Mendy Brothers, LLC et al v. Bank of New York Mellon et al
ORDER & REASONS that Defendant Bank of New York Mellon's 40 Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed with prejudice. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Edward B. Mendy's 49 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 60 MOTION for APPEAL OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE DECISION to District Cour, are hereby DISMISSED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Eldon E. Fallon on 6/13/2017. (cms)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MENDY BROTHERS, LLC, ET AL
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON ET AL
SECTION "L" (5)
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Bank of New York Mellon’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings. R. Doc. 40. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, R. Doc. 46. Defendant timely replies. R.
Doc. 54. Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and applicable law, the Court now issues this
Order and Reasons.
This case arises out of Plaintiffs Edward Mendy’s (“Mendy”) and Mendy Brothers LLC’s
(“Mendy Brothers”) alleged agreement to purchase immovable property from Defendant Bank of
New York Mellon (“BNYM”). Plaintiffs maintain this Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332. R. Doc. 18 at 1.
Plaintiff Mendy Brothers and Plaintiff Mendy, an owner of Mendy Brothers, bring this
breach of contract claim seeking specific performance. Id. at 17. In October 2015, Mendy
discussed the purchase of a home located at 7833 Primrose Street, New Orleans, LA, 70126 (the
“Property”) with BNYM’s agent, who informed Mendy that the purchase price was negotiable.
Id. at 4-5. Mendy and Mendy Brothers made a series of offers on the property, which BNYM
rejected. Id. at 6. On April 11, 2016, BNYM countered Plaintiffs’ offer with a counteroffer price
of $95,000. Id. On April 12, 2016, BNYM’s agent informed Plaintiffs that multiple purchasers
had expressed interest in the property and encouraged Plaintiffs to increase their offer; however,
Plaintiffs allege that this communication did not indicate a withdrawal of the counteroffer. Id.
Plaintiffs responded to BNYM that they did not wish to participate in a bidding war but would
consider the outstanding counteroffer, which they accepted via the online management system
BNYM used in its real estate transactions. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs contend that this acceptance created
a binding contract for the sale and purchase of the Property. Id. However, BNYM accepted a
different offer that was higher than the price offered by Plaintiffs. Id. at 8. Plaintiffs seek specific
performance and monetary damages for this alleged breach of contract. Id. at 12-13.
Plaintiffs also allege unjust enrichment and seek the profits Defendants made on the sale
of the property and damages for the difference between the agreed-upon price and the increase in
property values in the neighborhood. Id. at 14. Plaintiffs also allege they were the victims of a
civil conspiracy between BNYM and their unnamed associates, and seek compensatory and
punitive damages. Id. at 15.
Defendant BNYM responded, denying it had a contract with Plaintiffs. R. Doc. 19 at 7.
BNYM raised a number of affirmative defenses, including Plaintiffs’ failure to mitigate
damages, failure to state a claim, res judiciata, waiver, issue preclusion, prescription, preemption
and statute of limitations. Id. at 15-16.
Defendant BNYM asserts a Counterclaim against Plaintiffs, alleging that they wrongfully
caused a notice of lis pendens to be filed in the mortgage and conveyance records of Orleans
Parish. Id. at 20, 21. BNYM alleges that Plaintiffs did not timely respond to their call for highest
and best offers for the Property, and when Plaintiffs’ belated offer did arrive, it was lower than
other offers. Id. at 23. BNYM contends that the call for highest and best offers effectively
rejected offers previously presented, and revoked any counteroffers previously made. Id.
Plaintiffs filed a notice of lis pendens at the advent of this court action, which impacted BNYM’s
ability to sell the Property to the highest bidder. Id. at 21. BNYM alleges that this current court
action does not affect title or assert a mortgage or privilege, as required under La. C.C. 3751,
because Plaintiffs have no rights to the Property. Id. BNYM seeks damages, the amount of which
will be proven at trial. Id.
Defendant BNYM’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (R. Doc. 40)
Defendant explains this is a breach of contract dispute, where Plaintiffs’ contend they
entered into a contract to purchase residential property with BNYM, and then BNYM refused to
sell the property at the agreed upon price. R. Doc. 40 at 1. However, BNYM avers that Plaintiffs’
claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, punitive damages, unfair trade
practices and attorney fees are unsupported in fact and law and should be dismissed. Id.
BNYM provides a factual overview of the negotiations which Plaintiffs’ contend created
a contract to purchase the residential property. Id. at 3. After some back and forth between the
parties’ realtors, Plaintiffs claim that BNYM made a counteroffer to sell the property to Plaintiffs
for $95,000. Id. at 3. Plaintiffs contend that they eventually accepted this counter offer through
Defendant’s online offer management system. However, Defendant explains that the alleged
offer and acceptance were not in the form of an authentic act or act under private signature, as
required by Louisiana law. Furthermore, Defendant argues Plaintiffs have not alleged the realtor
who was involved in the negotiations had the mandate authority to contractually bind Plaintiffs
in the sale of immovable property. Id. at 4. As such, Defendant contends that the supposed
contract is not enforceable and Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts to support their other claims.
First, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims must be dismissed. Id. at
6. To prevail on a breach of contract claim in Louisiana, the party must prove the obligor
undertook an obligation, failed to perform the obligation, and the failure to perform caused
damages. Id. To create a binding obligation to buy or sell immovable property, a contract must
be memorialized in writing as an authentic act or act under private signature. Id. at 7 (citing La.
Civ. Code art. 1839). Furthermore, when such a contract is entered by an agent, that agent must
have an express written mandate memorialized as an authentic act or act under private signature
granting the agent authority to enter a contract to buy or sell immovable property. Id. at 8.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts that the supposed contract or mandate
were written as an authentic act or act under private signature. Thus, Defendant argues the
purported agreement did not create a binding obligation, and Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claims
must be dismissed. Id. at 8-9.
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim fails as a matter of law.
Id. at 10. According to Defendant, a party may only bring suit for unjust enrichment when the
law does not provide any other remedy. Id. (citing La. Civ. Code. art. 2298). Defendant contends
that because Plaintiffs could, in theory, recover for breach of contract, they cannot recover under
a theory of unjust enrichment. Id. at 11. Furthermore, Defendant avers that even if Plaintiffs were
entitled to recover on these grounds, they have failed to allege facts to support such a claim. Id.
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant would be unjustly enriched if it sold the
property to a third party at a higher price. Defendant argues that such hypothetical speculation is
an insufficient basis to pursue an unjust enrichment claim. 1 Id.
Additionally, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ claim for civil conspiracy should be
dismissed. Id. at 13. Under Louisiana law, civil conspiracy is not a cause of action, but must be
accompanied by an underlying tort. Id. Here, Plaintiffs’ claim is based on an alleged breach of
contract, not a tort, and therefore Defendant contends the civil conspiracy claim fails as a matter
Additionally, Defendant has advised the Court in status conferences that because of this outstanding
lawsuit, the property has not yet been sold; thus it is impossible that Defendant has been unjustly enriched at this
of law. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts that Defendant worked with any other
defendants or individuals to effectuate the alleged conspiracy in this case. Id. at 14. Because
conspiracy cannot be a solo endeavor, Defendant argues this claim should be dismissed.
Finally, Defendant addresses Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages, attorney fees, and
unfair trade practices. Under Louisiana law, punitive damages are not recoverable except for the
three statutory exceptions. Id. at 15. Plaintiffs’ claims do not fall into any of these statutory
exceptions, thus, Defendant argues punitive damages are precluded in this case. Id. Next,
Defendant avers that the American Rule applies to attorney fees unless such fees are specifically
authorized by statute. Id. There is no statute that would entitle Plaintiffs’ to attorney fees in this
case, and Plaintiffs have not indicated any such basis for recovery. Id. Finally, Defendant avers
that as a federally chartered bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company, it is
exempt from any claim under the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”). Id. at 16-17.
LUPTA does not apply to “any federally insured financial institution, its subsidiaries, and
affiliates.” Id. (citing La. Rev. Stat. § 51:1406(1)). Thus, Defendant argues that these claims
must also be dismissed.
Plaintiffs’ Response (R. Docs. 46, 48)
Plaintiff Edward Mendy filed a response, R. Doc. 46, which Plaintiff Mendy Brothers,
LLC joined. R. Doc. 48. Before responding to Defendant’s arguments, Plaintiffs first contend
that Defendant should be estopped from asserting these defenses, because it did not raise them
earlier in this litigation. Id. at 8. Next, Plaintiffs’ argue that the parties had a legally binding
contract to buy and sell immovable property. Id. at 10. While Plaintiffs admit that “a sale or
promise of sale of an immovable must be made by authentic act or by act under private signature,
they aver that the contract in this case was under private signature, as it was a simple writing
signed by the parties. Id. at 13.
Next, Plaintiffs contend that the unjust enrichment claim should not be dismissed, as it
was only pled as an alternative theory in case they failed to recover on the breach of contract
claim. Id. at 16. Similarly, Plaintiffs contend they have a valid claim for civil conspiracy, as
BNYM conspired with unknown defendants to commit a tort when it solicited offers from the
other unnamed defendants. Id. at 17.
Plaintiffs withdraw their claims for punitive damages and unfair trade practices, but
assert they may still be entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party. Id. at 18, 20, 22.
According to Plaintiffs, attorney fees are appropriate here as “delay damages” under Louisiana
Civil Code Article 1986. Id. at 19. Plaintiffs argue that the terms of the sales contract provided
that the prevailing party in any contractual dispute was entitled to attorney fees. Id. at 22.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that this motion is actually a summary judgment motion, as it
includes facts that are not stated in the pleadings. Id. at 23. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant states the contract was not executed as an authentic act or act under private signature,
and that there was no express written mandate granting the realtor authority to enter this
transaction on Plaintiffs’ behalf. Id. at 25-27. To refute these facts, Plaintiffs provide additional
information, which they contend creates a disputed material fact, precluding summary judgment.
Id. at 27.
Defendant’s Reply (R. Doc. 54)
Defendant timely replies. First, it restates its position that the purported sales contract is
invalid as it fails to comply with the form requirements for the sale of immovable property under
Louisiana law. R. Doc. 54 at 1-2. Next, it argues that the motion is not procedurally improper or
untimely. Id. at 2. The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure require that a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12 (c) may be brought any time after the pleadings are closed, provided it will not delay
trial. Defendant avers that this motion will not interfere with the August 21, 2017 trial date. Id. at
Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim, which they
describe as an alternate theory of recovery, is inapplicable in this case. Id. at 6-7. Because
Plaintiffs have even a hypothetical remedy under a breach of contract theory, no claim for unjust
enrichment exists—even as an alternative theory of recovery. Id. at 7. Furthermore, Defendant
argues that this claim must fail because it has been unable to sell the property and therefore has
not made any profits from the sale. Id. at 7.
Furthermore, Defendant avers that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a valid civil conspiracy
claim. Id. at 7. In their response, Plaintiffs make only conclusory allegations that Defendant
conspired to commit a tortious act with other unnamed defendants. However, Plaintiffs do not
allege facts to support this claim, and Defendant argues they should not should be allowed to
amend their complaint again in a responsive pleading. Id. at 8. Defendant also argues that
Plaintiffs’ claim for attorney fees under Louisiana Civil Code Articles 1997 and 1986 fails as a
matter of law. Id. According to Defendant, neither of those articles mention attorney fees, and
the Louisiana Supreme Court has determined that Article 1997 does not provide attorney fees for
breach of contract. Id. (citing Sher v. Lafeyette Insurance Co., 2007-2441 (La. 4/8/08), 988 So.
2d 186, 201). Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs’ claim for attorney fees based on a clause in
the purchase agreement fails because there was never a valid purchase agreement to sell the
Addressing Plaintiffs’ argument that their claim for punitive damages should be
dismissed without prejudice, Defendant avers that there is no merit to this claim and therefore it
must be dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 9. Finally, Defendant argues that contrary to Plaintiffs’
position, this is not a summary judgment motion and the Court should not view it as such. Id.
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs confuse the absence of necessary facts—such as whether the
purchase agreement was written as an authentic act—with relying on evidence outside the
pleadings. Id. at 9. Defendant avers that pointing out the absence of a necessary factual allegation
does not require reliance on materials outside the pleadings. Id. at 10.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Rule 12(c) Standard
Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed . . . a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The purpose
of a Rule 12(c) motion is to “dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a
judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any
judicially noticed facts.” Collins v. A.B.C. Marine Towing, L.L.C., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86515, at *6
(E.D. La. June 30, 2015) (internal citations omitted). When a court is presented with matters
outside the pleadings in a 12(c) motion, the Court may exclude the matters or treat the motion as
a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).The standard for a motion
for judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 209 (5th Cir. 2009). The Pillars of Hercules,
Twombly and Iqbal, therefore govern this standard. A complaint must plead “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “[F]acial plausibility [exists] when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court must
take the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and view them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing In re
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)).
As an initial matter, the Court finds that Defendant’s motion is timely. It was filed after
the close of the pleadings and early enough that the motion will not delay trial. Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
12(c). Defendant is not barred from asserting these defenses merely because it did not raise them
in its earlier Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join an Indispensable Party. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc.
12(c); R. Doc. 12. Plaintiffs are not prejudiced by the timing of this motion.
Furthermore, as Magistrate Judge North recently indicated, “[Plaintiff] Mendy is no runof-the-mill pro se litigant. He is an attorney, albeit a disbarred one, who, based upon his filings,
is clearly familiar with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even if he continues to demonstrate
disrespect for those rules and the orders of the Court.” R. Doc. 58. Mr. Mendy has continued to
seek additional discovery in this case, despite Court orders that he is not entitled to such
information. He has been less than forthcoming with the attorneys representing his LLC, which
has prevented them from complying with Court directives. On one occasion, Mr. Mendy refused
to reveal his presence on a conference call with the Court, despite the fact he was listening in for
the duration of the call. Such behavior is disrespectful and a waste of Court resources.
That said, the Court will now address each of Defendant’s arguments in turn.
Breach of Contract
In addressing Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim, the Court finds it helpful to consider
the additional information submitted by the parties. When a court is presented with matters
outside the pleadings in a 12(c) motion, the Court may exclude the matters or treat the motion as
a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Thus, the Court will
address Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim according to the summary judgment standard.
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A genuine issue of
material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1996). “[U]nsubstantiated assertions,”
“conclusory allegations,” and merely colorable factual bases are insufficient to defeat a motion
for summary judgment. See Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249-50. In ruling on a summary judgment motion, however, a court may not resolve
credibility issues or weigh evidence. See Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263
(5th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, a court must assess the evidence, review the facts and draw any
appropriate inferences based on the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment. See Daniels v. City of Arlington, Tex., 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001);
Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986).
Louisiana law dictates that “a transfer of immovable property must be made by authentic
act or by act under private signature.” La. Civ. Code art. 1839. To qualify as an authentic act, the
agreement must be memorialized in writing and signed by two witnesses in the presence of a
notary. La. Civ. Code art. 1833. The Civil Code explains that an act under private signature need
not be written by the parties, but must be signed by them. La. Civ. Code art. 1837. However, the
comments add the following clarification: “This article is not intended to change the
jurisprudential rule that an Act under private signature is valid even though signed by one party
alone.” La. Civ. Code art. 1837; comment B. In cases involving the sale of an immovable, an act
under private signature signed by one party may still be valid if the non-signing party has done
some other act to indicate their acceptance. Milliman v. Peterman, 519 So. 2d 238, 241–42 (La.
Ct. App.), writ denied, 520 So. 2d 752 (La. 1988); see also Miller v. Miller, 335 So. 2d 767 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 1976) writ denied 338 So. 2d 927 (La. 1976) (holding there is no requirement that a
written promise to sell be signed by both parties; acceptance by the vendee could be established
by evidence extraneous to the written instrument.) Thus, an agreement to sell immovable
property may be valid if it is an act under private signature signed by one party, and otherwise
verified by the non-signing party.
For example, in Milliman v. Peterman, a family seeking to purchase residential property
signed an agreement to purchase a home. Milliman, 519 So. 2d 238, 241–42. The sellers never
signed the sales agreement, but indicated their consent to the sale in other ways, including
sending a telegram, accepting the deposit, and eventually even signing the agreement. Id. The
court determined the agreement was an authentic act creating an obligation to sell immovable
property because, even though they did not sign the document, the sellers indicated their consent
to the sale by other overt acts other than oral assent. Id.
Plaintiffs argue the agreement in this case is valid despite the fact BNYM never signed
the document; however this misinterprets Louisiana law. An act under private signature is not
always valid just because one party signed it; instead, in some instances, the non-signing party
can still be bound by the agreement when they have indicated other “outward manifestation[s] of
acceptance.” Id. That is simply not the case here. In this case, Plaintiffs sent an email to their
realtor, indicating they wished to purchase the property at issue. They later submitted a
“Louisiana Residential Agreement to Buy or Sell,” signed only by Plaintiffs. BNYM never
signed this agreement, never indicated they wished to sell the property to Plaintiffs, and never
took any action which could be considered an “outward manifestation of acceptance.” Milliman,
519 So. 2d 238, 241–42. Plaintiffs’ alleged purchase agreement failed to qualify with the form
requirements for transferring immovable property under Louisiana law. Thus, their claim for
breach of contract is dismissed with prejudice.
Under Louisiana law, a party may only bring a claim of unjust enrichment when no
alternative remedy at law exists. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2298. Courts applying the Louisiana
statute for unjust enrichment have held that it is not the success of the alternative claim, but the
existence of the alternative claim that determines whether a claim for unjust enrichment is
available. Mayer v. Lamarque Ford, Inc., No. 00–1325, 2001 WL 175232, *1 (E.D. La. 2001).
Here, Plaintiffs’ claims are for breach of contract. As the Court explained above, there is no valid
contract in this case. However, because Plaintiffs have a possible remedy under existing breach
of contract law, they cannot recover under a theory of unjust enrichment. This claim is dismissed
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “conspiracy by itself is not an actionable
claim under Louisiana law.” Ames v. Ohle, 97 So. 3d 386, 393 (La. App. 4 Cir.
5/23/12) (citations omitted). The actionable element of a conspiracy claim is not the conspiracy
itself, but rather the tort that the conspirators agree to perpetrate and commit in whole or in
part. Id. Thus, to recover on this claim, Plaintiffs would need to plead sufficient facts that
indicate Defendant either agreed to commit, or actually committed, a tort. The only allegations
Plaintiffs make in relation to this claim is that Defendant committed a tort when it solicited offers
from other unknown defendants. 2 These statements are both vague and conclusory. Even when
Plaintiffs did not include these allegations in their pleadings, but only included them in response to
considering all the factual allegations included in Plaintiffs’ response, the Court finds Plaintiffs
have failed to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at
570. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim is dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiffs waived their claim for punitive damages in their response. R. Doc. 46 at 18.
While they requested that the claim be dismissed without prejudice, the Court finds this request
is unsupported by law. Louisiana law does not permit punitive damages, except where expressly
authorized by statute. See International Harvester Credit v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La.
1988). There is no statute which would permit punitive damages in this case. Thus, Plaintiffs’
claim for punitive damages is dismissed with prejudice.
“Attorney fees are not allowed in Louisiana except, where authorized by statute or
contract .” Rivet v. State, 680 So. 2d 1154, 1160 (La. 1996). Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to
attorney fees under Louisiana Civil Code Articles 1997 and/or 1986. Article 1997 states, “An
obligor in bad faith is liable for all the damages, foreseeable or not, that are a direct consequence
of his failure to perform.” La. Civ. Code art. 1997. The Louisiana Supreme Court explained that
this statute does not discuss attorney fees, and therefore held “that in cases of breach of contract,
Article 1997 does not provide for an award of attorney's fees.” Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 20072441 (La. 4/8/08), 988 So. 2d 186, 201, on reh'g in part (July 7, 2008). Thus, even if Plaintiffs
had a valid breach of contract claim—which they do not—they would not be entitled to attorney
fees under Article 1997.
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1986 reads,
“Upon an obligor's failure to perform an obligation to deliver a thing, or not to do
an act, or to execute an instrument, the court shall grant specific performance plus
damages for delay if the obligee so demands. If specific performance is
impracticable, the court may allow damages to the obligee. Upon a failure to
perform an obligation that has another object, such as an obligation to do, the
granting of specific performance is at the discretion of the court.”
La. Civ. Code art. 1986. This statute also does not explicitly discuss attorney fees, and no
Louisiana court has determined this article provides for an award of attorney's fees. Furthermore,
any potential attorney fee under this article would only result if Defendant failed to perform an
obligation. As the Court has determined there was no valid contract between the parties,
Defendant did not owe Plaintiffs an obligation, and therefore Plaintiffs cannot recover attorney
fees for a supposed breach of that obligation. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims for attorney fees are
dismissed with prejudice.
Unfair Trade Practices
Plaintiffs explain they intended to withdraw their claim based on the Louisiana Unfair
Trade Practices Act as Defendant is exempt from this Act. R. Doc. 46 at 22-23. Therefore, this
claim is dismissed with prejudice.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Bank of New York Mellon’s Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Edward B. Mendy’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, R. Doc. 49, and Motion for Appeal/Review of Magistrate Judge’s Decision, R. Doc.
60, are hereby DISMISSED AS MOOT.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 13th day of June, 2017.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?