Buisson Creative Strategies, L.L.C. et al v. Roberts et al

Filing 165

ORDER AND REASONS granting Chris Roberts's 117 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BUISSON CREATIVE STRATEGIES, LLC,
ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 15-6272

CHRISTOPHER ROBERTS, ET AL.

SECTION “H”

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Chris Roberts’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 117). For the following reasons, this Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Buisson Creative Strategies (“BCS”) and Gregory Buisson
bring this action against Christopher Roberts and Jefferson Parish alleging
numerous constitutional violations. Plaintiff BCS is a business that provides
public relations, advertising, marketing, event management, graphic design,
and consulting services. Prior to November 4, 2015, it had numerous contracts
with Jefferson Parish including providing services to the Jefferson Parish
Convention and Visitors Bureau, event management services for Lafreniere
Park, and event management services associated with the review stands for

Jefferson Parish’s East Bank Mardi Gras parades.

During the fall 2015

primary election for the Jefferson Parish Council, Plaintiffs provided
consulting services to Louis Congemi in his race for Parish Council against
incumbent

Defendant

Christopher

Roberts.

BCS

produced

various

commercials for the Congemi campaign alleging that Roberts was unqualified
for office because of, inter alia, his alleged failure to file income tax returns.
Roberts ultimately won re-election. According to the Complaint, he was
intent on retaliating against Plaintiffs for their role in creating the Congemi
attack ads. Plaintiffs aver that Roberts impermissibly used his legislative
authority to enact Ordinance 25045 (the “Ordinance”), which had the effect of
terminating BCS’s contracts with the Parish and its entities. The ordinance
provides that any person or firm who has received compensation for the
management or consulting of political campaigns for a candidate for the council
or for Jefferson Parish President during an “election cycle” cannot be awarded
contracts with the Parish regardless of whether a candidate wins or loses. It
also purported to terminate such individual’s existing contracts with the
Parish. Plaintiffs aver that this ordinance is narrowly tailored to target them
and only them. They allege that the ordinance violates the contracts clause,
the First Amendment, equal protection, due process, and the prohibition on
bills of attainder. They seek an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the
ordinance and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
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moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”1 A genuine issue
of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.”2
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,
the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws
all reasonable inferences in his favor.3 “If the moving party meets the initial
burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.”4 Summary judgment is
appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.”5 “In response to a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must
identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that
evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to
sustain a finding in favor of the non-movant on all issues as to which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial.”6 “We do not . . . in the absence
of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the
necessary facts.”7

Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual

dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.”8

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2012).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
3 Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 1997).
4 Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
5 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
6 John v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th
Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
7 Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
8 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).
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LAW AND ANALYSIS
In this Motion, Defendant Christopher Roberts asks the Court to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ claims asserted against him in his personal capacity, arguing that
he is shielded from liability by the doctrine of legislative immunity.9 Plaintiff
responds, arguing that Roberts’s actions were not legislative in nature.
Absolute legislative immunity protects an individual from suit in his
personal capacity for actions that are legislative in nature.10 This immunity
has been extended to include local legislators and other individuals acting in
legislative capacities.11 “Absolute immunity applies to activities, not offices . .
. . Legislative immunity protects officials fulfilling legislative functions even
if they are not ‘legislators.’ And absolute immunity only protects those duties
that are functionally legislative, not all activities engaged in by a legislator.”12
Though the Fifth Circuit has declined to adopt a definitive test to
determine if an action is legislative, it has considered the tests from other
circuits in determining the nature of an official’s action.13

Relevant

considerations include whether the decision made involves formulation of a
policy or ad hoc decision-making,14 whether the decision involves prospective,
legislative-type rules or executive-type enforcement,15 and whether the facts
underlying the decision are legislative facts (such as generalizations
Plaintiffs assert claims for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Roberts in
both his individual and official capacities. The Court has previously ruled that the claims
asserted against Roberts in his official capacity survive summary judgment. (Doc. 110).
10 Hughes v. Tarrant County Tex., 948 F.2d 918, 920 (5th Cir. 1991).
11 Id.
12 Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal citations
omitted).
13 Hughes, 948 F.2d at 921.
14 Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 580 (9th Cir. 1984).
15 Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983).
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concerning a policy or the state of affairs) or facts that relate to particular
individuals or situations (making the decision administrative).16
The Court finds the Supreme Court case of Bogan v. Scott-Harris to be
particularly applicable to this matter.17 There, a former city employee sued
local legislators in their individual capacity for their actions in enacting an
ordinance eliminating her position, alleging that the ordinance was enacted in
retribution for exercise of her First Amendment rights.18 The Court found the
defendant-legislators actions to be protected by legislative immunity,
specifically noting that any inquiry into their individual motivations was
inappropriate. The Court held that “[w]hether an act is legislative turns on
the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official
performing it.”19
In this matter, the Court finds that Christopher Roberts is entitled to
legislative immunity. Just as in Bogan, the actions at issue bear “all the
hallmarks of traditional legislation.”20 Roberts’s actions, in proposing and
voting on the Ordinance, were quintessentially legislative in nature.
Furthermore, the Ordinance involves enacting regulations applicable to all
Parish contracts, implicating interests beyond just those of Plaintiffs. Though
Plaintiff argues that his purpose in proposing this legislature was retaliatory,
the Court cannot properly inquire into to motivations of an individual
legislator.

Accordingly, Roberts is entitled to immunity from suit in his

individual capacity.

Citting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259 (1st Cir. 1984).
523 U.S. 44 (1998).
18 Id. at 53.
19 Id. at 54.
20 Id. at 55.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reason, Chris Roberts’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Doc. 117) is GRANTED as outlined above.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 25th day of January, 2017.

____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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