Guidry v. Noble Drilling Services, Inc. et al

Filing 67

ORDER AND REASONS denying 50 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Martin L.C. Feldman on 4/4/2018. (clc)

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

GLEN GUIDRY

CIVIL ACTION

V.

NO. 16-4135

NOBLE DRILLING SERVICES INC,
NOBLE DRILLING EXPLORATION
COMPANY AND NOBLE DRILLING
(U.S. LLC)

SECTION "F"

ORDER AND REASONS
Before

the

Court

is

the

defendants’

motion

for

summary

judgment. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
Background
This litigation arises out of a longshoreman’s allegations
that he suffered a disabling hip injury when he slipped on mud
while performing a casing operation on a drill ship.
Glen Guidry was employed as a field service representative by
VAM USA, LLC, a subcontractor of Shell. VAM performed casing
operations aboard the Noble Bully 1, a drill ship located in the
Gulf of Mexico, which was owned by Noble Drilling Services. The
drilling operation involved lowering a casing, a large-diameter
pipe, into the ocean floor. The casing is made up of casing joints,
or long steel pipes, which are attached with threads on each end
that join them together. 1 Guidry would walk from his computer to

1

Casing Joint, Oilfield Glossary, SCHLUMBERGER, http://www.glossary.
oilfield.slb.com/Terms/c/casing_joint.aspx (last visited April 3,
2018).
1

the drill floor where he would wipe off the threads of the casing
joint and inspect the joint for abnormalities before the crew
assembled it. As the driller operator ran the casing pipe down
into the ocean floor, oily mud would overflow from the casing and
accumulate at the base of the drilling floor.
On the early morning of May 11, 2015, Guidry was inspecting
the joint casing while standing upon the drilling floor, which was
covered in mud. Guidry slipped and allegedly sustained injuries to
his back, ligaments, muscles, and nervous system. On May 4, 2016,
he sued Noble Drilling Services, Inc, Noble Drilling Exploration
Company, and Noble Drilling (U.S.), LLC, claiming that he was
injured as a result of the defendant’s negligence and seeking
relief under general maritime law and the Longshoremen’s and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act. It is undisputed that Guidry is not a
Jones Act seaman. The defendants have moved for summary judgment.

I.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs that summary
judgment is proper if the record discloses no genuine dispute as
to any material fact such that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. No genuine dispute of fact exists if
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A genuine
2

dispute of fact exists only "if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The mere argued existence of a factual dispute does not defeat
an otherwise properly supported motion. See id. In this regard,
the non-moving party must do more than simply deny the allegations
raised by the moving party. See Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling &
Exploration Co., 974 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1992). Rather, he
must come forward with competent evidence, such as affidavits or
depositions, to buttress his claims. Id. Hearsay evidence and
unsworn documents that cannot be presented in a form that would be
admissible

in

evidence

at

trial

do

not

qualify

as

competent

opposing evidence. Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819
F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). "[T]he
nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory
allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of
evidence."

Hathaway

v.

Bazany,

507

F.3d

312,

319

(5th

Cir.

2007)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Ultimately,
"[i]f

the

evidence

is

merely

colorable

.

.

.

or

is

not

significantly probative," summary judgment is appropriate. Id. at
249 (citations omitted); King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir.
1994) (“Unauthenticated documents are improper as summary judgment
evidence.”).

3

Summary judgment is also proper if the party opposing the
motion fails to establish an essential element of his case. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In deciding
whether a fact issue exists, courts must view the facts and draw
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). Although

the Court must "resolve factual controversies in favor of the
nonmoving party," it must do so "only where there is an actual
controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of
contradictory facts." Antoine v. First Student, Inc., 713 F.3d
824, 830 (5th Cir. 2013)(internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
II.
A.
To succeed in a negligence claim under general maritime law,
“[t]he plaintiff must demonstrate that there was a duty owed by
the

defendant

to

the

plaintiff,

breach

of

that

duty,

injury

sustained by [the] plaintiff, and a causal connection between
defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury.” In re Cooper/T.
Smith, 929 F.2d 1073, 1077 (5th Cir. 1991). “It is a settled
principle of maritime law that a shipowner owes the duty of
exercising

reasonable

care

towards

those

lawfully

aboard

the

vessel who are not members of the crew.” Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959). Nonetheless,
4

the harm caused “must be reasonably foreseeable.” In re Cooper,
929 F.2d at 1077.
B.
The defendants contend that nothing in the record creates a
material fact issue and that the plaintiff has not submitted
evidence that supports his claim that the defendants breached the
duty owed to him. But the plaintiff has submitted testimony that
undermines the defendants’ arguments. The defendants contend that
the plaintiff testified that he was aware that mud and water were
a frequent occurrence in such operations and that the mud was a
hazard present in this operation. Moreover, they point to testimony
that the area was diligently cleaned during this project between
every joint casing. They argue that the defendants cannot be held
liable for Guidry’s fall when Guidry was aware of the conditions
and did not take steps to clean the mess. The plaintiff counters
that while there was always slippery mud during these operations,
the amount was excessive here. He testified that other operations
cleaned the mud between every joint, where on the Noble Bully I,
the Noble employees would clean between every two or three joints,
allowing the mud to accumulate. Strong or weak, this is obviously
a fact issue for trial.
The defendants also contend that Guidry stated on the record
that VAM was in control of “all aspects of the [casing] operation.”
Because VAM was in control, it was responsible for the amount of
5

mud

accumulating

testimony

by

on

the

floor.

Christopher

But

the

Broussard,

plaintiff

Shell’s

points

Night

to

Drilling

Supervisor, that the driller “is in charge of the casing operation
as it is progressing.” In contrast with his own testimony, the
plaintiff contends that based on Broussard’s testimony, Noble was
in charge, or at least shares responsibility, for the casing
operation. Further, the plaintiff points to his own testimony that
the

driller’s

speed

determines

the

amount

of

mud

that

would

accumulate on the rig floor; the faster he drilled, the more mud
would build up. Additionally, Kyle Randall, a Noble floor hand,
stated that it was their responsibility to manage the cleaning
operations. Because Guidry wasn’t in control of the amount of mud
or the cleaning of it, he argues, Noble is not immunized from
liability.
These issues demonstrate that a genuine dispute of fact exists
regarding whether the defendants breached their duty of reasonable
care.

Both

the

plaintiff

and

the

defendants

have

submitted

competent and conflicting evidence of whether Noble or VAM was in
control of the casing operation and ultimately responsible for
keeping

the

area

clean.

Further,

the

parties

have

submitted

conflicting evidence of whether Noble actually did keep the drill
floor

clean

contend

that

immediately
because

before

other

Guidry’s

witnesses

fall.

The

testified

defendants
that

Noble

employees diligently cleaned the area between every joint casing,
6

Guidry’s testimony is “simply incorrect.” The Court is unwilling
to determine the credibility of the witnesses at this stage. 2 The
conflicting testimony of a core issue in this case—the cleanliness
of the drill floor and the defendants’ diligence in maintaining
its cleanliness to a reasonable degree—creates a genuine dispute
of a material fact.

III.
A.
“As a general matter, the shipowner may rely on the stevedore
to

avoid

exposing

the

longshoremen

to

unreasonable

hazards.”

Scindia Stream Navigation Co., Ltd. V. De Los Santos, 451 U.S.
156, 170 (1981); see Manuel v. Cameron Offshore Boats, Inc., 103
F.3d

31,

33

n.6

(5th

Cir.

1997)(noting

that

Fifth

Circuit

jurisprudence generally extends the rights and obligations of
stevedores to independent contractors in this context). However,
Section 905 of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation

2

The defendants also argued that Guidry’s statements about the
Noble employees cleaning less regularly should not be considered
because he used imprecise language to describe the conduct, no one
else reported hazards to Noble, and Guidry had not provided further
evidence of Noble’s negligence. The Court declines Noble’s
invitation to determine the credibility of Guidry’s testimony or
to weigh its probative value in comparison to other evidence
presented. Whether Noble used reasonable care to keep the drill
area clean is a central issue in this case, and Guidry’s testimony
creates an issue of fact that is critical to determining that
issue.
7

Act allows a longshoreman to recover from a vessel owner for
injuries caused by its negligence in limited circumstances. 33
U.S.C. § 905(b); Scindia, 451 U.S. at 161. “Under section 905(b) a
vessel owner owes three specific legal duties to independent
contractors working on the vessel: (1) the turnover duty, 3 (2) the
duty to protect against hazards arising in areas or equipment under
the vessel's active control, and (3) the duty to intervene when
the vessel owner knows of a serious hazard and the stevedore
improvidently decides to ignore that risk.” Cameron Offshore, 103
F.3d at 33.
The

plaintiff

contends

that

the

defendants

breached

the

control duty. This duty obligates the vessel owners to “exercise
reasonable care to prevent injures to independent contractors in
areas that remain under the active control of the vessel.” Id. at
34 (quoting Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., S.A., 512 U.S. 92,
98 (1994)). In determining whether an area is under the active
control of the vessel, the Fifth Circuit has considered “whether
the area in question is within the contractor's work area, whether
the work area has been turned over to the contractor, and whether
the vessel owner controls the methods and operative details of the
stevedore's work.” Dow v. Oldendorff Carriers GMBH & Co., 387 Fed.
Appx. 504, 507 (5th Cir. 2010)(unpublished). Courts look to whether

3

The turnover duty refers to the conditions of the ship and its
equipment. Cameron Offshore, 103 F.3d at 33-34.
8

any vessel employees were in the area during the injury, and to
what extent they were exercising control over the operation. See
Richard v. Transocean Drilling, No. 03-92, 2004 WL 602780, at *4
(E.D. La. Mar. 23, 2004)(unpublished). On the other hand, if the
independent contractor, and not the vessel owner, is “in control
of the casing operation at the time of the injury . . . the
[shipowner] cannot be liable for breaching the active control
duty.” Hewitt v. Noble Drilling US, LLC, No. 15-1197, 2016 WL
2820504, at *3 (E.D. La. May 13, 2016).
B.
A genuine dispute of fact exists regarding to what extent the
defendants had active control over the casing operation and the
area where it took place. 4 The defendants point to testimony
discussed above that VAM was in charge of the casing operation.
However, Christopher Broussard testified that the Noble driller
was “in charge of the casing operating as it is progressing.” And
Gregory Randall, a Noble floor hand, testified that “as far as the
cleaning operations, that was our baby and we had to take care of
it.”

He

also

testified

that

although

everyone

had

the

responsibility to tell them that it was time to clean if they

4

A vessel owner is only liable under Section 905 if it acted
negligently. As discussed in Section II, there is a genuine dispute
as to the facts pertaining to the defendants’ negligence. But the
plaintiff cannot succeed on this claim if it does not also prove
that the defendants had active control.
9

noticed a dangerous situation, it was the Noble employees, and not
VAM

employees,

that

were

actually

responsible

for

cleaning.

Moreover, at the time of the accident, Guidry testified that there
were four Noble employees on the rig floor, plus an assistant rig
manager, an assistant driller, and the driller positioned in the
driller shack. The conflicting record testimony goes directly to
whether Noble had active control of the area and operation where
Guidry was injured. Because there is a genuine dispute as to
material

facts

underlying

a

determination

of

whether

Noble

breached its duty and was in control of the area, summary judgment
as to Guidry’s claim under section 905 is highly inappropriate.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED: that the defendants’ motion for
summary judgement is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, April 4, 2018

______________________________
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10