Stevenson v. Cain et al
Filing
31
ORDER AND REASONS DENYING 30 Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to FRCP 60(b)6, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 9/7/2018. (jls)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DAIMEYAHN STEVENSON
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 15-4776
N. BURL CAIN, ET AL.
SECTION “B”(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Petitioner filed a “Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant
to FRCP 60(b)(6),” seeking reconsideration of the dismissal of his
habeas petition in June 2016. Rec. Doc. 30. For the reasons
discussed below,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion is DENIED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner Daimeyahn Stevenson was convicted of armed robbery
in a Louisiana state court in November 2001. See Rec. Doc. 14 at
3. For purposes of Petitioner’s federal habeas petition, his
conviction
became
final
Petitioner
filed
the
on
January
underlying
29,
federal
2004.
See
habeas
id.
at
4.
petition
on
September 24, 2015. See id. at 7. In June 2016, Petitioner’s habeas
petition was dismissed with prejudice as untimely, for being filed
more than one year after Petitioner’s state conviction became
final.
See
Rec.
Doc.
19
at
1,
§ 2244(d)).
1
6-7
(referring
to
28
U.S.C.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A Rule 60(b)(6) motion is sometimes construed as a second or
successive habeas corpus application, but not when the motion
“alleges that the federal courts misapplied the federal statute of
limitations set out in § 2244(d).” See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545
U.S. 524, 530-36 (2005). Therefore, when a “petitioner’s Rule 60(b)
motion challenges only [a] [d]istrict [c]ourt’s previous ruling on
the AEDPA statute of limitations, it is not the equivalent of a
successive habeas petition[,]” and a district court may consider
the motion without certification from the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. See id. at 535-36. Petitioner’s habeas corpus application
was dismissed as untimely per 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), see Rec. Doc.
19, and so Petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion to disturb that
dismissal is properly before the court. See id.
Rule 60(b)(6) allows a district court to “relieve a party
. . . from a final judgment . . . for . . . any . . . reason that
justifies relief.” “Rule 60(b) vests wide discretion in courts,
but
. . .
relief
under
Rule
60(b)(6)
is
available
only
in
‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 777
(2017) (quoting Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535). “In determining whether
extraordinary circumstances are present, a court may consider a
wide range of factors” “includ[ing], in an appropriate case, the
risk of injustice to the parties and the risk of undermining the
public's
confidence
in
the
judicial
2
process.”
Id.
at
778.
Regardless of the fact that extraordinary circumstances are not
present here,1 which is an independent basis for denying the
instant motion, Petitioner’s motion does not present a valid basis
for vacating the dismissal of his habeas application.
The
Court
previously
concluded
that
Petitioner’s
habeas
petition was untimely because it was filed more than one year after
his state conviction became final, even taking into account his
state collateral proceedings. See Rec. Doc. 19 at 1, 6-7. After
the
Court
“Louisiana
denied
the
prisoners
petition,
can
the
benefit
Fifth
from
Circuit
the
held
that
Martinez/Trevino
exception to the procedural-default rule if they can show that
they have a substantial [ineffective assistance of trial counsel
(IATC)] claim and received [ineffective assistance of counsel]
from state habeas counsel.”2 Coleman v. Goodwin, 833 F.3d 537,
1
“[T]he Coleman v. Goodwin decision upon which Petitioner relies,
a circuit court decision that simply recognized that the
Martinez/Trevino
analysis is applicable to habeas corpus
applications filed in Louisiana (because the Louisiana procedural
scheme is sufficiently similar to that in Texas), does not
constitute an extraordinary circumstance that would support Rule
60(b) relief.” Morris v. Cain, No. 06-0289, 2018 WL 1468587, at *3
(M.D. La. Mar. 26, 2018). See also Broadway v. Warden La. State
Penitentiary, No. 97-0940, 2016 WL 9236456, at *3-4 (W.D. La. Nov.
7, 2016) (same).
2 The Martinez/Trevino exception excuses procedural default of
claims asserted in a federal habeas petition when the petitioner
was convicted “in [a] state[] ‘where . . . [the state’s] procedural
framework, by reason of its design and operation, makes it highly
unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful
opportunity to raise a claim of [IATC] on direct appeal . . . .’”
Coleman, 833 F.3d at 540 (quoting Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413,
432 (2013)).
3
543-44 (5th Cir. 2016). But Coleman does not address a situation
in which the federal habeas petition itself is untimely because it
was filed more than one year after the state conviction became
final. Petitioner’s habeas petition was dismissed “due to its
untimeliness,” Rec. Doc. 19 at 1, therefore the rule announced in
Coleman
does
not
support
reconsideration
of
the
denial
of
Petitioner’s habeas petition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 7th day of September, 2018.
___________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4
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