Kruebbe v. Gegenheimer

Filing 89

ORDER AND REASONS granting 33 , 70 Motions to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Party Meredith Claire Hearn, Raylyn R. Beevers and Charles Thomas Carr, III dismissed without prejudice. With respect to these Defendants only, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Complaint within 20 days of this Order. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm) (Main Document 89 replaced on 7/20/2016) (ecm).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JEFFREY KRUEBBE

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 15-6930

JON GEGENHEIMER ET AL

SECTION: “H”(3)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss filed by Charles Thomas Carr,
III and Meredith Claire Hearn (Doc. 33) and a Motion to Dismiss filed by Judge
Raylyn R. Beevers (Doc. 70). For the following reasons, the Motions to Dismiss
are GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
In this pro se civil rights action, Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality
of Louisiana Revised Statute 13:2562.22. He complains that the state court
Judicial Expense Fund, which holds fines assessed by state court judges, is
controlled by these same judges.
Mr. Kruebbe was charged with a misdemeanor criminal violation in state
court. When he failed to appear at a court date, Defendant Judge Beevers
found him in contempt, assessed a fine of $150, and issued a writ of attachment
for his arrest. Plaintiff alleges that he was never served with notice to appear
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in court. Nevertheless, his mother paid the contempt fee at issue, which was
deposited into the Judicial Expense Fund for the Second Parish Court for the
Parish of Jefferson. Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the Judicial
Expense Fund because the judges of the court control the fines they assess,
creating improper bias. He seeks injunctive relief precluding both his criminal
prosecution and further collection of monies into the Judicial Expense Fund.
Additionally, Plaintiff attempted to remove his misdemeanor theft prosecution
to this Court; however, that cause was remanded.1
Defendants Judge Rayln Beevers and Assistant District Attorney
Charles Thomas Carr have moved for dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint for
failure to state a claim.

Meredith Hearn has joined in Defendant Carr’s

Motion, however, she is not named as a defendant in either the Complaint or
the Amended Complaint.2
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”3 A claim is
“plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “[d]raw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”4
A court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must “draw

Doc. 20.
It appears that Ms. Hearn was first served with Plaintiff’s Notice of Removal of
Criminal Prosecution (Doc. 18); however, she is not named as a defendant therein. Plaintiff
attempted to add Ms. Hearn as a party through his Motion to Amend Case Caption; however,
that Motion was denied. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations before the Court are limited to
those contained in the Complaint (Doc. 1) and the Amended Complaint (Doc. 5).
3 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
4 Id.
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2

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all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”5

The Court need not,

however, accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.6
To be legally sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer
possibility” that the plaintiff’s claims are true.7 “A pleading that offers ‘labels
and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’”
will not suffice.8

Rather, the complaint must contain enough factual

allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
of each element of the plaintiffs’ claim.9
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Claims Against ADA Carr
The ADA Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal both
because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts tending to show them liable for any
misconduct and because they are entitled to immunity. The Court will address
these arguments in turn.
A. Failure to Allege Facts
In his opposition to Defendant Carr’s Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant has “aided a criminal proceeding against Plaintiff without
probable cause.” These allegations are not, however, contained in Plaintiff’s
Complaint or Amended Complaint. The claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint and
Amended Complaint concern alleged violations of his civil rights in the
enforcement of La. Rev. Stat. § 13:2562.22 in relation to the Judicial Expense
Fund. The challenged statute provides that “[i]n all criminal cases over which
the First and Second Parish Courts of Jefferson Parish have jurisdiction, there
Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 667.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
9 Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57.
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shall be taxed as costs against every defendant who is convicted after trial or
after plea of guilty or who forfeits his bond, a sum likewise determined but
which shall not exceed fifteen dollars, which shall be in addition to all other
finds, costs, or forfeitures lawfully imposed.”10 The challenged statute further
provides that “[a]ll sums collected or received under this Section shall be placed
in a . . . Judicial Expense Fund,” which “[t]he judges, en banc, of the courts
shall have control over.”11 Mr. Carr and Ms. Hearn argue that the claims
against them should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts
showing that they are liable for misconduct.
A plain reading of the challenged statute shows that Mr. Carr and Ms.
Hearn, acting as Assistant District Attorneys in the Jefferson Parish District
Attorney’s Office, exercise no control over the Judicial Expense Fund. Even
construed liberally, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to set forth facts from which the
Court could reasonably infer that the Defendant is liable for any alleged
misconduct.
devoid

of

Notably, Plaintiff’s Complaint and Amended Complaint are
any

specific

factual

allegations

against

Defendant

Carr.

Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims against the ADA Defendants are dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
B. Immunity
Plaintiff’s claims are likewise subject to dismissal on the basis of
qualified immunity.12

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects

government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

La. Rev. Stat. 13:2562.22(A).
La. Rev. Stat. § 13:2562.22(B).
12 The ADA defendants also aver that they are entitled to dismissal on the basis of
absolute prosecutorial immunity. Because the Court finds that dismissal would be warranted
under the less stringent qualified immunity standards, it need not reach the question of
whether absolute immunity applies.
10
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a reasonable person would have known.”13 In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme
Court promulgated a two-step analysis to determine if an official has stepped
outside the bounds of qualified immunity.14 Under that test, the initial inquiry
is whether the Plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation.15 If established,
the next inquiry is whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable
in light of clearly established law at the time the conduct occurred. 16 In
Pearson v. Callahan, the Court retreated somewhat from this rigid two-step
inquiry, giving courts leave to decide which prong to consider first.17 “Qualified
immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” 18
Even providing the liberal construction that Plaintiff is due as a pro se
litigant, the Court finds that the Compliant and Amended Complaint fail to
allege sufficient facts from which it could infer that the ADA Defendants have
committed any violations of clearly established law. As noted above, Plaintiff’s
Complaint and Amended Complaint are devoid of any distinct factual
allegations implicating the ADA Defendants. Without such an allegation,
Defendants are entitled to the protection of qualified immunity in the
performance of their official duties.
II. Claims Against Judge Beevers
Judge Beevers asks the Court to dismiss the claims against her on the
basis of prematurity, Younger abstention, and the Anti-Injunction Act.
Plaintiff’s opposition does not address these legal arguments. Because the
Court finds that Younger abstention applies, it need not reach Defendant’s
other arguments.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2008).
18 Id. at 237.
13
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In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court articulated a doctrine of
abstention when the exercise of federal jurisdiction would interfere with
ongoing state criminal proceedings.19 Younger abstention is grounded in
principles of equity, comity, and federalism.20 Three requirements must be
met before Younger abstention is appropriate: (1) the exercise of federal
jurisdiction would interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the
state proceeding implicates important state interests; and (3) the state
proceeding

affords

an

adequate

opportunity

to

raise

constitutional

challenges.21 If these requirements are met, then a federal court may only
enjoin a pending state criminal court proceeding if certain narrowly delimited
exceptions to the abstention doctrine apply. Specifically, courts may disregard
the Younger doctrine when: (1) the state court proceeding was brought in bad
faith or with the purpose of harassing the federal plaintiff, (2) the state statute
is “flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in
every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against
whomever an effort might be made to apply it,” or (3) application of the doctrine
was waived.22
The Court finds that, in this case, the prerequisites to Younger
abstention are satisfied. First, the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff are
ongoing and were in progress at the time this lawsuit was initiated. Second,
the state has an important interest in enforcing its criminal laws and its
contempt rulings, and any ruling in this matter would necessarily interfere
with the ongoing state court proceedings. Third, Plaintiff has an adequate

401 U.S. 37, 91 (1971).
Id. at 43–44.
21 See Bice v. Louisiana Pub. Defender Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012)
(citations omitted).
22 Younger, 401 U.S. at 49; Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446 (1977); DeSpain
v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1180 (5th Cir.1984).
19
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opportunity to raise his constitutional defenses in the state court proceedings.
Additionally, the Court finds that none of the exceptions to Younger abstention
are met in this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions are GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Charles Carr and Raylyn Beevers are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

With respect to these Defendants

only, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Complaint within 20 days of this
Order to the extent that he can plausibly state a claim under which relief can
be granted.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 20th day of June, 2016.

____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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