In re: In the Matter of Texas Petroleum Investment Company
Filing
15
ORDER & REASONS: denying 7 Motion to Dismiss Limitation Action as Untimely Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), or in the Alternative, To Lift Stay Order; denying as moot 13 Motion for Leave to File; denying as moot 14 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 4/22/16. (sek)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
IN THE MATTER OF
THE COMPLAINT OF TEXAS
PETROLEUM INVESTMENT COMPANY
FOR EXONERATION FROM OR
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
CIVIL ACTION
NO: 16-1590
SECTION: “J” (4)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Limitation Action as
Untimely Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), or in the Alternative, To
Lift Stay Order (Rec. Doc. 7) filed by Claimants Timmy Charpentier
and Betty Charpentier (“Claimants”) and an opposition thereto
(Rec. Doc. 12) filed by Limitation Petitioner Texas Petroleum
Investment Company (“TPIC”). Having considered the motion and
legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court
finds that the motion should be DENIED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation derives from the alleged injury of Timmy
Charpentier while working on TPIC’s Point Au Fer facility, a fixed
platform located in Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana, on August 9,
2012. (Rec. Doc. 7-1, at 2.) Mr. Charpentier, an operator employed
by Shamrock Management, was allegedly struck by a blast from the
pressure
release
valve
of
a
compressor
on
the
platform
and
sustained permanent, disabling injuries. Id. Claimants filed suit
in state court against HUB Energy Services on June 19, 2013,
1
alleging that HUB, as owner of the compressor, improperly and
negligently installed, maintained, and serviced the compressor
that injured Mr. Charpentier. (Rec. Doc. 1-2, at 2.) Claimants
filed their First Amended Petition on August 8, 2013, naming TPIC
as a defendant in its capacity as owner of the platform on which
Mr. Charpentier was allegedly injured. (Rec. Doc. 1-3.)
On November 20, 2015, Claimants filed their Second Amended
Petition, alleging for the first time causes of action under the
Jones
Act,
46
U.S.C.
§
30104,
and
general
maritime
law
unseaworthiness against TPIC as owner of the vessel DA-JA-VOO that
Mr. Charpentier used to travel to and from the Point Au Fer
facility. (Rec. Doc. 1-4.) On February 25, 2016, TPIC filed a
limitation action in this Court under The Limitation of Vessel
Owner’s Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30501-30512, seeking to limit
its liability to the value of the DA-JA-VOO. (Rec. Doc. 1.) TPIC
claims the value of the DA-JA-VOO is $17,500.00. Id. The Court
enjoined proceedings outside the limitation action and set the
monition period for six months, from March 8, 2016 to September 8,
2016. (Rec. Doc. 5.)
On March 22, 2016, Claimants filed the instant motion to
dismiss the limitation action or, in the alternative, to lift the
stay on the state court action. (Rec. Doc. 7.) TPIC filed its
opposition on April 12, 2016. (Rec. Doc. 12.) Claimants filed a
motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum, and TPIC filed
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a motion for leave to file a response to Claimant’s memorandum.
(Rec. Doc. 13; Rec. Doc. 14.) Both motions are pending before the
Court.
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
Claimants argue that TPIC’s limitation action is untimely for
its failure to comply with the six month window provided in 46
U.S.C. § 30511 and Supplemental Rule of F of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. (Rec. Doc. 7, at 3-6.) Specifically, Claimants
argue (1) that their First Amended Petition in the state court
proceeding, which named TPIC as defendant in August 2013, put TPIC
on notice of a claim worth more than the value of the DA-JA-VOO
and subject to limitation, and (2) that in the alternative, the
aggregation of discovery in the case and communications between
Claimants and TPIC similarly put TPIC on notice by January 15,
2015 at the latest.
TPIC responds (1) that the First Amended Petition did nothing
to put TPIC on notice that the claims against it were in any way
subject to limitation because the its allegations did not implicate
Mr. Charpentier’s potential seaman status, did not mention the DAJA-VOO in any way, and sued TPIC in its capacity as owner of the
platform, and (2) that the discovery and communications Claimants
seek to aggregate cannot establish notice under the Limitation Act
because they were not written in nature.
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LEGAL STANDARD
I.
Motion to Dismiss
The Limitation of Liability Act “allows a vessel owner to
limit liability for damage or injury, occasioned without the
owner's privity or knowledge, to the value of the vessel or the
owner's interest in the vessel.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine,
Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 439 (2001). The owner of a vessel may bring a
civil action for limitation of liability in federal district court.
The action is timely if it is filed within six months after a
claimant gives the owner written notice of a claim. 46 U.S.C. §
30511; see Karim v. Finch Shipping Co., Ltd., 265 F.3d 258, 26364 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[A]n action filed by a shipowner seeking to
limit its liability must be brought within six months after a
claimant gives the owner written notice of a claim.”). If the owner
files a petition after the six-month period expires, the court
must dismiss it as untimely. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Cailleteau, 869
F.2d 843, 846 (5th Cir. 1989). The purpose of the six-month
prescription is to “require the shipowner to act promptly to gain
the benefit of the statutory right to limit liability.” Id.
The Fifth Circuit uses the “reasonable possibility” test to
determine whether the claimant’s written notice triggers the sixmonth filing period. Complaint of Tom–Mac, Inc., 76 F.3d 678, 683
(5th Cir. 1996). Under this test, the claimant’s written notice
must reveal “a reasonable possibility that the claim made is one
4
subject to limitation.” Id. Therefore, “notice is sufficient if it
informs the vessel owner of an actual or potential claim . . .
which may exceed the value of the vessel . . . and is subject to
limitation.” In re Envtl. Safety & Health Consulting Servs., Inc.,
463 F. App'x 383, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting P.G. Charter
Boats, Inc. v. Soles, 437 F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 2006)). A
written notice “must inform the owner of both the details of the
incident and that the owner appeared to be responsible for the
damage in question.” In re Weber Marine, Inc. 2010 WL 4884436, at
*3 (E.D. La. Nov. 23, 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). The notice must also indicate that the claimant intends
to seek damages from the owner. In the Matter of Oceanic Fleet,
Inc., 807 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (E.D. La. Dec. 3, 1992). The owner’s
mere knowledge of the events giving rise to the claim is not
sufficient to commence the running of the six-month time period.
Complaint of McKinney Towing, Inc., No. 94-2171, 1994 WL 682546,
at *6 (E.D. La. Dec. 6, 1994).
II.
Motion to Lift Stay
Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule F contains
procedural laws pertaining to limitation actions. See In re Tetra
Applied Techs. L.P., 362 F.3d 338, 340 (5th Cir. 2004). Rule F
provides that a district court may “enjoin the further prosecution
of any action or proceeding against the [owner] or the [owner's]
property with respect to any claim subject to limitation in the
5
action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(3). However, a few exceptions
to this rule exist. The Supreme Court has held that, when a single
claimant sues a shipowner in state court and the owner files a
limitation action in federal court, the federal court must allow
a state court action to proceed but retain jurisdiction over the
limitation action. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1931).
The Fifth Circuit has allowed multiple claims to proceed outside
the limitation action “(1) if they total less than the value of
the vessel, or (2) if the claimants stipulate that the federal
court has exclusive jurisdiction over the limitation of liability
proceeding and that they will not seek to enforce a greater damage
award until the limitation action has been heard by the federal
court.” Odeco Oil & Gas Co. v. Bonnette, 4 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir.
1993). Thus, if the parties provide stipulations that protect the
shipowner’s right to limit its liability, the state court case can
proceed. In re Tetra, 362 F.3d at 341.
DISCUSSION
I.
Motion to Dismiss
At issue is whether TPIC’s limitation complaint was timely
filed.
First,
the
Court
finds
that
Claimants’
first
amended
petition did not provide notice of a reasonable possibility that
the claim was subject to limitation. Claimants added TPIC as a
defendant in their state court claim via amended petition on August
8, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 1-3.) Claimants alleged that TPIC improperly
6
or negligently installed, maintained, and serviced the compressor
that caused injury to Mr. Charpentier. The amended petition does
not mention the involvement of a vessel or any maritime claims.
Claimants only alleged that they were entitled to damages from
TPIC in its capacity as owner, installer, maintainer, or servicer
of the compressor.
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit found that the following
allegations gave rise to notice of a claim subject to limitation
action: “(1) [Claimant Diaz] was working for a subcontractor of
[Limitation Plaintiff] ES & H; (2) he was ‘assigned to work in a
small, unnamed boat’; (3) ES & H caused him to work from the boat
and directed his work for the day; (4) ES & H told Diaz and other
Team Labor Force employees to keep working when it otherwise shut
down operations on August 25, 2008 due to an approaching storm;
(5) ES & H sent home its safety representative when it shut down
operations; and (6) Diaz was injured on August 25, 2008, while
still performing his assigned work on the designated vessel.” In
re Envtl. Safety & Health Consulting Servs., Inc., 463 F. App'x
383, 386 (5th Cir. 2012). Thus, the Fifth Circuit found that the
limitation plaintiff knew that the claimant was injured, that the
claimant was working on a vessel, and that the limitation plaintiff
had directed claimant’s tasks on the vessel. Id. at 386-87. A
claimant need not identify the specific vessel involved in the
7
underlying claim. Id. at 387. However, the Fifth Circuit required
some notice of the existence of a claim implicating maritime law.
In the case at bar, the fact that Mr. Charpentier traveled to
and from the platform via a vessel did not apprise TPIC of the
reasonable possibility that Mr. Charpentier’s claim was subject to
limitation. Further, Claimants did not allege any facts to suggest
that Mr. Charpentier was a Jones Act seaman. Mr. Charpentier was
injured on a platform. Claimants did not allege that a vessel was
involved in the injury. The Fifth Circuit has held that a worker
who primarily works on fixed platforms is not a seaman, despite
the fact the he travels on a vessel to reach the platform or
performs incidental work tasks on a vessel. Mungia v. Chevron Co.,
U.S.A., 768 F.2d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1985). Thus, TPIC could not
have reasonably anticipated that Claimants would claim damages
under the Jones Act or maritime law.
Second, the Court finds that Claimants’ “aggregate notice”
arguments fail because the alleged notices were not in writing.
Claimants argue that TPIC received information in depositions that
should have alerted it to the fact that the claim was subject to
limitation. However, it is undisputed that the information was not
conveyed in writing to TPIC. Further, while TPIC may have known
that it owned the vessel that transported Mr. Charpentier to the
platform, TPIC’s mere knowledge of the events giving rise to the
8
claim is not sufficient to commence the running of the six-month
time period. McKinney Towing, 1994 WL 682546, at *6.
Therefore, TPIC first received notice of a claim potentially
subject to limitation on November 20, 2015, when Claimants amended
their petition to allege causes of action under the Jones Act and
general maritime law. Claimants filed the limitation action on
February 25, 2016, well within the six-month time limit. Claimants’
Motion to Dismiss lacks merit.
II.
Motion to Lift Stay
Claimants argue that the Court should lift the stay on the state
court
action
because
Claimants
filed
stipulations
to
protect
TPIC’s right to limit its liability. (See Rec. Doc. 7-5.) However,
Mr. and Mrs. Charpentier are not the only claimants in this action.
HUB also filed a claim in this proceeding. (Rec. Doc. 11.) HUB has
not filed any stipulations that might preserve TPIC’s limitation
rights. Further, the value the claims exceeds the value of the DAJA-VOO. Mr. Charpentier’s medical bills alone total $77,660.30.
(Rec. Doc. 7-6.) Thus, the Court finds that lifting the stay is
untimely until the monition period ends on September 8, 2016.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT
IS
HEREBY
ORDERED
that
Claimants’
Motion
to
Dismiss
Limitation Action as Untimely Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), or in
the Alternative, To Lift Stay Order (Rec. Doc. 7) is DENIED.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Claimant’s Motion for Leave to
File Supplemental Memorandum (Rec. Doc. 13) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that TPIC’s Motion for Leave to File
Response to Supplemental Memorandum (Rec. Doc. 14) is DENIED as
moot.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 22nd day of April, 2016.
____________________________
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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