Cain et al v. New Orleans City et al

Filing 119

ORDER AND REASONS granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion 54 to dismiss on grounds of absolute and qualified immunity.. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 5/3/16. (jjs)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALANA CAIN, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 15-4479

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL.

SECTION: R(2)

ORDER AND REASONS
Named plaintiffs Alana Cain, Ashton Brown, Reynaud Variste,
Reynajia Variste, Thaddeus Long, and Vanessa Maxwell filed this civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to declare the manner in which the
Orleans Parish Criminal District Court collects post-judgment court costs
from indigent debtors unconstitutional. According to plaintiffs, the Criminal
District Court and other, related actors maintain a policy of jailing criminal
defendants who fail to pay their court costs solely because of their indigence.1
The “judicial defendants” now move the Court to dismiss plaintiffs’
claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2
Defendants contend that plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can

See generally R. Doc. 7 (Plaintiffs’ First Amended Class Action
Complaint).

1

The “judicial defendants” are the Orleans Parish Criminal District
Court, its thirteen judge, and the judicial administrator, Robert Kazik.
2

be granted because they are entitled to absolute and qualified immunity.3
For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the
motion.

I.

BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Allegations

In this section 1983 civil rights lawsuit, plaintiffs allege, on behalf of
themselves and those similarly situated, that the City of New Orleans, the
Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, its judges and judicial administrator,
and Orleans Parish Sheriff Marlin Gusman maintain an unconstitutional
scheme of jailing indigent criminal defendants and imposing excessive bail
amounts for nonpayment “offenses” in an effort to collect unpaid court
courts. According to plaintiffs, the Criminal District Court maintains an
internal “Collections Department,” informally called the “fines and fees”
department, that oversees the collection of court debts from former criminal
defendants. The “typical” case allegedly proceeds as follows.
When a person is charged with a crime, the Criminal District Court
judges first determine whether the criminal defendant is legally “indigent,”

3

R. Doc. 54.

meaning they qualify for appointment of counsel through the Orleans Public
Defenders under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 15:175.

According to

plaintiffs, eight-five percent of the criminal defendants in Orleans Parish are
legally indigent.4 With assistance of counsel, the defendants either plead
guilty to their criminal charges or proceed to trial. If convicted, the criminal
defendants must appear before a judge at the Criminal District Court for
sentencing.
At sentencing, in addition to imposing a term of imprisonment or
probation, the court may assess against the criminal defendants various
“court costs.” These costs may include restitution to any victim, a statutory
fine, fees, or other costs imposed at the judge’s discretion. According to
plaintiffs, the discretionary assessments “fund the District Attorney’s office,
the Public Defender, and the Court[,]” which rely on these collections “to
fund their operations and to pay employee salaries and extra benefits.” 5
Plaintiffs allege that the Criminal District Court judges impose court costs
without inquiring into the criminal defendants’ ability to pay.6

4

R. Doc. 7 at 5.

5

Id. at 22-23 ¶ 88.

6

Id. at 23 ¶ 91.

If the criminal defendants cannot immediately pay in full, the Criminal
District Court judges direct them to the Collections Department, or “fines
and fees.” There, a Collections Department employee allegedly imposes, at
his discretion and without inquiring into a defendant’s ability to pay, a
payment schedule—usually requiring a certain amount per month. 7
Collections Department employees also allegedly warn the defendants that
failure to pay the monthly amount, in full, will result in their arrests.
Plaintiffs contend that Collections Department employees refuse to accept
anything less than full payment.8
When criminal defendants fail to pay, a Collections Department
employee allegedly issues a pre-printed warrant for the defendant’s arrest by
forging a judge’s name.9 According to plaintiffs’ allegations, the Collections
Department often issues these warrants “years after a purported
nonpayment,” and the warrants are “routinely issued in error” or without
regard to a debtor’s indigence.10

7

Id. at 27-28 ¶103.

8

Id. at 28 ¶ 106.

9

Id. at 29 ¶ 109.

10

Id. at ¶ 110.

Plaintiffs also allege that each Collections Department arrest warrant
is “accompanied by a preset $20,000 secured money bond required for
release.”11 According to plaintiffs, defendants’ unwavering adherence to this
“automatic $20,000 secured money bond” requirement results from
defendants’ financial interest in state-court arrestees’ paying for their
release.12 Plaintiffs contend that the Criminal District Court judges collect
1.8% of each bond, while the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s office, the
Orleans Public Defenders’ office, and the Orleans Parish Sheriff each collect
0.4% of each bond. 13
Plaintiffs allege that when criminal defendants are arrested for
nonpayment, they are “routinely told” that to be released from prison, they
must pay for the $20,000 secured money bond, the entirety of their
outstanding court debts, or some other amount “unilaterally determine[d]”
by the Collections Department. 14 As a result, these indigent debtors allegedly
“languish” in prison “indefinite[ly]” because they cannot afford to pay any of

11

Id. at ¶ 113.

12

Id. at 21-22 ¶88.

13

Id. at 22 ¶88.

14

Id. at 30 ¶114.

the foregoing amounts. 15 Although “arrestees are eventually brought to
court,” plaintiffs allege that the Sheriff, the Criminal District Court, and the
judges “have no set policy or practice” regarding how long arrestees must
wait for a hearing. According to plaintiffs, indigent debtors “routinely” spend
a week or more in prison. 16

According to plaintiffs’ allegations, some

arrestees, with help from family and friends, pay for their release without
ever having a hearing and thus have “no opportunity to contest the debt or
the jailing.”17
When criminal defendants are brought to court, the Criminal District
Court judges allegedly send them back to prison if they are unable to pay
their debts or release them “on threat of future arrest and incarceration” if
they do not promptly pay the Collections Department. 18 At these brief
“failure-to-pay hearings,” the judges allegedly do not consider the debtors’
abilities to pay. 19

15

Id. at ¶115.

16

Id.

17

Id. at ¶114.

18

Id. at ¶116.

19

Id.

Plaintiffs contend that these practices are unconstitutional and have
created “a local debtors’ prison” in Orleans Parish. 20
B.

Parties

The named plaintiffs in the First Amended Complaint are six
individuals who were defendants in the Orleans Parish Criminal District
Court—Alana Cain, Ashton Brown, Reynaud Variste, Reynajia Variste,
Thaddeus Long, and Vanessa Maxwell. 21
The Criminal District Court appointed counsel from the Orleans Public
Defenders to represent each of the named plaintiffs, except Reynaud Variste,
during their criminal proceedings.22 Thus, the court must have determined
that Cain, Brown, Reynajia Variste, Long, and Maxwell were legally indigent

20

See R. Doc. 7 at 3.

21

Id. at 7 ¶7.

R. Doc. 59-3 at 1 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet, entry for 12/04/2012)
(“Court appointed Alex Liu, OPD.”), 5 (Ashton Brown Docket Sheet, entry for
10/02/2013) (“Court appointed Seth Wayne, OPD.”), 9 (Reynajia Variste
Docket Sheet, entry for 10/02/2014) (“Court appointed Lindsey Samuel,
OPD.”) 23 (Vanessa Maxwell Docket Sheet, entry for 12/14/2011) (“Court
appointed Jerrod Thompson-Hicks, OIPD.”); R. Doc.95-7 at 1 (Thaddeus
Long Docket Sheet, entry for 06/02/2011) (“Court appointed Anna Fecker,
OIDP).
22

under Louisiana Revised Statutes §15:175. 23 Reynaud Variste appears to
have retained private counsel. 24
With the assistance of counsel, all of the named plaintiffs pleaded
guilty to their respective criminal charges, which include theft, 25 battery,26
drug possession, 27 “simple criminal damage,”28 and disturbing the peace.29
At plaintiffs’ sentencings, the presiding judges imposed terms of
imprisonment, which were often suspended, as well as terms of active or
inactive probation. In addition, the judges assessed against plaintiffs various
court costs—whether restitution, fines, and/or discretionary fees and costs. 30

23

See R. Doc. 7 at 5.

R. Doc. 59-3 at 14 (Reynaud Variste Docket Sheet, entry for 9/25/2012)
(“Defendant must retain private counsel.”).
24

25

Id. at 4 (Alana Cain Guilty Plea), 8 (Ashton Brown Guilty Plea).

26

Id. at 12 (Reynajia Variste Guilty Plea).

27

Id. at 22 (Reynaud Variste Guilty Plea).

28

Id. at 28 (Vanessa Maxwell Guilty Plea).

29

R. Doc. 95-7 at 5 (Thaddeus Long Guilty Plea).

R. Doc. 59-3 at 2 (Alana Cain Docket Sheet, entry for 5/30/2013), 6
(Ashton Brown Docket Sheet, entry for 12/16/2013), 9 (Reynajia Variste
Docket Sheet, entry for 10/21/2014), 18 (Reynaud Variste Docket Sheet,
entry for 10/31/2013), 23 (Vanessa Maxwell Docket Sheet, entry for
3/06/2012); R. Doc. 95-7 at 1 (Thaddeus Long Docket Sheet, entry for
7/29/2011).
30

At some point, all of the named plaintiffs were arrested for failing to pay
outstanding court costs on a warrant issued by the court’s Collections
Department.
Plaintiffs now sue the City of New Orleans for hiring the Criminal
District Court’s Collection Department workers and the police officers who
execute the allegedly invalid arrest warrants. 31 Plaintiffs also sue Sheriff
Marlin Gusman, in his official capacity, for “unconstitutionally detain[ing]
impoverished people indefinitely because of their inability to . . . pay[] for
their release.” 32 In addition, plaintiffs sue the Orleans Parish Criminal
District Court for its role in managing and funding the Collections
Department, and the court’s Judicial Administrator, Robert Kazik, in his
individual and official capacities, because he is allegedly responsible for
operating the Collections Department. 33

Finally, plaintiffs name as

defendants every judge at the Criminal District Court—thirteen in all—
because they allegedly supervise the Collections Department employees and
have failed to provide the parish’s criminal defendants with constitutionally-

31

R. Doc. 7 at 7 ¶8.

32

Id. at 8 ¶12.

33

Id. at 7-8 ¶¶9-10.

required process before imprisoning people for failure to pay court costs.
Plaintiffs sue the judges only for declaratory relief. 34
C.

Plaintiffs’ Claims for Relief

Plaintiffs filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as
violations of Louisiana tort law.

Plaintiffs seek damages (including

attorneys’ fees) and an injunction against all defendants, except the judges.
Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of
defendants’ practices. 35
The Court summarizes plaintiffs’ claims as follows:
(1)

Defendants’ policy of issuing and executing arrest warrants for
nonpayment of court costs is unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment;

34

Id. at 8 ¶13.

Only Cain, Brown, Reynajia Variste, and Maxwell’s claims for equitable
relief remain. In an order addressing an earlier motion to dismiss, the Court
found that Reynaud Variste and Thaddeus Long lacked standing to pursue
prospective equitable relief and dismissed those claims. R. Doc. 109 at 1921.
35

(2)

Defendants’ policy of requiring a $20,000 “fixed secured money
bond” for each Collections Department warrant (issued for
nonpayment of court costs) is unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment;

(3)

Defendants’ policy of indefinitely jailing indigent debtors for
nonpayment of court costs without a judicial hearing is
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment;

(4)

Defendants’ “scheme of money bonds” to fund certain judicial
actors is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent defendants argue this
scheme is in compliance with Louisiana Revised Statutes §§
13:1381.5 and 22:822, which govern the percentage of each
surety bond that the judicial actors receive, those statutes are
unconstitutional;

(5)

Defendants’ policy of jailing indigent debtors for nonpayment of
court costs without any inquiry into their ability to pay is
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;

(6)

Defendants’ policy of jailing and threatening to imprison
criminal defendants for nonpayment of court debts is
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it imposes unduly harsh and
punitive restrictions on debtors whose creditor is the State, as
compared to debtors who owe money to private creditors;

(7)

Defendants’ conduct constitutes wrongful arrest under Louisiana
law; and

(8)

Defendants’ conduct constitutes wrongful imprisonment under
Louisiana law.

D.

The Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

The Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, the thirteen judges, and
the judicial administrator now move to dismiss plaintiffs’ suit on grounds of
absolute and qualified immunity. According to defendants, the judges are
absolutely immune from suit for conduct which constitutes a “judicial act.” 36
Defendants concede, however, that absolute judicial immunity does not
apply to plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief, but argue that the Court’s
awarding declaratory relief in this case upsets “federalism, fairness, and

36

R. Doc. 54-1 at 1.

efficiency concerns.”37

Further, defendants argue that the Judicial

Administrator, Robert Kazik, is shielded by absolute or qualified immunity
for his alleged conduct because he merely “assist[ed] judges in carrying out
judicial functions.” 38 In the present motion to dismiss, defendants do not
raise any arguments pertaining to the amenability to suit of the Criminal
District Court itself.
In opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs note that they sue the
judges for only declaratory relief, and thus absolute immunity does not bar
these claims. Regarding the Judicial Administrator, plaintiffs argue that
Kazik is not entitled to absolute immunity because he was not acting
pursuant to a valid judicial order. Further, plaintiffs argue that Kazik’s
conduct was objectively unreasonable, precluding his entitlement to
qualified immunity.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft

37

Id.

38

Id.

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads
facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. A court must
accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the plaintiff. See Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228,
239 (5th Cir. 2009); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Plaintiffs’ Claims Against the Criminal District Court
Judges

Defendants admit that their arguments about judicial immunity do not
apply to claims for declaratory relief. 39 See generally Holloway v. Walker,
765 F.2d 517, 525 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Judicial immunity does not extend to suits
for . . . declaratory relief under section 1983.”). Here, plaintiffs have sued the
Criminal District Court judges for only declaratory relief. Plaintiffs do not
seek damages or injunctive relief against the judges. Conceding this point,
defendants nonetheless argue that the Court should decline to decide

39

Id.

plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief in the interests of “federalism,
fairness, [and] efficiency.”40
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which plaintiffs
invoke here, is “an enabling act, which confers discretion on the courts” to
decide or dismiss a declaratory judgment suit, “rather than an absolute right
on a litigant.” Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995) (citations
omitted); accord Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Holmes Cty., 343 F.3d 383, 387,
389 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). In analyzing claims under the Act, a
court must determine “(1) whether the declaratory action is justiciable; (2)
whether the court has the authority to grant declaratory relief; and (3)
whether to exercise its discretion to decide or dismiss the action.” SherwinWilliams, 343 F.3d at 387.
In an earlier order resolving another motion to dismiss, the Court
satisfied itself that the claims for declaratory relief were justiciable as to four
of the six named plaintiffs.41 The Court also has the authority to grant
declaratory relief. 42 Therefore, the only issue presented by defendants’

40

R. Doc. 54-1 at 6.

41

R. Doc. 109 at 19-21.

Defendants do not argue that the Court lacks proper authority. The
Court’s authority to grant declaratory relief depends on whether (1) the
declaratory defendant previously filed a cause of action in state court against
42

current motion is whether the Court should, in its discretion, exercise that
authority.
In determining whether to exercise its authority to hear a declaratory
judgment action, a court should consider the following factors:
(1) whether there is a pending state action in which all of the
matters in controversy may be fully litigated;
(2) whether the plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of a lawsuit filed
by the defendant;
(3) whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in bringing
the suit;
(4) whether possible inequities in allowing the declaratory
plaintiff to gain precedent in time or to change forums exist;
(5) whether the federal court is a convenient forum for the parties
and witnesses;
(6) whether retaining the lawsuit would serve the purposes of
judicial economy; and
(7) whether the federal court is being called on to construe a state
judicial decree involving the same parties and entered by the
court before whom the parallel state suit between the same
parties is pending.

the declaratory plaintiff, (2) the state suit and the pending federal suit
involve the same legal issues, and (3) the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits the
court from enjoining the state court proceedings. AXA Re Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Day, 162 F. App’x 316, 319-20 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
These concerns are not present here.

Id. at 388 (quoting St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590-91 (5th Cir.
1994)). These considerations aim to address concerns of federalism (“the
proper allocation of decision-making between state and federal courts”),
fairness (“legitimate and proper reasons for forum selection”), and judicial
efficiency (“avoid[ing] duplicative or piecemeal litigation where possible”).
Id. at 390-91.
Defendants argue that the foregoing considerations dictate dismissal.
Defendants contend that there are ongoing state-court proceedings and that
plaintiffs have “clear[ly] engaged in forum shopping” because their
constitutional challenges “should have been raised in the ongoing state
criminal proceedings [because] the potential exists for conflicting rulings.” 43
These contentions, however, are merely re-packaged versions of defendants’
earlier arguments in favor of Younger abstention and joinder of certain
parties, which the Court rejected in other orders. 44 Having considered the
relevant factors, the Court will exercise its discretion to hear plaintiffs’ claims
for declaratory relief.

43

R. Doc. 54-1 at 6-7.

44

R. Doc. 109 at 25-31; R. Doc. 111 at 25.

First, there is no pending state action between the same parties and
involving the same legal issues. See id. at 396; cf. Ironshore Specialty Ins.
Co. v. Tractor Supply Co., 624 F. App’x 159, 166 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[A] district
court may decline to decide a declaratory judgment suit where another suit
is pending in state court presenting the same issues, not governed by federal
law, between the same parties.”). As explained in the Court’s earlier order,
there is no ongoing state court action at all. 45 Further, plaintiffs do not raise
“novel questions of state law” that might warrant the Court’s declining to
decide the declaratory judgment action. See Sherwin-Williams, 343 F.3d at
396. On the contrary, plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges caution against
dismissal; “[t]he presence of federal issues must always be a major
consideration weighing against surrender of federal jurisdiction.”

Id.

(quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
26 (1983)). Moreover, defendants’ argument that plaintiffs have engaged in
forum shopping is without merit. “Merely filing a declaratory judgment
action in a federal court with jurisdiction to hear it . . . is not in itself improper
. . . or otherwise abusive ‘forum shopping.’” Id. at 391. Finally, this Court is
sufficiently convenient for all parties, who are Louisiana citizens, and judicial

45

R. Doc. 109 at 25-30.

economy is not wasted by the Court’s retaining the lawsuit. As addressed in
a previous order, defendants’ concern about inconsistent rulings rests on the
erroneous assertion that plaintiffs challenge the imposition of court costs,
rather than the manner in which court costs are collected.

Cf. id.

(“Duplicative litigation may also raise federalism or comity concerns because
of the potential for inconsistent state and federal court judgments . . . .”). The
remaining considerations (the second, fourth, and seventh factors) do not
apply. Cf. Ironshore Specialty Ins., 624 F. App’x at 167 (noting that certain
factors “speak to fairness”—“whether the plaintiff is using the declaratory
judgment process to gain access to a federal forum on improper or unfair
grounds”). Because federalism, fairness, and efficiency do not weigh in favor
of dismissal, the Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’
claims for declaratory relief against the Criminal District Court judges.
B.

Plaintiffs’ Claims against the Criminal District Court
Judicial Administrator

Defendants argue that Robert Kazik, the Criminal District Court
Judicial Administrator, is entitled to absolute immunity because at all times
he was assisting the judges in carrying out their judicial functions.
Alternatively, defendants argue that Kazik is at least entitled to qualified
immunity for his actions, which were not objectively unreasonable. Because

the Court finds that Kazik is protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity,
the Court does not address defendants’ arguments for qualified immunity.
“Despite the broad terms of § 1983,” the Supreme Court “has long
recognized” that immunity doctrines protect certain potential defendants
from liability under the statute. Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1502
(2012). For example, judges are absolutely immune from monetary liability
“for all judicial acts that are not performed in the clear absence of
jurisdiction, however erroneous the act and however evil the motive.”
Johnson v. Kegans, 870 F.2d 992, 995 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 492 U.S. 921
(1989) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978)). This is so because
of the “special nature” of a judge’s responsibilities. Id. (quoting Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978)). Absolute immunity “help[s] guarantee
an independent, disinterested decision-making process” by “prevent[ing]
harassment and intimidation that could otherwise result if disgruntled
litigants—particularly criminal defendants and inmates . . . could vent their
anger by suing . . . the person or persons who rendered an adverse decision.”
Id. at 996-97 (citations omitted).
To further this underlying policy, “other necessary participants in the
judicial process are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity.”
Kirkendall v. Grambling & Mounce, Inc., 4 F.3d 989, 1993 WL 360732, at

*3 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). This absolute quasi-judicial immunity
“protects officials that perform functions comparable to those of judges. . . .”
Da Vinci Inv., Ltd. P’ship v. Parker, 622 F. App’x 367, 373 (5th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Beck v. Tex. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 204 F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 2000)).
In determining whether an official is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial
immunity, courts must take a “functional approach”—looking to “the nature
of the function performed, not the identity or title of the actor who performed
it.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993).
Consistent with this “functional approach,” courts often hold that other
judicial employees, such as clerks of court, law clerks, and others, enjoy
absolute quasi-judicial immunity when “performing a discretionary act or . .
. a ministerial function at the direction of the judge.”46 Williams v. Wood,

Absolute quasi-judicial immunity, in another sense of that term, also
applies to actors outside of the traditional state judicial system, who perform
quasi-judicial functions. See O’Neal v. Miss. Bd. of Nursing, 113 F.3d 62, 65
(5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “certain quasi-judicial agency officials” are
entitled to absolute immunity). For example, administrative law judges,
disciplinary committee members, parole boards, and others have all been
entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. See Johnson, 870 F.2d at 995
(collecting cases). “To determine whether nonjudicial actors perform quasijudicial functions, and thus are entitled to absolute immunity” the court
considers, among other things, “(1) the need to assure that the individual can
perform his functions without harassment or intimidation; (2) the presence
of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of
controlling unconstitutional conduct; (3) insulation from political influence;
(4) the importance of precedent; (5) the adversary nature of the process; and
(6) the correctability of error on appeal.” Da Vinci Inv., Ltd., 622 F. App’x at
46

612 F.2d 982, 985 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d
2013, 206 (3d Cir. 1975)); see generally Evans v. Suter, 260 F. App’x 726,
727 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity . . . when
they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” (citing
Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987));
Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 2009) (granting absolute
immunity to family court staff attorneys); Olivia v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 40
(2d Cir. 1988) (“[F]or purposes of absolute judicial immunity, judges and
their law clerks are as one.”).

In other words, judicial employees are

absolutely immune when they act, whether “in bath faith or with malice”
pursuant to a court order or a judge’s instructions because the employee is
“act[ing] as the arm of the judge and comes within his absolute immunity.”
Williams, 612 F.2d at 985; accord Johnson, 870 F.2d at 998 (describing
parole board members as “serving essentially as the arm of the sentencing
judge”); Severin v. Parish of Jefferson, 357 F. App’x 601, 605 (5th Cir. 2009)
(granting absolute immunity to “employees of the Louisiana Fifth Circuit

373 (denying immunity to city councilmember). Because the defendant at
issue here is a judicial employee serving at the pleasure of the Criminal
District Court judges, the Court does not apply these factors in determining
whether he is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Court of Appeal who acted pursuant to the procedures allegedly
implemented by the judges”).
A judicial directive that cloaks court employees with absolute
immunity may be formal and official, such as a court order, or more informal,
such as verbal communication from a judge. For example, in Severin v.
Parish of Jefferson, a civil rights plaintiff sued several state-court appellate
judges and other employees of the Louisiana appeals court for allegedly
instituting a policy to “circumvent Louisiana’s constitutional requirement of
three judge panels” on pro se post-conviction writs. 357 F. App’x 601, 603
(5th Cir. 1009). The judges allegedly directed a staff member to rule on the
prisoners’ writ applications without review by the constitutionally-required
panel. 47 Id. In affirming the district court’s dismissal of the 1983 suit, the
Fifth Circuit held that the court’s employees who allegedly helped carry out
the court’s unconstitutional policy were protected by judicial immunity, even

In the underlying facts cited by the district court, a deceased member
of the court’s staff detailed in a suicide note that “for . . . the past 10 years,
not one criminal writ application filed by an inmate pro se has been reviewed
by a Judge on the Court.” Severin v. Parish of Jefferson, No. 09-2766, 2009
WL 1107713, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 23, 2009). The staff member continued, “I
prepared the ruling on each of those writ applications, and they were signed
by a Judge without so much as a glance at the application. In fact, two of the
judges on the writ panel never even knew the pro se application was filed,
must less aware of the application’s contents.” Id.
47

though there was no official court order or decree directing the employees to
engage in the prohibited conduct. Id. at 605. The court explained that
because these employees “acted pursuant to the procedures allegedly
implemented by the judges [and] were only acting at the express direction of
the judges, to assist them in carrying out their judicial functions, these
defendants [were] likewise entitled to absolute judicial immunity with
respect to [the plaintiff’s] claim for monetary damages.” Id.
Here, the crux of plaintiffs’ claims against the Criminal District Court
Judicial Administrator Robert Kazik is his supposed involvement in the
constitutional violations committed by the Criminal District Court’s
Collections Department. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Kazik trained
Collections Department employees to issue arrest warrants, accompanied by
a $20,000 secured money bond for court debtors’ nonpayment of court
costs. Kazik allegedly trained the Collections Department employees to sign
the judges’ names to pre-printed warrants without ever consulting a judge or
a member of the judge’s staff.

Although plaintiffs seemingly argue in

opposition to dismissal that Kazik furtively undertook this allegedly
unconstitutional conduct on his own, the allegations in the First Amended
Complaint reveal the opposite. Indeed, plaintiffs allege that the judges

“supervise and are responsible for the Judicial Administrator,”48 and a
Criminal District Court transcript incorporated by reference to the complaint
details the judges’ knowledge and approval of Kazik’s conduct. 49 According
to this transcript, the judges have, for years, delegated authority to the
Collections Department employees to issue arrest warrants for court debtors’
nonpayment without the judges’ direct oversight.50

The judges have

allegedly given Kazik and the Collections Department “standing authority”
not only to issue warrants for nonpayment, but also to recall arrest warrants
or release incarcerated debtors when they pay back-owed debts. 51 All of the
judges are “aware of the [Collections Department’s] practice,” and unless a
judge instructs the Collections Department otherwise, Kazik and other court
employees continue operating pursuant to this policy.
It is undisputed that issuing arrest warrants and setting bail are
judicial functions, typically performed by a judge in his or her judicial
capacity. See generally Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 516 (5th Cir. 2005)
(“Ordering the police officers to arrest and imprison [the plaintiff] and
48

R. Doc. 7 at 8 ¶13.

49

R. Doc. 7-1.

50

Id. at 23.

51

Id. at 24-25.

requiring . . . payment of a money judgment are clearly acts normally
performed by a judge.”); Herring v. Mayfield, 51 F.3d 1043, 1995 WL
153026, at *1 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[S]etting the amount of the bond . . . is within
the scope of [the judge’s] jurisdiction, thus affording her absolute judicial
immunity.”); Watson v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 611 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir.
1980) (“[T]he issuance of an arrest warrant is a common judicial function.”).
It is also undisputed that these acts were carried out within the Criminal
District Court, although not necessarily in a formal courtroom proceeding or
a judge’s chambers.

Further, these arrest warrants for nonpayment

concerned former criminal defendants in that court. Thus, had the arrest
warrants been issued by the judges themselves, they would undoubtedly be
entitled to absolute judicial immunity.52

See Ballard, 413 F.3d at 515

(considering whether the act complained of is a “normal judicial function,”
whether the act occurred in the courtroom or “appropriate adjunct spaces,”

Although judicial officers are not entitled to absolute immunity for acts
performed in “the clear absence of jurisdiction,” plaintiffs do not argue, and
the Court does not find, that the conduct at issue falls within this exception.
The “absence of jurisdiction” refers to the court’s lacking subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case or personal jurisdiction over a litigant. See
generally Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1389 (noting that “a clear absence of all
jurisdiction” refers only to a “clear lack” of subject matter or personal
jurisdiction). Nothing in the record indicates the Criminal District Court
judges lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction over the state-court
criminal defendants.
52

whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the court,
and whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in determining
whether the judge acted within her judicial capacity for purposes of absolute
judicial immunity).
The issue in this case is whether the Criminal District Court’s Judicial
Administrator, who had “standing authority” from the judges to monitor
court debtors’ payment of court costs and to issue arrest warrants when
debtors failed to pay, is equally entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity
for acting at the judges’ instruction. Plaintiffs argue that Kazik cannot be
immune because there are no allegations that, in issuing arrest warrants for
nonpayment, Kazik was “complying with a valid judicial order.”53 But as
noted, formal court decrees are not necessary to immunize court employees
who act according to a judge’s instructions. See Severin, 357 F. App’x at 603.
Because, by plaintiffs’ own allegations, Kazik acted according to “procedures
allegedly implemented by the judges [and] at the express direction of the
judges, to assist them in carrying out their judicial functions,” Kazik is also
protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

Id.; see also Rogers v.

Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 1988) (immunizing “deputy circuit

53

R. Doc. 70 at 19.

clerk [who] issued the arrest warrant at the direction of the assistant circuit
judge”).
Absolute quasi-judicial immunity shields Kazik from suit under both
federal and state law. See generally Sharp v. Palmisano, No. 13-5429, 2013
WL 5969661, at *4 (E.D. La. Nov. 8, 2013) (“Louisiana jurisprudence on
judicial immunity mirrors the federal doctrine.” (quoting Moore v. Taylor,
541 So.2d 378, 381 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1989))). As noted, absolute judicial
immunity—and therefore absolute quasi-judicial immunity—does not apply
to claims for declaratory relief. See generally Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d
517, 525 (5th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, the Court dismisses plaintiffs’ claims
against Kazik, in his individual capacity, for monetary and injunctive relief
under federal and state law. 54

Absolute immunity does not apply to claims against a defendant in his
official capacity. See Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & P0lice Civil Serv. Bd.,
229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). However, if the suit
against the municipal entity “fails for a jurisdictional, procedural, or pleading
defect,” any official capacity claim against an individual also fails. Id. The
Court has not yet addressed the parties’ arguments regarding plaintiffs’
claims against Criminal District Court.
54

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES

IN PART defendants’ motion to dismiss on grounds of absolute and qualified
immunity.

3rd
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _______ day of May, 2016.

___________________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE