Arceneaux v. Assumption Parish School Board et al
ORDER & REASONS granting 17 Motion for Summary Judgment. FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' request for attorneys' fees is DENIED. Signed by Judge Mary Ann Vial Lemmon on 3/10/2017. (mmm)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
BRIAN ARCENEAUX AND
COLETTE ARCENEAUX, ON
BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR
CHILD, "REBEKKA A."
ASSUMPTION PARISH SCHOOL
BOARD AND NILES RICHE
ORDER AND REASONS
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED, and plaintiffs’ claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees is DENIED.
This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants, the
Assumption Parish School Board (“APSB”) and Niles Riche, the principal of Assumption High
School (“AHS”). Defendants argue that plaintiffs, Brian and Colette Arceneaux, who filed this
suit on behalf of their minor daughter, Rebekka A., cannot prevail on their claim that APSB and
Riche discriminated against Rebekka on the basis of gender in violation Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States when Rebekka was removed from the
cheerleading squad for engaging in unacceptable behavior while in her cheerleaders uniform at a
school function. Defendants also argue that plaintiffs cannot prove that they retaliated against
Rebekka in violation of Title IX by subjecting her to drug testing because she was never tested.
AHS is a high school under the jurisdiction of the APSB, an entity that receives federal
funding for the operation and benefit of AHS. Rebekka entered AHS as a freshman in 2013, and
was a member of the varsity cheerleading squad her freshman, sophomore and junior years.
Lynn Daigle, the AHS cheerleading sponsor, is responsible for implementing rules for
eligibility to participate in cheerleading. In 2015, Rebekka and her mother, Colette, both signed a
copy of the Application for Cheerleading Tryouts for the upcoming 2015-2016 school year.
Included in the application packet were copies of the AHS Cheerleader and Mascot Method of
Selection and Eligibility Sheet, AHS Cheerleaders Rules and Regulations, and AHS
Cheerleaders/Mascot Discipline System. The AHS Cheerleading/Mascot Discipline System states
that a cheerleader would be dismissed from the squad for involvement “in any unacceptable
behavior while in uniform or at a school function” or “if disciplinary action results in a
suspension.” It also states that “[a] student WILL NOT be allowed to try out for the next year’s
squad if that student has been dismissed from the squad for disciplinary measures during the school
The AHS Student Athlete Handbook applies to all sports at AHS. Plaintiffs claim that
cheerleading was a sport at AHS. The AHS Student Athlete Handbook provides that for a first
suspension, a student is prohibited from participating in an athletic event that occurs during the
term of suspension, and that “[a] suspension offense of a serious nature could result in the dropping
of a student from the athletic team . . . at the discretion of the coach, athletic director, and/or
principal.” It also states that for a second suspension a student athlete “would be ineligible to
participate in any sport for the remainder of that school year[,] with the exception of being allowed
to participate in “any type of spring training or tryout sessions for the following school year.”
Further, the AHS Student Athlete Handbook provides that “[e]ach head coach is responsible for
compiling a set of eligibility rules and polices for his or her particular sport.”
In the fall of 2015, K.T., a member of the AHS cheerleading squad, was suspended from
school for fighting, but she was not dismissed from the squad. Daigle and Monique Meyer, the
junior varsity cheerleading sponsor, met with the cheerleaders and informed them that the
cheerleading disciplinary policy had been changed to require two suspensions for dismissal from
the squad. Rebekka testified at her deposition that, at this meeting, Daigle told the cheerleaders
that cheer was now considered a sport at AHS. Daigle testified at her deposition that she did not
recall saying that, and Daigle, along with Riche; Sydney P. Acosta, AHS’s Athletic Director; and
Joey L. Comeaux, the APSB’s representative, all testified at their depositions that cheerleading
was not considered a sport at AHS.
Daigle and Riche testified that Daigle changed the
cheerleading disciplinary suspension policy at Riche’s request because he sought more uniformity
in such policies among school activities. The members of the 2015-2016 AHS cheerleading squad
were not provided with written documentation of this change. The AHS Cheerleaders/Mascot
Discipline System sheet that was handed out in March or April 2016 in connection with tryouts
for the 2016-2017 school year reflects that it would require two suspensions for a cheerleader to
be removed from the squad. However, the provision stating that a cheerleader would be dismissed
from the squad for “unacceptable behavior while in uniform or at a high school function” remained
On February 18, 2016, the AHS cheerleading squad, including Rebekka, performed at a
girls’ basketball playoff game in Lafayette, Louisiana. The school bus on which the cheerleading
squad was riding stopped at a gas station on the return trip to AHS. Rebekka and another
cheerleader left the bus to use the restroom. While in the restroom, the girls lifted their uniform
skirts to expose their underwear-clad buttocks, and the other girl took a photograph on her cellular
telephone. The other girl sent the photograph to the Weekend Schemers for it to be posted on
Snapchat and viewed by all of the Weekend Schemers’s followers. The Weekend Schemers
maintains a Snapchat account that posts pictures provided by third parties and bills itself as “[t]he
authority on college life, partying, and most importantly scheming.” Many of the photographs
featured on Weekend Schemers’s Snapchat account depict young women exposing their buttocks.
On February 19, 2016, a third girl notified Daigle about the incident. Daigle discussed the matter
with Meyer and then reported the incident to Riche.
On February 19, 2016, Riche and Heath Zeringue, AHS’s disciplinarian, called Rebekka
to the school office and questioned her about the incident. Rebekka truthfully recounted the events
and provided a handwritten statement to Zeringue, who determined that a three-day in-school
suspension was an appropriate punishment for Rebekka’s committing what he considered to be “a
serious offense that is not otherwise defined in AHS’s code of conduct.” Later that day, the
Arceneauxs and Rebekka met with Riche, Daigle and Meyer who informed them that Rebekka
would receive the following discipline as a result of the event: (1) a three day in-school suspension
from February 22-24, 2016; (2) she would not be permitted to attend the Sadie Hawkins dance
scheduled for the weekend prior to the commencement of her suspension; (3) she would be
dismissed from the cheerleading squad for the remainder of the school year; and, (4) she would
not be permitted to try out for the cheerleading squad for her senior year, the 2016-2017 school
On March 4, 2016, the Arceneauxs appealed Rebekka’s suspension. On March 15, 2016,
AHS responded that the appeal would not be considered because it was untimely under the rules
set forth in the APSB Student Code of Conduct. On April 7, 2016, the Arceneauxs filed a formal
grievance with the APSB.
On April 8, 2016, plaintiffs’ counsel wrote to Riche and Tibby Martinez, the superintendent
of the APSB, stating that Rebekka’s punishment violated AHS’s policy governing the discipline
of student athletes and requested that they remedy the situation. The letter stated that, pursuant to
the AHS Student Athlete Handbook, Rebekka could not be prohibited from trying out for the
cheerleading squad for the 2016-2017 school year because she had only one suspension during her
time at AHS.
On April 27, 2016, the APSB responded to the Arceneauxs’ formal grievance stating that
Rebekka’s conduct violated the AHS Cheerleading/Mascot Discipline System that Colette and
Rebekka signed in 2015. According to the APSB, Rebekka’s dismissal from the cheerleading
squad for the 2015-2016 school year and the ban prohibiting her from trying out for the 2016-2017
school year was warranted under these rules.
On May 19, 2016, the Arceneauxs filed this suit on Rebekka’s behalf alleging that the
discipline imposed on Rebekka as a result of the February 18, 2016, incident constituted gender
discrimination under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
which is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Arceneauxs allege that cheerleading was
considered a sport for the 2015-2016 school year, and the policies regarding suspensions outlined
in the AHS Student Athlete Handbook are more lenient than those contained in the AHS
Cheerleading/Mascot Discipline System. They claim that the discrepancy in the disciplinary
policies resulted in Rebekka’s punishment being harsher than that received by male student
athletes for similar behavior, which amounted to gender discrimination. The Arceneauxs also bring
a Title XI retaliation claim alleging that, in April 2016, Rebekka was called into the school office
for random drug testing after she was removed from the cheerleading squad in retaliation for their
complaints about the discipline imposed on Rebekka. Rebekka was not tested because the school
officials realized after calling her in that she was no longer a cheerleader. Defendants have moved
for summary judgment arguing that the Arceneauxs cannot prevail on their gender discrimination
or retaliation claims.
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the "court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Granting a motion for summary judgment
is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits
filed in support of the motion demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10 (1986). In determining whether there is a dispute as
to a material fact, the court considers all of the evidence in the record and draws all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but does not make credibility determinations or weigh
the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000). 1
Defendants captioned their motion as one for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or for summary judgment. “The standard for dismissal under Rule 12(c) is the
same as that for dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Chauvin v. State Farm & Cas.
Co., 495 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 2007). Under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) the court may consider only the
contents of the pleading and the attachments thereto. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496,
498 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)); see also Bosarge v. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics, 796
F.3d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 2015) (“In considering a motion for judgment on the pleading under Rule 12(c), the
court is generally limited to the contents of the pleadings, including the attachments thereto.”) (quotations
omitted). Because both plaintiffs and defendants submitted evidence outside of the pleadings, such as
Gender Discrimination under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause
Plaintiffs allege that the APSB violated Title IX and that the APSB and Riche violated the
Equal Protection Clause because they failed to ensure that AHS’s disciplinary rules pertaining to
student athletes were uniformly applied to male and female athletes. They claim that Rebekka was
subjected to gender discrimination because she was disciplined under a rule applicable only to
cheerleaders, which is typically an all-female sport. Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ Title IX and
Equal Protection claims should be dismissed because plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that Rebekka
was treated differently than similarly situated students who engaged in the same activity and were
subject to the same disciplinary rules.
Gender Discrimination under Title IX
Title IX provides, in pertinent part, that:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participating in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). A plaintiff may bring a Title IX claim for damages or injunctive relief against
an institution or program receiving federal funds, but the statute does not authorize suits against
school officials, teachers or other individuals. Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S.Ct. 788,
795-96 (2009). “Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, . . . and
passed Title IX with the explicit understanding that it would be interpreted as Title VI was.” Id. at
affidavits and deposition testimony, which the court considered, the motion is treated as a motion for
To prevail on a Title IX claim, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant engaged in
intentional discrimination based on gender; and, (2) the defendant received federal financial
assistance. 20 U.S.C. § 1681; see also Chance v. Rice Univ., 984 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1993).
Gender Discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause
Section 1983 provides a remedy against “every person,” who under color of state law,
deprives another of any rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). Section 1983 is not itself a source
of substantive rights; it merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred
elsewhere. Olabisiomotosho v. City of Hous., 185 F.3d 521, 525 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1999). To pursue
a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must: (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and; (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law. Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Hous., 529 F.3d
257, 260 (5th Cir. 2008); see also West v. Atkins, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2255-54 (1988).
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from “deny[ing] to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To prevail on a claim
of gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause a plaintiff “must allege and prove that
he received treatment different from that received by similarly situated individuals and that the
unequal treatment stemmed from a discriminatory intent.” Priester v. Lowndes Cnty., 354 F.3d
414, 424 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Taylor v. Johnson, 257 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2001)); see also
Hinojosa v. Martinez, 53 F.3d 1281 (5th Cir. 1995). “Discriminatory intent” means “‘that the
decision maker singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected his course of
action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effect on an identifiable group.’” Id.
(quoting Taylor, 257 F.3d at 473).
Analyzing Gender Discrimination Claims under Title IX and the Equal
Because the laws are similar, courts use the jurisprudence developed under Title VI and
Title VII to interpret Title IX. See Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir. 1994); Bowers
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 509 Fed. Appx. 906, 910 (11th Cir. 2013); Richardson
v. Loyola Coll. of Md., Inc., 167 Fed. Appx. 223, 224 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Middlebrooks v. Univ. of
Md., 166 F.3d 1209 (4th Cir. 1999). Further, § 1983 actions challenging gender discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause are analyzed in the same manner as Title VII and Title IX cases.
See Giles v. Shaw Sch. Dist., 655 Fed. Appx. 998, 1002 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Lee v. Conecuh
County Bd. of Educ., 634 F.2d 959,962 (5th Cir. 1981)).
A plaintiff bringing a claim under Title IX or §1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, may use either direct or circumstantial evidence to prove that she was subjected to
intentional discrimination. Portis v. First Nat’l Bank of New Albany, Miss., 34 F.3d 325, 328 (5th
Cir. 1994). “‘Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of intentional
discrimination] without inference or presumption.’” Id. at 328-29 (quoting Brown v. E. Miss. Elec.
Power Ass’n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993)). “[D]irect evidence includes any statement or
written document showing a discriminatory motive on its face.” Id. at 329 (citations omitted). If
a “plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination, ‘the burden of proof shifts to the [defendant]
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have been made
regardless of the forbidden factor.’” Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 778
F.3d 473, 475 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Brown, 989 F.2d at 861).
When there is no direct evidence of intentional discrimination, a plaintiff must prove her
case by inference using the McDonnel Douglas burden-shifting analysis. Id. at 475. First, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination, which creates a presumption that the
defendant unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094 (1981). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the adverse action. Buisson v. Bd. of Supervisors of the La. Cmty. and Tech. Coll. Sys., 592 Fed.
Appx. 237, 2014 WL 5804127, at *4 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492
F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007)). “If the [defendant] articulates a legitimate reason for the adverse .
. . action, ‘the plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of proving that the [defendant’s] proffered
reason is not true but instead is a pretext for the real discriminatory . . . purpose.’” Id. (quoting
McCoy, 492 F.3d at 556).
To establish a prima facie case under the McDonnel Douglas framework, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she met the defendant’s qualifications
for participation in the activity; (3) she suffered an adverse action; and (4) that others not in her
protected class received more favorable treatment under similar circumstances. Buisson, 592 Fed.
Appx. at 243 (citing McCoy, 492 F.3d at 556). The APSB argues that plaintiffs cannot prevail on
their Title IX claim because they do not have examples of other students subject to the same
disciplinary rules as Rebekka that were not in her protected class and treated more favorably. To
counter this argument, plaintiffs present many examples of male students at AHS who exhibited
behavior similar to Rebekka’s that were allegedly not disciplined as harshly as she was. However,
“the McDonnel Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
discrimination.” Portis, 34 F.3d at 328 (quoting Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 105 S.Ct. 613,
Plaintiffs have presented what they allege is direct evidence of gender discrimination.
Namely, there is a disciplinary policy applicable to all student athletes and a separate policy that
is applicable only to cheerleaders. Plaintiffs claim that Rebekka was disciplined under the old
cheerleading policy that required only one suspension for dismissal from the squad, which is
harsher than the policy applicable to all student athletes that calls for dismissal from an athletic
team after two suspensions. Also, the cheerleading disciplinary policy has a provision that requires
dismissal from the squad for engaging in unacceptable behavior while in the cheerleading uniform
or at a school function. The unacceptable behavior policy is not included in the AHS Student
Athlete Handbook. Plaintiffs claim that the discrepancies in the policies amounts to gender
discrimination because cheerleading is typically an all-female sport. This direct evidence of
gender discrimination renders inapplicable the McDonnel Douglas burden-shifting analysis and
makes it unnecessary to analyze the purported examples of disparate treatment.
The policies related to suspensions are different in the written version of AHS
Cheerleaders/Mascot Discipline System applicable to the 2015-2016 school year, and the AHS
Student Athlete Handbook. The cheerleading disciplinary policy calls for removal from the squad
after one suspension, whereas the AHS Student Athlete Handbook requires two suspensions to be
removed from an athletic team. However, this discrepancy is irrelevant because Rebekka was not
removed from the cheerleading squad under the outdated suspension policy. Daigle, Riche and
Rebekka all testified that, at the time Rebekka was removed from the cheerleading squad, the
cheerleading disciplinary policy regarding suspensions had been updated to require two
suspensions for removal. This change was made because Riche sought more uniformity in
suspension policies among school activities. Therefore, there is no evidence of intentional
discrimination on the basis of gender with respect to the cheerleading suspension policy because
it was the same as the suspension policy found in the AHS Student Athlete Handbook at the
Further, Rebekka was not removed from the cheerleading squad due to her suspension.
Daigle and Riche testified that Rebekka was dismissed from the cheerleading squad for violation
of the rule of engaging in unacceptable behavior while in her uniform, which Rebekka admitted at
her deposition. Plaintiffs contend that this rule is evidence of intentional gender discrimination
because cheerleading is an all-female sport and the rule holds cheerleaders to a higher behavioral
standard than members of other athletic teams.
Daigle and Riche testified that Daigle, as the cheerleading sponsor, is responsible for
setting the rules applicable to cheerleading. The AHS Student Athlete Handbook states that the
head coach of each sport “is responsible for compiling a set of eligibility rules and polices for his
or her particular sport.” The AHS Cheerleading/Mascot Discipline System is Daigle’s statement
of the eligibility rules and policies for participation in cheerleading. There is no evidence in the
record that Daigle instituted her particular set of rules, including the unacceptable behavior rule,
with the intention to discriminate on the basis of gender.
Indeed, Daigle’s rules for participating in cheerleading applied to both males and females
because cheerleading is a co-educational activity. The Application for Cheerleading Tryouts
specifically anticipated that males might participate in cheerleading by stating that the parent is
giving permission for his or her “daughter/son” to participate. Riche testified at his deposition that
males have been on the AHS cheerleading squad. Presumably, the cheerleading disciplinary policy
regarding unacceptable behavior would have been applied equally to male cheerleaders. Thus, the
policy is not intentionally discriminatory on the basis of gender. The lack of there being a male
cheerleader at the present time at AHS does not change the analysis.
Thus, there is no evidence that Rebekka was disciplined under a policy applicable only to
females that was intentionally discriminatory on the basis of gender. Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED and plaintiffs’ Title IX and Equal Protection Clause
discrimination claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Retaliation under Title IX
Plaintiffs argue that Rebekka’s being called for drug testing after she was dismissed from
the cheerleading squad was done in retaliation for their appealing Rebekka’s suspension and filing
a formal grievance with the APSB. Defendants argue that this claim must be dismissed because
the Arceneaux’s did not engaged in a protected activity and Rebekka did not suffer an adverse
Title IX’s implementing regulations prohibit the recipient of federal funds from retaliating
against any individual who makes a complaint or participates in an investigation under Title IX.
34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (“No recipient [of federal funds] . . . shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or
discriminate against any individual . . . because he has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under [Title IX].”). To
establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in
a protected activity; (2) she suffered a material adverse action; and, (3) that a causal link exists
between the protected activity and the adverse action. Collins v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 609 Fed.
Appx. 792, 795 (5th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their retaliation claim because Rebekka did not suffer a material
adverse action. Plaintiffs claim the adverse action was Rebekka’s being called to the school office
for random drug testing after she was dismissed from the cheerleading squad. However, they
admit that Rebekka was not subjected to the testing when the school officials realized that Rebekka
was no longer a cheerleader. Walking to the school office is not a material adverse action.
Therefore, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ Title IX retaliation claim,
and that claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.2
Defendants’ Request for Attorneys’ Fees
Defendants move for attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which provides that, in an
action brought under § 1983 or Title IX, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, . . ., a reasonable attorney’s fee . . .” “[Section] 1988 authorizes a district court to award
attorney’s fees to a defendant upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation.” Fox v. Vice, 131 S.Ct. 2205, 2213 (2011) (quotation omitted). The court
“review[s] frivolity by asking whether the case was so lacking in merit that it was groundless,
rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful.” United States v. State of Miss, 921 F.2d
604, 609 (5th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Important factors in determining frivolity are: (1)
whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle,
and (3) whether the district court dismissed the case or held a full-blown trial. Id.
Plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case and a trial was not held. There is no
information in the record regarding whether defendants failed to engage in a good faith effort to
settle. However, plaintiffs’ case was not frivolous because it is reasonable that they believed
Rebekka was disciplined under a system that appears to be discriminatory. Therefore, defendants’
motion for attorneys’ fees is DENIED.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED, and plaintiffs’ claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Because there was no material adverse action, there is no need to discuss whether plaintiffs engaged in a
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10th day of March, 2017.
MARY ANN VIAL LEMMON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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