Amir El v. Louisiana State et al

Filing 63

ORDER AND REASONS granting 60 Motion to Dismiss. Denying as moot 52 Motion for Summary Judgment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims against the consolidated Defendant, the State of Louisiana, are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier on 2/20/2018. (Reference: all cases)(cg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KING SANDI AMIR EL

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

No.: 16-2125
c/w 17-3061
SECTION: “J”(2)

LOUISIANA STATE, ET AL.

ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(c)
or, alternatively, for Summary Judgment Pursuant to FRCP 56 filed
by Defendant, former Jefferson Parish Sheriff Newell Normand, in
his individual capacity, and current Jefferson Parish Sheriff
Joseph

Lopinto,

in

his

official

Jefferson Parish. 1 (Rec. Doc. 60.)

capacity

as

the

Sheriff

of

Plaintiff, King Sandi Amir El,

did not file an opposition to the motion.

Having considered the

1 Plaintiff’s amended complaint names Newell Normand “both in his personal
capacity, and Official capacity as employee for Jefferson Parish State of
Louisiana.” (Rec. Doc. 32 at 1.) In the motion to dismiss, Normand notes that
he is no longer the Sheriff of Jefferson Parish and that Plaintiff’s official
capacity claim is now in reality a claim against his successor, Sheriff Joseph
Lopinto, in his official capacity as current Sheriff of Jefferson Parish.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) provides:
An action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in an
official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office
while the action is pending. The officer's successor is
automatically substituted as a party. Later proceedings should be
in the substituted party's name, but any misnomer not affecting the
parties’ substantial rights must be disregarded. The court may order
substitution at any time, but the absence of such an order does not
affect the substitution.
Accordingly, current Jefferson Parish Sheriff Lopinto is substituted as the
defendant with respect to the official-capacity claims.

motion and legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law,
the Court finds that the Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This litigation appears to stem from Plaintiff’s arrest in
May of 2015. On or around May 30, 2015, Plaintiff was stopped by
Defendant

Officer

grandmother’s

home.

D.

Boudreaux

Plaintiff

in

the

alleges

front

that

yard

Officer

of

his

Boudreaux

“aggressively demanded that Plaintiff identify himself” and to
produce his driver’s license. Plaintiff refused to produce any
identification but identified himself as “King Sandi Amir El, a
Moslem Moorish American.” Despite Plaintiff’s attempt to resist,
Officer Boudreaux then allegedly grabbed Plaintiff’s arm and led
him toward his police car. Plaintiff asserts that Officer Boudreaux
handcuffed him and again asked Plaintiff to identify himself.
Plaintiff “allowed his Clock of Destiny, Moorish Nationality Card,
to be observed” by Officer Boudreaux; other deputies then arrived
at the scene. One of the deputies who arrived on scene allegedly
told

Plaintiff,

“You’re

not

King,

you

are

Carlton

Morris.”

Plaintiff instructed the officer that his name is not Carlton
Morris, but rather King Sandi Amir El. Officer Boudreaux then told
Plaintiff to get into the police car voluntarily or he would use
his Taser on him. Thereafter, Plaintiff was transported to the
Jefferson Parish Correctional Center (“JPCC”).

Plaintiff alleges

that at the JPCC he again identified himself as a Moslem Moorish
2

American but was mocked by Jefferson Parish deputies.

While in

the JPCC, Plaintiff asserts that he was held under the false name
of Carlton Clennon Morris and identified on documents as “negro”
or “black,” which Plaintiff also alleges is untrue.
In September 2015, Plaintiff made an appearance at the 24th
Judicial District Courtroom and proclaimed that he was not a Negro,
black, or a colored person.

Thereafter, Commissioner Schneider

then allegedly stated, “You are black, and you are a Negro, and if
you say anything else I will hold you in contempt.”

Plaintiff

told Commissioner Schneider that he was denying him his right to
be heard and that Plaintiff did not consent to being held “in
involuntary servitude for defending [his] honor and reputation.”
Commissioner Schneider ordered the courtroom officer to handcuff
Plaintiff and transport him to the JPCC.

Plaintiff alleges that

he was held for approximately forty-eight hours without reprieve.
Plaintiff again alleges he was held under the name Carlton Clennon
Morris.
Finally, in January 2016, Plaintiff made another appearance
at the 24th Judicial District Courtroom. During proceedings before
the Honorable Raymond Steib, Plaintiff asserts that he was asked
to “please remove your hat” which was a “Moorish Fez.”

Further,

Plaintiff alleges Judge Steib ordered Carlton Clennon Morris to
take a drug screening, but Plaintiff again alleges that he is not
Carlton Clennon Morris.
3

On March 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed this pro se and in forma
pauperis suit against Jefferson Parish and the State of Louisiana.
(Case No. 16-2125; Rec. Doc. 1.)

Thereafter, the Court granted

Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint and name the following
individuals as Defendants: Governor John Bel Edwards, Jefferson
Parish District Attorney Paul Connick, Deputy D. Boudreaux, and
Sherriff Newel Normand, in their personal and official capacities.
(Rec. Docs. 31, 32.)
thirty-five

different

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint includes
claims,

including

numerous

alleged

constitutional violations, against the four Defendants listed in
the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation from

these Defendants and a declaration that they are not permitted to
refer to him as Carlton Clennon Morris.
a

declaration

that

Defendants

are

not

Further, Plaintiff seeks
permitted

to

label

or

document him as Negro, black, African, or colored person.
On April 3, 2017, the Court granted Jefferson Parish’s Motion
to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Rec. Doc. 26) dismissing
all claims against Jefferson Parish with prejudice. (Rec. Doc.
38.)

On May 12, 2017, the Court also granted Governor Edwards’

Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 35) dismissing the claims against
Governor Edwards, Jefferson Parish District Attorney Connick, and
the State of Louisiana with prejudice. (Rec. Doc. 43.)

On July

19, 2017, the Court dismissed the claims against Jefferson Parish
Sheriff Deputy D. Boudreaux without prejudice during the Court’s
4

call docket. (Rec. Doc. 48.)

On October 3, 2017, the Court denied

Plaintiff’s Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief. (Rec. Doc.
55.)

On October 24, 2017, former Jefferson Parish Sheriff Newell

Normand, in his individual capacity, and current Jefferson Parish
Sheriff Joseph Lopinto, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of
Jefferson Parish, filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to
FRCP 12(c) or, alternatively, for Summary Judgment Pursuant to
FRCP 56. (Rec. Doc. 60.)

Plaintiff did not file an opposition.

The motion is now before the Court on the briefs and without oral
argument.
LEGAL STANDARD AND DISCUSSION
Former

Sheriff

Normand,

in

his

individual

capacity,

and

current Sheriff Lopinto, in his official capacity as the Sheriff
of Jefferson Parish move for a judgment on the pleadings pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).
Rule 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—
but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment
on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).

A motion brought

pursuant to Rule 12(c) “is designed to dispose of cases where the
material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can
be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any
judicially noticed facts.”

Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone

Props., Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990).

5

Courts evaluate a motion under Rule 12(c) for judgment on the
pleadings using the same standard as a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,

528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 385
F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004)).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead enough facts to “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff
pleads facts that allow the Court to “draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id.

A

court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.

Lormand v. U.S.

Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009); Baker v. Putnal,
75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).

The Court is not, however, bound

to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.
Iqbal,

556

U.S.

at

678.

“[C]onclusory

allegations

or

legal

conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice
to prevent a motion to dismiss.”

Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc.,

296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002).
A. Claims

against

former

Sheriff

Normand

in

his

Individual

Capacity
To hold Normand liable, in his individual capacity, Plaintiff
“must allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional
6

violation.

This

standard

requires

more

than

conclusional

assertions: The plaintiff must allege specific facts giving rise
to the constitutional claims.”
(5th

Cir.

2002)

(citation

Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741
omitted).

Moreover,

“[p]ersonal

involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of
action.”

Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983).

Here, Plaintiff has made no factual allegations against Normand,
nor has Plaintiff alleged that Normand was personally involved in
the events surrounding his purported constitutional violations.
To the extent Plaintiff names Normand as a defendant based only on
his (former) role as supervisor of the deputies and the jail
facility, the law is clearly established that respondeat superior
liability is not a viable theory under section 1983.

See, e.g.,

Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Under
section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for the actions
of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.”).

Thus,

Plaintiffs claims against Normand in his individual capacity must
be dismissed.
B. Claims

against

current

Sheriff

Lopinto

in

his

Official

Capacity
“A suit against a public official in his official capacity
‘is not a suit against the official personally.’ Rather, because
an award of monetary damages against an official in his official
capacity can only be executed against the government entity, the
7

suit is ‘to be treated as a suit against the entity.’” Alex v. St.
John the Baptist Par. Sheriff's Office, 16-17019, 2017 WL 5157538,
at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 2017) (quoting Monell v. New York City
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 358 (1978) and Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)).

Accordingly, an official-

capacity suit against the Sheriff would in reality be a claim
against the local government entity he serves.

The United States

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
In order to hold a municipality or a local government
unit liable under Section 1983 for the misconduct of one
of its employees, a plaintiff must initially allege that
an official policy or custom was a cause in fact of the
deprivation of rights inflicted. To satisfy the cause in
fact

requirement,

a

plaintiff

must

allege

that

the

custom or policy served as a moving force behind the
constitutional violation at issue or that [his] injuries
resulted from the execution of an official policy or
custom. The description of a policy or custom and its
relationship to the underlying constitutional violation,
moreover, cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific
facts.
Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Department, 130 F.3d 162,
167 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

Further, “[a] plaintiff

may not infer a policy merely because harm resulted from some
8

interaction with a governmental entity.”

Colle v. Brazos County,

Texas, 981 F.2d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 1993).

Rather, he must identify

the policy or custom which allegedly caused the deprivation of his
constitutional rights.

See, e.g., Murray v. Town of Mansura, 76

F. App’x 547, 549 (5th Cir. 2003); Treece v. Louisiana, 74 F. App’x
315, 316 (5th Cir. 2003).

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint does not

allege an unconstitutional custom, usage, or policy.

Nor does he

state any facts that show that such a policy, if any, was causally
related to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.
not

allege

or

show

any

pattern

of

As such, Plaintiff does

unconstitutional

conduct.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims must be dismissed.
C. Plaintiff’s Claims Against the State of Louisiana
The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the State of
Louisiana as frivolous on May 12, 2017.

(Rec. Doc. 43.)

However,

due to the transfer and consolidation of another pro se and in
forma pauperis complaint filed by Plaintiff (“the Consolidated
Complaint”), 2 Plaintiff’s claims against the State of Louisiana
are once again before the Court.

In the Consolidated Complaint,

Plaintiff seeks “declaratory relief . . . [that] the proceedings
in the STATE OF LOUISIANA, Courtroom be declared void for lack of

2

On April 10, 2017, Plaintiff filed another pro se and in forma pauperis suit
naming the State of Louisiana as the sole Defendant. (Case No. 17-3061; Rec.
Doc. 1.) In the Consolidated Complaint, Plaintiff’s asserts identical factual
allegations as those discussed above. As such, on September 13, 2017, the case
was transferred and consolidated with case number 16-2125 before this Court.
(Rec. Doc. 51.)

9

jurisdictional evidence over plaintiff . . . in determining its
scope and delineation of scope of the Moslem Moorish American
nationality-race . . . .” (Case No. 17-3061; Rec. Doc. 1.)
Because Plaintiff has filed the Consolidated Complaint in
forma pauperis, the Court may sua sponte, consider whether all or
part of Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed as frivolous.
See Washington v. U.S. Ct. of App. Fifth Cir., 8-4583, 2009 WL
482134, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 20, 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)).

The Court “may dismiss an [in forma pauperis]

proceeding for frivolousness or maliciousness at any time, before
or after service of process, and [the Court] is vested with
especially

broad

discretion

in

determining

whether

such

a

dismissal is warranted.” Id. (quoting Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d
1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1998)).

The Court has “not only the authority

to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory,
but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's
factual

allegations

contentions
Williams,

are

490

and

clearly

U.S.

319,

dismiss

those

baseless.”
327

claims

Id.

(1989)).

whose

(citing

Thus,

a

factual

Neitzke

v.

complaint

is

frivolous “if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.”

Id.

(citing Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994)).
However, a court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only
if

the

facts

are

clearly

baseless,

a

category

encompassing

allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.
10

Id.

(citing

Denton

v.

Hernandez,

504

U

.S.

25,

31

(1992)).

Additionally, “[a] complaint is malicious if the claims asserted
therein have already been asserted by the plaintiff in a pending
or previous lawsuit against the same or different defendants.”
Id.

“When declaring that a successive in forma pauperis suit is

‘malicious’ the court should insure that the plaintiff obtains one
bite at the litigation apple-but not more.”

Id. (citing Pittman

v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1993)).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against the
State of Louisiana are frivolous and must be dismissed.

The

alleged facts in this matter show that Plaintiff’s claims are
clearly baseless and have no merit.

Plaintiff appears to request

that this Court void the state court proceedings against him
because his “Moslem Moorish American nationality” makes him immune
from

suit.

As

the

Court

has

noted

in

its

previous

order,

Plaintiff’s suit is an attempt to escape the laws of this country.
See Rec. Doc. 43.

The fact that Plaintiff claims he is “Moslem

Moorish American” does not permit him to ignore or be immune from
the

laws

of

consistently

the

state

rejected

and

federal

arguments

frivolous and utterly baseless.

government.

similar

to

Courts

Plaintiff’s

have
as

See e.g., Bey v. Bank of Am., 14-

2797, 2015 WL 4168447, at *3 (E.D. La. July 8, 2015) (“Any claim
to ownership by Plaintiff based on his alleged status as an
‘Indigenous Moorish American National’ lacks any legal basis and
11

is

thus

disregarded

as

frivolous.”);

Alozie

El

v.

City

of

Shreveport, 17-1339, 2017 WL 5935837, at *1 (W.D. La. Oct. 20,
2017) (“The Moorish National’ arguments that underlie the petition
are meritless.”);

Caldwell v. Wood, 7-41, 2010 WL 5441670 at *17

(W.D.N.C. Dec. 28, 2010) (“The suggestion that Petitioner is
entitled to ignore the laws of the State of North Carolina by
claiming

membership

ludicrous.”).

in

the

“Moorish–American”

nation

is

Additionally, Plaintiff’s prosecution is malicious

in that Plaintiff has previously asserted similar claims against
the

same

Defendant,

the

dismissed with prejudice.

State

of

Louisiana,

which

the

Court

See Rec. Doc. 43.

Therefore, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the
consolidated defendant, the State of Louisiana, with prejudice.
In

light

of

this

conclusion,

Plaintiff’s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment (Rec. Doc. 52) is denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc.
60) filed by former Sheriff Normand, in his individual capacity,
and current Sheriff Joseph Lopinto, in his official capacity as
the Sheriff of Jefferson Parish, is hereby GRANTED.
individual

and

official

capacity

PREJUDICE.

12

claims

are

Plaintiff’s

DISMISSED

WITH

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against the
consolidated

Defendant,

the

State

of

Louisiana,

are

hereby

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Rec. Doc. 52) is DENIED AS MOOT.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 20th day of February, 2018.

CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

13