Williams v. Great American Insurance Company et al

Filing 55

ORDER AND REASONS - For the reasons that follow, MCT Transportation, LLCs 31 motion is DENIED and Great American Insurance Companys 44 motion is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 3/8/2017. (cg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JAMES D. WILLIAMS

CIVIL ACTION

v.

NO. 16-2236

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL.

SECTION "F"

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions: (1) MCT Transportation,
LLC’s motion for summary judgment; and (2) Great American Insurance
Company’s motion for summary judgment.

For the reasons that

follow, MCT Transportation, LLC’s motion is DENIED and Great
American Insurance Company’s motion is GRANTED.
Background
This

personal

injury

litigation

and

insurance

coverage

dispute arises from the plaintiff crashing his sport utility
vehicle into a bobtail 1 tractor, which was parked on Pearl Parkway
in St. Tammany Parish while the tractor’s driver was asleep inside
the sleeping berth of the tractor.
On June 7, 2015, Kent Risner drove a 2006 Kentworth tractor
trailer

--

which

he

owned

and

operated

but

leased

to

MCT

See SAUL SORKIN, GOODS IN TRANSIT § 45.01 (2008)(defining
“bobtailing” as “[t]he operation of a tractor without an attached
trailer”).
1

1

Transportation,

LLC

(MCT)

--

to

AWG

Grocers

in

Pearl

River,

Louisiana so that he could deliver goods that he had been hauling
from Kansas City, Missouri. 2

He delivered the trailer of goods to

the AWG facility between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m.
unloaded at that time.

The trailer was not

Instead, leaving the trailer of goods

behind at the AWG facility to be unloaded, Risner left the facility
in the tractor and parked nearby to sleep. 3

Shortly thereafter,

at about 1:30 a.m. on June 8, James Williams was driving a 1998
Mercury Mountaineer eastbound on Pearl Parkway when he struck
Risner’s Kentworth tractor, which Williams alleges was illegally
parked, without parking lights, in the eastbound lane. 4

Williams

failed to see the tractor and alleges that he was injured as a
result of the collision.
Prior to dropping off the trailer of goods on June 7, 2015,
Risner had received dispatch instructions from MCT, directing him
to pick up a load in Kansas City, Missouri and deliver it to the
AWG facility in Pearl River, Louisiana.

He received a bill of

lading from MCT containing these instructions.

Risner confirmed

When he was not hauling for MCT, Risner regularly garaged the
2006 Kenworth tractor at his house in Myrtle, Missouri.
3 While waiting for the trailer to be emptied, Risner left the
facility and parked nearby in order to rest pursuant to the 10hour break rule imposed by 49 C.F.R. § 395.3 of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Act.
4 This is disputed.
Mr. Risner has stated that he was asleep inside
the cab of the tractor trailer, which he said he had parked on the
roadway shoulder outside the AWG warehouse gates.
2

2

that the delivery made just prior to the accident was made for MCT
pursuant to the dispatch instructions contained in the bill of
lading.

When Risner arrived at the AWG facility before midnight

on June 7 to drop off the trailer for unloading the next morning,
the bill of lading accompanying the load was stamped “ReceivedSubject to Count,” with the understanding that the trailer would
be unloaded and the cargo would be counted the next morning. 5
Risner planned to return to pick up the empty trailer on June 8
after it was unloaded.

Then, consistent with MCT policy, he

planned to take the empty trailer to MCT’s facility in Gulfport,
Mississippi so that he could pick up another load for MCT and
deliver it to a receiver on his return trip north. 6
The

MCT-Risner

lease

agreement

for

the

tractor

trailer

provided that, pursuant to federal regulations, “MCT will have
exclusive possession, use and control of the equipment, and that
MCT will assume complete responsibility for the operation of the
equipment, required by such regulation during the term of this
Agreement.”

In

transporting

commodities

for

MCT,

the

lease

Nevertheless, Risner testified, that at that point, “I could take
that bill of lading and [send] it to MCT and get it on my next
paycheck. That load was considered delivered to me.”
6 Risner did not have to wait on this particular trailer to be
unloaded, but he told Curtis Snyder with MCT that he would wait on
this trailer to be unloaded and take it to Gulfport.
Risner
testified that he was waiting on this particular trailer to be
unloaded so he could haul it to Gulfport so that it could be loaded
for his return trip.
5

3

agreement obliged Risner to do so in “an efficient and prompt
manner

in

accordance

with

instructions

given

by

MCT

and

in

accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and
regulations.” The lease agreement stated that MCT would “dispatch”
Risner

as

to

pertinent

matters

regarding

the

receipt,

transportation, and delivery of commodities to be transported by
the equipment.

In accordance with the lease agreement, Risner was

to receive 72% of the gross revenue for each load delivered on
behalf of MCT.
shipping

The lease required Risner to “deliver to MCT all

documents,

including

but

not

limited

to

bills

of

lading...which evidence receipt of the commodities transported.”
The delivery instructions would be documented in a bill of lading
that Risner received for each load from or on behalf of MCT.

Once

the bill of lading was signed by the recipient evidencing delivery,
Risner would turn the signed bill of lading into MCT in order to
get paid.
According to MCT policy, a driver that delivered a load to
the AWG facility in Pearl River must wait for any empty trailer
(if available) and take it to the MCT facility in Gulfport to pick
up a load of Dole bananas to transport north on the return trip. 7

Risner testified: “We [MCT drivers] were asked to always pull an
empty trailer back from Gulfport or back from Pearl River to
Gulfport. And if we didn’t or if there was not an empty, we needed
to call – I needed to call Mr. Snyder and get his blessing to come
over there bobtail without a trailer.”
7

4

This

policy

ensured

that

each

driver

was

carrying

a

revenue

producing load on the trip to and from Pearl River and Gulfport.
Both Risner and MCT were paid for the delivery of the load to AWG
and for making another delivery by picking up a load from MCT’s
facility in Gulfport.
Risner
insurance.

was

required

to

acquire

non-trucking

liability

Great American Insurance Company issued to Risner a

Non-Trucking Liability and Physical Damage Policy beginning on
October 1, 2014.

The Policy provides neither general liability

insurance coverage, nor does it provide commercial automobile
liability coverage.

Rather, non-trucking policies are designed to

provide bobtail insurance coverage, for tractors while they are
not being used for business purposes. Part II – LIABILITY COVERAGE
FOR NON TRUCKING USE provides:
A.

COVERAGE

We will pay all sums an insured legally must pay as
damages because of bodily injury or property damage to
which this insurance applies, caused by an accident and
resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a
covered auto.
***
2.

HOWEVER, NONE OF THE FOLLOWING IS AN INSURED:
a.

Anyone engaged in the business of transporting
property for hire.

***
C.

EXCLUSIONS

This insurance does not apply to any of the following:

5

***
13.

TRUCKING OR BUSINESS USE

Bodily injury or property damage arising out of any
accident which occurs while the covered auto is being
used in the business of any lessee or while the covered
auto is being used to transport cargo of any type. For
purposes of this exclusion the phrase “in the business
of any lessee” means any of the following uses of the
covered auto:
a.

for the benefit of or to further the interest
of any lessee or when conducting business of
any type;

b.

by any person or organization acting within
the scope of employment of any lessee;

c.

by any person or organization acting under the
direction, control or dispatch of any lessee;

d.

while traveling to or from any location for
the purpose of picking up, delivering or
transporting cargo on behalf of any lessee;

e.

while traveling between any location where the
covered auto is regularly garaged and
i.

any terminal or facility of any lessee,
or

ii.

any other location,
for the purpose of picking up, delivering
or transporting any cargo; or

f.

while traveling from:
(1)
(2)

On

March

any terminal or facility of any lessee,
or
any location at which the covered auto
was present for the purpose of picking
up, delivering or transporting cargo, to
any location where the covered auto is
regularly garaged.

15,

2016,

invoking

this

Court’s

diversity

jurisdiction, Williams sued Risner, Jose Chavez, MCT, and three
6

insurance

companies,

Travelers

Casualty

&

Surety

Company

of

America, RWI Transportation, LLC, and Great American Insurance
Company

(GAIC).

On

August

11,

2016,

the

Court

granted

the

plaintiff’s motion to dismiss without prejudice his claims against
RWI, Travelers, and Chavez. MCT and GAIC now seek summary judgment
on the issue of whether GAIC’s policy provides coverage.
I.
A.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs that summary
judgment is proper if the record discloses no genuine dispute as
to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

No genuine dispute of fact exists if

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

A genuine

dispute of fact exists only "if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The Court emphasizes that the mere argued existence of a
factual dispute does not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion.

See

id.

Therefore,

"[i]f

the

evidence

is

merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative," summary judgment is
appropriate.

Id. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

Summary judgment

is also proper if the party opposing the motion fails to establish
7

an essential element of his case.
477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

In this regard, the non-moving party

must do more than simply deny the allegations raised by the moving
party.

See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 974 F.2d

646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992).

Rather, he must come forward with

competent evidence, such as affidavits or depositions, to buttress
his claims.

Id.

Hearsay evidence and unsworn documents that

cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence
at trial do not qualify as competent opposing evidence.

Martin v.

John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.
1987); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).
defeat

summary

judgment

"[T]he nonmoving party cannot

with

conclusory

allegations,

unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence."
Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007)(internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

In deciding whether a fact

issue exists, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).

Although the Court

must "resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving
party," it must do so "only where there is an actual controversy,
that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory
facts."

Antoine v. First Student, Inc., 713 F.3d 824, 830 (5th

Cir. 2013)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

8

B.
According to Louisiana law, 8 an insurance policy is a contract
that

must

be

construed

using

the

general

rules

interpretation set forth in the Civil Code.

of

contract

See Cadwallader v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 848 So.2d 577, 580 (La. 2003).

The Court’s

role in interpreting contracts is to determine the common intent
of the parties.

La. Civ. Code art. 2045.

In determining common

intent, pursuant to Civil Code article 2047, words and phrases
used in an insurance policy are to be construed using their plain,
ordinary and generally prevailing meaning, unless the words have
acquired a technical meaning.

See Henry v. South Louisiana Sugars

Co-op., Inc., 957 So.2d 1275, 1277 (La. 2007)(citing Cadwallader,
848 So.2d at 580).
explicit

and

lead

“When the words of a contract are clear and
to

no

absurd

consequences,

no

further

interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent” (La.
Civ. Code art. 2046), and the agreement must be enforced as
written.

Hebert v. Webre, 982 So.2d 770, 773-74 (La. 2008).

The

Court’s approach to a contract’s meaning is driven by simple common
sense principles.
Courts

should

not

interpret

insurance

policies

in

an

unreasonable or a strained manner so as to enlarge or to restrict
policy provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplated by the

There is no dispute that Louisiana law governs this diversity
case.
8

9

terms or so as to achieve an absurd conclusion.

South Louisiana

Sugars Cooperative, 957 So.2d at 1277 (citation omitted).

Unless

it conflicts with state law or public policy, an insurance policy
may limit an insurer’s liability and impose and enforce reasonable
conditions upon the policy obligations the insurer contractually
assumes.

Id. at 1277-78 (citations omitted).

A policy provision that is susceptible of different meanings
must be interpreted with a meaning that renders it effective and
not with one that renders it ineffective.

La. Civ. Code art. 2049.

Further, the policy should be construed as a whole and one portion
should not be construed separately at the expense of disregarding
another.

See La. Civ. Code art. 2050; see also Hebert, 982 So.2d

at 774 (citations omitted).
If an ambiguity remains after the Court applies the general
rules of construction, the ambiguous contractual provision is to
be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage.

Henry,

957 So.2d at 1278 (citing Cadwallader, 848 So.2d at 580).

Under

this rule of strict construction, equivocal provisions seeking to
narrow an insurer’s obligation are strictly construed against the
insurer.

Id. (citing Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Interstate

Fire & Casualty Co., 630 So.2d 759, 764 (La. 1994) and Garcia v.
St. Bernard Parish School Board, 576 So.2d 975, 976 (La. 1991)).
For

the

rule

of

strict

construction

10

to

apply,

the

ambiguous

insurance policy provision must be not only susceptible to two or
more interpretations, but each of the alternative interpretations
must be reasonable.

Id. (citing Cadwallader, 848 So.2d at 580).
II.
A.

As a threshold matter, it is undisputed that: Risner was the
insured under the GAIC policy; Risner owned the 2006 Kenworth
tractor, which was the “covered auto” for the purposes of the
policy; and the tractor was leased to MCT at the time of the
accident. It is likewise undisputed that the exclusionary language
contained in the policy is unambiguous.

The only dispute is

whether the facts as established by the summary judgment record
trigger the unambiguous business use exclusion contained in GAIC’s
non-trucking liability policy.
B.
MCT submits that these facts demonstrate that Risner was not
using the covered auto in the business of MCT at the time of the
accident such that the GAIC policy provides coverage:

Risner had

dropped off the trailer with the load he was carrying for MCT,
went to the guard facility and checked out; Risner was not headed
to MCT at the time of the accident; Risner was not pulling a
trailer or transporting any cargo at the time of the accident;
Risner had what he needed (the bill of lading) to get paid for the
11

load if he would have left right after delivery; MCT did not direct
him to park on the Pearl Parkway, nor did MCT direct him to sleep
in his cab; Risner was asleep at the time of the accident; Risner
was not required to bring the particular trailer he transported to
AWG back to Gulfport.
GAIC counters that: MCT is not an insured nor a third party
beneficiary and, therefore, has no standing to claim coverage under
GAIC’s

policy;

there

is

no

coverage

under

the

business

use

exclusion in the non-trucking liability policy because it is
undisputed that Risner was in the business of trucking for MCT at
the time of the accident.

The summary judgment record and an

analogous Fifth Circuit case support GAIC’s motion.
GAIC submits that the record supports its position that the
vehicle was being used in the business of MCT when the accident
happened.

The Court agrees that the record facts trigger GAIC’s

business use policy exclusion, which states:
Part II – LIABILITY COVERAGE FOR NON TRUCKING USE provides:
A.

COVERAGE

We will pay all sums an insured legally must pay as
damages because of bodily injury or property damage to
which this insurance applies, caused by an accident and
resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a
covered auto.
***

12

2.

HOWEVER, NONE OF THE FOLLOWING IS AN INSURED:
a.

Anyone engaged in the business of transporting
property for hire.

***
C.

EXCLUSIONS

This insurance does not apply to any of the following:
***
13.

TRUCKING OR BUSINESS USE

Bodily injury or property damage arising out of any
accident which occurs while the covered auto is being
used in the business of any lessee or while the covered
auto is being used to transport cargo of any type. For
purposes of this exclusion the phrase “in the business
of any lessee” means any of the following uses of the
covered auto:
a.

for the benefit of or to further the interest
of any lessee or when conducting business of
any type;

b.

by any person or organization acting within
the scope of employment of any lessee;

c.

by any person or organization acting under the
direction, control or dispatch of any lessee;

d.

while traveling to or from any location for
the purpose of picking up, delivering or
transporting cargo on behalf of any lessee;

e.

while traveling between any location where the
covered auto is regularly garaged and
i.

any terminal or facility of any lessee,
or

ii.

any other location,
for the purpose of picking up, delivering
or transporting any cargo; or

f.

while traveling from:
(1)

any terminal or facility of any lessee,
or

(2)

any location at which the covered auto
was present for the purpose of picking
13

up, delivering or transporting cargo, to
any location where the covered auto is
regularly garaged.

GAIC submits that the facts of this case trigger both section 13(c)
and 13(d) of the business use exclusion.

Section 13(c) offers one

definition of “in the business of any lessee” means the use of a
covered auto by any person acting under the direction, control, or
dispatch of any lessee.

And, section 13(d) offers another: “in

the business of any lessee” means the use of a covered auto by any
person while traveling to or from any location for the purpose of
picking up, delivering or transporting cargo on behalf of any
lessee.

Here, the summary judgment record demonstrates that

Risner had dropped off the trailer of goods, drove just outside
the warehouse gates and parked the tractor and retired to sleep in
the cabin of the tractor for his mandatory break, all while he
waited to pick up the emptied trailer the next day so that he could
haul it to MCT’s facility in Mississippi, where he would pick up
a load of bananas to haul north.

Although MCT did not direct that

he sleep in his truck on the shoulder of the highway, MCT does not
dispute its own company policy as Risner described it: if a trailer
is available for transport from AWG, a driver must transport the
trailer to its facility in Gulfport to pick up another load for
transport. These facts demonstrate that Risner’s tractor was being

14

used in the business of MCT at the time that Williams crashed into
it.

GAIC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Simply put, the evidence in the summary judgment record

supports

Risner’s

testimony

that

he

was

not

heading

home

or

otherwise off the clock at the time of the accident, but, rather,
he was waiting in Pearl River to retrieve the trailer he had
delivered there, once it was unloaded, after which and pursuant to
MCT company policy, he was to pick up another load for MCT in
Gulfport.

MCT downplays its company policy as described by Risner

by focusing on Risner’s testimony that he “volunteered” to wait
for the emptied trailer and MCT underscores the fact that Risner
was sleeping after midnight at the time of the accident.

But the

fact that Risner “volunteered” to take the emptied trailer in the
morning as opposed to arranging to take some other trailer or call
MCT to get further instruction if he was going to violate company
policy by not transporting an available empty trailer to its
facility is not material.

There is no dispute in the record that

MCT had in place a policy of requiring drivers to haul an empty
trailer, if available, from AWG to its facility in Gulfport.

Nor

is there any dispute that Risner was acting in accordance with MCT
policy by staying over and, coincidentally, taking his federallymandated break while waiting for the available trailer to haul the
next day.

15

Nor does the fact that Risner was sleeping at the time of the
accident transform Risner’s status from being in the business of
MCT to being off the clock.

In fact, the summary judgment record

shows that Risner’s rest break was mandated by federal regulations.
Risner testified that he was required to take a 10 hour break in
his sleeper berth whenever he had been driving 11 hours (inclusive
of a mandatory 30 minute break that had to be taken within the
first 8 hours). 9

It is undisputed that Risner did not have a

choice in taking this break and it was during this break that the
accident occurred.
The Court’s conclusion that, as a matter of law, the covered
auto was being used in the business of MCT at the time of the
accident is reinforced by Mahaffey v. General Sec. Ins. Co., 543
F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008).
insurance

policy

There, the district court ruled that an

provided

coverage

for

a

commercial

truck

accident, holding that a “non-trucking use” endorsement in the
policy did not exclude coverage because the driver was not “in the
business
accident.

of”

the

trucking-company

lessee

at

the

time

of

the

But the Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered, finding

that the driver was in the business of the lessee as a matter of

Risner’s driver logs for June 7 and June 8 indicate that, at all
times leading up to and including the time of the accident, he was
“on duty” for MCT.
9

16

law.

The facts of Mahaffey as summarized by the per curiam panel

are pertinent here:
Farr Auto Sales (Farr) leased a truck and provided
a driver, Arthur Wynn, to First Coast Intermodal Service
to haul a load from Bowling Green, Kentucky, to New
Orleans, Louisiana. Wynn dropped the load off in New
Orleans at approximately 4 p.m. and called the First
Coast dispatcher. The dispatcher told Wynn to “take the
rest of the night off and call [First Coast dispatch] in
the morning to see if they had a load.” After speaking
with the First Coast dispatcher, Wynn drove the truck
without its trailer (“bobtailed” 10) to a truck stop where
he ate dinner, watched television, took a shower, and
played some slot machines. In total, Wynn stayed at the
truck stop for between six and seven hours.
Although Wynn usually slept in the cab of his truck,
a leak left the mattress in the main cabin wet, and Wynn
decided to go to a motel for the night. On his way to
the motel, Wynn was involved in an automobile accident
with John Mahaffey. Mahaffey brought suit in Louisiana
state court against Wynn, First Coast, and First Coast’s
insurance provider, GSI. [Defendants then removed the
case to federal court and then filed a third-party
complaint against Redland Insurance Company, alleging
that because Wynn was bobtailing at the time of the
accident, the Redland insurance policy provided primary
coverage.]
543 F.3d at 739.
The

Redland

policy

in

Mahaffey

included

a

non-trucking

endorsement, which provided that “the insurance does not apply to
...[a]

covered

‘auto’

while

used

to

carry

property

in

any

business...[or] a covered ‘auto’ while used in the business of

See SAUL SORKIN, GOODS IN TRANSIT § 45.01 (2008)(defining
“bobtailing” as “[t]he operation of a tractor without an attached
trailer”).
10

17

anyone to whom the ‘auto’ is rented.” 11 Id. at 740. Because the
Louisiana Supreme Court had not considered whether an independent
trucker is acting in the business of a lessee, the Fifth Circuit
ascertained how the state supreme court would rule if faced with
interpreting such an insurance provision.
Circuit

considered

instructive

certain

Id. at 741. The Fifth
non-exclusive

factors

articulated by the only state appellate court to consider a similar
issue: whether the driver was free to go where he pleased; whether
the driver was paid for time or mileage; whether the driver was
under dispatch or standby for further deliveries; and whether the
activity was more of a personal or work-related function.

Id. at

742 (citing LeBlanc v. Bailey, 700 So.2d 1311 (La.App. 4 Cir.
1997)).
In concluding that Wynn was acting in the business of First
Coast, the Fifth Circuit found it significant that Wynn was not
heading home; rather, he was on standby for further deliveries and
had not been released to return to his home in Missouri.

Id.

The

Fifth Circuit also reasoned that Wynn was furthering First Coast’s
commercial interests to have a driver on standby and that, unlike
driving home after completing deliveries,

Like in Mahaffey, the phrase “in the business of” in GAIC’s nontrucking policy exclusion is unambiguous, and the issue of properly
resolved as a matter of law on a motion for summary judgment. See
id. at 741.
11

18

driving to a motel far from home in order to sleep to be
adequately rested, when asked to remain in the area to
see if a load becomes available, is a work-related
function for a commercial driver because commercial
drivers are required to have a certain number of rest
hours between hauls.

Id. at 743.

“Unlike driving home, which is generally found to be

not in the business of a lessee,” the Fifth Circuit observed, “Wynn
was driving to a motel to sleep with a reasonable expectation that
a

load

would

be

available

the

following

day.

Courts

have

recognized that a driver can be acting in the business of another
when driving to or from a place to sleep or rest.”

Id.; cf. Auto-

Owners Ins. Co. v. Redland Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 1043 (6th Cir.
2008)(truck was being used “in the business of” trucking company
when driver was involved in an accident while driving to find a
place to sleep for the night and traveling in the direction of his
next presumed, though not confirmed, dispatch).
Like Wynn, Risner was bobtailing after delivering a load for
his trucking company lessee at the time of the accident.

And,

like Wynn, Risner had not been released to travel home to Missouri,
but, rather, pursuant to company policy, he was on standby or
dispatch to pick up his empty trailer and then retrieve another
load.

And, finally, Risner was in the process of taking a

federally mandated break when the accident occurred.

Under the

circumstances, when remaining in the area entirely for work-

19

related reasons, to pick up a trailer to then travel to the
lessee’s

facility

to

retrieve

another

load

to

haul,

this

is

indisputably “a work-related function for a commercial driver
because commercial drivers are required to have a certain number
of rest hours between hauls.”

See id. at 743.

Where, as here,

the tractor was being used to further the commercial interests of
the lessee, MCT, Risner was acting in the business of MCT as a
matter of law.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, GAIC’s motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED and MCT’s motion for summary judgment
is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, March 8, 2017

_____________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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