Doe et al v. St. James Parish School Board et al
Filing
14
ORDER & REASONS denying 12 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 12/10/2015. (mmm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JOHN DOE, ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 15-5370
ST. JAMES PARISH SCHOOL
BOARD, ET AL.
SECTION: R
ORDER AND REASONS
On October 22, 2015, John and Jane Doe filed this lawsuit on behalf of
their child, Child Doe, alleging constitutional violations in connection with the
suspension and expulsion of their child from St. James Parish Math and
Science Academy.1 On November 12, 2015, plaintiffs moved for a temporary
restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction allowing their son to play in
a high school football playoff game scheduled for the following day.2 Plaintiffs'
motion was temporarily reallotted to a different section of this Court, which
denied the motion.3 On December 9, 2015, plaintiffs filed a renewed motion
1
R. Doc. 1, at 2-3.
2
R. Doc. 7.
3
R. Doc. 9.
1
for a temporary restraining order.4 Although plaintiffs direct the Court's
attention to another high school football playoff game--this one scheduled for
December 12, 2015--plaintiffs argue that their motion for a temporary
restraining order "is not solely about playing in a football game."5 Instead,
plaintiffs argue, their motion seeks to remedy ongoing constitutional
violations by enabling Child Doe to return to St. James Parish Math and
Sciences as a regular student with full access to all scholastic and
extracurricular opportunity that the school makes available, including
participation in a football game.
Temporary restraining orders are "extraordinary relief and rarely
issued." Albright v. City of New Orleans, 46 F.Supp.2d 523, 532 (E.D. La.
1999). A party can obtain a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction only if: (1) there is a substantial likelihood that the movant will
prevail on the merits; (2) there is a substantial threat that irreparable harm to
the movant will result if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury
outweighs the threatened harm to the defendant; and (4) the granting of the
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order will not disserve the
public interest. Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987). A court
4
R. Doc. 12-2.
5
Id. at 8.
2
may issue a temporary restraining order without notice only if "specific facts
in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse
party can be heard in opposition[.]" Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1)(A).
Plaintiffs' filings fail to state specific facts showing that immediate and
irreparable injury will result to the plaintiffs in the absence of extraordinary
relief. To the extent plaintiffs continue to base their irreparable harm claim
on Child Doe's inability to play high school football, their argument is without
merit. See Khan v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 561 F. Supp. 2d 760, 766 (S.D.
Tex. 2008) (holding that student "will suffer no 'irreparable injury' by not
being allowed to participate in or speak at" a high school graduation
ceremony); St. Patrick High Sch. v. New Jersey Interscholastic Athletic
Associations, No. CIVA 10-CV-948 (DMC), 2010 WL 715826, at *4 (D.N.J.
Mar. 1, 2010) (holding that there was no irreparable harm when a high school
basketball team was prohibited from playing in the state championship); Cruz
ex rel. Cruz v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc., No. CIV. A.
00-5594, 2000 WL 1781933, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2000) ("Not being able
to play on game day is certainly a disappointment but does not in my judgment
constitute the type of harm warranting the extraordinary remedy of injunctive
relief."). Although plaintiffs insist that their motion is not directed towards
3
football alone, they have not identified any other specific injury that Child Doe
will suffer in the absence of immediate injunctive relief, much less
demonstrated why that injury is irreparable in nature. Thus, plaintiffs cannot
obtain the extraordinary relief they seek. See, e.g., RCM Technologies, Inc. v.
Beacon Hill Staffing Group, LLC, 502 F.Supp.2d 70, 74 (D.D.C. 2007)
(denying application for temporary restraining order because plaintiff's alleged
injuries were speculative and non-specific).
For the reasons stated, plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining
order is DENIED.
10th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this ___ day of December, 2015.
_____________________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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