Carlisle v. Normand, et al

Filing 359

ORDER AND REASONS - IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Sheriff Joseph Lopinto's Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 307 ) is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant Patricia Klees's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Lack of Jurisdiction (Rec. Doc. 308 ) is GRANTED; and Defendant Patricia Klees's Motion to Dismiss Based on Prescription (Rec. Doc. 309 ) is DENIED AS MOOT, as set forth in document. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 9/25/2018. (sa)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
TAYLOR CARLISLE

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 16-3767

NEWELL NORMAND, ET AL.

SECTION: “H”(1)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Sheriff
Joseph Lopinto (Doc. 307) and two Motions to Dismiss by Defendant Patricia
Klees: a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Lack of Jurisdiction
(Doc. 308) and a Motion to Dismiss Based on Prescription (Doc. 309). For the
following reasons, Defendant Lopinto’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART,
Defendant Klees’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Lack of
Jurisdiction is GRANTED, and Defendant Klees’s Motion to Dismiss Based
on Prescription is DENIED AS MOOT.
BACKGROUND
The facts and procedure of this case are set forth in this Court’s Order
and Reasons’ of October 31, 2017, and December 19, 2017. They need not be

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repeated here. 1 Defendant Lopinto now files a Motion to Dismiss arguing that
Plaintiff Carlisle’s claims against him are barred by Heck v. Humphrey. 2
Lopinto additionally argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim because
Defendant Lopinto lacks the power to grant a remedy. 3 Plaintiff opposes the
motion. 4 Defendant Klees now files two motions to dismiss. Klees argues first
that she is immune from claims against her in her official capacity under the
Eleventh Amendment. 5 Second, for the claims against Klees in her individual
capacity, she argues that she is entitled to absolute immunity and, in the
alternative, qualified immunity. 6 Klees further argues that all claims against
her are prescribed. 7 Plaintiff opposes. 8
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I.

Heck v. Humphrey Bars Plaintiff’s Claims Against Lopinto
Sheriff Lopinto moves to dismiss Plaintiff Carlisle’s claims against him.

While Lopinto acknowledges that there are multiple Plaintiffs in this suit, he
moves only to dismiss the claims asserted by Plaintiff Carlisle. 9
Defendant Lopinto first moves to dismiss Plaintiff Carlisle’s claims
against him on the ground that they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey. 10 This
Court previously held that Heck applies to Plaintiff’s claims for damages based

See Docs. 178, 231.
512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (holding that damages claims do not exist under § 1983 based
on an allegedly invalid incarceration except in very limited circumstances). See also Doc.
307-1.
3 See Doc. 307-1.
4 See Doc. 330.
5 See Doc. 308-1.
6 See Doc. 308-1.
7 See Doc. 309-1.
8 See Docs. 328, 329.
9 Doc. 307-1 at 1 (“Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff Carlisle’s claims against him on
grounds that same are Heck barred and otherwise fail to state a cause of action.”).
10 See 512 U.S. at 477.
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on Plaintiff’s incarceration imposed as a sanction in Drug Court. 11 Because
Plaintiff’s incarceration has not been invalidated in some other proceeding,
Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 claim based on the invalidity of that
incarceration. 12 The Heck rule also applies to claims for prospective injunctive
or declaratory relief “if a favorable judgment would ‘necessarily imply’ the
invalidity of the prisoner’s ‘conviction’ . . . or the length of the prisoner’s
confinement.” 13 Therefore, for the same reasons set forth in this Court’s
previous ruling that Heck applies to Plaintiff’s claims for damages, Heck also
bars Plaintiff’s claims for prospective relief declaring unconstitutional the
Drug Court procedures under which Plaintiff was sanctioned to terms of
imprisonment.
Plaintiff, however, raises several arguments in support of the proposition
that Heck does not apply here. For example, Plaintiff argues that his claims
may proceed under Wolff v. McDonnell. 14 Wolff, however, does not control this
case. In Wolff, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff relief under § 1983 not
for an invalid incarceration but instead for the violation of procedural Due
Process rights that exist in the context of prison disciplinary hearings. 15 In
fact, the Court in Wolff specifically clarified that habeas corpus, not § 1983, is

Doc. 178 at 19–21.
Obtaining a certificate of appealability in a federal § 2254 proceeding does not mean that
the imprisonment has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus” because a COA is not a
writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Thus, the COA in this case does not rise to
the level of invalidation necessary to overcome the Heck bar.
13 Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a claim for declaratory
relief that the prison disciplinary rule under which plaintiff was convicted was
unconstitutional was barred by Heck because it would necessarily imply that plaintiff’s
sanction was invalid).
14 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
15 See id. at 554–55.
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the proper procedural vehicle for seeking relief from an invalid incarceration. 16
Here, Plaintiff seeks damages “associated with the sheriff’s failure to provide
credit for good time served,” not for the deprivation of procedural rights in the
decision to do so. 17 As such, Plaintiff seeks relief that necessarily would
invalidate his underlying contempt sentence—the exact type of relief the Court
in Wolff held is unavailable via § 1983. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim is not a Wolff
claim.
Plaintiff also raises additional yet equally unpersuasive arguments
regarding Heck’s applicability to this case. For instance, Plaintiff argues that
Heck does not apply to Sheriff Lopinto because he is an “independently elected
official,” not a “state actor.” 18 Whether an official is elected has no bearing on
whether the official is a state actor for purposes of § 1983. As a local law
enforcement officer, a sheriff undoubtedly is a state actor for purposes of §
1983. 19 Plaintiff also argues that Heck does not apply because Plaintiff is no
longer imprisoned, but this Court has already rejected that argument. 20
Finally, Plaintiff argues that some of his claims against the Sheriff are
for detention while awaiting a bed at a drug treatment program or otherwise
for detention not pursuant to a sentence or conviction. 21 Heck does not bar a
claim for incarceration that was not imposed pursuant to a judicial order.
Similarly, Heck does not bar claims against the Sheriff for denying Plaintiff
good time if the order imposing his incarceration did not specify that

See id.
Doc. 330 at 7.
18 See Doc. 330 at 11.
19 See Grant v. Sistrunk, 41 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting it was “beyond dispute” that
officials of a sheriff’s department were state actors for § 1983 purposes).
20 Doc. 178 at 21.
21 Plaintiff also refers to a claim that the Sheriff failed to present Plaintiff to a magistrate
within 72 hours of being arrested for a new charge. None of Plaintiff’s amended complaints
contain such a claim.
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punishment. Therefore Plaintiff’s claims for wrongful imprisonment against
the sheriff remain but only to the extent that the imprisonment or refusal to
consider good time was not pursuant to an order from Drug Court.
Defendant Lopinto also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the
grounds that Defendant Lopinto lacks the authority to amend a sentence
imposed by a judge. The claims to which this defense would apply—those for
incarceration pursuant to an order of the Drug Court—are coterminous with
the claims that this Court determined above are barred by Heck. Therefore the
Court does not reach this argument.
II.

Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim Against Klees
Defendant Klees moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against her in her

official capacity on the ground that they are barred by sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment. This Court has previously dismissed claims
against other administrators of Drug Court in their official capacities as claims
against the State itself barred by sovereign immunity. 22 Plaintiffs argue that
their official-capacity claims against Klees for directing the arrest and
incarceration of Plaintiffs are for acts that she took in her capacity as a police
officer for the City of Gretna rather than in her capacity as a Drug Court
administrator.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint first mentions Klees in the
section that “supplement[s] the official capacity claims.” 23 There, Klees is
identified as a “program official” who was “deemed under federal law to be
acting as [an] official[] of the program.” 24 Plaintiffs allege that “the program
officials sued herein, in their official capacity, namely . . . Klees . . . compose

See Docs. 136, 178.
Doc. 117 at 4.
24 Doc. 117 at 4.
22
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the ‘team’ . . . who are operating the program.” 25 Plaintiffs’ Second Amending
Complaint does not allege that Klees acted in her capacity as a Gretna police
officer. The Second Amended Complaint contains only two references to the
Gretna Police Department. In one, Plaintiffs allege that the Gretna Police
Department detained Plaintiff Carlisle on August 25, 2015, and took him to
the Jefferson Parish Correction Center. 26 Plaintiffs do not allege that Klees
was the officer who carried that out. In the other, Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he
Probation officer Theriot accepted the hearsay of Officer Klees and Mussall
and Becnel and arranged an attachment to issue through Gretna Police
Department and directed Officer Fortmeyer to arrest Carlisle. Carlisle was
booked at Gretna PD.” 27 Again, Plaintiffs do not allege that Klees was the
officer of the Gretna Police Department who issued the attachment for,
arrested, or booked Plaintiff Carlisle. This Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs
have not stated a claim against Defendant Klees in her official capacity as an
officer of the Gretna Police Department.
Because Plaintiffs’ only official-capacity claims against Klees arise from
her role as an administrator of Drug Court, they are actually claims against
the Drug Court itself. As such, they merge with Plaintiffs’ claims against other
Drug Court administrators in their official capacities. 28 This Court has already
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the Drug Court. 29 For the same reasons set
forth previously by this Court, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Klees for
declaratory or injunctive relief are dismissed for lack of standing. 30

Doc. 117 at 9.
Doc. 117 at 45.
27 Doc. 117 at 45–46.
28 See Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 485 (5th Cir. 2000).
29 Doc. 178 at 12–18.
30 See Doc. 178 at 15–18.
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The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs have also sued Defendant Klees
in her personal capacity. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint does not
explicitly state that it asserts a claim against Klees in her personal capacity,
and in fact it does not mention Klees in any section purporting to assert any
claims against anyone in their personal capacities. As described above, Klees
is named as a defendant in a section of the Second Amending Complaint that
purports to supplement Plaintiffs’ official capacity claims. Therefore, while the
Second Amended Complaint presents facts that could form the basis of Klees’s
personal liability, Plaintiffs fail to make a short and plain statement that they
seek relief from Klees individually. “[A] § 1983 suit naming defendants only in
their ‘official capacity’ does not involve personal liability to the individual
defendant.” 31 Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not asserted a claim against Klees
in her personal capacity, and no claims against her remain. Even if such claims
existed, however, Klees would benefit from both absolute and qualified
immunity. 32
Defendant Klees further moves to dismiss the class allegations against
her pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Plaintiffs do not contest
this argument. For the same reasons that this Court previously dismissed the
class allegations against other Drug Court administrators, the class
allegations against Defendant Klees are dismissed as well. 33

Turner, 229 F.3d at 483.
This Court previously held that other administrators of Drug Court enjoy absolute judicial
immunity. Doc. 110 at 15–16. Klees, also a Drug Court administrator, enjoys the same
immunity for her role in any sanctions Plaintiffs received. Further, because Plaintiff
Carlisle has not shown the existence of a “clearly established” right that was violated when
he signed an agreement waiving his Due Process rights in Drug Court, Klees also enjoys
qualified immunity under the test for qualified immunity created by the Supreme Court in
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), and further explained in Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 236 (2008).
33 See Doc. 110 at 16.
31
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In light of the foregoing holding, there are no remaining claims against
Klees, and her Motion to Dismiss based on prescription is moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Lopinto’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
307) is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant Klees’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim and Lack of Jurisdiction is GRANTED, and Defendant
Klees’s Motion to Dismiss Based on Prescription is DENIED AS MOOT.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 25th day of September, 2018.

____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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