Terrebonne v. B&J Martin Inc et al

Filing 43

ORDER AND REASONS granting in part 22 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Defendant's cure obligation is satisfied to the extent that Medicaid has tendered payment for Plaintiff's medical expenses. Signed by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. (ecm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DAVID TERREBONNE

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO: 16-8630

B & J MARTIN, INC.

SECTION: “H”(4)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(Doc. 22). For the following reasons, this Motion is GRANTED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
This is a Jones Act case. Plaintiff worked aboard the F/V AMY CLAIRE,
a vessel owned by his employer, Defendant B&J Martin, Inc.

In

November/December of 2015, Plaintiff was working aboard the vessel on
navigable waters when he began to experience chest pain. Despite advising
Defendant of this pain for weeks, he avers that he was not permitted to leave
the boat to seek medical attention. He eventually suffered a cardiac event. At
that time he was advised that he needed a small heart procedure; however,
Defendant refused to pay for this procedure. He alleges that as a result, he
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was forced to wait five months and ultimately undergo more extensive open
heart surgery at a charity hospital in New Orleans.

He brings claims for

negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure.
In the instant Motion, Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claim for cure. Plaintiff opposes.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”1 A genuine issue
of fact exists only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.”2
In determining whether the movant is entitled to summary judgment,
the Court views facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draws
all reasonable inferences in his favor.3 “If the moving party meets the initial
burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden
shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.”4 Summary judgment is
appropriate if the non-movant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.”5 “In response to a
properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must
identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the manner in which that
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2012).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
3 Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 1997).
4 Engstrom v. First Nat’l Bank of Eagle Lake, 47 F.3d 1459, 1462 (5th Cir. 1995).
5 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
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evidence supports that party’s claim, and such evidence must be sufficient to
sustain a finding in favor of the non-movant on all issues as to which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial.”6 “We do not . . . in the absence
of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the
necessary facts.”7

Additionally, “[t]he mere argued existence of a factual

dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion.”8
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Defendant moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for cure,
arguing that it is precluded by Plaintiff’s Medicaid eligibility.

Plaintiff

responds in opposition, arguing that Defendant’s Motion is premature.
Under general maritime law, a ship owner must pay maintenance and
cure to a seaman injured while in the service of the vessel. “Cure” is defined
as the reasonable cost of medical expenses incurred by a seaman until he
reaches maximum medical improvement.9 “The law recognizes that a Jones
Act employer has no obligation to provide maintenance and cure benefits when
the seaman’s living expenses and medical treatment are provided by others at
no expense to the seaman.”10 The cure obligation was historically satisfied by
the free medical care provided to seamen through the United States Public
Service Hospitals; however, this entitlement to care no longer exists. 11 Many
John v. Deep E. Tex. Reg. Narcotics Trafficking Task Force, 379 F.3d 293, 301 (5th
Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
7 Badon v. R J R Nabisco, Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Little v.
Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
8 Boudreaux v. Banctec, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 425, 430 (E.D. La. 2005).
9 Hall v. Noble Drilling Inc., 242 F.3d 582, 586-87 (5th Cir 2001).
10 In re McKinney Inland, L.L.C., No. CIV. A. 07-5564, 2008 WL 1901698, at *2 (E.D.
La. Apr. 25, 2008) (Barbier, J.).
11 Lovell v. Master Braxton, LLC, No. CV 15-3978, 2016 WL 6819043, at *5 (E.D. La.
Nov. 18, 2016) (Fallon, J.).
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courts have found that Medicaid is “the functional equivalent of the previously
available free treatment at Public Health Service Hospitals.”12 Accordingly, a
ship owner may avoid liability for cure payments to the extent that a plaintiff’s
medical bills are paid by Medicaid, as this medical care is provided at no cost
to the injured seamen.13
The parties agree that Medicaid satisfies a defendant’s cure obligation
“to the extent an injured seaman qualifies for [Medicaid], and the [Medicaid]
facilities are available within a reasonable distance from the seaman’s
residence, and competent physicians are likewise available and will accept
[Medicaid] payment.”14 Though Plaintiff concedes that his claim for cure is
abrogated to the extent that his medical bills are paid by Medicaid, he argues
that Defendant’s cure obligation should not be fully discharged at this time.
In support of this argument, he points to multiple outstanding bills from
several medical providers for which Medicaid has not yet paid benefits.
Discovery is ongoing, and it may yet be shown that some of the providers will
not accept Medicaid payments. Additionally, Plaintiff is still treating for his
injuries and continues to incur medical bills. Until it is determined that he
will face no exposure for these bills, summary judgment on his cure claim is
inappropriate.15 The Court will, however, grant summary judgment in favor

Id.
Id.
14 In Matter of Gulf Pride Marine Serv., Inc., No. 96-1104, 1997 WL 118394, at *13
(E.D. La. Mar. 14, 1997) (Fallon, J.).
15 Defendant is correct that the burden of showing that Medicaid is insufficient to
provide cure ultimately lies with the Plaintiff. Toulson v. Ampro Fisheries, 872 F. Supp. 271,
277 (E.D. Va. 1995). However, given that discovery is ongoing and Plaintiff is not at
maximum medical improvement, the Court is unwilling to fully discharge Defendant’s cure
obligation at this time.
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of Defendant to the extent that Medicaid has provided payment for Plaintiff’s
medical expenses.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment is GRANTED IN PART. Defendant’s cure obligation is satisfied to
the extent that Medicaid has tendered payment for Plaintiff’s medical
expenses.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 20th day of March, 2017.

____________________________________
JANE TRICHE MILAZZO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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