Guidry v. Noble Drilling Services, Inc. et al
Filing
140
ORDER and REASONS denying 130 Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order and Reasons dated August 28, 2018 in which the Court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Liberty Insurance Corporation's intervention, as stated within document. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 9/18/2018. (cbs)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
GLEN GUIDRY
CIVIL ACTION
V.
NO. 16-4135
NOBLE DRILLING SERVICES INC,
NOBLE DRILLING EXPLORATION
COMPANY AND NOBLE DRILLING
(U.S. LLC)
SECTION "F"
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the defendants’ motion to reconsider the
Court’s Order and Reasons dated August 28, 2018, in which the Court
denied
the
defendants’
motion
for
summary
judgment
seeking
dismissal of Liberty Insurance Corporation’s intervention.
For
the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
Background
Glen Guidry was employed as a field service representative by
VAM USA, LLC, a subcontractor of Shell.
VAM performed casing
operations aboard the Noble Bully 1, a drill ship located in the
Gulf of Mexico, which was owned by Noble Drilling Services.
On
the morning of May 11, 2015, Guidry was inspecting joint casing
while standing upon the drilling floor, which was covered in mud.
Guidry slipped and allegedly sustained injuries to his back,
ligaments, muscles, and nervous system.
On May 4, 2016, he sued
Noble Drilling Services, Inc, Noble Drilling Exploration Company,
1
and Noble Drilling (U.S.), LLC, alleging that he was injured as a
result of the defendants’ negligence and seeking relief under the
general
maritime
Compensation Act.
and
Harbor
law
the
Longshore
and
Harbor
Workers’
Liberty Insurance Corporation was the Longshore
Workers’
employer, VAM.
and
Compensation
insurer
for
the
plaintiff’s
As such, Liberty has paid compensation, indemnity,
and medical expenses to Guidry. Liberty intervened in this lawsuit
on September 25, 2017, seeking repayment for the roughly $260,000
paid to Guidry in indemnity benefits and medical payments.
On April 9, 2018, defendants Noble Drilling Services, Inc.,
Noble Drilling Exploration Company, Noble Drilling (U.S.), LLC,
and Bully 1 (U.S.) Corporation moved for summary judgment, seeking
dismissal of the intervention of Liberty Insurance Corporation.
Liberty filed an opposition to the summary judgment motion on April
23, 2018, and the defendants were granted leave to file a reply on
May 2, 2018.
On August 28, 2018, the Court denied the motion for summary
judgment, finding that the defendants had “failed to address the
issue and provide evidence to show that all of the explicit terms
of the contract ha[d] been satisfied.”
In considering the motion,
the Court first found that it was undisputed that Liberty issued
a workers’ compensation insurance policy to VAM.
The insurance
policy states, “We [Liberty] have a right to recover our payments
from anyone liable for an injury covered by this policy.
2
We will
not enforce our right against the person or organization named in
the schedule.”
Under the heading entitled “Schedule,” it states,
“Where required by contract or written agreement prior to loss and
allowed by law.”
Separately, VAM and Shell executed a contract that provided
that “All CONTRACTOR’s insurances shall be endorsed to provide
that underwriters waive any rights of recourse, including in
particular, subrogation rights against OTHER CONTRACTOR GROUP to
the extent of the obligations assumed by CONTRACTOR herein.”
In
its Order and Reasons, the Court found that the defendants fall
within the definition of “OTHER CONTRACTOR GROUP” in the contract.
However, the Court noted that the contract provides that
Liberty will waive subrogation rights against other contractors,
such as the defendants, “to the extent of the obligations assumed
by [VAM] herein,” and that the defendants failed to (1) show that
VAM assumed any obligation respecting subrogation rights towards
other contractors or (2) provide any alternative meaning of the
clause conditioning Liberty’s waiver on VAM assuming obligations
that would permit a finding that the wavier is effective despite
no contractual provisions assuming obligations.
The defendants
now move for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of their motion
for summary judgment.
3
I.
Motions requesting reconsideration of court orders generally
fall under Rule 54(b), Rule 59(e), or Rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Higgins v. Cain, No. 07–9729, 2012
WL 3309716, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2012); Waste Mgmt. of La.,
Inc. v. River Birch, Inc., No. 11–2405, 2012 WL 876717, at *1 (E.D.
La. Mar. 14, 2012); Castrillo v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc.,
No. 09–4369, 2010 WL 1424398, at *3–4 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2010).
Rule 59(e) provides that a motion to alter or amend a judgment
must be filed no later than twenty-eight days after the entry of
judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
Rule 60(b), on the other hand,
applies to motions filed after the twenty-eight day period, but
demands more “exacting substantive requirements.” See Lavespere v.
Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173–74 (5th Cir.
1990), abrogated on other grounds, Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37
F.3d 1069, 1078 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Rules 59 and 60, however, apply only to final judgments. When
a party seeks to revise an order that adjudicates fewer than all
the claims among all of the parties, then Rule 54(b) controls.
Under Rule 54(b), the district court possesses the inherent power
to reconsider, rescind, or modify an interlocutory order for cause
seen by it to be sufficient.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Because
the Court's August 28, 2018 Order and Reasons adjudicated fewer
than all of the claims among the parties to this suit, Rule 54(b)
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governs.
Notably, Rule 54(b) motions are construed under the same
standards that govern Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend a final
judgment.
See
Waste
Mgmt.
of
La.,
2012
WL
876717,
at
*1;
Castrillo, 2010 WL 1424398, at *3.
“A Rule 59(e) motion ‘calls into question the correctness of
a judgment.’”
Templet v. Hydrochem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478 (5th
Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Transtexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581
(5th Cir. 2002)).
Because of the interest in finality, Rule 59(e)
motions may only be granted if the moving party shows there was a
mistake of law or fact or presents newly discovered evidence that
could
not
have
been
discovered
previously.
Id.
at
478–79.
Moreover, Rule 59 motions should not be used to relitigate old
matters, raise new arguments, or submit evidence that could have
been presented earlier in the proceedings.
See id. at 479;
Rosenblatt v. United Way of Greater Houston, 607 F.3d 413, 419
(5th Cir. 2010)(“[A] motion to alter or amend the judgment under
Rule 59(e) ‘must clearly establish either a manifest error of law
or fact or must present newly discovered evidence’ and ‘cannot be
used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made
before the judgment issued.’”)(citing Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp.,
332 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003)(quoting Simon v. United States,
891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990)).
The grant of such a motion
is an “extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.” Indep.
Coca–Cola Employees' Union of Lake Charles, No. 1060 v. Coca–Cola
5
Bottling Co. United, Inc., 114 F. App'x 137, 143 (5th Cir. Nov.
11, 2004) (citing Templet, 367 F.3d at 479).
The Court must
balance two important judicial imperatives in deciding whether to
reopen a case in response to a motion for reconsideration: “(1)
the need to bring the litigation to an end; and (2) the need to
render just decisions on the basis of all the facts.” Templet, 367
F.3d at 479.
II.
The defendants’ motion for reconsideration directs the Court
to
their
reply
memo,
which
“inadvertently overlooked.”
they
allege
the
Court
may
have
In denying the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, the Court noted that “[b]ecause Noble has failed
to address the issue and provide evidence to show that all of the
explicit terms of the contract had been satisfied, it is not
entitled to summary judgment.”
reply
memo
did
address
the
The defendants assert that their
fact
that
Liberty’s
waiver
of
subrogation was qualified by a provision in the Shell/VAM contract.
In particular, the defendants point to Section IV of their reply
memo,
entitled
“A
Waiver
of
a
Right
Indemnification and LOIA Does Not Apply.”
to
Enforce
is
Not
Although the Court may
not have included an explicit discussion of this section of the
defendants’ reply memo in its Order and Reasons, the Court did not
overlook this paper.
6
The defendants’ reply memo references the qualifying language
in the Shell/VAM contract but does not identify an underlying
obligation assumed by VAM towards OTHER CONTRACTOR GROUP that would
support a waiver of subrogation against the defendants.
Moreover,
their attempt to provide an alternative meaning of the clause
conditioning Liberty’s waiver on VAM assuming obligations that
would permit the Court to find the waiver effective despite no
contractual provisions assuming obligations is unpersuasive.
Specifically,
language
only
the
applies
defendants
in
the
contend
context
of
that
an
the
qualifying
indemnity
claim.
Because they are not seeking indemnity from VAM, the defendants
submit, it follows that Liberty has waived its subrogation rights
against them.
To support this proposition, the defendants point
to Fifth Circuit case law, holding that a waiver of subrogation
clause can be enforced independently of an indemnity provision.
See Hudson v. Forest Oil Corp., 372 F.3d 742, 747 (5th Cir. 2004);
Boudreaux v. Scott’s Boat Rentals, LLC, 184 F. Supp. 3d 343, 34749 (E.D. La. 2016).
However, at issue in those cases was whether
LOAIA applied to invalidate a waiver of subrogation clause, rather
than
whether
a
particular party.
waiver
of
See id.
subrogation
clause
applied
to
some
The defendants’ papers, considered now
for a second time, do not support a finding that the qualifying
language lacks meaning.
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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: that the defendants’ motion to
reconsider this Court’s Order and Reasons dated August 28, 2018 is
DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, September 18, 2018
______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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