costs. Jail staff allegedly told Variste that she could pay her outstanding
court debts or post the “standard $20,000 money bond” to be released.45
While Variste was still in jail, a Collections Department employee told a
member of Variste’s family that Variste had to pay “at least $400 before [the
Collections Department] would agree to let [Variste] out of jail.”46 The
Collections Department allegedly arrived at this amount because it was
“close to half of what [Variste] owed in total.”47 Variste spent at least seven
days in prison and was never given a hearing before her family gathered

42

Id. at 15 ¶47.

43

Id.

44

Id. at ¶48.

45

Id. at 16 ¶55.

46

Id. at 17 ¶57.

47

Id.
11

enough money “to buy her release.”48 According to the First Amended
Complaint, the Collections Department continues to threaten Reynajia
Variste with prison time if she cannot make her monthly payments.49
Plaintiffs contend that Thaddeus Long was wrongly arrested for failing
to pay his court costs because Long paid his debts in full years before.
According to the First Amended Complaint, Long was convicted in 2011 and
finished paying his court costs in October 2013.50 In June 2015, a New
Orleans police officer, conducting a traffic stop, discovered an outstanding
warrant for Long’s supposed nonpayment.51 The officer arrested Long, and
Long spent six days in prison, unable to post “the standard $20,000 secured
money bond” before he was given a hearing. At the failure-to-pay hearing,
Long explained that he had already paid his court debts in full, a “mistake . .
. apparent from the court records,” and he was released immediately.52

48

Id. at ¶60.

49

Id. at ¶ 64.

50

Id. at 18 ¶67.

51

Id.

52

Id. at ¶69.
12

Vanessa Maxwell allegedly spent twelve days in prison after her arrest
for nonpayment before being brought to court.53 According to plaintiffs, the
presiding judge did not evaluate Maxwell’s present ability to pay, but
nonetheless made her release from prison contingent on Maxwell’s paying
$191 “within a week.”54 Plaintiffs contend that Maxwell was never able to
come up with the money, and Maxwell is now “in imminent danger of arrest
. . . pursuant to monetary conditions that she cannot [meet].”55
Plaintiffs now sue the City of New Orleans for hiring the Criminal
District Court’s Collection Department workers, as well as the police officers
who execute the allegedly invalid arrest warrants.56 Plaintiffs also sue Sheriff
Marlin Gusman, in his official capacity, for “unconstitutionally detain[ing]
impoverished people indefinitely because of their inability to . . . pay[] for
their release.”57 In addition, plaintiffs sue the Orleans Parish Criminal
District Court for its role in managing and funding the Collections
Department, and the court’s Judicial Administrator, Robert Kazik, in his

53

Id. at 20 ¶83.

54

Id.

55

Id. at ¶84.

56

Id. at 7 ¶8.

57

Id. at 8 ¶12.
13

individual and official capacities, because he is allegedly responsible for
operating the Collections Department.58

Finally, plaintiffs name as

defendants every judge at the Criminal District Court—thirteen in all—
because they allegedly supervise the Collections Department employees and
have failed to provide the parish’s criminal defendants with constitutionallyrequired process before imprisoning people for failure to pay court costs.
Plaintiffs sue the judges only for declaratory relief.59
C.

Plaintiffs’ Claims for Relief

Plaintiffs filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as
violations of Louisiana tort law.

Plaintiffs seek damages (including

attorneys’ fees) and an injunction against all defendants, except the judges.
Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of
defendants’ practices.
The Court summarizes plaintiffs’ allegations, as articulated in the First
Amended Complaint, as follows:

58

Id. at 7-8 ¶¶9-10.

59

Id. at 8 ¶13.
14

(1)

Defendants’ policy of issuing and executing arrest warrants for
nonpayment of court costs is unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment;

(2)

Defendants’ policy of requiring a $20,000 “fixed secured money
bond” for each Collections Department warrant (issued for
nonpayment of court costs) is unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment;

(3)

Defendants’ policy of indefinitely jailing indigent debtors for
nonpayment of court costs without a judicial hearing is
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment;

(4)

Defendants’ “scheme of money bonds” to fund certain judicial
actors is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent defendants argue this
scheme is in compliance with Louisiana Revised Statutes §§
13:1381.5 and 22:822, which govern the percentage of each
surety bond that the judicial actors receive, those statutes are
unconstitutional;
15

(5)

Defendants’ policy of jailing indigent debtors for nonpayment of
court costs without any inquiry into their ability to pay is
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;

(6)

Defendants’ policy of jailing and threatening to imprison
criminal defendants for nonpayment of court debts is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it imposes unduly harsh and
punitive restrictions on debtors whose creditor is the State, as
compared to debtors who owe money to private creditors;

(7)

Defendants’ conduct constitutes wrongful arrest under Louisiana
law; and

(8)

Defendants’ conduct constitutes wrongful imprisonment under
Louisiana law.

D.

The Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

The Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, the thirteen judges, and
the judicial administrator now move to dismiss plaintiffs’ suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
Defendants admit that plaintiffs invoke the Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because plaintiffs’ constitutional claims
16

arise under section 1983.60 Nonetheless, defendants argue that “important
considerations of comity and federalism” demand that the Court decline
jurisdiction in this case.61 Defendants urge the Court to abstain under the
doctrines announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (“Younger
abstention”); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (“Burford
abstention”); and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C.
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (collectively, the “RookerFeldman doctrine”). The Court first addresses whether certain plaintiffs
have standing and then addresses each of defendants’ arguments in turn.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Motions submitted under Rule 12(b)(1) of Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure allow a party to challenge the court's subject matter jurisdiction
on the allegations of the complaint. Lopez v. City of Dallas, Tex., 2006 WL
1450520, *2 (N.D. Tex. 2006). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to

Defendants do not address the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction to
hear plaintiffs’ state-law claims, which are “so related” to the constitutional
claims as to “form part of the same case or controversy.” See 28 U.S. § 1367.
Defendants’ arguments for dismissal are directed only to plaintiffs’
constitutional claims. See R. Doc. 52-1. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis is
limited to plaintiffs’ claims arising under section 1983.
60

61

Id. at 1-2.
17

dismiss, the court may rely on (1) the complaint alone, presuming the
allegations to be true, (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts,
or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts and by the court's
resolution of disputed facts. See Montez v. Dep’t of Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 149
(5th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that subject
matter jurisdiction exists. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523
(5th Cir. 1981). When examining a factual challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction that does not implicate the merits of plaintiff's cause of action,
the district court has substantial authority “to weigh the evidence and satisfy
itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Garcia v. Copenhaver,
Bell & Assocs., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Clark v. Tarrant
County, 798 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the court may
consider matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits. See
Garcia, 104 F.3d at 1261. A court's dismissal of a case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits, and the dismissal does not
prevent the plaintiff from pursuing the claim in another forum. See Hitt v.
City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977).

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Reynaud Variste’s and Thaddeus Long’s Standing to
Pursue Equitable Relief
18

Defendants do not raise the issue of plaintiffs’ Article III standing.
When necessary, however, a federal court must address the issue of standing
on its own. Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of Gulf Coast, Inc., 301 F.3d 329,
331-32 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
Article III of the Constitution requires plaintiffs in federal court to
allege an actual “case or controversy.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493
(1974); see generally U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial power shall extend
to all cases [and] to controversies . . . .”).

The case-or-controversy

requirement means that plaintiffs “must allege some threatened or actual
injury resulting from the [defendants’] putatively illegal action before a
federal court may assume jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)). “Abstract injury is not enough. . . . The injury
or threat of injury must be both real and immediate.” Id. at 494 (quoting
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-110 (1969)). For plaintiffs seeking
equitable relief, “past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a
present case or controversy . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present
adverse effects.” Id. at 495-96; see also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (finding allegation that defendants “routinely” engage in
unconstitutional conduct “falls far short of the allegations . . . necessary to
establish a case or controversy” for plaintiff seeking injunctive relief).
19

Here, by plaintiffs’ own allegations, and the Criminal District Court
records of which this Court has taken judicial notice, neither Reynaud
Variste nor Thaddeus Long owe any outstanding court costs for which they
may be imprisoned according to defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional
policy.62 Nor are they currently incarcerated for past-due debts. Because
Variste and Long have no outstanding debts and are not currently
incarcerated, they are not suffering any “real or immediate” injury or threat
of the alleged injury—the unconstitutional arrest and imprisonment as a
result of their indigence. Cf. Ray v. Judicial Corr. Servs., No. 12-CV-02819RDP, 2013 WL 5428360, at *(N.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2013) (“Plaintiffs are
experiencing continuing, present adverse effects [because] all of the
Plaintiffs are still on probation and still owe various fines and fees.”).
Any “prospect of future injury” assumes that Variste and Long will
again be charged with violations of Louisiana criminal law, will again be
assessed with courts costs that they cannot pay, and will again be arrested
and imprisoned for nonpayment. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 496. But the Court

See R. Doc. 7 at 15 (noting that after his arrest in 2015, Reynaud Variste
“eventually used his paycheck to pay the entire debt amount”), 18 (alleging
that Thaddeus Long was wrongfully arrested for failing to pay because he
“paid his debts in full in October 2013”); R. Doc. 59-3 at 20 (Reynaud Variste
Docket Sheet) (“The defendant has paid all fines and fees as ordered by the
court.”); R. Doc. 95-7 at 1-2 (Thaddeus Long Docket Sheet) (same).

62

20

must assume that plaintiffs “will conduct their activities within the law and
so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged
course of conduct.” Id. at 497. Thus, any threat of injury is mere “speculation
and conjecture”—too abstract to satisfy Article III’s requirement of a “case or
controversy.” See id.
Because Reynaud Variste and Thaddeus Long lack standing to pursue
their claims for equitable relief, the Court dismisses their claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief against all defendants.

See generally

Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 959 F.2d 1283, 1285 (5th Cir.
1992) (“[P]laintiffs may lack standing to seek prospective relief even though
they have standing to sue for damages.”).
In addressing defendants’ arguments for dismissal in the remainder of
this order, the Court will refer only to plaintiffs Cain, Brown, Reynajia
Variste, and Maxwell where necessary.
B.

Heck v. Humphrey Does Not Bar Plaintiffs’ Section
1983 Claims for Damages

The Court begins with an analysis of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). Heck is not a traditional abstention case like the other doctrines
defendants contend require dismissal. Nonetheless, because defendants
briefly argue it, the Court will address it.

21

In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal
defendant may not challenge the constitutionality of his conviction or
sentence in a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless that conviction
or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state court, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuing a writ of habeas corpus. 512 U.S. at 486-87. A criminal defendant
challenges the constitutionality of his conviction or sentence in a section
1983 case when “establishing the basis for the damages claim necessarily
demonstrates the invalidity of the conviction.” Id. at 482-83. In other words,
Heck bars suit when the factual findings necessary to prevail on the 1983
claim directly contradict or undermine the factual findings underlying the
plaintiff’s criminal conviction. For example, Heck often applies in 1983
claims for offenses such as false imprisonment, use of excessive force, or
malicious prosecution against the plaintiff’s arresting officers or others. See,
e.g., DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 2007)
(applying Heck to claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, illegal search and seizure, and use of excessive force);
LaMartina-Howell v. St. Tammany Par. Sch. Bd., No. 07-1168, 2009 WL
3837323, at *6 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2009) (applying Heck to plaintiff’s claim of

22

false arrest because it would undermine plaintiff’s state-court conviction for
resisting arrest).
Here, the named plaintiffs have all pleaded guilty to various criminal
offenses under Louisiana law. Alana Cain was convicted of theft of $1500 or
more for stealing a ring.63 Ashton Brown was convicted of misdemeanor
theft of under $500.64 Reynajia Variste and Vanessa Maxwell were both
convicted of second-degree battery.65 Maxwell was also convicted of “simple
criminal damage under $500.”66 In this section 1983 action, plaintiffs allege
that the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, its judges, and other actors
maintain an unconstitutional policy of issuing post-judgment arrest
warrants and indefinitely jailing criminal defendants for their failure to pay
outstanding court costs. Plaintiffs contend, among other things, that this
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because
defendants routinely deny the state-court criminal defendants judicial

R. Doc. 59-3 at 4 (Alana Cain Guilty Plea); R. Doc. 59-4 at 3 (Transcript
of Alana Cain’s Guilty Plea).

63

R. Doc. 59-3 at 5 (Ashton Brown Guilty Plea); R. Doc. 95-4 at 11-12
(Transcript of Ashton Brown’s Guilty Plea).

64

R. Doc. 59-3 at 12 (Reynajia Variste Guilty Plea), 28 (Vanessa Maxwell
Guilty Plea).

65

66

Id. at 28 (Vanessa Maxwell Guilty Plea).
23

hearings or any other opportunity to explain their inability to pay, which is
allegedly due only to their indigence.
Beyond bare or conclusory statements such as “plaintiffs cannot state
a claim under the Heck doctrine,”67 and “the [Heck] rule applies here,”68
defendants have not articulated any argument for applying Heck to plaintiffs’
constitutional claims. Defendants cannot seriously argue that the facts
necessary to support plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims (i.e., the Criminal District
Court judges’ failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry into the criminal
defendants’ good-faith ability to pay) contradict or undermine the factual
bases for plaintiffs’ state-court guilty pleas for theft, battery, and “simple
criminal damage.” Therefore, Heck does not apply. See Powers v. Hamilton
Cty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 604 (11th Cir. 2007) (“To prevail in his
§ 1983 suit, [plaintiff] must show that he was not afforded an indigency
hearing to which he had a constitutional right before being committed to jail.
If he succeeds, the resulting judgment in his favor would in no way impugn
his conviction for reckless driving.”).
B.

Younger Abstention Does Not Apply

67

R. Doc. 52-1 at 13.

68

Id. at 14.
24

As to the abstention doctrines, defendants first argue that Younger
abstention applies. Following the rule of Younger v. Harris, federal courts
may not enjoin pending state court proceedings. 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971)
(“[N]ational policy forbid[s] federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state
court proceedings except under special circumstances.”); see also
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (“Younger itself held
that, absent unusual circumstances, a federal court could not interfere with
a pending state criminal prosecution.”). Younger abstention is warranted
when (1) “the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state
judicial proceeding,” (2) the state proceeding “implicates important state
interests,” and (3) the plaintiff has “an adequate opportunity in the state
proceeding[] to raise constitutional challenges.” Bice v. La. Pub. Def. Bd.,
677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012); accord Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
Plaintiffs contend that there are no “ongoing state judicial
proceedings” because each plaintiff has been convicted and sentenced.
According to plaintiffs, the Criminal District Court issued final judgments in
their criminal cases “years ago.”69 Defendants argue that plaintiffs are

69

R. Doc. 70 at 4.
25

subject to ongoing criminal proceedings because each of them was sentenced
to pay a certain amount of court courts, and “none have paid in full.”70
According to defendants, plaintiffs’ criminal cases will “remain open until all
assessed costs are paid.”71
Pending criminal prosecutions are classic “ongoing state judicial
proceedings.” See, e.g., Health Net, Inc. v. Wooley, 534 F.3d 487, 494 (5th
Cir. 2008) (“Younger abstention originally applied only to criminal
prosecutions . . . .”). Once a criminal defendant’s conviction and sentence
have become final, however, his criminal prosecution is no longer “ongoing”
even though the defendant may still be serving the remainder of his sentence.
See generally New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491
U.S. 350, 369 (1989) (“[T]he proceeding is not complete until judicial review
is concluded. . . . For Younger purposes, the State’s trial-and-appeals process
is treated as a unitary system . . . .”); Powers v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def.
Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 605-06 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding Younger
inapplicable after state-court revoked plaintiff’s probation months before he
filed suit because the “proceedings in state court have long since

70

R. Doc. 52-1 at 3, 5.

71

R. Doc. 78 at 2.
26

concluded”); Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 405 F.3d
1298, 1316 n.9 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding Younger abstention “clearly
erroneous” when plaintiff “has already been tried and convicted . . . and none
of the parties suggests that any charges remain pending against him”);
Trombley v. Cty. of Cascade, Mont., 879 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding
no ongoing proceeding when plaintiff “has pleaded guilty and is currently out
on parole”); Almodovar v. Reiner, 832 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1987)
(“Probation is not a pending criminal action for Younger purposes.”);
Moncier v. Jones, No. 3:11-CV-301, 2012 WL 262984, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Jan.
30, 2012) (explaining that a proceeding is “pending” from “the time of filing
. . . until a litigant has exhausted his state appellant remedies”); Baltzer v.
Birkett, No. 02 C 4718, 2003 WL 366577, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2003)
(finding no ongoing proceeding when plaintiff was serving his prison
sentence, but the time for appeal had expired).
Here, each of the named plaintiffs has pleaded guilty and been
sentenced by the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court—the most recent in
2014, nearly a year before plaintiffs filed this suit.72 With the exception of
Vanessa Maxwell, who appears to have served eighteen months, all of the

72

See R. Doc. 59-3 at 9 (Reynajia Variste Docket Sheet).
27

named plaintiffs were sentenced to “suspended” or “deferred” terms of
imprisonment and sentenced to active or inactive probation. The Criminal
District Court also imposed court costs as part of plaintiffs’ criminal
sentences.73 For some, the court ordered payment of these court costs as a
condition of their probation.74 After sentencing, the Criminal District Court
“referred” plaintiffs to “fines and fees”—the court’s internal collections
department—and marked plaintiffs’ court records as “case closed.”75 It is
undisputed that these convictions and sentences are now final because none
of the plaintiffs directly appealed. Moreover, there are no new pending
prosecutions against any named plaintiff. None of the plaintiffs is currently
incarcerated while awaiting trial or other criminal proceeding, and none
currently has a warrant outstanding for his or her arrest or charges filed
against him or her for nonpayment of court costs or any substantive criminal
offense.76 See Abusaid, 405 F.3d at 1316 n.9 (finding Younger abstention

Id. at 4 (Alana Cain Guilty Plea), 8 (Ashton Brown Guilty Plea), 12
(Reynajia Variste Guilty Plea), 28 (Vanessa Maxwell Guilty Plea).

73

74

See id. at 4 (Alana Cain Guilty Plea).

See, e.g., id. at 2 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet), 23 (Vanessa Maxwell
Docket Sheet).

75

See R. Doc. 61 at 2 (“[T]here are no outstanding capias warrants for
nonpayment or late payment of outstanding Orleans Parish Criminal
District Court debts[.]”).
76

28

“clearly erroneous” when “none of the parties suggests that any charges
remain pending against [the plaintiff]”); Moncier, 2012 WL 262984, at *5
(explaining that a proceeding is “pending” from “the time of filing . . . until a
litigant has exhausted his state appellant remedies”)
The issue here is whether plaintiffs, merely because their court costs
remain unpaid, are subject to ongoing state judicial proceedings.
Defendants’ only argument is that plaintiffs’ original criminal prosecutions
remain open because their sentences are not “complete” or “satisfied” until
plaintiffs pay the full amount of outstanding court costs. But an incomplete
sentence, such as an undischarged term of imprisonment, probation, or
parole, does not constitute an “ongoing state judicial proceeding” for
purposes of Younger abstention. See, e.g., Trombley, 879 F.2d 866 (9th Cir.
1989) (no ongoing proceeding when plaintiff “is currently out on parole”);
Almodovar, 832 F.2d at 1141 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Probation is not a pending
criminal action for Younger purposes.”); Baltzer, 2003 WL 366577, at *3
(finding no ongoing proceeding when plaintiff was serving his prison
sentence, but the time for appeal had expired). Because the mere existence
of plaintiffs’ undischarged debts does not constitute an “ongoing state
judicial proceeding,” Younger abstention does not apply. See generally
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (“When no state criminal
29

proceeding is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed, federal
intervention does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of
the state criminal justice system; nor can federal intervention, in that
circumstance, be interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state court’s
ability to enforce constitutional principles.”).
Defendants’ argument that Bice v. Louisiana Public Defender Board
controls the outcome here is misplaced. In Bice, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed a district court’s decision to abstain from interfering with
the plaintiff’s pending prosecution in New Orleans Municipal Court. 677
F.3d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff in Bice argued that a Louisiana
law requiring convicted criminal defendants to pay into the state’s Indigent
Defender Fund was unconstitutional under Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments because the plaintiff’s appointed counsel was biased against
him. Id. at 715-16. Applying Younger, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff
was subject to an ongoing criminal prosecution in municipal court and that
his civil rights challenge would have required “postpon[ing] Bice’s
prosecution until adequate funding is located” or “withdraw[ing] Bice’s
public defender [and] requiring the municipal court judge to locate new
counsel.” Id. at 718-19.

30

Similar circumstances are not present in this case. As noted, each of
the plaintiffs was convicted and sentenced long ago, and those convictions
are now final. None of the plaintiffs is currently subject to criminal charges
in state-court. Therefore, there are no ongoing state judicial proceedings and
abstention under Younger is not warranted here.
C.

Burford Abstention Does Not Apply Because Plaintiffs’
Constitutional Claims Do Not Involve a State
Administrative Procedures

Defendants also argue that Burford abstention is warranted here
because a ruling that jailing criminal defendants for failing to pay court costs
is unconstitutional would “negat[e] Louisiana law” in Orleans Parish, which
maintains a “comprehensive scheme for amending, reconsidering, and
reviewing criminal sentences.”77 Plaintiffs counter that Burford abstention
is inappropriate for two reasons. First, plaintiffs argue that they have not
challenged the validity of their criminal sentences and therefore do not want
their sentences amended, reconsidered, or reviewed.

Second, plaintiffs

emphasize that regardless of what Louisiana law may allow, “all Louisiana

77

R. Doc. 52-1 at 8-9.
31

parishes, all municipal entities, and all state actors” must abide by the
Constitution of the United States.78
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., the Supreme Court affirmed a district court’s
decision to abstain in a case involving “questions of the regulation of the
[Texas oil and gas] industry by the State administrative agency.” 319 U.S.
315, 332 (1943). In support of its holding, the Court emphasized that “the
federal government . . . chose[] to leave the principal regulatory
responsibility with the states.” Id. at 319. After Burford, “[w]here timely and
adequate state-court review is available, a federal court sitting in equity must
decline to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state administrative
agencies.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S.
350, 361 (1989) (emphasis added). As a general rule, “Burford abstention
requires the existence of a state administrative proceeding to which the
federal court could defer.” Lipscomb v. Columbus. Municipal Separate
School District, 145 F.3d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) (citing
St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1994)); see also Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Guy, 682 F.3d 381, 391 (5th Cir. 2012) (“Burford abstention is
concerned with protecting complex state administrative processes from

78

R. Doc. 70 at 9-10.
32

undue federal inference . . . .” (emphasis added)); Webb v. B.C. Rogers
Poultry, Inc., 174 F.3d 697, 700 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The Burford doctrine allows
a federal court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction in deference to
complex state administrative procedures.” (emphasis added)).
Although courts have applied Burford to areas other than state
administrative proceedings, these occasions are rare and arise only when the
case presents state-law issues of wholly local concern. See Estate of Merkel
v. Pollard, 354 F. App’x 88 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying Burford abstention
because adjudication required resolving Texas divorce law); Claudill v.
Eubanks Farms, Inc., 301 F.3d 658 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying Burford
abstention to diversity action for dissolution of a Kentucky corporation); see
generally Aransas Project v. Shaw, 775 F.3d 641, 650 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Of
primary concern in Burford was the involvement of the federal courts in
deciding issues of essentially state law and policy.”).
Here, plaintiffs’ section 1983 claims neither implicate the procedures
of a state administrative agency nor raise state-law issues of only local
concern. On the contrary, plaintiffs allege that defendants have deprived
them of their constitutional rights—claims that plainly arise under federal
law and that “are entitled to be adjudicated in the federal courts.” McNeese
v. Bd. of Ed. For Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 187, Cahokia, Ill., 373 U.S. 668, 674
33

(1963) (refusing to apply Burford abstention). Defendants’ argument that
they have validly adhered to Louisiana law misses the point. In evaluating a
constitutional claim, “it is immaterial whether [defendants’] conduct is legal
or illegal as a matter of state law.” Id. Burford abstention does not apply.
D.

Rooker-Feldman Does Not Apply Because Plaintiffs’
Constitutional Claims Do Not Require Rejecting Their
State-Court Convictions

Finally, defendants argue that the Court should abstain from
adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. RookerFeldman bars federal district courts from “modify[ing] or revers[ing] state
court judgments.” Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir.
2013) (citations omitted); see also Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding Rooker-Feldman applies when a federal plaintiff challenges
a state-court judgment as “legal[ly] wrong” or otherwise “erroneous”).
Rooker-Feldman is an especially narrow doctrine, “confined to . . . cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments . . . and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280,
284 (2005).
In determining whether Rooker-Feldman applies, a court must
carefully evaluate what it is asked to review and reject. Truong, 717 F.3d at
34

382 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284). The court lacks jurisdiction only
when the plaintiff “seeks relief that directly attacks the validity of an existing
state court judgment,” Weaver v. Tex. Capital Bank, N.A., 660 F.3d 900, 904
(5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added), or the plaintiff’s federal claims “are so
inextricably intertwined with a state judgment that the federal court is in
essence being called upon to review the state court decision.” Ill. Cent. R.R.
Co. v. Guy, 682 F.3d 381, 390-91 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing D.C. Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)). Rooker-Feldman does not
prohibit a federal plaintiff from “present[ing] some independent claim, albeit
one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to
which he was a party.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293.
Defendants’ arguments in support of abstention under RookerFeldman rest on a misunderstanding of the relief plaintiffs seek through
their section 1983 claims. Defendants emphasize that all of the named
plaintiffs pleaded guilty to their respective criminal charges and that none of
their convictions or sentences has been reversed or expunged. Defendants
argue that plaintiffs’ efforts to “reconsider[], amend[], . . . or appeal” their
sentences must be done in state court.79 But plaintiffs’ allegations, as well as

79

R. Doc. 52-1 at 10.
35

their arguments in opposition to dismissal, make clear that plaintiffs do not
contest the validity of their state-court convictions or sentences. Indeed,
plaintiffs plainly admit that none of them “is challenging his or her criminal
conviction or sentence.”80 Nor do they argue “that their convictions should
be overturned or that the monetary portion of the judgment against them is
invalid.”81
Instead, plaintiffs challenge the means by which defendants’ attempt
to enforce the state court judgment, an issue separate and distinct from the
validity of the judgment itself. See Mosley v. Bowie Cty. Tex., 275 F. App’x
327, 329 (5th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing between challenging a judgment
and challenging defendants’ “efforts to enforce” the judgment); Ray v.
Judicial Corr. Servs., No. 12-CV-02819-RDP, 2013 WL 5428360, at *8-9
(N.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2013) (finding plaintiffs’ challenge to arrests for
nonpayment attacks only “the post-judgment probationary program[,]”
rather than the “merits” or “bases” of the state court decisions). Because a
claim that defendants violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights in defendants’
enforcement of the state court judgments “do[es] not ask the district court to

80

R. Doc. 70 at 2.

81

Id.
36

review, modify, or nullify, a final order of a state court, [this claim is] not
barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Mosley, 275 F. App’x at 329
(quoting Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 2000)).
In sum, none of the foregoing abstention doctrines applies to plaintiffs’
section 1983 civil rights claims. Because the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over these claims and supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’
state-law claims, the Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

21st
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _______ day of April, 2016.

___________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

37