Carroll et al v. American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Company et al
Filing
169
ORDER AND REASONS that Defendant Airbnb's 111 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiffs' claims against it are DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 12/21/2017. (Reference: 16-2589)(cms)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JUSTIN CARROLL, ET AL
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 16-2589
AMERICAN EMPIRE SURPLUS
LINES INSURANCE CO., ET AL
SECTION: “H”(5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Airbnb, Inc.’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 111). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This action arises from injuries sustained as a result of the collapse of a
staircase. Andrew Callard, plaintiff in the now-settled consolidated action,
rented a property at 1423 Royal Street in New Orleans, Louisiana (“the
Property”) from its owners, Defendants Mark Hamilton and Lynn Schwarzhoff
(the “Owners”), using the website maintained by Defendant Airbnb, Inc.
(“Airbnb”). 1 Plaintiff Justin Jude Carroll, a friend of Callard’s, also stayed at
1
Doc. 111-2 at 3.
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the Property during Callard’s rental. 2 On April 10, 2015, the wooden stairs
that Carroll was ascending to access the Property collapsed, causing Carroll to
fall approximately ten feet. 3 Plaintiff Carroll alleges that he sustained severe
musculoskeletal and neurological injuries as the result of the fall. 4 Carroll
asserts tort claims against Defendants Hamilton and Schwarzhoff, several of
their alleged insurers, and Defendant Airbnb. 5 Plaintiff Keren Rosenblum,
Carroll’s wife, asserts claims for loss of consortium against the same
defendants. 6
Defendant Airbnb now moves for summary judgment dismissing
Plaintiffs’ claims against it, arguing that under Louisiana law Defendant
Airbnb owed no duty to Plaintiffs and that Airbnb had no knowledge of the
defect that allegedly caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. Plaintiffs oppose.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
stipulations. . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” “shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 7 A genuine issue of fact exists only “if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” 8
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,
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3
4
5
6
7
8
See Docs. 1 at 3, 111-2 at 3.
See Doc. 1 at 4.
Doc. 1 at 4.
Docs. 1, 44.
Docs. 1, 44.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
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the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws
all reasonable inferences in his favor. 9 “If the moving party meets the initial
burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” 10 Summary judgment is
appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.” 11 “In response to a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must
identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that
evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to
sustain a finding in favor of the nonmovant on all issues as to which the
nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial.” 12 The Court does “not . . .
in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would
prove the necessary facts.” 13 Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a
factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.” 14
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs bring negligence claims against Defendant Airbnb, asserting
that Airbnb knew or should have known of the defect that caused the stairs to
collapse and negligently failed to correct the defect or remove the Property from
its listings. 15 Negligence liability in Louisiana flows from Louisiana Civil Code
Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).
Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
11 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
12 Johnson v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th Cir.
2004) (internal citations omitted).
13 Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 393–94 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v. Liquid
Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
14 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).
15 Doc. 44 at 4.
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article 2315. 16 Louisiana courts employ a duty-risk approach to negligence
claims, requiring a plaintiff to prove that,
(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his or her conduct to a
specific standard of care; (2) the defendant failed to conform his or
her conduct to the appropriate standard of care; (3) the defendant’s
substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries;
(4) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a legal cause of the
plaintiff’s injuries; and (5) actual damages. 17
Whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty is a threshold issue in any
negligence action. 18 The existence of a duty, and whether a plaintiff’s harm
falls within its scope, is a question of law. 19
Additionally, Louisiana Civil Code articles 2317.1 and 2322 provide that
a person who owns or controls a building is liable for harm caused by its defect,
but only when the plaintiff can prove the following elements:
(1) ownership [or control] of the building; (2) the owner knew or, in
the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the ruin or
defect; (3) the damage could have been prevented by the exercise
of reasonable care; (4) the defendant failed to exercise such
reasonable care; and (5) causation. 20
A finding of custodial liability under article 2317.1 and 2322 is “predicated
upon a finding of negligence.” 21 A custodian’s duty is the same as that under
the general negligence theory of article 2315. 22
Defendant Airbnb argues that it is not liable to Plaintiffs for two reasons:
a) Defendant Airbnb owed no duty to Plaintiffs because it neither owned nor
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315.
Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, 171 So. 3d 851, 855 (La. 2014).
18 Lemann v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., 923 So. 2d 627, 633 (La. 2006).
19 See McLachlan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 488 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2007); Lemann, 923
So. 2d at 633.
20 Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175, 182–83 (La. 2013); see also
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2317.1, 2322.
21 Jackson v. Brumfield, 40 So. 3d 1242, 1243 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2010).
22 Vinccinelli v. Musso, 818 So. 2d 163, 165 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2002).
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controlled the Property on which Plaintiff Carroll was injured, and b)
Defendant Airbnb had no knowledge of the defective condition of the stairs,
foreclosing liability under articles 2317.1 and 2322. Plaintiffs respond by
pointing to two sources of duty that they claim Defendant Airbnb owed to them.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Airbnb had a special relationship with either
the Plaintiffs or Owners such that Airbnb had a duty to prevent the Owners
from harming third parties like Plaintiffs. And Plaintiffs argue that Defendant
Airbnb had sufficient control over the Property so as to become liable under
Louisiana Civil Code articles 2317.1 and 2322. Plaintiffs do not specifically
respond to the knowledge issue.
I.
Duty Pursuant to a Special Relationship
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Airbnb owed them a duty under article
2315 because a special relationship existed between Airbnb and either Plaintiff
Carroll or the Owners, though Plaintiffs are not clear as to which. 23
Louisiana courts have found that if a defendant has a sufficiently close
relationship with a wrongdoer, the defendant may owe a duty to third persons
to protect them from harm caused by the wrongdoer. 24 The examples collected
in Louisiana Tort Law—the only source regarding this type of special
relationship that Plaintiffs cite—are limited to parent or guardian over minor
child, master over servant, jailer or over his charge, and perhaps a psychiatric
hospital over its committed patients. 25 Each of those relationships involves a
defendant exerting a degree of control over the other party far exceeding even
Doc. 154 at 9–13.
See FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT LAW § 5.07[4] (2004
ed. Supp. 2016). The authors also note that doctors have a duty to warn third parties of
danger posed by their patients, but only when the patient has communicated an immediate
threat of physical violence to the doctor. Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant
Airbnb had knowledge of the danger the stairs posed.
25 See id.
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the amount that Plaintiffs allege that Airbnb exercised over the Defendant
Owners. 26 At most, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Airbnb was a “gatekeeper”
to the Property, with the right to inspect the property at any time and delist
the Property at will. 27 Such a relationship does not involve the direct control,
and corresponding responsibility, of the more custodial relationships that have
traditionally given rise to a duty to protect third parties. Accordingly,
Defendant Airbnb did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs because of any special
relationship between Airbnb and the Defendant Owners.
Louisiana courts also look for a special relationship when imposing a
duty upon a defendant whose breach was the failure to act at all. 28 In those
situations, courts look to the nature of the relationship between the defendant
who failed to act and the injured plaintiff. A relationship with “special
attributes of trust or confidence,” as Plaintiffs state, is generally required to
trigger such a duty. 29 The court in In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Product
Liability Litigation provided a detailed exploration of the Louisiana
jurisprudence on this issue. 30 In that case, inhabitants of FEMA trailers sued
the companies that FEMA contracted with to install the trailers for breaching
a duty to warn the inhabitants of dangerous levels of formaldehyde in the
trailers. 31 The court concluded that Louisiana law only imposes a duty to act
for the benefit of others, in that case the inhabitants, when there is some
special relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. 32 The court noted
See id.
See Doc. 44 at ¶¶ 15–17.
28 See Fox v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ. & Agr. & Mech. Coll., 576 So. 2d 978, 981 (La.
1991); see also In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., 838 F. Supp. 2d 497,
506 (E.D. La. 2012) (gathering cases).
29 Doc. 154 at 10 (quoting In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 506).
30 See In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 504–11.
31 Id. at 409–503.
32 Id.
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that a contractual relationship is usually insufficient, and finding even that
lacking, held that the contractors owed the inhabitants no duty. 33
Plaintiffs cite two cases to support their assertion that Plaintiffs and
Defendant Airbnb had the special relationship required to trigger a duty to act.
In Fox v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agricultural
and Mechanical College, which tends to support finding no duty, a student from
another college who broke his neck at a tournament hosted by the LSU rugby
club sued LSU for failing to ensure that the tournament was conducted with
adequate safety. 34 The court reasoned that LSU, a separate entity from its
rugby club, had no duty to the visiting player because there was no special
relationship between the player and LSU. 35
In Smith v. Orkin Exterminating Co., a homeowner hired the defendant
company to provide exterminating services in her home and sued when the
defendant’s employee sexually assaulted her. 36 The court held that the
company had a duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring and retaining the
employees that it sent into customers’ homes. 37 The court reasoned that while
one does not usually owe others a duty to prevent harm by a third party, the
defendant company both created the opportunity for the harm to occur and was
in the best position to prevent the harm. 38
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Airbnb is analogous to the defendant
company in Smith because Airbnb sends guests into the homes of its hosts. 39
The Court finds this unpersuasive. As an initial matter, Smith is a negligent
Id. at 506–11.
Fox, 576 So. 2d at 980.
35 Id. at 981–82.
36 Smith v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 540 So. 2d 363, 364–65 (La. Ct. 1 App. 1989).
37 Id. at 366–67.
38 Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at
201–03 (5th ed. 1984)).
39 See Doc. 154 at 11.
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hiring case, while the case at hand is better viewed through the frame of
premises or custodial liability, discussed below. 40 Even so, the relationship
between Defendant Airbnb and either the Defendant Owners or Plaintiffs is
much weaker than that between the employer and either the employee or
customer in Smith. 41 Airbnb’s Terms of Service specifically disclaim any
control over, or responsibility for, the actions of hosts and guests. 42 Instead,
they describes Airbnb’s role as facilitating a transaction between property
owners and guests. 43 Further, while the company in Smith actively selected
and managed the employee whose acts harmed the plaintiff, Airbnb merely
offered a platform on which the Defendant Owners listed the Property. 44 In
this way, Defendant Airbnb’s role is more like that of LSU in Fox, which merely
maintained the grounds on which another party staged the tournament at
which the plaintiff was injured.
Plaintiffs characterize the relationship between Airbnb and its users
differently, but there is no dispute over the underlying facts. In keeping with
the characterization of Airbnb’s role as a mere intermediary, Plaintiffs state
that, “Airbnb provides an online platform that provides property owners, or
Hosts, access to Guests, individuals seeking lodging.” 45 Plaintiffs also describe
how Airbnb allows property owners to create a profile and collects information
about their property as part of the listing process. 46 On the other hand,
Plaintiffs claim that, “Airbnb must accept a potential Host before the Host is
See Smith, 540 So. 2d at 366–67.
See id.
42 Doc. 71-10 at 2.
43 Doc. 71-10 at 2, 3–4. Plaintiffs were not party to the Terms of Service, and so are probably
not bound by its terms. However, Plaintiffs only connection to Defendant Airbnb is the
rental of the Property conducted pursuant to the Terms of Service, and so the document is
relevant to describe the nature of Defendant Airbnb’s role in the transaction.
44 See Doc. 71-10 at 3–4; Smith, 540 So. 2d at 366–67.
45 Doc. 154 at 2.
46 Doc. 154 at 2.
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allowed to make their property available for rent on Airbnb’s website,” 47 and
frequently refer to the fact that Airbnb retains the right to remove a listing for
any reason. 48 While these acceptance and retention rights are superficially
similar to those of the employer in Smith, Plaintiffs offer no evidence that
Defendant Airbnb actually exercises those rights with anything approaching
the care and discernment of a business hiring an employee. Instead, Defendant
Airbnb’s role is more akin to a real estate agent, who works to connect the
parties to a transaction and often facilitates payment. A real estate agent also
retains the right to accept and terminate listings, just as Airbnb does. Under
Louisiana law, real estate agents have the duty to disclose those defects of
which they have knowledge, but no duty to inspect the properties they
advertise. 49
Furthermore, unlike the company in Smith, Defendant Airbnb was not
in the best position to prevent the harm that occurred. Airbnb had no right to
inspect the Property before the incident and no right to authorize repairs. 50
Exclusive control of the property remained with the Defendant Owners, and
thus they were in the best position to mitigate the risk posed by a defective
staircase.
Accordingly, Defendant Airbnb did not owe Plaintiffs a duty because of
a special relationship between Plaintiffs and Airbnb. Having found above that
no relationship between Airbnb and Defendant Owners imposed a duty on
Airbnb, this Court concludes that Airbnb had no duty pursuant to the general
Doc. 154 at 2.
Doc. 154 at 3–5.
49 See, e.g., Waddles v. LaCour, 950 So. 2d 937, 942 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2007) (“[T]he duty to
disclose any material defects extends only to those defects of which the broker or agent is
aware.”); Reeves v. Weber, 509 So. 2d 158, 160 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1987).
50 Plaintiffs cite no evidence to support any assertion to the contrary.
47
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negligence principles of article 2315 to protect Plaintiffs from the harm they
suffered.
II.
Duty Arising From Custody or Garde
Plaintiffs also assert that Defendant Airbnb owed them a duty because
of the custody or control over the Property that Airbnb retained. The duty of a
custodian of a building under articles 2317.1 and 2322 is to “keep [it] in a
reasonably safe condition[, and to] discover any unreasonably dangerous
condition on his premises and either correct the condition or warn potential
victims of its existence.” 51 Defendant Airbnb argues that it does not owe that
duty to Plaintiffs because it lacked custody, or garde, over the Property. While
ownership of a thing is usually sufficient to establish garde, the principle of
imposing liability on the entity best able to mitigate risk is broader than
ownership alone and thus more than one party may have garde. 52 To determine
whether a person has garde over a thing, courts look to “(1) whether the person
bears such a relationship as to have the right of direction and control over the
thing; and (2) what, if any, kind of benefit the person derives from the thing.” 53
Plaintiffs cannot establish that Defendant Airbnb had garde over the
Property because they fail to identify a dispute of material fact as to whether
Defendant Airbnb had a right of direction and control over it.
In determining whether a party has a legal relationship with a
thing so as to have the right of direction and control over it, courts
have looked to a variety of factors, including whether the party has
the right to use, alienate, encumber, or lease the thing, or
otherwise grant a right of use to others[, see Doughty, 576 So. 2d
at 464–65; Smith v. State of Louisiana, 620 So. 2d 1172, 1183–84
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1992)]; whether the party has the right to
authorize alterations or repairs to the thing[, Butler v. Re/Max
Vinccinelli, 818 So. 2d at 165.
See Dupree v. City of New Orleans, 765 So. 2d 1002, 1009 (La. 2000); Doughty v. Insured
Lloyds Ins. Co., 576 So. 2d 461, 464 (La. 1991).
53 Dupree, 765 So. 2d at 1009.
51
52
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New Orleans Props., Inc., 828 So. 2d 43 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2002)], and whether the party has an unfettered right to access the
thing at will, versus only a limited access to enter[, see Bethea v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 22 So. 3d 1114, 1116 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 2009)]. 54
Plaintiffs make a variety of factual claims about the nature of the
relationship between Defendant Airbnb and the Property, some of which are
irrelevant to the issue of garde and some of which lack evidentiary support.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant Airbnb is the “gatekeeper” to the Property,
asserting that Airbnb is the “only way” that they gained access to the Property
and that Plaintiff Carroll would not have been at the Property had it not been
listed with Airbnb. 55 Plaintiffs have shown that Airbnb was the only way
Carroll did access the Property, but have not shown that it was the only way
anyone could have done so. In other words, Plaintiff cite to no evidence that
the right of Defendant Owners to grant access to their Property to whomever
they like was in any way inhibited by their contract with Airbnb. Similarly,
though Plaintiffs state that “Airbnb has the sole discretion to allow guests’
access to the hosts’ properties,” Plaintiffs do not provide evidence that Airbnb
had the right to prevent the Defendant Owners from granting access to anyone
they please. 56
Plaintiffs also repeatedly assert that Airbnb had the right to inspect the
Property. 57 However, the only evidence Plaintiffs cite to support that claim is
the Airbnb Terms of Service and the deposition of Airbnb’s corporate
representative. The Terms of Service, in setting forth the conditions that an
Airbnb host must fulfill in order to take advantage of insurance provided by
In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (footnotes inserted inline).
Doc. 154 at 14.
56 Doc. 154 at 14
57 See Doc. 154 at 11 (“Airbnb can inspect properties for safety related concerns in its sole
discretion.”), 14 (“Airbnb has the right to inspect or not inspect the property. . . .”).
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Defendant Airbnb, states, “You must permit Airbnb or the designee(s) of
Airbnb’s insurer to make inspections of Covered Property at all reasonable
times.” 58 Airbnb’s corporate representative clarified that this right was to
inspect “the damaged property or the property in question . . . not general
inspection of the entire property,” and only existed after an incident occurred. 59
Plaintiffs point to no evidence suggesting that Defendant Airbnb had the
general right to inspect the Property before the incident in question, and
conceded so at oral argument.
Plaintiffs list a variety of additional rights that Defendant Airbnb
maintained—including the right to remove the Property’s listing from its
website at will, to require repairs after an accident before re-listing the
Property, and the right to conduct background checks of Defendant Owners—
none of which bear on whether Airbnb had garde over the Property itself.
Plaintiffs summarized their argument as, “control of the platform is control of
the property.” 60 This Court disagrees. Returning to the factors of whether
garde exists as summarized in In re FEMA Trailer, Plaintiffs produce no
evidence that Airbnb retained the right to alienate the Property, to authorize
repairs, or to access the Property at will. 61 Rather, Defendant Airbnb was
situated more like a travel agent, facilitating a transaction between the
Defendant Owners and guests. Travel agents do not have garde over the hotels
they book for their customers, just as they do not have a general duty under
article 2315 to protect their customers from harm caused by those hotels. 62
Doc. 71-7 at 42.
Doc. 154-2 at 11.
60 Oral Argument, Dec. 6, 2017.
61 See In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 512.
62 See Butler v. Re/max New Orleans Properties, Inc., 828 So. 2d 43, 47 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2002)
(holding that a real estate agent with keys to a property and instructions to sell it did not
have garde over the property); Pierre v. Am.-Int’l Travel, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 435, 435–37
58
59
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III.
Notice or Constructive Notice of the Defect
Even if Defendant Airbnb did have garde over the Property, Plaintiffs
have produced no evidence that Airbnb knew or should have known of the
defect in the stairs, as required by article 2322. In order to recover under a
theory of custodial liability, “a plaintiff must prove that the defendant had
actual or constructive knowledge of the vice or defect. Constructive knowledge
‘imposes a reasonable duty to discover apparent defects in things under the
defendant’s garde.’” 63 “Constructive notice is the existence of facts which imply
actual knowledge. . . . To establish constructive notice, plaintiff must prove
that the defect causing the injury existed over a sufficient length of time to
establish that reasonable diligence would have led to its discovery and
repair.” 64
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendant Airbnb had no actual knowledge
of any defect in the stairs, and they also fail to cite any evidence that Defendant
Airbnb should have known of the condition of the stairs. There is no evidence
of the length of time that the alleged defect in the stairs existed, that an
inspection would have revealed the condition of the stairs, or that any party
had any suspicion that the stairs were dangerous. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have
failed to carry their burden at this summary judgment stage on the issue of
knowledge. 65
(M.D. La. 1989) (holding that, under Louisiana law, a travel agent did not have a duty to
protect its customer travelers from the negligence of the airline or airport).
63 Daniel v. Clarion Inn & Suites, 214 So. 3d 38, 41 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2017) (quoting Tsegaye
v. City of New Orleans, 183 So. 3d 705, 718 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2015)).
64 Flenner v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 110 So. 3d 661, 665 (La. App. 4 Cir.
2013); see also Dronette v. Shelter Ins. Co., 998 So. 2d 942, 945 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2008).
65 See also Ukudi v. McMoran Oil & Gas, L.L.C., 587 F. App’x 119, 122 (5th Cir. 2014)
(upholding summary judgment on liability under article 2322 when plaintiff merely
asserted that defendants should have known about a defect, but produced no evidence as
to why); Duplantis v. Cadillac Fairview Shopping Ctr. Properties (La.), Inc., 894 So. 2d 393,
398 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2005) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that defendant mall owners
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs fail to establish a dispute over a fact material to the question
of whether Defendant Airbnb owed a duty to Plaintiffs under either the general
negligence obligations of article 2315 or the obligations associated with custody
of a thing under articles 2317.1 and 2322. Plaintiffs further fail to cite to any
evidence suggesting that Defendant Airbnb knew or should have known of the
condition of the stairs, as required by article 2322. Because the Court finds
that Defendant Airbnb owed no duty to Plaintiffs and had no actual or
constructive knowledge of any defect in the stairs, Defendant Airbnb’s Motion
for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ claims against it are
DISMISSED with prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 21st day of December, 2017.
____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
should have periodically inspected a handrail and holding that there was no evidence
defendants should have known of a defect in it).
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