Thomas v. Pohlmann et al

Filing 31

ORDER AND REASONS re 17 Motion for Summary Judgment and 25 Motion for Summary Judgment - IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants motions for summary judgment are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Signed by Judge Susie Morgan. (bwn)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
PAMELA THOMAS, ET AL.
Plaintiffs

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 15-4891

JAMES POHLMANN, ET AL.,
Defendants
ORDER AND REASONS

SECTION: “E” (5)

Before the Court are two motions for summary judgment filed by the Defendants,
Sheriff James Pohlmann and two unidentified St. Bernard Parish deputies.1 Pursuant to
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
the Defendants seek summary judgment on all of the claims asserted by the Plaintiffs in
this action. Plaintiffs oppose the motions.2 For the reasons that follow, the motions for
summary judgment are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
This civil action arises from an incident that occurred on or about January 1, 2015,
in the parking lot of a Dollar General Store located at 4201 East Judge Perez Drive in
Chalmette, Louisiana.3 On that date, deputies from the St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Office
responded to an emergency call regarding an ongoing disturbance in the parking lot of
the aforementioned Dollar General Store. Upon arriving at the scene, deputies found,
among others, Plaintiffs Derrick Jones and Ernest Jones, Jr., who are brothers, involved
in a physical altercation in the parking lot.4 Plaintiff Pamela Thomas, the mother of Ernest

R. Docs. 17, 25.
R. Docs. 24, 26. The Plaintiffs in this action include (1) Pamela Thomas, (2) Derrick Jones, and (3) Ernest
Jones, Jr. When referring to them collectively, the Court uses “Plaintiffs.”
3 R. Doc. 1 at 4.
4 Plaintiffs contend they were horse playing, while the Defendants contend Ernest and Derrick were engaged
in a fight. The nature of the incident, and whether it was a serious fight or a jovial incident of horse playing,
is not material to the Court’s decision.
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2

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and Derrick, was also present at the scene. Each of the Plaintiffs—Pamela, Derrick, and
Ernest—was arrested by St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Office deputies. Pamela and Ernest
were arrested for disturbing the peace by fighting, in violation of Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 14:103(A)(1), and resisting an officer, in violation of Louisiana Revised
Statutes section 14:108.5 Derrick was arrested only for disturbing the peace by fighting.
Pamela and Ernest subsequently pleaded guilty to both charges filed against them, and
Derrick too pleaded guilty to the sole charge filed against him.6
On September 30, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed this federal action against (1) Sheriff
James Pohlmann, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of St. Bernard Parish, and (2) John
Doe and Jane Doe, two unidentified St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Office deputies, in their
official and individual capacities.7 The Plaintiffs have alleged the following causes of
action: (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, namely that Plaintiffs were falsely arrested and
subjected to excessive force at the hands of the Defendants; (2) a Monell claim against
Sheriff James Pohlmann; and (3) certain state law claims, specifically claims under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, for false arrest, excessive force, inflicting of emotional
distress, battery, and assault.8
On April 27, 2016, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment with respect
to the claims asserted by Pamela and Derrick.9 Defendants contend that, because Pamela
pleaded guilty to state charges of disturbing the peace by fighting and resisting an officer,
and because Derrick pleaded guilty to disturbing the peace by fighting, all of the claims
brought in this action by Pamela and Derrick should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant

See R. Doc. 17-2; R. Doc. 25-2.
R. Docs. 17-2 at 3, 25-2 at 6.
7 R. Doc. 1.
8 R. Doc. 1 at 7–9.
9 R. Doc. 17.
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to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Defendants filed a nearly identical motion on June 2, 2016, with respect to the claims
asserted by Plaintiff, Ernest Jones, Jr., a minor child whose claims are being maintained
by his mother, Pamela Thomas.10 Specifically, Defendants argue that, because Ernest, like
Pamela, pleaded guilty to state charges of disturbing the peace by fighting and resisting
an officer, his claims should be dismissed under Heck.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.”11 “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” 12
When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the
evidence in the record but refrains from making credibility determinations or weighing
the evidence.”13 All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.14
There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.15
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of
persuasion at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would
‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” 16 If the

See R. Doc. 25.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56. See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
12 DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005).
13 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008). See also
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000).
14 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).
15 Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2002).
16 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263–64 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Golden Rule Ins. Co.
v. Lease, 755 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Colo. 1991)).
10
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moving party fails to carry this burden, the motion must be denied. If the moving party
successfully carries this burden, the burden of production then shifts to the non-moving
party to direct the Court’s attention to something in the pleadings or other evidence in the
record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material
fact does indeed exist.17
If the dispositive issue is one on which the non-moving party will bear the burden
of persuasion at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of production by either (1)
submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the non-movant’s
claim, or (2) affirmatively demonstrating that there is no evidence in the record to
establish an essential element of the non-movant’s claim.18 If the movant fails to
affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record, its motion for summary
judgment must be denied.19 Thus, the non-moving party may defeat a motion for
summary judgment by “calling the Court’s attention to supporting evidence already in the
record that was overlooked or ignored by the moving party.”20 “[U]nsubstantiated
assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence. The party opposing summary
judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the
precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim. ‘Rule 56 does not impose

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–24.
Id. at 331–32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19 See id. at 332.
20 Id. at 332–33. The burden would then shift back to the movant to demonstrate the inadequacy of the
evidence relied upon by the non-movant. Once attacked, “the burden of production shifts to the nonmoving
party, who must either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving party’s papers, (2) produce
additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) submit
an affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f).” Id. at 332–33, 333 n.3.
17

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upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a
party’s opposition to summary judgment.’”21
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held, generally, that a
plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime cannot bring a Section 1983 claim challenging
the constitutionality of his or her conviction, unless that conviction has been reversed,
expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus.22 Specifically, the Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner
seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of
his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the
plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of
any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should
be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.23
“At the core of Heck is a proscription against allowing a civil suit to cast doubt on a
criminal conviction. However, where no conflict exists between the conviction and the
claims involved in the civil complaint, the § 1983 suit must be allowed to proceed.” 24

21 Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998)

(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Forsyth
v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) and quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915–
16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)).
22 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994).
23 Id. (emphasis in original).
24 Crowe v. Hoffman, No. 12-687, 2013 WL 357006, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2013) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at
487).
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I.

Section 1983 Claims
a. False Arrest
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on each of the three Plaintiffs’ false

arrest claims asserted under Section 1983, which fail as a matter of law pursuant to the
Heck doctrine. In Walter v. Horseshoe Entertainment, the Fifth Circuit held that:
In order to support a claim for unlawful [or false] arrest, a plaintiff must
show that he was arrested without probable cause. Burge v. Parish of St.
Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 481 (5th Cir. 1999). Here, the plaintiffs were
arrested for crimes of which they were ultimately convicted. Heck therefore
bars recovery for the false arrest claim, because the conviction necessarily
implies that there was probable cause for the arrest. Sappington v. Bartee,
195 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1999).25
Similarly, where the plaintiff’s conviction on a charge for which he or she was arrested is
by way of a guilty plea, or a plea of no contest, to that charge, the plea necessarily implies
that there was probable cause for the arrest and, thus, that the arrest was not unlawful or
false.26
In this case, Pamela and Ernest pleaded guilty in the 34th Judicial District Court
for the Parish of St. Bernard, State of Louisiana, to charges of (1) disturbing the peace by
fighting, in violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:103(A)(1), and (2) resisting
an officer, in violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:108. 27 Derrick pleaded
guilty to disturbing the peace by fighting, in violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes

Walter v. Horseshoe Entm’t, 483 F. App’x 884, 887–88 (5th Cir. 2012).
See, e.g., Buckenberger v. Reed, 342 F. App’x 58, 61 (5th Cir. 2009); Wallace v. City of Slidell, No. 15383, 2016 WL 1223065, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2016) (“By definition, the claim of false arrest, in particular,
challenges to the lawfulness of an arrest. By entering no-contest pleas, each of the arrestee-Plaintiffs has
been ‘convicted’ of crimes for which he or she was arrested. A judgment on the false arrest claims in favor
of the arrestee-Plaintiffs would necessarily imply the invalidity of those convictions, which have not been
reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. As a result, the claims of false arrest are barred.”); Magee v.
Reed, No. 14-1986, 2015 WL 5020252, at *3–4 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2015); Idel v. New Orleans Police Dep’t,
No. 11-1078-DEK, 2012 WL 860380, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Mar. 13, 2012); DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi,
No. C.A. C-05-096, 2005 WL 2045562, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2005); Barker v. Jack, No. 3:04-CV-0596G, 2004 WL 1144144, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Tex. May 20, 2004).
27 See R. Doc. 17-2; R. Doc. 25-2.
25

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section 14:103(A)(1).28 These are the same charges for which each Plaintiff was arrested;
that is, Pamela and Ernest were arrested for disturbing the peace by fighting and resisting
an officer, and Derrick was arrested for disturbing the peace by fighting.29 Despite
Pamela’s and Ernest’s guilty pleas to disturbing the peace by fighting and resisting arrest,
and Derrick’s guilty plea to disturbing the peace by fighting, Plaintiffs now argue that their
arrests on those charges, from which their guilty pleas stem, amounted to false arrests in
violation of Title 28, United States Code, Section 1983. This is the precise type of
inconsistency against which the Heck doctrine is meant to guard.
Under Fifth Circuit case law, the Plaintiffs’ guilty pleas, Pamela’s and Ernest’s to
disturbing the peace by fighting and resisting an officer, and Derrick’s to disturbing the
peace by fighting, necessarily imply that their arrests on the same charges were supported
by probable cause.30 Moreover, Plaintiffs’ guilty pleas have not been reversed, expunged,
or otherwise invalidated.31 As a result, Plaintiffs are foreclosed under Heck from pursuing
their Section 1983 false arrest claims.
b. Excessive Force
“How Heck applies to excessive force claims is not always clear.”32 Unlike for false
arrest claims, Heck does not operate as a per se bar on excessive force claims.33 In fact,
the Fifth Circuit has held that, unlike with claims of false arrest, “[b]y proving an excessive
force claim, a plaintiff will not invariably invalidate his conviction.”34 To determine if a
plaintiff’s excessive force claim is barred under the Heck doctrine, the district court must

R. Doc. 17-2.
See R. Docs. 17-2, 25-2; see also R. Doc. 17-4.
30 See supra notes 25, 26.
31 R. Doc. 17-4 at 2, ¶7; R. Doc. 25-3 at 2, ¶7; R. Docs. 24-1, 26-1.
32 Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, 100 F. App’x 321, 323 (5th Cir. 2004).
33 Wallace, 2016 WL 1223065, at *2 (citing Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2008)).
34 Arnold, 100 F. App’x at 323 (citing Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873 (5th Cir. 2006)).
28
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analyze (1) “the specific elements that comprise the conviction[s] at issue,” and (2) “the
specific facts being alleged in the civil case.”35 Stated differently, the Court is “required to
conduct a fact-specific analysis to determine whether success on [a plaintiff’s] excessive
force claim would require negation of an element of the criminal offenses with which she
is charged, or proof of a fact that is inherently inconsistent with a conviction on one of the
underlying criminal charges.”36 “[O]nly ‘certain convictions’ will bar an excessive force
claim,”37 as the Heck doctrine applies only where the underlying criminal convictions and
the excessive force claims are inconsistent.38 For example, the Fifth Circuit has held that
“[a] claim of excessive force that is ‘temporally and conceptually’ distinct from the
conviction would not be barred by Heck,” but when the excessive force claim and the
underlying conviction “stem from a single interaction,” Heck operates to bar the excessive
force claim.39
1. Resisting Arrest – Pamela Thomas & Ernest Jones, Jr.
Pamela and Ernest pleaded guilty to, and thus were convicted of, resisting an
officer, in violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:108.40
In Arnold v. Town of Slaughter, the Fifth Circuit confronted the very issue of
whether a conviction for resisting arrest under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:108
and the facts underling the plaintiff’s excessive force claims under Section 1983 stemmed

Bramlett v. Buell, No. Civ.A. 04-518, 2004 WL 2988486, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 2004). See also Mayberry
v. Hamblen, No. Civ.A. SA02CA0521FBN, 2006 WL 503511, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2006) (“[A] Heck
determination focuses on the specific elements of the conviction and the specific facts alleged in the civil
case.”).
36 Wilson v. Dailey, No. 11-117, 2011 WL 2637183, at *2 (E.D. La. July 6, 2011) (citing Bush, 513 F.3d at
497).
37 Crowe v. Hoffman, No. 12-687, 2013 WL 357006, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2013) (quoting Hudson, 98
F.3d at 873).
38 See, e.g., Bramlett, 2004 WL 2988486, at *4.
39 Walter, 483 F. App’x at 887 (quoting Bush, 513 F.3d at 498).
40 See R. Doc. 17-2; R. Doc. 25-2. Pamela and Ernest also both pleaded guilty to disturbing the peace by
fighting, in violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:103(A)(1).
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from “a single interaction.”41 In the Arnold case, the Fifth Circuit held that, because the
plaintiff had been convicted of resisting arrest, and because the plaintiff’s excessive force
claims went to the facts underlying his resisting arrest conviction, his excessive force
claims were barred by Heck:
Arnold’s claims are not that the police used excessive force after he stopped
resisting arrest or even that the officers used excessive and unreasonable
force to stop resistance. Instead, Arnold claims that he did nothing wrong,
but was viciously attacked for no reason. . . . In this way, Arnold’s claims are
distinguishable from excessive force claims that survive Heck’s bar.42
The Fifth Circuit in Arnold found it significant that, in bringing his excessive force claims,
the plaintiff maintained “he did nothing wrong” and was “attacked for no reason.”43 By
arguing that he did nothing wrong, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff believed
he was innocent and that he, in fact, did not resist arrest, despite having been convicted
of that offense in state court.44 Under these circumstances, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the plaintiff’s excessive force claims “squarely challenge[d] the factual determination
that underlie[d] his conviction for resisting an officer,” finding that the plaintiff’s
excessive force claims and resisting-an-officer conviction stemmed from a single
interaction and, thus, were barred under Heck.45
The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi,
a case in which the plaintiff was convicted in state court of aggravated assault of a police
officer and subsequently brought excessive force claims against the officer and the Corpus
Christi Police Department in federal court.46 The Fifth Circuit noted the plaintiff’s

100 F. App’x 321.
Id. at 324.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 324–25.
46 DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 656 (5th Cir. 2007).
41

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complaint did not allege that “his claims of excessive force [were] separable from his
aggravated assault on the officer. Instead, the complaint maintain[ed] that [the plaintiff]
did nothing wrong, that he simply defended himself, against mace, baton, and then gun,
as the violence escalated.”47 In sum, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff’s excessive
force claims and his aggravated-assault-on-an-officer conviction were “presented as a
single violent encounter through which [the officer] used excessive force.”48 Citing its
decision in Arnold, the Fifth Circuit concluded, because the plaintiff maintained his
innocence, his excessive force claims contradicted his state court conviction of aggravated
assault on an officer, and the two were “inseparable.”49 For that reason, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s excessive force claims under
Heck.50
In Daigre v. City of Waveland, Mississippi, the Fifth Circuit likewise noted that,
despite having been convicted of resisting arrest in state court, the plaintiff maintained
her innocence in bringing federal excessive force claims against the arresting officer and
police department.51 The Fifth Circuit reasoned, in line with Arnold and DeLeon, that the
plaintiff’s excessive force claims were barred because she thought she was innocent with
respect to the “entire arrest encounter,” which undermined her resisting-arrest conviction
because it was clear the excessive force claims were based on a single interaction with
police, the same interaction that resulted in her being charged with resisting arrest.52

Id.
Id. at 656–57.
49 Id. at 657.
50 Id.
51 Daigre v. City of Waveland, Miss., 549 F. App’x 283, 286–87 (5th Cir. 2013).
52 Id. at 287 (alterations omitted) (quoting DeLeon, 488 F.3d at 657).
47

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The Fifth Circuit rendered another similar decision in Walker v. Munsell. In
Walker, the circuit noted the plaintiff’s claim “[was] not that the officers used excessive
force after he stopped resisting or to stop his resistance; his claim [was] based solely on
his assertions that he did not resist arrest, did nothing wrong, and was attacked by
the . . . officers for no reason.”53 For those reasons, the Fifth Circuit in Walker, relying on
its prior decisions in Arnold and DeLeon, reasoned that the plaintiff’s excessive force
claims “squarely challenge[d] the factual determination that underlie[d] his conviction
for resisting an officer,” and if the plaintiff prevailed, “he [would] have established that
his criminal conviction lack[ed] any basis.”54
A court in the Western District of Louisiana aptly summarized the foregoing line
of jurisprudence in a recent decision, stating that “when a plaintiff contends that he did
not resist arrest, that is, that he committed no offense and was instead unjustly victimized,
the Fifth Circuit has uniformly concluded that his excessive force claim is Heck barred
because the excessive force claim necessarily attacks the validity of the conviction for
resisting arrest.”55
In this case, Pamela and Ernest very clearly allege in their Complaint that, “[a]t all
times during the encounter with the Defendants, Plaintiffs acted in a lawful manner.”56
That is, Pamela and Ernest maintain their innocence with respect to their encounter with
St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Office deputies on January 1, 2015.57 Similar to Arnold,
DeLeon, Daigre, Walker, and Price, the allegations of innocence in this case are
necessarily inconsistent with the factual determinations underlying Pamela’s and Ernest’s

Walker v. Munsell, 281 F. App’x 388, 389 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id.
55 Price v. City of Rayne, No. 13-0790, 2016 WL 866945, at *3 (W.D. La. Mar. 3, 2016).
56 R. Doc. 1 at 5.
57 See generally R. Doc. 1.
53

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convictions for resisting arrest in violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:108.
Pamela and Ernest have not alleged that their excessive force claims stem from conduct
that occurred after they resisted arrest, nor do Pamela or Ernest allege that St. Bernard
Parish Sheriff’s Office deputies used excessive force to stop their resistance. Instead, it is
clear that Pamela’s and Ernest’s excessive force claims stem from the same interaction
with deputies that resulted in their convictions for resisting arrest. For these reasons, and
in light of the Fifth Circuit jurisprudence detailed above, the Court finds that Pamela’s
and Ernest’s excessive force claims are barred pursuant to Heck.
2. Disturbing the Peace – Derrick Jones
Derrick pleaded guilty only to disturbing the peace by fighting, in violation of
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:103(A)(1).58 Unlike Pamela and Ernest, Derrick did
not plead guilty to, and thus was not convicted of, resisting an officer in violation of
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:108.59 The Court has not identified any cases in
which a plaintiff’s conviction for disturbing the peace by fighting was, in and of itself,
found to bar excessive force claims under Heck. Moreover, Derrick’s conviction for
disturbing the peace by fighting—a charge stemming from his pre-arrest conduct—does
not meet the requirements of Heck such that it bars his excessive force claims against the
arresting deputies. Heck operates to bar Section 1983 claims that call into question or
render invalid a prior conviction or sentence.60 “[A]t the core of Heck is a proscription
against allowing a civil tort suit to cast doubt on a criminal conviction.” 61 Derrick’s
excessive force claims against the deputies who arrested him are not inconsistent with his

R. Doc. 17-2.
See R. Doc. 17-2; R. Doc. 17-4; R. Doc. 24-1.
60 See, e.g., Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87.
61 Bramlett, 2004 WL 2988486, at *2 (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487).
58
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conviction for disturbing the peace by fighting, a charge that stemmed from his conduct
prior to the arrival of deputies from the St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Office and, thus, prior
to any alleged excessive force that he experienced at the hands of those deputies.
As a result, the Court finds that, because Derrick’s excessive force claim is not
inconsistent with his conviction for disturbing the peace by fighting, and because his
excessive force claim does not call into question that conviction, Derrick’s excessive force
claim is not barred by Heck.62
II.

Monell Claims
Plaintiffs, collectively, contend Sheriff James Pohlmann, in his official capacity as

the Sheriff of St. Bernard Parish, “developed, implemented, enforced, encouraged, and
sanctioned de facto policies, practices, and/or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference
to the civil rights and constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs that caused the violation of
such rights.”63 These allegations amount to a claim of supervisory liability against Sheriff
Pohlmann, and ipso facto the St. Bernard Parish Sheriff’s Office, under Monell v.
Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Defendants argue, however, that “[s]upervisory liability claims under Monell
require an underlying constitutional violation and where the underlying violation is
barred by Heck[,] it cannot form the basis for a derivative Monell claim.”64 Defendants
thus argue that, because Plaintiffs “have no viable claims due to the Heck rationale as a
result of their guilty pleas,” Plaintiffs’ Monell claims also must fail.

See, e.g., Esteem v. City of Pasadena, No. CV 04-662-GHK (MANx), 2007 WL 4270360, at *9 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 11, 2007) (“The fact that Esteem was disturbing the peace could be fully consistent with the fact that
excessive force was used in the arrest.”).
63 R. Doc. 1 at 8.
64 R. Doc. 17-1 at 16 (citing Williams v. Town of Delhi, No. 14-00043, 2015 WL 868746, at *7 (W.D. La.
Feb. 27, 2015)). See also R. Doc. 25-1 at 16.
62

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In Williams v. Town of Delhi, the Western District of Louisiana held, specifically,
that “[s]upervisory liability claims under Monell require an underlying constitutional
violation and, where the underlying violation is barred by Heck, it cannot form the basis
for a derivative Monell claim.”65
Therefore, the Defendants argument is correct in theory, but only the Monell
claims asserted by Pamela and Ernest are barred thereunder. That is, because both
constitutional violations alleged by Pamela and Ernest—i.e., their false arrest and
excessive force claims—are barred under Heck, so too are their Monell claims barred.
Derrick’s Monell claim, however, is not barred on this basis, as his excessive force claim
is not Heck barred.
III.

State-Law Claims
Plaintiffs, collectively, allege that the Defendants were negligent under Louisiana

law as another theory of liability.66 Specifically, Plaintiffs contend the Defendants are
liable under Louisiana law for (1) false arrest; (2) excessive force; (3) inflicting emotional
distress; (4) battery; and (5) assault.67
Because the Court concluded that all three of the Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims
under Section 1983 are barred under Heck, all three of the Plaintiffs’ false arrest claims
under Louisiana state law are also barred pursuant to Heck.68

Williams, 2015 WL 868746, at *7 (citing DeLeon, 488 F.3d 649 (barring claims against individual officer
and municipality pursuant to Heck); Daigre, 549 F. App’x at 287 (same); Whatley v. Coffin, 496 F. App’x
414, 417 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (same)).
66 See R. Doc. 1 at 9.
67 R. Doc. 1 at 9.
68 See, e.g., Wallace, 2016 WL 1223065, at *2 (citing Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799)) (“The arresteePlaintiffs assert § 1983 claims of false arrest, and state law claims of false imprisonment . . . . [T]he claims
of false arrest [under § 1983] are barred. Furthermore, because the arrestee-Plaintiffs’ state law claims of
false imprisonment are premised on the unlawfulness of those arrests, as well, they too are precluded.”).
65

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With respect to Pamela and Ernest, the Court concluded that their Section 1983
excessive force claims are barred under Heck, as discussed supra. Pamela’s and Ernest’s
state law claims for excessive force, assault, battery, and inflicting emotional distress are
premised on the same basis as their Section 1983 excessive force claims.69 For example,
to prevail on assault and battery claims against a law enforcement officer, the plaintiff
must establish that the officer acted with unreasonable or excessive force. 70 Similarly, to
prevail on a claim that the officer inflicted emotional distress, the plaintiff must establish
that the officer’s conduct was “extreme” and “outrageous.”71 Given what must be proven,
establishing state law claims of assault, battery, and inflicting emotional distress would
be necessarily inconsistent with, and would call into question, the facts underlying
Pamela’s and Ernest’s convictions for resisting arrest.72 The Middle District of Louisiana
recently came to a similar conclusion in Collier v. Roberts, a case in which the plaintiff
was convicted of resisting arrest and subsequently brought state law claims for excessive
force, assault, battery, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. 73 The court in
Collier concluded that, based on the proof requirements associated with state law assault,
battery, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, proving those claims
would be inconsistent with the plaintiff’s resisting arrest conviction. For that reason, the
court found that the plaintiff’s state law assault, battery, and intentional infliction of

See, e.g., id. at *4 (“Relatedly, the arrestee-Plaintiffs’ state law claims of assault and battery are also Heckbarred because they and the precluded § 1983 claims of excessive force are premised on the same basis.”);
see also Hainze, 207 F.3d at 799; Foster v. City of Addis, No. 13-00702-JJB-SCR, 2014 WL 5778922, at *4
(M.D. La. Nov. 3, 2014) (holding that Heck barred a plaintiff’s assault and battery claims because they were
inconsistent with her conviction for resisting an officer).
70 Wagster v. Gautreaux, No. 12-00011-SDD-SCR, 2013 WL 6194516, at *15 (M.D. La. Nov. 26, 2013)
(quoting Elphage v. Gautreaux, 969 F. Supp. 2d 493, 515 (M.D. La. 2013)).
71 Romain v. Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, No. 14-660-SDDRLB, 2016 WL 3199504, at *4 (M.D. La. June 8, 2016) (citing White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205, 1209
(La. 1991)).
72 See supra note 69.
73 Collier v. Roberts, No. 13-425-SDD-EWD, 2016 WL 3448607, at *6 (M.D. La. June 17, 2016).
69

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emotional distress claims, along with his state law excessive force claims, were barred
under Heck. This case is on all fours with Collier, and the Court sees no reason to diverge
from that court’s reasoning. Because Pamela’s and Ernest’s state law claims for excessive
force, assault, battery, and inflicting emotional distress are premised on the same basis as
their Section 1983 claims for excessive force, which are barred under Heck, and because
their state law claims are inconsistent with their resisting arrest convictions, the Court
finds that Pamela’s and Ernest’s state law claims are also barred.
With respect to Derrick, the Court has concluded that his federal excessive force
claim is not Heck barred. Thus, neither are Derrick’s state law claims for excessive force,
inflicting emotional distress, battery, and assault barred.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The motions are GRANTED to the extent that Pamela Thomas’s, Ernest Jones,
Jr.’s, and Derrick Jones’s federal and state law claims for false arrest, or false
imprisonment, are barred pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, and those claims are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The motions are also GRANTED to the extent that the remaining claims of
Pamela Thomas and Ernest Jones, Jr.—their (1) federal and state law claims for excessive
force, (2) state law claims for assault, battery, and inflicting emotional distress, and (3)
Monell claims against Sheriff Pohlmann—are barred pursuant to Heck, and those claims
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The motions are otherwise DENIED. Derrick’s (1) Section 1983 excessive force
claim, (2) Monell claim against Sheriff Pohlmann in his official capacity, and (3) state law
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claims for excessive force, assault, battery, and inflicting emotional distress are not barred
under Heck and, thus, are not dismissed.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 5th day of July, 2016.

______ ______________ __________
SUSIE MORGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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