McCool v. Amacker et al
Filing
7
ORDER & REASONS. It is ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (R. Docs. 3 , 4 , 6 ) are GRANTED. Plaintiff's 1983 claims are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's remaining state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Carl Barbier. (gec)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
NANINE MCCOOL
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO: 16-14255
DAWN AMACKER, ET AL.
SECTION: “J”(2)
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court are Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (R. Docs.
3, 4, 6). 1 Plaintiff has not filed a response to any of the
Defendants’
motions.
Having
considered
the
motions
and
legal
memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds
that the motions should be GRANTED.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts underlying this litigation are outlined in detail
in the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision In re McCool, 2015-0284
(La. 6/30/15); 172 So. 2d 1058. In short, Plaintiff was disbarred
for violations of Rule 3.5(a)-(b) and Rule 8.4(a),(c), and (d) of
the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 1078. After
1
Defendants include: The Honorable Dawn Amacker of the 22nd Judicial District
Court of Louisiana, in her official capacity; The Honorable Bernette J. Johnson
of the Louisiana Supreme Court, in her official capacity; The Honorable Greg G.
Guidry of the Louisiana Supreme Court, in his official capacity; The Honorable
Scott J. Crichton of the Louisiana Supreme Court, in his official capacity; The
Honorable Jeannette Theriot Knoll of the Louisiana Supreme Court, in her
official capacity; The Honorable Marcus R. Clark of the Louisiana Supreme Court,
in his official capacity; the Honorable John L. Weimer of the Louisiana Supreme
Court, in his official capacity; Retired Judge James L. Cannella, in his
official capacity; Damon S. Manning, an attorney and investigator for the
Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board; Tammy Pruet Northrup, an attorney and
investigator for the Louisiana Attorney Disciplinary Board; and The Honorable
Deborah Gambrell of the Tenth District Chancery Court of Mississippi.
the Louisiana Supreme Court rendered its decision in In re McCool,
Plaintiff
filed
this
lawsuit
pursuant
to
42
U.S.C.
§
1983.
Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated her rights under the First,
Fifth,
and
Fourteenth
Amendments
to
the
United
States
Constitution, along with other alleged violations of the Louisiana
Constitution. (R. Doc. 1 at 1, 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendants acted “independently and in concert under color
of state law to deprive [Plaintiff] of her [First] Amendment Right
of freedom of speech, and to deprive her of substantive due process
and equal protection under the law.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff also
alleges that two of the Defendants, Damon S. Manning and Tammy
Pruet
Northrup,
made
false
and
misleading
statements
during
Plaintiff’s disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 9-10. Consequently,
Plaintiff seeks damages, including punitive damages and attorney’s
fees, for these alleged constitutional violations. Id. at 11. In
response to the filing of this lawsuit, Defendants filed separate
motions to dismiss. (R. Docs. 3, 4, 6.) In short, Defendants argue
that they did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and
that they are immune from civil liability. See id. Plaintiff did
not file a response to any of the Defendants’ motions. Defendants’
motions are now before the Court on the briefs and without oral
argument.
2
LEGAL STANDARD
A.
Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “the
district court is ‘free to weigh the evidence and resolve factual
disputes in order to satisfy itself that it has the power to hear
the case.’” Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir.
2005). The party asserting jurisdiction must carry the burden of
proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Randall D. Wolcott,
M.D., P.A. v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 2011). The
standard of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is
the same as that for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
which is discussed below. United States v. City of New Orleans,
No. 02–3618, 2003 WL 22208578, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2003).
B.
Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The
complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005). The allegations “must be simple,
concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
must plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is
3
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). A
claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that
allow
the
court
to
“draw
the
reasonable
inference
that
the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A court must
accept all well-pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S. Unwired,
Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232–33 (5th Cir. 2009); Baker v. Putnal, 75
F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). The court is not, however, bound to
accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
DISCUSSION
The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to bar suits by individuals against nonconsenting states.
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363
(2001). “Congress may, however, abrogate such immunity in federal
court if it makes its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute and acts pursuant to a valid exercise
of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Nevada Dep’t
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003). In § 1983 official
capacity suits, “the action is in essence one for the recovery of
money from the state” itself rather than the nominal defendant.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (holding that the
“state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled
4
to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual
officials are nominal defendants”). Therefore, “the principle of
state-sovereign immunity generally precludes actions against state
officers in their official capacities.” McCarthy ex rel. Travis v.
Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2004). 2
State courts are an arm of the state entitled to sovereign
immunity. Allen v. Howard, No. 13-233, 2014 WL 1330089, at *3 (E.D.
La. April 3, 2014) (citing Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored
People v. State of Cal., 511 F. Supp. 1244, 1257 (E.D. Cal. 1981)
aff’d sub nom. NAACP v. State of Cal., 711 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.
1983)) (collecting cases and noting that courts considering this
question have “consistently held that state courts are “arms” of
the state and that they are entitled, as such, to share in the
protection
against
suit
afforded
by
sovereign
immunity.”);
Jefferson v. La. State Supreme Court, 46 F. App’x 732, 732 (5th
Cir. 2002) (“The Eleventh Amendment clearly bars Jefferson’s
§
1983 claims against the Louisiana Supreme Court, which is a branch
of Louisiana’s state government.”) By Plaintiff asserting her §
1983
claims
against
Judge
Dawn
Amacker,
Justice
Bernette
J.
Johnson, Justice Greg G. Guidry, Justice Scott J. Crichton, Justice
2
There are exceptions to this general rule. Whether a state officer may be sued
in her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 depends on what relief is being
sought by the plaintiff. Boyle v. Kliebert, No. 13-5717, 2014 WL 4539658, at *2
(E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2014). “An official capacity suit may proceed where the
plaintiff is seeking only prospective injunctive relief, but must be dismissed
where the plaintiff is seeking money damages. Id. (citing Am. Bank & Trust Co.
of Opelousas v. Dent, 982 F.2d 917, 921 (5th Cir. 1993).
5
Jeannette Theriot Knoll, Justice Marcus R. Clark, Justice John L.
Weimer,
Retired
Judge
James
L.
Cannella, 3
and
Judge
Deborah
Gambrell 4 in their official capacities, Plaintiff essentially seeks
recovery of money from the State, 5 and claims for money damages by
a private citizen against the State are barred under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. Allen, 2014 WL 1330089, at *3 (citing
Kaminsky v. Rosenblum, 929 F.2d 922, 925 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Absent
consent by the state, a § 1983 action brought against a public
officer
in
his
official
capacity
is
barred
by
the
Eleventh
Amendment.”) Therefore, unless an exception applies, this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
against these Defendants due to the State’s sovereign immunity.
Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to any of the Defendants’
motions, nor is the Court aware of any exception that may apply in
this case. See id. (discussing waiver exception and Ex Parte Young
exception, neither of which apply in this case); see also Hughes
v. Johnson, No. 15-7165, 2016 WL 6124211, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 20,
3
Retired Judge James L. Cannella was assigned as Justice ad hoc and sat in
place of Justice Jefferson D. Hughes, III, who was recused, in In re McCool.
4 Although Judge Gambrell has not filed a pleading or motion in this lawsuit,
this Court is “duty-bound to examine the basis of subject matter jurisdiction
sua sponte. . . .” Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 2013);
Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Federal courts may examine the
basis of their jurisdiction sua sponte, even on appeal.”). Accordingly, this
Court must determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over Judge
Gambrell, who is sued by Plaintiff in her official capacity. See id.; (R. Doc.
1 at 2.)
5
Plaintiff’s prayer for relief seeks “damages against each defendant
individually and collectively as permitted by law, including as appropriate
punitive damages and attorney’s fees.” (R. Doc. 1 at 11.) Plaintiff’s complaint
makes no mention of injunctive relief. See id.
6
2016) (citing La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5106(A) (2010)) (explaining that
“Louisiana
has
explicitly
asserted
its
sovereign
immunity
by
statute.”) Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims against Judge Dawn Amacker, Justice Bernette J. Johnson,
Justice
Greg
G.
Guidry,
Justice
Scott
J.
Crichton,
Justice
Jeannette Theriot Knoll, Justice Marcus R. Clark, Justice John L.
Weimer, Retired Judge James L. Cannella, and Judge Deborah Gambrell
in their official capacities must be dismissed without prejudice
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Ecker v. United
States,
358
immunity
F.
App’x
deprives
the
551,
552-53
Court
of
(5th
Cir.
subject
2009)
matter
(sovereign
jurisdiction);
Hughes, 2016 WL 6124211, at *4 (dismissing § 1983 claims against
Louisiana Supreme Court justices without prejudice).
Similarly, Tammy Pruet Northrop and Damon S. Manning are
entitled to qualified immunity protection. See Loughlin v. Tweed,
310 F.R.D. 323, 335 (E.D. La. 2015) (finding “deputy disciplinary
counsel,” acting in his official capacity through the Louisiana
Office of Disciplinary Counsel was entitled to qualified immunity
pursuant
to
the
Eleventh
Amendment).
The
Louisiana
Attorney
Disciplinary Board is entitled to qualified immunity for monetary
claims
under
the
Eleventh
Amendment.
Atkins
v.
La.
Attorney
Disciplinary Bd., No. 09-6471, 2010 WL 420558 (E.D. La. Jan. 29,
2010). Here, Defendants Northrop and Manning were sued in their
official capacities as “attorney[s] and investigator[s] for the
7
Louisiana
Attorney
Disciplinary
Board.”
(R.
Doc.
6-1
at
3.)
Specifically, Plaintiff’s complaint states that Damon Manning was
acting “in his professional capacity as an investigating attorney
for the [Louisiana Attorney Discipline Board]” 6 and that Tammy
Pruet was acting “on behalf of the [Louisiana Attorney Discipline
Board].” 7 Plaintiff does not assert that she is suing Defendant
Northrop or Manning in their personal capacities. See (R. Doc. 1.)
Further, Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendants’ motions
and thus does not argue that Manning and Northrop are sued in their
individual capacities. Accordingly, because Defendant Northrup and
Manning were acting in their official capacities as Louisiana
Attorney Disciplinary Board personnel, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
against Defendants Tammy Pruet Northrop and Damon S. Manning are
dismissed
without
prejudice
for
lack
of
subject
matter
jurisdiction. See Loughlin, 310 F.R.D. at 335.
Plaintiff’s
remaining
claims
sound
in
state
law
for
violations of the Louisiana Constitution. (R. Doc. 1 at 4.) When
federal
law
claims
in
an
action
based
on
federal
question
jurisdiction are eliminated and only state law claims remain, the
federal court should not continue to exercise jurisdiction. Lucien
v. Jones, No. 16-9591, 2016 WL 4942997, at *7 (E.D. La. Sept. 16,
2016) (citing Bruneau v. Deposit Ins. Corp., 785 F. Supp. 585, 590
6
7
R. Doc. 1 at 7.
R. Doc. 1 at 9-10.
8
(E.D. La. 1992)). Federal courts may relinquish jurisdiction by
either dismissing the case without prejudice or in cases that have
been removed, by remanding the case to state court. Id. (citing
Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988)). This case
was filed in federal court, and the Court cannot remand a case
that
was
remaining
not
initially
state
law
removed.
claims
for
Id.
Accordingly,
violations
of
Plaintiff’s
the
Louisiana
Constitution are dismissed without prejudice. 8
Finally,
Defendants
ask
that
Plaintiff’s
complaint
be
dismissed “at plaintiff’s cost.” (R. Doc. 3-1 at 6; R. Doc. 4-1 at
6; R. Doc. 6-1 at 7.) Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, in any action
to enforce a provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court, in its
discretion, may award the prevailing party, other than the United
States, reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b); Waganfaeld v. City of New Orleans, No. 06-5036, 2011 WL
809318, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 2, 2011). However, Defendants failed
to address any of the factors relevant to awarding attorney’s fees
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Dean v. Riser, 240 F.3d 505, 508
(5th Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise its
discretion to award Defendants attorney’s fees in this case.
8
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges violations of Louisiana Constitution Article
1, Sections 2, 3, 7, 9, and 22. (R. Doc. 1 at 4.) These claims, along with any
other cognizable state law claims, are dismissed without prejudice.
9
CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
(R. Docs. 3, 4, 6) are GRANTED. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are
hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s remaining state law
claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
New Orleans, Louisiana this 4th day of November, 2016.
CARL J. BARBIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
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