OJ's Janitorial and Sweeping Service, LLC et al v. Syncom Space Services, LLC et al

Filing 48

ORDERED that the 32 Motion to Compel is DENIED. FURTHER ORDERED that the 33 Motion to Quash and for Protective Order is GRANTED. Signed by Magistrate Judge Karen Wells Roby on 7/19/2017. (tm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
OJ’S JANITORIAL AND SWEEPING
SERVICE, LLC, ET AL

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO:

SYNCOM SPACE SERVICES, LLC, ET AL

SECTION: “N” (4)

16-02540

ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion to Compel (R. Doc. 32) filed by Plaintiff O.J.’s Janitorial
Sweeping Service Service, LLC (“Plaintiff”) seeking an order compelling the Defendants, Syncom
Space Services, LLC (“S3”) and PAE Applied Technologies, Inc. (“PAE”) (collectively
“Defendants”) to more fully respond to the Plaintiff’s Supplemental Request for Production No.
2. The motion is opposed. R. Doc. 37.
Additionally, before the Court is a Motion to Quash and for Protective Order (R. Doc.
33) filed by the Defendants seeking an order to quashing the Plaintiff’s Supplemental Request for
Production No. 2 and for a protective order excluding the information sought form discovery. The
motion is also opposed. R. Doc. 36. Both motions were submitted on July 19, 2017 and heard with
argument that same day.
I.

Background
This action was filed in the District Court on March 29, 2016 asserting claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1981 and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. R. Doc. 1. The Plaintiffs Otis Jones
and OJ’s Janitorial Sweeping Service, LLC (“OJ’s Janitorial”) alleges that Syncom Space
Services, LLC (“S3”) was formed in order to bid on a Synergy Achieving Consolidated Operations
and Maintenance contract ( the “contract”) at two NASA facilities. Id. at p. 3. In particular, the
Plaintiffs were to perform custodial services and other work at the Michoud Assembly Facility.

1

The Plaintiffs allege that S3 and PAE Applied Technologies, LLC (“PAE”) contacted the Plaintiffs
seeking to have OJ’s Janitorial participate in the bidding process for the custodial work to be
performed. Id. at p. 3-4. The Plaintiffs allege that S3 and PAE was motivated to involve the
Plaintiffs in order for their overall bid to be comprised of three precent HUBZone-certified small
businesses as well as to appear to be a promoter of diversity given that OJ Janitorial’s is HUBZonecertified and owned by an African American. Id. at p. 5. The Plaintiffs further allege that S3 and
PAE’s interest in awarding the custodial work to OJ’s Janitorial was merely a charade to ultimately
award the contract to Madison Services, Inc., a white-owned company. Id.
After S3 received the contract, S3 and PAE allegedly informed Jones and OJ’s Janitorial
that it was no longer being considered for the custodial work as a result of a bidding mistake. Id.
at p. 7. The Plaintiffs also allege that that they were lied to again by the Defendants when they
stated that OJ’s Janitorial was withdrawn from consideration because of Jones’s unprofessional
conduct. Id. at p. 8. Moreover, after removing OJ’s Janitorial from consideration, Madison was
ultimately awarded the custodial work. As such, the Plaintiffs asserted claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act as well as a breach of contract claim.
At this time, the Plaintiff has filed a motion to compel and the Defendants have filed a
cross motion to quash and for protective order in connection to the Plaintiff’s Supplemental
Request for Production No. 2. R. Doc. 32; R. Doc. 33. In particular, the Plaintiff’s Supplemental
Request seeks information related to the subcontracts, performance reviews, and other information
or correspondence that the Defendants had with Madison in connection with the work to be
performed at the Michoud Assembly Facility. R. Doc. 33-4. 1 The Plaintiff argues that this

1

The Plaintiff has specifically abandoned any request for information related to the subcontracts
in connection with Stennis Space Center or the Michoud Assembly Facility ground work
subcontract. R. Doc. 36, p. 6.
2

information is relevant in proving what its damages are; in consindering the conduct of Madison
given that the Defendants allege that the Plaintiff’s unprofessional conduct was tied to the end of
the contract; and in determining the exact scope of the work that the Plaintiff would have
performed under his contract.
In turn, the Defendants argue that the requests are irrelevant. R. Doc. 33. Aside from the
fact that Madison was a non-minority company, the Defendants argue that the contract with
Madison is irrelevant given that the scope of work to be performed by Madison was completely
different given that Madison was to perform not only the custodial work at Michoud Assembly
Facility but also the ground work there as well as custodial and ground work at Stennis Space
Center. R. Doc. 33-1, p. 7. At this time, the Defendants have further clarified that they have
produced certain responsive documents. R. Doc. 46.
II.

Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain

discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense. . .
.” Rule 26(b)(1) specifies that “[i]nformation within the scope of discovery need not be admissible
in evidence to be discovered.” Rule 26(b)(1) also specifics that discovery must be “proportional
to the needs of the case, considering the important of the issues at stake in the action, the amount
in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id.
Under Rule 26(b)(2)(C), discovery may be limited if: (1) the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from another, more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive source; (2) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity

3

to obtain the discovery sought; or (3) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by
Rule 26(b)(1).
Rule 26(c) governs the issuances of Protective Orders in discovery. A Court may “for
good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The rule offers a variety of
potential options that the Court may use to protect the moving party, including forbidding or
limiting the scope of discovery into certain matters. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(D), (G). “The party
seeking the protective order bears the burden to show ‘the necessity of its issuance, which
contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact[.]’” Cazaubon v. MR Precious Metals,
LLC, 14-2241, 2015 WL 4937888, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 17, 2015) (quoting In re Terra Int'l, 134
F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir.1998)). The trial court enjoys wide discretion in setting the parameters of a
protective order. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (“To be sure, Rule
26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate
and what degree of protection is required.”). Finally, Rule 26(c)(1) requires a certification that the
moving party has conferred or attempted to confer in good faith with the other affected party to
attempt to resolve the issue without the court’s interference.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 provides sanctions for failure to cooperate in discovery.
Rule 37(a) allows a party in certain circumstances to move for an order compelling discovery from
another party. In particular, Rule 37(a)(3)(b)(iii)-(iv) allows a party seeking discovery to move for
an order compelling an answer or production of documents where a party “fails to answer an
interrogatory” or “fails to produce documents.” An “evasive or incomplete” answer or production
is treated the same as a complete failure to answer or produce. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).

4

In addition to alleging that the responding party has failed to properly cooperate with
discovery, a motion to compel under Rule 37(a) must also “include a certification that the movant
has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make
disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 31(a)(1).
III.

Analysis
At this time, the Plaintiff has filed a motion to compel and the Defendants have filed a

cross motion to quash and for protective order in connection to the Plaintiff’s Supplemental
Request for Production No. 2. R. Doc. 32; R. Doc. 33. However, during oral argument and in
supplemental briefing, the Defendants have clarified that they have produced responsive
documents, including payment information, to Request Nos. 28 and 29. R. Doc. 46. As such, the
documents Requests Nos. 30-33 appear to be the remaining discovery requests at issue. Those
request seek:
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 30
All emails, correspondence, memoranda, electronically stored information or
similar material concerning defendants’ assessment, evaluation or review of
Madison’s performance under the sub contracts.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 31:
All emails, correspondence, memoranda, electronically stored information or
similar material to and from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(“NASA”) in any way dealing with Madisons’ performance under the subcontracts.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 32:
All emails, correspondence, memoranda, electronically stored information or
similar material to and from the United States Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”) in any way dealing with Madisons’ performance under the subcontracts.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 33
All emails, correspondence, memoranda, electronically stored information or
similar material to and from any officer, director, manger, employee or agent of
5

Madison to and from any officer director, manager employee or agent taking place
after February 1, 2016.
R. Doc. 33-6.
All the information being requested in these discovery requests concern either Madison’s
performance under the contract or its dealings with the Defendants after Madison took over the
subcontract from the Plaintiffs. Discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) must be
both relevant and proportional, including a consideration of the importance of the discovery to
resolving the issues in the litigation. It is unclear how important—if at all—Madison’s
performance or any communication after it took over the subcontract is or how relevant any of that
information would be given that the issue at play in this litigation are related to the Defendants’
alleged discriminatory termination of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court grants the motion to quash
and for protective order and denies the motion to compel.
IV.

Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (R. Doc. 32) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion to Quash and for Protective

Order (R. Doc. 33) is GRANTED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 19th day of July 2017.

KAREN WELLS ROBY
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

6