Williams v. EAN Holdings, LLC et al

Filing 12

ORDER & REASONS: granting 6 Motion to Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 11/13/15. (sek)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MICHELLE M. WILLIAMS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 15-5258

EAN HOLDINGS, LLC, ET AL.

SECTION: “J”(3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Remand (Rec. Doc. 6) filed by
Plaintiff

Michelle

M.

Williams

(“Plaintiff”)

and

oppositions

thereto (Rec. Doc. 9; Rec. Doc. 10) filed by Defendants EAN
Holdings, LLC and Christopher W. Woodworth (“Defendants”). Having
considered the motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the
applicable law, the Court finds that the motion should be GRANTED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation derives from a May 31, 2014 motor vehicle
accident, in which Plaintiff sustained injuries. (Rec. Doc. 1, at
2.) Plaintiff filed suit in Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans against Woodworth, the driver of the other car in the
accident, and EAN Holdings, the owner of the vehicle driven by
Woodworth. (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 1.) Plaintiff specifically alleged
that her claim exceeded $75,000 and claimed damages including
mental

and

physical

pain

and

suffering,

disability,

medical

expenses, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of use and/or function
of

body

parts,

loss

of

earning

1

capacity,

impairment

of

psychological functioning, loss of support, loss of society, loss
of consortium, and “any and all damages proven at the trial of
this matter.” (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 2-3.)
On

September

18,

2015,

Defendants

received

Plaintiff’s

responses to requests for admissions, in which Plaintiff stated
again that her claim exceeded $75,000. (Rec. Doc. 9, at 3.) On
October

5,

Defendants

received

copies

of

Plaintiff’s

medical

records, as well as Plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories, in
which she described her injuries. Id. Based on this information
about Plaintiff’s damages, Defendants filed a notice of removal in
this Court on October 19, 2015. (Rec. Doc. 1.) Defendants asserted
that the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s claim based on United States Code, Title 28, Section
1332. According to Defendants, Plaintiff’s discovery responses
revealed that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, making
removal appropriate at that time.
On October 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to
Remand. (Rec. Doc. 6.) Defendants opposed this motion on November
10. (Rec. Doc. 9; Rec. Doc. 10.)
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
The parties dispute the timeliness of removal. Plaintiff
asserts that her original petition for damages, filed on May 26,
2015,

affirmatively

alleged

that

the

amount

in

controversy

exceeded $75,000. Because Defendants failed to remove the action
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within the requisite thirty days from service of the petition,
Plaintiff argues that removal is untimely and her Motion to Remand
should be granted. However, Defendants contest the sufficiency of
Plaintiff’s allegations in her petition. According to Defendants,
Plaintiff’s

allegations

were

vague,

and

she

did

not

provide

documentation in support of her contention that the amount in
controversy exceeded $75,000. Thus, Defendants claim that they
were uncertain about whether the federal amount in controversy
requirement

was

satisfied

until

they

received

Plaintiff’s

discovery responses. Because Defendants filed their Notice of
Removal within thirty days of receiving the responses, they claim
that removal was timely.
LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court if
a federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the
action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The district courts have original
jurisdiction over cases involving citizens of different states in
which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of
interest or costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The removing party bears
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
federal jurisdiction exists at the time of removal. DeAguilar v.
Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1408 (5th Cir. 1995). The jurisdictional
facts supporting removal are examined as of the time of removal.
Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2000).
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Ambiguities are construed against removal and in favor of remand,
because removal statutes are to be strictly construed. Manguno v.
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002).
The procedure for removal of civil actions derives from United
States Code Title 28, Section 1446. Section 1446(b) provides that
the notice of removal "shall be filed within [thirty] days after
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy
of the initial pleading" if such initial pleading indicates that
the civil action is removable. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). If it only
becomes clear that the action is removable after receipt of "an
amended pleading, motion, order or other paper," then the notice
of removal "may be filed within [thirty] days [of] receipt" of
that document. Id. § 1446(b)(3).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
held that the initial pleading triggers "the thirty-day removal
period under [Section 1446(b)(1)] only where the initial pleading
‘affirmatively reveals on its face that the that the plaintiff is
seeking damages in excess of the minimum jurisdictional amount of
the federal court.’" Mumfrey v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 719 F.3d 392,
399 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Chapman v. Powermatic, Inc., 969 F.2d
160, 163 (5th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis in original). The Fifth Circuit
has "specifically declined to adopt a rule [that] would expect
defendants

to

‘ascertain[]

from

the

circumstance[s]

and

the

initial pleading that the [plaintiff] was seeking damages in excess
4

of

the

minimum

jurisdictional

amount.’"

Id.

(brackets

in

original). The Fifth Circuit espouses a bright line rule under
which the plaintiff must include in the initial pleading either
the exact damages amount or "a specific allegation that damages
are in excess of the federal jurisdictional amount" to trigger the
removal clock. Id. at 399 (quoting Bosky v. Kroger Tex., LP, 288
F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2002)).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues that the thirty-day removal clock began running
when

Defendants

Plaintiff

is

were

served

correct.

Her

with

her

for

damages.

affirmatively

petition

petition

alleges,

“Petitioner’s claim exceeds $75,000.” (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 3.) Thus,
for removal to be timely, Defendants needed to file a Notice of
Removal within thirty days of service of the petition. They did
not do so.
The case cited by Defendant Woodworth, Brown v. Richard, does
not hold to the contrary. See No. 00-1982; 2000 WL 1653835 (E.D.
La. Nov. 2, 2000) (Vance, J.). In Brown, the plaintiff’s petition
claimed the following damages: “injuries to her neck, back, body,
and

mind

including:

past

and

future

mental

aguish

[sic]

and

physical suffering; past and future expenses for medical care;
expenses for transportation to and from health care providers;
past and future loss of earnings; impaired earning capacity; and
property

damage

to

her

vehicle.”
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Id.

at

*3.

Because

these

allegations did not reveal the extent of the plaintiff’s damages,
the court held the removal clock did not begin running when the
defendant was served with the petition. Id. at *4. However, the
plaintiff’s petition did not affirmatively allege that the value
of

her

claim

exceeded

the

federal

minimum.

Thus,

Brown

is

distinguishable from the instant case. Likewise, the case cited by
Defendant

EAN

Holdings,

Simon

v.

Wal-Mart

Stores,

Inc.,

is

distinguishable from the instant case for the same reason. 193
F.3d 848, 850-851 (5th Cir. 1999).
Defendants argue that they could not have removed the case based
only

on

the

documentation

petition
from

because

Plaintiff

they

had

showing

not

that

received

the

any

amount

in

controversy was satisfied. It is true that the removing party has
the burden of proving that federal subject matter jurisdiction
exists. DeAguilar, 47 F.3d at 1408. However, “[u]nless the law
gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls
if the claim is apparently made in good faith.” St. Paul Mercury
Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938). When a
plaintiff

affirmatively

alleges

the

amount

in

controversy,

a

federal court should only decline jurisdiction if it appears “to
a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the
jurisdictional amount.” Id. at 289. Thus, if Defendants had timely
removed the case, they could have relied on Plaintiff’s apparently
good-faith

assertions

about

the
6

amount

in

controversy.

If

Plaintiff had sought a remand at that time, she would have carried
the burden of showing to a legal certainty that the amount in
controversy was not satisfied.
Defendant EAN Holdings also contends that the allegations in
Plaintiff’s petition are contradictory, rendering the amount in
controversy uncertain. In her petition, Plaintiff “reserved her
right to a trial by jury on all issues, but she did not ask for a
jury trial[,] nor did she pay the appropriate filing fee . . . .”
(Rec. Doc. 10, at 1.) In Louisiana, the parties are not entitled
to a trial by jury unless the value of the plaintiff’s claim
exceeds $50,000. EAN Holdings argues that Plaintiff’s failure to
request a jury trial contradicts her assertion that her claim
exceeds $75,000. Defendant suggests that Plaintiff did not request
a jury trial because her claim did not even meet the $50,000
Louisiana

requirement.

Defendant’s

argument

lacks

merit.

Plaintiff’s attorney may have decided to forego a jury trial for
strategic reasons. Plaintiff’s failure to request a jury trial
does not imply that her claim does not exceed $50,000.
Plaintiff’s

petition

clearly

stated

that

the

amount

in

controversy was satisfied, and Defendants failed to remove the
case

within

thirty

days

of

service

of

the

petition.

Thus,

Defendants’ removal is untimely, and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand
must be granted.

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CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Rec.
Doc. 6) is GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 13th day of November, 2015.

____________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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