Washington v. Fieldwood Energy LLC et al

Filing 128

ORDER AND REASONS - IT IS ORDERED that Wood Group's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's claims (Rec. Doc. 105 ) is GRANTED. Wood Group's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the Intervenor's Claims (Rec. Doc. 104 ) is DENIED AS MOOT, as set forth in document. This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 6/12/2018. (sa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DONALD WASHINGTON

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 15-6615

FIELDWOOD ENERGY LLC

SECTION “H”

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are Defendant Wood Group’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiff’s Claim (Doc. 105) and Motion for Summary Judgment
on Intervenor’s Claim (Doc. 104). For the following reasons, Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s claim is GRANTED, and its
Motion for Summary Judgment on Intervenor’s claim is DENIED AS MOOT.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Donald Washington alleges that he was injured when he slipped
and fell while working aboard an oil and gas production platform located on
the Outer Continental Shelf. Plaintiff was a cook employed by a third-party,
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Taylors International (“Taylors”), and assigned to the platform VR 272A.
Plaintiff alleges that he was injured when he slipped and fell on unsecured
stairs while carrying steaks.

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendant

Fieldwood Energy, LLC (“Fieldwood”) is liable to him under the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) as the owner/operator of the platform.
Plaintiff’s Complaint further alleges that Defendant Wood Group PSN, Inc.
(“Wood Group”), an independent contractor of Fieldwood, is vicariously liable
to him for the negligence of its employee, Justin Roberts. Plaintiff alleges that
Justin Roberts should have known the steps on which Plaintiff fell were
unsecured and repaired them. Finally, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
(“Liberty Mutual”) has intervened in this matter, seeking recovery of the
amounts it paid out on behalf of Washington as the Longshore and Harbor
Worker’s Compensation Act insurer for Taylors. Liberty Mutual asserts
subrogation against any recovery received by Washington in settlement or
judgment.
In deciding previous motions, the Court found that there were material
issues of fact as to whether Plaintiff was a borrowed employee of Fieldwood.
However, it found that Justin Roberts was a borrowed employee of Fieldwood
but declined to dismiss Plaintiff’s vicarious liability claims against Roberts’s
nominal employer Wood Group. Fieldwood has since reached settlement with
Plaintiff, and only Plaintiff’s and Intervenor’s claims against Wood Group
remain.
The Court now considers two motions filed by Wood Group. In the first,
Wood Group moves for summary judgment, holding that its employee Justin
Roberts cannot be found to have been negligent because he did not owe or
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breach a duty to Plaintiff. In the second, Wood Group argues that Liberty
Mutual’s subrogation claims should be dismissed because it waived
subrogation in the Master Service Agreement between Taylors and Fieldwood.
Having found that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claims against it, Liberty Mutual’s claims likewise fall and this Court need not
address Defendant’s arguments thereto.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 1 A genuine issue
of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” 2
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,
the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws
all reasonable inferences in his favor. 3 “If the moving party meets the initial
burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” 4 Summary judgment is
appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

Sherman v. Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th Cir. 1972).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
3 Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1997).
4 Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
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the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.” 5 “In response to a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must
identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that
evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to
sustain a finding in favor of the non-movant on all issues as to which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial.” 6 “We do not . . . in the absence
of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the
necessary facts.” 7 Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual
dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.” 8
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that Wood Group is vicariously liable for the negligence
of its employee Justin Roberts in failing to inspect and repair the steps upon
which Plaintiff fell. The parties agree that Louisiana law applies to this dispute
through OCSLA. Louisiana employs the duty-risk analysis in negligence cases,
under which plaintiffs bear the burden to prove that:
(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific
standard (the duty element); (2) the defendant’s conduct failed to
conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) the
defendant’s substandard conduct was a cause in fact of the
plaintiff’s injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant’s
substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
John v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th
Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
7 Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
8 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).
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(the scope of liability or scope of protection element); and (5) the
actual damages (the damages element). 9
Both Louisiana courts and federal courts applying Louisiana law routinely
grant motions for summary judgment dismissing tort claims when plaintiffs
cannot produce evidence of all five elements. 10 Wood Group argues Plaintiff
cannot show that Roberts owed him a duty that was breached.
The parties agree that Roberts did not owe Plaintiff a duty beyond the
exercise of ordinary care that is owed to the public generally. 11 “[T]he duty
imposed upon fellow independent contractors is that imposed on all persons,
the exercise of reasonable care.” 12 “The duty to exercise reasonable care
includes an obligation to refrain from creating an unreasonable risk of harm
or a hazardous condition.” 13
Plaintiff argues that Roberts had a duty to discover and correct the
unsafe condition of the unsecured stairs that caused Plaintiff’s accident.
Audler v. CBC Innovis Inc., 519 F.3d 239, 249 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lemann v.
Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., 923 So. 2d 627, 633 (La. 2006)).
10 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, No. 16-8954, 2017 WL 3267337, at *2 (E.D. La.
Aug. 1, 2017) (dismissing premises liability claim on summary judgment because plaintiff
could produce no evidence that the dangerous condition existed for any length of time or that
defendant had notice); Lucas v. United States, No. 16-5009, 2017 WL 1549547, at *4 (E.D.
La. May 1, 2017) (Fallon, J.) (dismissing medical malpractice claim on summary judgment
when plaintiff could produce no evidence that doctor breached standard of care); Broussard
v. Retail Inv’rs of Tex., Ltd., 123 So. 3d 912, 917 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2013) (affirming summary
judgment for property owner when plaintiff could not offer evidence of what caused her fall);
Jackson v. Home Depot, Inc., 906 So. 2d 721, 726 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal
of negligence claim because plaintiff could not produce evidence that employee struck him).
11 The parties dispute the law regarding the duty owed between independent
contractors that are not in contractual privity. However, given this Court’s ultimate decision,
it need not address this dispute.
12 McCarroll v. Seatrax Servs., Inc., No. 12-2402, 2013 WL 3872219, at *4 (E.D. La.
July 24, 2013).
13 Granger v. Marine, No. 15-477, 2016 WL 4697693, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2016).
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Notably, he does not allege that Roberts knew that the stairs were unsecured,
but rather, that he should have known. Plaintiff argues that the evidence
shows that part of Roberts’s job on the platform was to maintain its steps. To
the contrary, however, Roberts actually testified that inspecting and repairing
structural aspects of the platform, such as steps, were not jobs he would
ordinarily perform but that, in the past, when he noticed that a set of steps on
the platform was not secured, he repaired them. 14 He stated that his job is
“making sure everything works on the platform” and “maintain[ing] the
equipment.”
The testimony of Roberts’s supervisor, Person-in-Charge James Pena,
supports Roberts’s testimony regarding his duties on the platform. In Pena’s
declaration, he confirms that Roberts was not expected to inspect the platform
steps, but rather, was “tasked with making rounds to check equipment as part
of [his] daily routine.” 15 Plaintiff’s position that the term “equipment” should
be read to include all of the steps on the platform is unreasonable. Roberts
worked as a production operator on an oil and gas production platform, and
therefore the term “equipment” is much more reasonably read to include that
which is necessary for the production of oil and gas. Plaintiff has not produced
any evidence that Roberts had a duty to inspect all of the steps on the platform,
and Roberts expressly testified that “inspecting the structural aspects of the
platform” was not part of his regular duties. 16 Further, “[t]he duty of
reasonable care does not encompass a duty to eliminate a preexisting unsafe

Docs.105-5, p.3; 109-2, p.5.
Doc. 105-2.
16 Doc. 105-5, p.3.
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condition present on a work site over which the independent contractor does
not exercise control.” 17 Finally, the fact that Roberts previously noticed that a
set of steps was unsecured and took it upon himself to repair those steps does
not make him responsible for all of the steps on the platform. Plaintiff has not
established that Roberts owed him a duty that was breached, and therefore,
cannot show that Roberts was negligent or that Wood Group was vicariously
liable for that negligence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Wood Group’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on Plaintiff’s claims is GRANTED. Wood Group’s Motion for Summary
Judgment regarding the Intervenor’s Claims is DENIED AS MOOT. This
matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 12th day of June, 2018.

____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Granger, 2016 WL 4697693, at *5.

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