Carlisle v. Normand, et al

Filing 704

ORDER AND REASONS: Defendant's 690 Motion to Reconsider is GRANTED. The Court amends its previous 680 Order partially granting relief so as to fully grant summary judgment to the Sheriff. Because the Sheriff is the last remaining Defendant herein, this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo on 12/21/2021.(pp)

Case 2:16-cv-03767-JTM-JVM Document 704 Filed 12/21/21 Page 1 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TAYLOR CARLISLE, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 16-3767

NEWELL NORMAND, ET AL.

SECTION: H(1)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Sheriff Joseph Lopinto’s Motion to Reconsider the
Court’s Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 690). For the following reasons, this Motion is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
In this suit, Plaintiffs challenge the manner in which the Jefferson
Parish Drug Court (“Drug Court”) is conducted. Plaintiffs Taylor Carlisle and
Emile Heron were convicted of the possession of various controlled substances
and, as part of their sentences, enrolled in Drug Court. The gist of Plaintiffs’
claims is that the Drug Court administrators deprived them of due process in

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various ways, leading to unlawful incarcerations and other negative
consequences.
Relevant to the instant Motion are Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant
Joseph Lopinto in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Jefferson Parish (the
“Sheriff”).1 At the outset of this litigation, Plaintiffs brought “putative class
action claims against the Sheriff for declaratory and injunctive relief and
damages under § 1983, challenging the imposition of jail time for alleged
probation violations by Drug Court participants.”2 On September 25, 2018, this
Court held that the Supreme Court case of Heck v. Humphrey precluded
Plaintiffs’ claims against the Sheriff to the extent Plaintiffs sought relief for
detention based on judicial incarceration orders that had not been invalidated.3
Following this Court’s September 25, 2018 ruling, Plaintiffs’ only remaining
claims against the Sheriff were those alleging that the Sheriff’s Office
imprisoned Plaintiffs and denied them good time credit either without or in
contravention to a judicial order.4
On December 13, 2018, the Sheriff filed his first motion for summary
judgment (“First MSJ”), in which he argued that Plaintiffs were, at all relevant
times, incarcerated pursuant to valid court orders.5 On August 7, 2019, the
Court granted the Sheriff’s First MSJ in part, finding (1) that valid Drug Court

By rule, Sheriff Lopinto was substituted as the Defendant Sheriff regarding Plaintiffs’
claims in 2017 when Lopinto was appointed to replace Normand. See FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d).
See Doc. 618 at 2 n.1.
2 Doc. 521 at 1–5.
3 See Doc. 359; see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 482 (1994).
4 See Doc. 436 at 4–5 (discussing Plaintiffs’ remaining claims following the Court’s ruling on
the Sheriff’s Motion to Dismiss).
5 Doc. 443.
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orders undermine most of Plaintiffs’ claims for wrongful imprisonment and (2)
that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they were wrongfully denied good
time credit.6 The Court did, however, allow Plaintiffs’ claims for wrongful
imprisonment to proceed as to two specific periods of incarceration for which
the Court could not find evidence of the Sheriff’s lawful authority to jail them.
For Plaintiff Carlisle, this was his period of incarceration from August 25, 2015
to September 1, 2015. For Plaintiff Heron, this was his period of incarceration
from mid-to-late June 2016 to July 20, 2016.
Subsequently, on December 20, 2019, the Sheriff filed his second motion
for summary judgment (“Second MSJ”), arguing that these two periods of
incarceration were also executed pursuant to valid court orders and presenting
new evidence allegedly proving as much.7 The Court disagreed and denied the
motion.8 In response, the Sheriff filed his third motion for summary judgment
(“Third MSJ”) with yet more evidence, and this time the Court determined that
Carlisle’s imprisonment from August 25, 2015 to September 1, 2015 was
validly ordered, but the same could not be said for Heron’s respective period of
incarceration.9 The Court entered an Order with reasons to follow granting in
part (as to Carlisle) and denying in part (as to Heron) the Sheriff’s Third MSJ.
Now before the Court is the Sheriff’s Motion to Reconsider the Order as
to the Third MSJ.10 The Sheriff presents new evidence relevant to Heron’s

See Doc. 545.
See Doc. 566.
8 See Doc. 618.
9 See Doc. 628 (the Sheriff’s third motion); Doc. 680 (Court’s Order).
10 See Doc. 690.
6
7

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roughly month-long incarceration. Plaintiffs oppose this Motion.11 This Court
hereby sets out the reasons for its partial grant of the Sheriff’s Third MSJ, as
well as its rationale for altering that ruling to a full grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Sheriff.
LEGAL STANDARD
I.

Motions to Reconsider
Motions to reconsider interlocutory orders are governed by Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 54(b).12 “Under Rule 54(b), ‘the trial court is free to
reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in
the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the
substantive law.’”13 “‘[T]he power to reconsider or modify interlocutory rulings
is committed to the discretion of the district court, and that discretion is not
cabined by the heightened standards for reconsideration governing final
orders.’”14
II.

Motions for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if

See Doc. 702.
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (noting that a district court may revise at any time prior to final
judgment “any order . . . that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities
of fewer than all the parties”); see McClendon v. United States, 892 F.3d 775, 781 (5th Cir.
2018).
13 Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lavespere v. Niagara
Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990)).
14 Id. at 337 (quoting Saint Annes Dev. Co. v. Trabich, 443 Fed. Appx. 829, 831–32 (4th Cir.
2011) (internal quotations omitted)).
11
12

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any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 15 A genuine issue
of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.”16
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,
the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws
all reasonable inferences in her favor.17 “If the moving party meets the initial
burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.”18 Summary judgment is
appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.”19 “In response to a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must
identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that
evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to
sustain a finding in favor of the non-movant on all issues as to which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial.”20 “We do not . . . in the absence
of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the

Sherman v. Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th Cir. 1972).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
17 Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1997).
18 Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
19 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
20 John v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th Cir.
2004) (internal citations omitted).
15
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necessary facts.”21 Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual
dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.”22
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Prior to the Court’s most recent Order in this case, there were two
pending wrongful imprisonment claims against the Sheriff: one for Plaintiff
Carlisle’s incarceration from August 25 to September 1, 2015, and another for
Plaintiff Heron’s incarceration from mid-to-late June 2016 to July 20, 2016.
The Court will address the Sheriff’s evidence presented as to each Plaintiff
separately.
I.

Plaintiff Carlisle
The Sheriff has presented the following evidence of the lawfulness of

Carlisle’s roughly week-long detention. His First MSJ included an August 25,
2015 minute entry of the 24th Judicial District Court that states:
The Defendant, Taylor E. Carlisle, appeared before the bar of the
Court this day for Drug Court.
The Defendant was represented by Joseph A. Marino, Jr.
The Court ordered the Defendant to be given a sanction of 6
months JPCC, flat time/contempt.
The Court ordered the Defendant to be held for Revocation after
his sanction is completed.
The Defendant is to appear in Court September 1, 2015.23

Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air
Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
22 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).
23 Doc. 525-4 at 5.
21

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The Court deemed this entry insufficient evidence of lawful detention between
August 25 and September 1 insofar as it was silent as to whether Carlisle was
to be remanded to Jefferson Parish Correctional Center (“JPCC”) prior to his
September 1, 2015 court date.
Next, in his Second MSJ, the Sheriff presented an “Order of Attachment”
dated August 25, 2015, wherein the Sheriff of Jefferson Parish is directed to
“attach the body of Taylor E. Carlisle” and have him appear in court “to answer
for a contempt in neglecting or refusing to attend before said Court as a
Defendant.”24 The problem with the Order of Attachment, the Court found, was
that it contradicted the August 25 minute entry on the point of whether
Carlisle appeared in court. The Sheriff also adduced one page from Carlisle’s
“Criminal History Report,” which states that, on August 25, 2015, Carlisle was
arrested pursuant to a Drug Court attachment and “needs to be held brought
to Drug Court Tuesday September 1, 2015.”25 The problem with the Criminal
History Report, however, was that it does not detail who gave the officer the
order to hold Carlisle until September 1.
Finally, in his Third MSJ, the Sheriff presents another signed minute
entry from August 25, 2015 that states, “The Defendant, Taylor E. Carlisle, did
not appear before the bar of the Court this day for Drug Court. At the request
of the Assistant District Attorney the Court ordered that an attachment be
issued for Taylor E. Carlisle.”26 The Court finds this evidence sufficient to

Doc. 566-4.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
26 Doc. 628-4.
24
25

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demonstrate that Carlisle was imprisoned from August 25 to September 1
pursuant to a lawful court order. This minute entry does not suffer from the
defects identified in the Sheriff’s other evidence. While it does continue to
contradict the minute entry from the First MSJ on whether Carlisle appeared
in court, the Court finds that this inconsistency does not render unlawful any
arrest made pursuant to this order. Indeed, the Sheriff’s officer executing the
order may not have been aware of the contradiction, and even if he were, he
can hardly be expected to defy a court order on account of a possible clerical
error. Accordingly, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Sheriff
with respect to Carlisle’s claim.27
II.

Plaintiff Heron
Next, based on the Sheriff’s Third MSJ, the Court denied relief in his

favor with respect to Heron’s claim. This is because the Sheriff argued that on
January 19, 2016, the 24th Judicial District Court ordered that Heron serve a
six-month sentence for contempt and that he be held for his revocation hearing,
yet the Sheriff never produced evidence of this January 19 order. In his Second
MSJ, the Sheriff presented an affidavit from Ligaya Preatto, the Commander
of the Records Division for the JPCC, testifying as to the January 19 order, but
there was no direct proof thereof. The only order included was from July 20,
2016, which confirmed the occurrence of the revocation hearing on that same
date but did not speak to the January 19 order.
The Sheriff’s instant Motion cures this defect. It contains the signed
January 19 minute entry from the Jefferson Parish court reflecting that “[t]he

27

See Doc. 680.

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Defendant was ordered to be held for Revocation.”28 It also contains an affidavit
from Deputy James Hilton, Clerk Supervisor with the Records Department at
JPCC, stating that he personally entered the January 19 minute entry into the
database of the Sheriff’s Office.29 This evidence proves that pursuant to a valid
court order, Heron was incarcerated from mid-to-late June until July 20, 2016,
the date of his revocation hearing.
The evidence also indicates that Heron received credit for time served.
Heron was in detention from December 15, 2015 until January 19, 2016—at
which point he was ordered to serve six months for contempt and be held for
revocation until July 20, 2016. On January 26, 2016, the court entered another
order amending its January 19 order to give Heron credit for time served
between December 15 and January 26. This means Heron’s contempt sentence
ended around early June, which is when he would have been released had he
not been held for revocation until July 20, per the January 19 court order.
CONCLUSION
While the Court has serious concerns about a Drug Court that causes
defendants to spend significantly more time incarcerated than had they served
their original sentences outside Drug Court, what is before this Court is
whether the Sheriff had discretion to deviate from a court order. The answer
is he did not. Thus, and for the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to
Reconsider (Doc. 690) is GRANTED. The Court amends its previous Order

28
29

Doc. 690-3 at 4.
Id. at 2.

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partially granting relief (Doc. 680) so as to fully grant summary judgment to
the Sheriff. Because the Sheriff is the last remaining Defendant herein, this
case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 21st day of December, 2021

____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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