Lauga v. Cain et al

Filing 23

ORDER ADOPTING 18 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's objections are OVERRULED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's recommendation and Petitioner William David Lauga's pet ition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254 is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's 20 Motion for Stay & Abeyance is DENIED. Signed by Judge Nannette Jolivette Brown on 7/26/2017.(mmv)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

WILLIAM DAVID LAUGA

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 15-6298

N. BURL CAIN, WARDEN

SECTION “G”(1)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Petitioner William David Lauga’s (“Petitioner”) objections1 to the
Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge assigned to the case.2 Also
pending before the Court is Petitioner’s “Motion for Stay and Abeyance.”3 Petitioner, a state
prisoner incarcerated in the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana, filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.4 The Magistrate Judge recommended that the
petition be dismissed with prejudice.5 Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation.6 After reviewing the complaint, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation, Petitioner’s objections, the record, and the applicable law, the Court will deny
Petitioner’s motion to stay, overrule Petitioner’s objections, adopt the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation, and dismiss the petition with prejudice.

1

Rec. Doc. 19.

2

Rec. Doc. 18.

3

Rec. Doc. 20.

4

Rec. Doc. 1.

5

Rec. Doc. 18.

6

Rec. Doc. 19.

I. Background
A.

Factual Background
On October 1, 2009, Petitioner was charged by bill of information with one count of armed

robbery in the 22nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Tammany, State of Louisiana.7 On
April 28, 2010, following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of armed robbery.8 On August 16,
2010, the state trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of 65 years imprisonment without benefit
of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.9 On June 10, 2011, the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction.10 However, the Louisiana First Circuit vacated
Petitioner’s sentence because the trial court did not wait 24 hours after denying Petitioner’s motion
for post-verdict judgment of acquittal and a motion for a new trial before imposing sentence as
required by Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 873.11 Accordingly, the Louisiana First
Circuit remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.12
On December 15, 2011, the state trial court resentenced Petitioner to a term of 65 years
imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.13 The Louisiana
First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on December 21,
2012,14 and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his related writ application on August 30, 2013.15
7

State Rec., Vol. I of VIII, Bill of Information, Oct. 1, 2009.

8

State Rec., Vol. I of VIII, Jury Verdict Form, Apr. 28, 2010.

9

State Rec., Vol. I of VIII, Minute Entry, Aug. 16, 2010.

10

State v. Lauga, 2010-KA-2209 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/10/11); 2011 WL 3480949.

11

Id. at *2.

12

Id.

13

State Rec., Vol. IV of VIII, Minute Entry, Dec. 15, 2011.

14

State v. Lauga, 2012-KA-842 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/21/12); 2012 WL 6681850.

15

State v. Lauga, 2013-KO-157 (La. 8/30/13); 120 So.3d 258.

2

On June 23, 2014, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief with the state
trial court,16 which was denied on July 16, 2014.17 Petitioner’s related writ applications were
denied by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal on October 23, 2014,18 and the Louisiana
Supreme Court on September 25, 2015.19
Petitioner filed this federal habeas petition on November 23, 2015, raising the following
grounds for relief: (1) his rights were violated by the State’s introduction of evidence concerning
another crime he was alleged to have committed in Orleans Parish; (2) the trial court erred in
failing to declare a mistrial after the prosecutor questioned Petitioner concerning an alleged
juvenile delinquency adjudication in St. Bernard Parish; (3) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct
in presenting evidence concerning the Orleans Parish crime and in asking about the alleged St.
Bernard Parish juvenile delinquency adjudication; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5) his
sentence was excessive.20 The State filed a response arguing that Petitioner’s claims have no
merit,21 and Petitioner filed a reply to the State’s response.22

16

State Rec., Vol. VI of VIII, Application for Post-Conviction Relief, June 23, 2014.

17

State Rec., Vol. VII of VIII, Order Denying Application for Post-Conviction Relief, July 16, 2014.

18

State v. Lauga, 2014-KW-1203 (La. App. 1 Cir. 10/23/14); State Rec., Vol. VII of VIII.

19

State ex rel. Lauga v. State, 2014-KO-157 (La. 9/25/15); 178 So.3d 161.

20

Rec. Doc. 1. For ease of analysis, the Magistrate Judge addressed Petitioner’s claims in a different order
than they are listed in his federal application. Rec. Doc. 18 at 8, n.16. The Court addresses Petitioner’s claims in the
same order as they were addressed by the Magistrate Judge.
21

Rec. Doc. 12.

22

Rec. Doc. 13.

3

B.

Report and Recommendation Findings
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the petition be dismissed with prejudice.23 First,

the Magistrate Judge addressed Petitioner’s claim that his rights were violated by the State’s
introduction of evidence concerning another crime for which he was charged but never convicted
in Orleans Parish.24 The Magistrate Judge noted that in habeas actions a federal court does not
review the mere admissibility of evidence under state law,25 and so, to the extent Petitioner was
arguing that the state courts misapplied state evidence law, the Magistrate Judge found that such a
claim was not reviewable.26 Moreover, to the extent that Petitioner was asserting a federal claim,
the Magistrate Judge noted that habeas relief should not be granted for errors in a trial court’s
evidentiary rulings unless those errors result in a “denial of fundamental fairness” under the Due
Process Clause and “the admission was a crucial, highly significant factor in the defendant’s
conviction.”27 The Magistrate Judge determined that Petitioner’s conviction cannot be attributed
to the evidence of the Orleans Parish crime because there was compelling evidence of Petitioner’s
guilt including the testimony of Joseph Brooks, the victim in the crime.28 Therefore, the Magistrate
Judge recommended that this claim be denied.29
Second, the Magistrate Judge addressed Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in
failing to declare a mistrial after the prosecutor questioned Petitioner concerning a juvenile

23

Rec. Doc. 18.

24

Id. at 8.

25

Id. at 13 (citing Little v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 855, 862 (5th Cir. 1998)).

26

Id.

27

Id. (quoting Neal v. Cain, 141 F.3d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1998)).

28

Id. at 14.

29

Id.

4

delinquent charge in St. Bernard Parish.30 The Magistrate Judge noted that during trial the
prosecutor attempted to question Petitioner about a juvenile adjudication in St. Bernard Parish,
defense counsel objected to the question, and the trial court sustained the objection because under
Louisiana law evidence of a juvenile adjudication is not admissible to attack credibility.31 The
Magistrate Judge found that this claim was not cognizable on federal habeas review because a
federal court lacks authority to rule that a state court incorrectly interpreted its own law.32
Third, the Magistrate Judge addressed Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct by presenting evidence concerning the Orleans Parish crime, by asking about the
alleged St. Bernard Parish juvenile adjudication, and by suggesting during closing arguments that
Petitioner possessed a gun that Petitioner alleged he had previously sold to a pawn shop.33 The
Magistrate Judge noted due process may be violated if a prosecutor knowingly uses false testimony
at trial, but a petitioner is entitled to relief on such a claim only if he shows: (1) the testimony was
actually false; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the testimony was
material.34 The Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner had presented no evidence that the
testimony concerning the Orleans Parish crime was false, and so Petitioner’s wholly conclusory
and unsupported allegations failed to state a viable claim of prosecutorial misconduct.35 Regarding
the St. Bernard Parish juvenile adjudication, the Magistrate Judge noted that there was no evidence

30

Id.

31

Id. at 15.

32
Id. at 18 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991); Charles v. Thaler, 629 F.3d 494, 500–01
(5th Cir. 2011)).
33

Id.

34

Id. at 19 (citing Duncan v. Cockrell, 70 F. App’x 741, 744 (5th Cir. 2003)).

35

Id. (citing Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 531 (5th Cir. 1990)).

5

that the prosecutor was aware that his questions were based on a false premise or inaccurate
information.36 While the state courts found that the evidence was inadmissible, the Magistrate
Judge found that there was no reason to believe that the prosecutor’s questions were asked in bad
faith in a deliberate attempt to taint the proceedings.37 Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge
determined that the questions did not play a significant factor in the jury’s verdict considering that
Petitioner denied that such an adjudication occurred and no further evidence concerning the matter
was admitted.38 Finally, as for the prosecutor’s statements regarding the gun, the Magistrate Judge
found that Petitioner produced no evidence to establish that he sold the gun and the jury was
instructed that they could not consider any statements made during closing argument as evidence.39
Therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommended that this claim be denied.40
Fourth, the Magistrate Judge addressed Petitioner’s claims that he received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel.41 Regarding Petitioner’s claims that his counsel performed an
inadequate pre-trial investigation and failed to call witnesses who could have benefited the
defense, the Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner had not established deficient performance
because his allegations were entirely speculative and unsubstantiated, and even if Petitioner had
shown deficient performance he failed to establish prejudice because he had not shown how the
investigation would have benefited the defense.42 The Magistrate Judge also found Petitioner’s

36

Id. at 20.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 21.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id. at 22.

42

Id. at 29–34.

6

claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to use additional preemptory challenges to be
meritless.43 Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found Petitioner’s argument that counsel should
have stricken jurors with connections to the legal system unavailing because Petitioner had not
shown that those jurors had a bias against him.44 Regarding Petitioner’s argument that his counsel
should have used peremptory challenges to strike jurors who, when posed with a hypothetical
question, stated that they would rather see an innocent man convicted than see a guilty man go
free, the Magistrate Judge found this argument unavailing because Petitioner had not shown that
the jurors would have consciously and purposely disobeyed the jury instructions.45 The Magistrate
Judge also rejected Petitioner’s argument that even if his separate contentions regarding counsel’s
ineffectiveness do not warrant relief when considered individually, relief is warranted if they are
considered cumulatively.46
Finally, the Magistrate Judge addressed Petitioner’s claim that his sentence was
excessive.47 To the extent that Petitioner claimed that his sentence was excessive or otherwise
inappropriate under Louisiana law, the Magistrate Judge found that the claim is not cognizable in
this federal proceeding.48 To the extent that Petitioner claimed that his sentence is excessive under
federal law, the Magistrate Judge found that the claim is meritless because Petitioner’s sentence
fell within the range provided by law and was not grossly disproportionate to the crime.49

43

Id. at 34.

44

Id. at 35.

45

Id. at 36.

46

Id. (citing Pondexter v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 511, 525 (5th Cir. 2008)).

47

Id. at 39.

48

Id. at 41.

49

Id. at 42–43.

7

II. Objections
A.

Petitioner’s Objections
Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.50 He asserts that

he was never convicted of armed robbery in Orleans Parish.51 Petitioner argues that his trial
attorney failed to investigate the Orleans Parish charge, and he contends that an investigation
would have allowed his attorney to refute the evidence the State used against Petitioner.52
Petitioner contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that he committed the crime in
Orleans Parish because he was never convicted of the crime.53 Furthermore, Petitioner notes that
the Magistrate Judge cited the strength of the victim’s testimony, but Petitioner contends that the
description provided to the on-scene officer did not match a description of Petitioner’s physical
characteristics.54 Therefore, Petitioner asserts that his counsel’s failure to investigate precluded
him from receiving a fair trial.55 Moreover, Petitioner argues that his attorney did not investigate
the alleged juvenile adjudication in St. Bernard Parish.56
Next, Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor’s references to the alleged juvenile adjudication
in St. Bernard Parish violated due process because the prosecutor should have investigated the

50

Rec. Doc. 19.

51

Id. at 2.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 3.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 4.

56

Id. at 5.

8

facts of the case before trying to introduce the evidence to the jury.57 Moreover, Petitioner contends
that the prosecutor’s reference to the juvenile adjudication warranted a mistrial.58
Petitioner also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that he presented no evidence to
support his assertion that he sold the gun at a pawn shop.59 He notes that the Magistrate Judge
found this argument unavailing because evidence was presented at trial to show that the gun used
in the instant offense was similar to the gun used in the Orleans Parish robbery not that the same
gun was used.60 However, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor “made a point to prove it was [the
same] gun.”61 Petitioner contends that he would have been able to substantiate his assertion that
the victim was mistaken about Petitioner being the assailant if his trial counsel would have
obtained records from the pawn shop.62
Next, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that his claim that his trial counsel
was ineffective in failing to use preemptory challenges to strike jurors who stated they would rather
see an innocent man convicted than a guilty man go free.63 Petitioner disputes the Magistrate
Judge’s assertion that the question was vague and hypothetical, arguing that the question was
pointed and exact.64

57

Id. at 6.

58

Id. at 6–7.

59

Id. at 7.

60

Id. at 9.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 10.

64

Id.

9

Finally, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that his sentence was
not excessive.65 Petitioner contends that a 65 year sentence for a first offense armed robbery
conviction is excessive.66
B.

Petitioner’s “Motion for Stay & Abeyance”
In the “Motion for Stay & Abeyance” Petitioner requests that the Court stay this matter to

allow the state trial court to review evidence that Petitioner contends is critical to substantiate his
claims.67 Therefore, to the extent that the new affidavit would create a “mixed petition,” Petitioner
requests that the Court stay this case to allow him to return to the state trial court to present this
evidence.68 However, if the Court determines that the affidavit can be considered, Petitioner
requests that the Court grant him an evidentiary hearing.69
Petitioner presents an affidavit by his former attorney Michael C. Ginart, Jr. dated
December 22, 2016.70 Ginart attests that he and his law partner represented Petitioner in case
numbers 156-151/156, which was brought against Petitioner in St. Bernard Parish on charges of
armed robbery, possession or dealing in unregistered or illegal transferred weapons, simple assault,
improper telephone communications and simple criminal damage to property over $500.00.71

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Rec. Doc. 20 at 1.

68

Id. at 2.

69

Id.

70

Id. at 6–7.

71

Id. at 6.

10

Ginart further attests that Petitioner was 17 years old at the time of the St. Bernard Parish crime
and was prosecuted as an adult not as a juvenile.72
Ginart’s affidavit attaches Petitioner’s criminal record and minutes from the St. Bernard
Parish Clerk of Court regarding Petitioner’s case.73 A minute entry dated October 19, 2000,
indicates that the charges against Petitioner were dismissed.74
C.

State’s Opposition
The State of Louisiana did not file a brief in opposition to Petitioner’s objections or motion

for stay despite receiving electronic notice of the filings.
III. Standard of Review
A.

Review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
In accordance with Local Rule 73.2, this case was referred to the Magistrate Judge to

provide a Report and Recommendation. A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify the
recommended disposition” of a magistrate judge on a dispositive matter.75 A district judge must
“determine de novo any part of the [Report and Recommendation] that has been properly objected
to.”76 A district court’s review is limited to plain error for parts of the report which are not properly
objected to.77

72

Id. at 7.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 10.

75

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

76

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

77
See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded
by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending time to file objections from ten to fourteen days).

11

B.

Standard of Review Under the AEDPA
Following the enactment of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), the standard of review used to evaluate issues presented in habeas corpus petitions
was revised “to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under
law.”78 For questions of fact, federal courts must defer to a state court’s findings unless they are
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.”79 A state court’s determinations on mixed questions of law and fact or pure
issues of law, on the other hand, are to be upheld unless they are “contrary to, or involve[ ] an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States.”80
Regarding this standard, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit further explains:
A state court decision is contrary to clearly established precedent if the state court
applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court’s
cases. A state-court decision will also be contrary to clearly established precedent
if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from
a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from
Supreme Court precedent. A state-court decision involves an unreasonable
application of Supreme Court precedent if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal rule from the Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts
of the particular state prisoner’s case.81
If Supreme Court case law “give[s] no clear answer to the question presented, let alone one in [the
petitioner’s] favor, ‘it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established
Federal law.’”82 Additionally, “unreasonable is not the same as erroneous or incorrect; an incorrect

78

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002).

79

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

80

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

81

Wooten v. Thaler, 598 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

82

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (quoting Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006)).

12

application of the law by a state court will nonetheless be affirmed if it is not simultaneously
unreasonable.”83
IV. Law and Analysis
A.

Introduction of Evidence Regarding the Orleans Parish Crime
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court deny Petitioner’s claim that his rights

were violated by the State’s introduction of evidence concerning another crime for which he was
charged but never convicted in Orleans Parish.84 To the extent that Petitioner was arguing that the
state courts misapplied state evidence law in allowing the admission of the evidence, the
Magistrate Judge found that such a claim is not reviewable in federal habeas actions.85 Petitioner
does not object to this recommendation.86 The Fifth Circuit has held that “[i]n habeas actions,
[federal courts] do not sit to review the mere admissibility of evidence under state law.”87
Therefore, reviewing for plain error, and finding none, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation that Petitioner’s claim that the state courts misapplied state evidence law in
allowing the admission of the “other crimes” evidence is not reviewable.
To the extent that Petitioner was asserting admission of the evidence regarding the Orleans
Parish crime resulted in a denial of fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause, the
Magistrate Judge recommended that this claim be denied because Petitioner’s conviction cannot
be attributed to this evidence as there was compelling evidence of Petitioner’s guilt including the

83

Puckett v. Epps, 641 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).

84

Rec. Doc. 18 at 8–13.

85

Id. at 13.

86

Rec. Doc. 19.

87

Little v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 855, 862 (5th Cir. 1998).

13

testimony of Joseph Brooks, the victim in the crime.88 Petitioner objects to this determination
arguing that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that he committed the crime in Orleans Parish
because he was never convicted of the crime.89 Furthermore, Petitioner notes that the Magistrate
Judge relied on the strength of the victim of the instant crime’s testimony, but Petitioner contends
that the description the victim provided to the on-scene officer did not match a description of
Petitioner’s physical characteristics.90 Accordingly, the Court reviews this issue de novo.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the Magistrate Judge did not find that Petitioner
committed the crime in Orleans Parish, and the Report and Recommendation notes that the State
introduced evidence concerning other crimes that Petitioner “was alleged to have committed” and
for which he “was charged, but never convicted.”91 The Fifth Circuit has stated that “a state trial
court’s evidentiary rulings will mandate habeas relief when errors are so extreme that they
constitute a denial of fundamental fairness” under the Due Process Clause.92 Therefore, habeas
relief is only warranted “when the wrongfully admitted evidence has played a crucial, critical, and
highly significant role in the trial.”93
On direct appeal, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal addressed Petitioner’s claim
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding the armed robbery in Orleans Parish.94
The Louisiana First Circuit found that the other crimes evidence was relevant to show identity

88

Rec. Doc. 18 at 14.

89

Id. at 3.

90

Rec. Doc. 19 at 2–3.

91

Rec. Doc. 18 at 8.

92

Little, 162 F.3d at 862 (citing Evans v. Thigpen, 809 F.2d 239, 242 (5th Cir. 1987)).

93

Id. (citing Andrade v. McCotter, 805 F.2d 1190, 1193 (5th Cir. 1986)).

94

Lauga, 2011 WL 3480949.

14

because “the modus operandi in both robberies was so distinctively similar that one may
reasonably infer that they were the work of one person.”95 Moreover, the First Circuit found that
even if the other crimes evidence was not admissible, reversal of Petitioner’s conviction was not
required because Petitioner’s “conviction was surely not attributable to the admission of the other
crimes evidence.”96 Specifically, the First Circuit noted that Petitioner was positively identified by
the victim in this case, who’s “trial testimony established he was absolutely positive in his
identification of the defendant as the individual who feigned the role of a U.S. Marshal and robbed
him at gunpoint.”97 Therefore, the First Circuit found that “the jury’s verdict in this case was based
on the victim’s positive identification of the defendant as the robber shortly after the offense
occurred, and again in open court at the trial,” and not on the admission of the other crimes
evidence.98
Petitioner contends that the admission of the other crimes evidence was overly prejudicial.
However, he has not shown that the testimony played a crucial, highly significant role in his
conviction. As the Louisiana First Circuit found, the State presented compelling evidence of
Petitioner’s guilt. Petitioner contends that the description the victim provided to the on-scene
officer did not match a description of Petitioner’s physical characteristics.99 However, this
argument is unavailing because Deputy Sean Beavers, the responding officer, testified that the
victim described the perpetrator as a white man and provided a general description of Petitioner’s

95

Id. at *8.

96

Id. at *8–9.

97

Id. at *9.

98

Id.

99

Rec. Doc. 19 at 2–3.

15

physical characteristics.100 Therefore, because of the compelling evidence against Petitioner, he
has failed to establish that the admission of the other crimes evidence played a crucial, highly
significant role in his conviction. Accordingly, upon de novo review, the Court finds that the state
court’s denial of relief on this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal
law.
B.

Denial of a Mistrial
The Magistrate Judge found Petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to declare

a mistrial after the prosecutor questioned Petitioner concerning a juvenile delinquent adjudication
in St. Bernard Parish was not cognizable on federal habeas review because a federal court lacks
authority to rule that a state court incorrectly interpreted its own law.101 Petitioner objects to this
determination, arguing that the prosecutor’s reference to the juvenile adjudication warranted a
mistrial as Louisiana law does not allow evidence of a juvenile conviction to be used to attack
credibility.102
As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “[u]nder § 2254, federal habeas courts sit to review state
court misapplications of federal law. A federal court lacks authority to rule that a state court
incorrectly interpreted its own law.”103 Here, Petitioner contends that the prosecutor’s reference to
a juvenile adjudication warranted a mistrial under state law. Therefore, on de novo review the
Court concludes that this claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review.

100

State Rec., Vol. II of VIII, Trial Transcript at 212, 218.

101

Rec. Doc. 18 at 14–18.

102

Rec. Doc. 19 at 6–7.

103

Charles v. Thaler, 629 F.3d 494, 500–01 (5th Cir. 2011).

16

C.

Prosecutorial Misconduct
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court deny Petitioner’s claim that the

prosecutor engaged in misconduct by presenting evidence concerning the Orleans Parish crime,
by asking about the alleged St. Bernard Parish juvenile adjudication, and by suggesting during
closing arguments that Petitioner possessed a gun that Petitioner alleged he had previously sold to
a pawn shop.104 Petitioner objects to this determination, arguing that the prosecutor’s references to
the alleged juvenile adjudication in St. Bernard Parish violated due process because the prosecutor
should have investigated the facts of the case before trying to introduce the evidence to the jury.105
Petitioner also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that he presented no evidence to support
his assertion that he sold the gun at a pawn shop.106 Petitioner argues that the prosecutor “made a
point to prove it was Mr. Lauga’s gun.”107 Therefore, the Court reviews this claim de novo.
“A state denies a criminal defendant due process when it knowingly uses perjured
testimony at trial or allows untrue testimony to go uncorrected.”108 “To obtain relief, the defendant
must show that (1) the testimony was actually false, (2) the state knew it was false and (3) the
testimony was material.”109
Petitioner has not presented any evidence that the testimony concerning the Orleans Parish
crime was false. The Fifth Circuit has concluded that a habeas petitioner’s “bare allegations” that

104

Rec. Doc. 18 at 18–21.

105

Rec. Doc. 19 at 6.

106

Id. at 7.

107

Id. at 9.

108

Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972);
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Cordova v. Collins, 953 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.1992)).
109

Id. (citing Kirkpatrick v. Whitley, 992 F.2d 491, 497 (5th Cir.1993)).

17

a prosecutor presented false testimony at trial is insufficient to establish a valid due process
claim.110 Therefore, Petitioner’s wholly conclusory and unsupported allegations that the testimony
regarding the Orleans Parish crime was false are insufficient to state a viable claim of prosecutorial
misconduct.
As for the St. Bernard Parish juvenile adjudication, no evidence of the crime was actually
admitted at trial. During trial, the prosecutor asked Petitioner if he was ever convicted in St.
Bernard Parish as a juvenile, and Petitioner denied that the juvenile adjudication had occurred.111
Petitioner’s trial counsel then objected to the line of questioning, and the trial court sustained the
objection.112 In his motion to stay, Petitioner presents an affidavit by his former attorney, Ginart,
who represented Petitioner in the St. Bernard Parish case. 113 Ginart’s affidavit attaches Petitioner’s
criminal record and minutes from the St. Bernard Parish Clerk of Court regarding Petitioner’s
case.114 A minute entry dated October 19, 2000, appears to indicate that the charges against
Petitioner in St. Bernard Parish were dismissed.115 However, even assuming that the prosecutor’s
line of questioning regarding the St. Bernard Parish adjudication was false, Petitioner has not
shown that the prosecutor was aware that his questions were false. Furthermore, Petitioner has not
demonstrated that the questions played a significant factor in the jury’s verdict considering that
Petitioner denied that such an adjudication occurred and no further evidence concerning the matter

110

Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 531 (5th Cir. 1990).

111

Lauga, 2011 WL 3480949, at *3.

112

Id.

113

Rec. Doc. 20 at 6.

114

Id. at 7.

115

Id. at 10.

18

was admitted into evidence. Therefore, Petitioner has not stated a viable claim of prosecutorial
misconduct.
Finally, Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper because it
falsely suggested that Petitioner was in possession of a gun, which Petitioner alleges he sold at a
pawn shop. However, Petitioner has produced no evidence to establish that he sold the gun.
Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that this statement was false. Moreover, Petitioner has not
demonstrated that this statement was material to his conviction. Accordingly, on de novo review,
the Court finds that the state court’s denial of relief on Petitioner’s procedural misconduct claims
was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.
D.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Petitioner raises three ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) his counsel performed

an inadequate pre-trial investigation and failed to call witnesses who could have benefited the
defense; (2) his counsel failed to use additional preemptory challenges to strike jurors; and (3)
even if his separate contentions regarding counsel’s ineffectiveness do not warrant relief when
considered individually, relief is warranted if they are considered cumulatively.116 The Magistrate
Judge recommends that the Court dismiss all of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims.117 Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination regarding his counsel’s pretrial investigation, but does not object to the Magistrate Judge’s determinations regarding the use
of preemptory challenges or cumulative errors.118 Accordingly, the Court reviews the claims that
are objected to de novo and the claims that are not objected to for plain error.

116

Rec. Doc. 1 at 18.

117

Rec. Doc. 18 at 22–39.

118

Rec. Doc. 19.

19

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate
both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his
defense.119 If a court finds that a petitioner fails on either of these two prongs it may dispose of the
ineffective assistance claim without addressing the other prong.120
To satisfy the deficient performance prong, a petitioner must overcome a strong
presumption that the counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable representation.121
Petitioner must show that the conduct was so egregious that it failed to meet the constitutional
minimum guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.122 Courts addressing this prong of the test for
ineffective counsel must consider the reasonableness of counsel’s actions in light of all the
circumstances.123
To prevail on the actual prejudice prong, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.”124 A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.”125 Where a petitioner challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea on the grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must establish that but for counsel’s alleged
error, the petitioner “would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted upon going to trial.”126

119

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984).

120

Id.

121

See Crockett v. McCotter, 796 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 1986); Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432, 1441
(5th Cir. 1985).
122

See Styron v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 438, 450 (5th Cir. 2001).

123

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

124

Id. at 694.

125

Id.

126

See Ward v. Dretke, 420 F.3d 479, 487 (5th Cir. 2005).

20

“This assessment will turn partially on a prediction of what the outcome of a trial might have
been.”127
As the record shows, the state trial court identified the governing legal standard found in
Strickland and applied it to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims.128 In considering
Petitioner’s claims on federal habeas corpus review that are repetitive of claims already made to a
state court, the central question “is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s
determination under Strickland was incorrect but whether [it] was unreasonable—a substantially
higher threshold.”129 In addition, “because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state
court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that
standard.”130 Thus, this standard is considered “doubly deferential” on habeas corpus review.131
Considering this standard, the Court addresses each of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in turn.
1.

Failure to Investigate and Call Witnesses

Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Court dismiss
Petitioner’s claim that his counsel performed ineffectively by failing to investigate and call
witnesses.132 Specifically, Petitioner asserts that his counsel’s failure to investigate the Orleans
Parish crime precluded him from receiving a fair trial.133 Moreover, Petitioner argues that his

127

Id. (internal quotation omitted).

128

State Rec., Vol. VII of VIII, Trial Court Order, Jul. 16, 2014.

129

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 112 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 478

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Rec. Doc. 19 at 4.

133

Id.

(2007)).

21

attorney did not investigate the alleged juvenile adjudication in St. Bernard Parish.134 Finally,
Petitioner contends that he would have been able to substantiate his assertion that the victim was
mistaken about Petitioner being the assailant if his trial counsel would have obtained records from
the pawn shop where he sold the gun that the prosecutor referenced during closing arguments.135
To succeed on a failure to investigate claim a petitioner “must allege with specificity what
the investigation would have revealed and how it would have altered the outcome of trial.”136 The
Fifth Circuit has recognized that “[a] petitioner cannot show prejudice with respect to a claim that
counsel failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence without adducing what the
investigation would have shown.”137
With respect to the armed robbery in Orleans Parish, Petitioner has not shown what
evidence would have been discovered through further investigation. With respect to the gun that
Petitioner alleges was sold in a pawn shop, Petitioner presents no evidence to support his assertion
that he actually sold the gun. Therefore, Petitioner has not demonstrated prejudice as to these
claims because he has not adduced what the investigation would have shown.138
Finally, with respect to the armed robbery in St. Bernard Parish, Petitioner presents an
affidavit by his former attorney, Ginart, who represented Petitioner in the St. Bernard Parish
case.139 As discussed above, Ginart’s affidavit attaches Petitioner’s criminal record and minutes

134

Id. at 5.

135

Id. at 9.

136

Moawad v. Anderson, 143 F.3d 942, 948 (5th Cir. 1998).

137

Diaz v. Quarterman, 239 F. App’x 886, 890 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).

138

Id.

139

Rec. Doc. 20 at 6.

22

from the St. Bernard Parish Clerk of Court regarding Petitioner’s case,140 and a minute entry dated
October 19, 2000, appears to indicate that the charges against Petitioner in St. Bernard Parish were
dismissed.141 However, even assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to
investigate the St. Bernard Parish adjudication, Petitioner has not shown that this evidence would
have benefitted his defense. At trial, Petitioner denied that he was ever convicted of a crime as a
juvenile in St. Bernard Parish.142 Petitioner’s trial counsel then objected to the line of questioning,
and the trial court sustained the objection.143 Therefore, based on this line of questioning, the jury
could have concluded that Petitioner was never arrested in St. Bernard Parish, and Petitioner has
not shown that evidence that he was in fact arrested but never convicted of the crime would have
been beneficial to his defense. Accordingly, on de novo review, the Court finds that the state
court’s denial of relief on Petitioner’s failure to investigate claim was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of federal law.
2.

Failure to Use Preemptory Challenges

The Magistrate Judge also found Petitioner’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to use additional preemptory challenges to be meritless.144 Specifically, the Magistrate
Judge found Petitioner’s argument that counsel should have stricken jurors with connections to the
legal system unavailing because Petitioner had not shown that those jurors had a bias against
him.145 Regarding Petitioner’s argument that his counsel should have used peremptory challenges

140

Id. at 7.

141

Id. at 10.

142

Lauga, 2011 WL 3480949, at *3.

143

Id.

144

Rec. Doc. 18 at 34.

145

Id. at 35.

23

to strike jurors who, when posed with a hypothetical question, stated that they would rather see an
innocent man convicted than see a guilty man go free, the Magistrate Judge found this argument
unavailing because Petitioner had not shown that the jurors would have consciously and purposely
disobey the jury instructions.146 Petitioner does not object to this determination, except to dispute
that the question posed to the jurors was vague and hypothetical.147 The Fifth Circuit has
recognized that an “attorney’s actions during voir dire are considered to be a matter of trial
strategy.”148 Therefore, “[a] decision regarding trial tactics cannot be the basis for a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel unless counsel’s tactics are shown to be so ill chosen that it
permeates the entire trial with obvious unfairness”149 Therefore, reviewing for plain error, and
finding none, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the state court’s denial
of relief on this claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.
3.

Cumulative Errors

The Magistrate Judge also rejected Petitioner’s argument that even if his separate
contentions regarding counsel’s ineffectiveness do not warrant relief when considered
individually, relief is warranted if they are considered cumulatively.150 Petitioner does not object
to this determination. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that “[m]eritless [ineffective assistance of
counsel] claims or claims that are not prejudicial cannot be cumulated, regardless of the total
number raised.”151 Therefore, finding no plain error, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s

146

Id. at 36.

147

Rec. Doc. 19 at 10.

148

Teague v. Scott, 60 F.3d 1167, 1172 (5th Cir. 1995).

149

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

150

Rec. Doc. 18 at 36.

151

Pondexter v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 511, 525 (5th Cir. 2008).

24

recommendation that the state court’s denial of relief on this claim was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of federal law.
E.

Excessive Sentence
The Magistrate Judge found Petitioner’s claim that his sentence was excessive unavailing

because Petitioner’s sentence fell within the range provided by law and was not grossly
disproportionate to the crime.152 Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination,
arguing that a 65 year sentence for a first offense armed robbery conviction is excessive.153
Because Petitioner objects to the Magistrate’s recommendation, the Court reviews this issue de
novo.
The Eighth Amendment “preclude[s] a sentence that is greatly disproportionate to the
offense, because such sentences are cruel and unusual.”154 This Court must “initially make a
threshold comparison of the gravity of [the defendant’s] offenses against the severity of [the
defendant’s] sentence.”155 If the sentence is not grossly disproportionate to the crime, the inquiry
is finished.156 However, if the Court infers from this comparison “that the sentence is grossly
disproportionate to the offense,” then it must “compare the sentence received to (1) sentences for
similar crimes in the same jurisdiction and (2) sentences for the same crime in other
jurisdictions.”157 “Although wide discretion is accorded a state trial court’s sentencing decision
and claims arising out of the decision are not generally constitutionally cognizable, relief may be

152

Rec. Doc. 18 at 42–43.

153

Rec. Doc. 19 at 10.

154

McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1992) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

155

Id. at 316.

156

United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 942 (5th Cir. 1997).

157

McGruder, 954 F.2d at 316.

25

required where the petitioner is able to show that the sentence imposed exceeds or is outside the
statutory limits, or is wholly unauthorized by law.”158 The Fifth Circuit has “recognized, following
guidance from the Supreme Court, that successful Eighth Amendment challenges to prison-term
lengths will be rare.”159
In Rummel v. Estelle, the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole for the defendant’s third nonviolent felony conviction for the crime of
obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses.160 Following its decision in Rummel, the Supreme Court
upheld a sentence of 20 years imprisonment for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute
and 20 years imprisonment for distribution of marijuana, with the prison terms running
consecutively.161 The Court stated that “Rummel stands for the proposition that federal courts
should be reluctant to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment, and that successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences should be exceedingly rare.”162
Solem v. Helm is the only case involving an adult defendant in which the Supreme Court
has found that a lengthy prison term violated the Eighth Amendment.163 There, the defendant was
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for issuing a “no account” check

158

Haynes v. Butler, 825 F.2d 921, 923–24 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

159

United States v. Hebert, 813 F.3d 551, 566 (quoting United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 436 (5th Cir.

2009)).
160
445 U.S. 263, 265 (1980). The defendant had previously been convicted of fraudulent use of a credit card
to obtain $80 worth of goods and services and passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id.
161

Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).

162

Id. at 374 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

163

463 U.S. 277 (1983).

26

for $100.164 The conviction was the defendant’s seventh nonviolent felony conviction.165 The
Solem Court distinguished the case from Rummel, where the defendant was eligible for parole
within 12 years, noting that this fact was heavily relied on by the Court.166 The Court found that
the sentence was significantly disproportionate to the crime, reasoning that the criminal conduct
was relatively minor, the defendant was treated more harshly than other criminals in the state who
were convicted of more serious crimes, and the defendant was treated more harshly than he would
have been in any other jurisdiction.167
The Supreme Court has rejected proportionality claims in other cases following Solem. In
Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court, in a 5-4 plurality opinion, upheld a sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for the defendant’s first felony conviction of possession of 372
grams of cocaine.168 The controlling opinion concluded that the Eighth Amendment contains a
“narrow proportionality principle,” that “does not require strict proportionality between crime and
sentence” but rather “forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the
crime.”169 In Ewing v. California, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 plurality opinion, rejected a
challenge to a sentence range of 25 years to life for the theft of three golf clubs under California’s
“three strikes” recidivist statute.170

164

Id. at 281–82.

165

Id. at 280.

166

Id. at 297.

167

Id. at 303.

168

501 U.S. 957 (1991).

169

Id. at 997, 1000–1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

170

Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).

27

Finally, in Lockyer v. Andrade, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion, found that the Ninth
Circuit erred in determining that two consecutive sentence ranges of 25 years to life imprisonment
for “third strike” convictions of stealing videotapes valued at $84.60 and $68.84 respectively were
not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.171 The Court
stated that a state court decision is “‘contrary to [] clearly established precedent if the state court
applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases’ or ‘if the state
court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme]
Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme Court] precedent.’”172 Because
the petitioner’s sentence in Lockyear implicated factors relevant in both Rummel and Solem and
because Solem stated that it did not overrule Rummel, the Supreme Court held that the state court’s
denial of relief was not contrary to clearly established federal law.173 Turning to the unreasonable
application clause, because “[t]he gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional
violation for only the extraordinary case,” the Supreme Court found that it was not an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law for the California courts to affirm the petitioner’s
sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison.174
In the instant case, Petitioner was found guilty of armed robbery in violation of Louisiana
Revised Statute § 14:64.175 The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of 65 years imprisonment
without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.176 Louisiana Revised Statute

171

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).

172

Id. at 73 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000)).

173

Id. at 74.

174

Id. at 77.

175

State Rec., Vol. I of VIII, Jury Verdict Form, Apr. 28, 2010.

176

State Rec., Vol. IV of VIII, Minute Entry, Dec. 15, 2011.

28

§ 14:64(B) provides that “[w]hoever commits the crime of armed robbery shall be imprisoned at
hard labor for not less than ten years and for not more than ninety-nine years, without benefit of
parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.”177 Accordingly, the sentence was within the
statutory range prescribed by Louisiana law. When a sentence is within the statutory limits
prescribed by state law, a petitioner “must show that the sentencing decision was wholly devoid
of discretion or amounted to an arbitrary or capricious abuse of discretion, or that an error of law
resulted in an improper exercise of the sentencer’s discretion and thereby deprived the petitioner
of his liberty.”178
The state trial court found that Petitioner’s sentence was warranted given the severity of
the offense, and the state appellate courts upheld that determination. Specifically, the state trial
court relied on the following facts to support the sentence: (1) the case did not involve drug activity,
unlike many armed robberies, making the case more sinister; (2) Petitioner represented himself to
be in law enforcement and used that representation to prey on the victim; (3) Petitioner manifested
deliberate cruelty to the victim by threatening to kill him; (4) Petitioner used a firearm in the
commission of the offense; and (5) there was evidence that Petitioner had been involved in similar
offenses for which he was never convicted.179 Accordingly, considering the wide discretion that is
accorded a state trial court’s sentencing decision, relief is not warranted because Petitioner has not
shown that the sentence imposed exceeds or is outside the statutory limits, or is wholly
unauthorized by law.180 Accordingly, on de novo review, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not

177

La. Rev. Stat. § 14:64(B).

178

Haynes v. Butler, 825 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1987).

179

State v. Lauga, 2012-KA-842 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/21/12); 2012 WL 6681850, at *4.

180

Haynes, 825 F.2d at 923–24.

29

entitled to relief as he has not established that the state courts’ denial of relief was contrary to or
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court.
F.

Motion to Stay
Finally, Petitioner has filed a motion to stay requesting that the Court stay this matter to

allow the state trial court to review the affidavit provided by his former attorney, Ginart.181 To the
extent that the new affidavit would create a “mixed petition,” Petitioner requests that the Court
stay this case to allow him to return to the state trial court to present this evidence.182 However, if
the Court determines that the affidavit can be considered, Petitioner requests that the Court grant
him an evidentiary hearing.183
“Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available
state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the opportunity to pass upon and
correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.”184 A federal habeas corpus petition
should typically be dismissed if the petitioner has failed to exhaust all available state remedies.185
However, dismissal without prejudice of a “mixed petition” may result in a subsequent petition
being barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).186

181

Rec. Doc. 20 at 1.

182

Id. at 2.

183

Id.

184

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

185

Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 230 (2004).

186
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181–82 (2001) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one-year limitation
period is not tolled during the pendency of federal habeas proceedings).

30

Because of this dilemma, federal courts are authorized to stay a habeas petition and hold it
in abeyance while a petitioner exhausts claims in state court.187 However, the United States
Supreme Court has noted that a “stay and abeyance should be available only in limited
circumstances.”188 A district court should stay federal habeas proceedings to allow a petitioner to
exhaust state remedies only when the district court finds: “(1) the petitioner has good cause for
failure to exhaust his claim, (2) the claim is not plainly meritless, and (3) the petitioner has not
engaged in intentional delay.”189
Here, Ginart’s affidavit was not presented to the state courts. However, Petitioner’s claims
regarding the St. Bernard Parish juvenile adjudication were presented to the state courts. Moreover,
for the reasons discussed supra, even considering this evidence, Petitioner is not entitled to relief
on his federal habeas claims. Accordingly, the Court finds that a stay is not warranted.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief as
he has not established that the state courts’ denial of relief was contrary to or an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. Furthermore,
a stay of this matter is not warranted. Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s objections are OVERRULED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation and Petitioner William David Lauga’s petition for issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

187

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005).

188

Id.

189

Shillereff v. Quarterman, 304 F. App’x 310, 314 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277–78).

31

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s “Motion for Stay & Abeyance”190 is
DENIED.

26th
NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this ______day of July, 2017.

__________________________________
NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

190

Rec. Doc. 20.

32