MC Bank & Trust Company v. Suard Barge Service, Inc. et al

Filing 23

ORDER AND REASONS granting 11 Motion for Entry of Default as to Louis O'Neil Suard Jr. Signed by Judge Sarah S. Vance on 9/11/2017. (tm)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
M C BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
VERSUS

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 16-14311

SUARD BARGE SERVICE, INC.,
ET AL

SECTION “R” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment. 1
For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion.

I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a loan provided by Plaintiff M C Bank & Trust

Company to Defendant Suard Barge Service, Inc.2 On January 12, 2010,
Suard Barge Service, as borrower, executed a term loan agreement for
$3,950,000,3 a promissory note, 4 two commercial security agreements, 5 an
assignment of life insurance policy,6 and a preferred fleet mortgage. 7 The

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

R. Doc. 11.
R. Doc. 1 at 2-3.
R. Doc. 11-3.
R. Doc. 11-4.
R. Doc. 11-6; R. Doc. 11-7.
R. Doc. 11-13 at 3.
R. Doc. 11-14.

preferred fleet mortgage granted plaintiff a continuing security interest in
certain collateral, including the vessels the M/V Captain Suard and the Suard
XXI. 8
Defendant Premier Services, Inc. served as a guarantor of the January
12, 2010 loan agreement between plaintiff and Suard Barge Service.9 As
guarantor, Premier Services executed the term loan agreement, 10 a
commercial security agreement, 11 a commercial guaranty, 12 and a preferred
fleet mortgage.13 The preferred fleet mortgage was executed by Premier
Services and granted plaintiff a continuing security interest in certain
collateral, including the vessels the Suard 70, the Suard 71, the Suard 72, the
Suard 73, the Suard 76, and the Suard XV. 14
Plaintiff’s January 12, 2010 loan to Suard Barge Service was also
guaranteed by Defendant Louis O’Neil Suard, Jr. in his individual capacity.15
Mr. Suard served as president of Suard Barge Service and Premier Services
at the time of the loan. 16 Mr. Suard signed the term loan agreement as

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Id. at 2-3.
R. Doc. 1 at 9.
R. Doc. 11-3 at 13.
R. Doc. 11-7.
R. Doc. 11-17.
R. Doc. 11-15.
Id. at 1-2.
R. Doc. 1 at 9; R. Doc. 11-3 at 13.
R. Doc. 11-3 at 13.
2

guarantor17 and executed a separate commercial guaranty.18 Under the
terms of the commercial guaranty, Mr. Suard guaranteed payment of the full
indebtedness of Suard Barge Service to plaintiff. 19 At the time of the January
12, 2010 loan, Mr. Suard had already executed another commercial security
agreement to secure an earlier loan from plaintiff to Suard Barge Service.20
This agreement grants plaintiff a continuing security interest in Mr. Suard’s
boat, Awesome, bearing Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries registration
number LA-1345-EX and decal number 087039-04. 21
Plaintiff alleges that Suard Barge Service defaulted on the January 12,
2010 loan by failing to make any required monthly payments due on or after
April 12, 2015, failing to provide required financial statements, and failing to
provide proof of insurance coverage on certain collateral. 22 On May 20,
2015, plaintiff notified Suard Barge Service and Mr. Suard that the loan was
in default.23 On February 1, 2016, plaintiff notified Suard Barge Service,
Premier Services, and Mr. Suard by letter of its decision to accelerate the loan

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

R. Doc. 1 at 9; R. Doc. 11-3 at 13.
R. Doc. 1-14.
Id. at 1.
R. Doc. 11-5.
Id.
R. Doc. 1 at 13-14.
Id.; R. Doc. 1-16.
3

and declare all amounts immediately due and payable.24

Suard Barge

Service, Premier Services, and Mr. Suard allegedly failed to pay the loan
balance.25
On August 30, 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint against Suard Barge
Service, Premier Services, and Mr. Suard in his individual capacity.26
Plaintiff also named as defendants eight vessels included as collateral in the
preferred fleet mortgages.27 Plaintiff requests damages in the amount of the
unpaid loan principal and interest, as well as costs, attorneys’ fees, expenses,
and charges associated with the loans.28

Plaintiff further requests a

judgment recognizing its right to enforce the loan agreement, the promissory
note, the preferred fleet mortgages, the security agreements, the life
insurance assignment, and the commercial guarantees.29 Plaintiff also seeks
a writ of sequestration. 30
Mr. Suard executed waivers of service on behalf of all defendants, 31 but
defendants did not file a timely answer or responsive pleading in this matter.

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

R. Doc. 1 at 14-15; R. Doc. 1-17.
R. Doc. 1 at 15.
R. Doc. 1.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20.
R. Doc. 6.
4

On November 30, 2016, the clerk entered default against all defendants.32
On August 30, 2017, Mr. Suard filed an answer generally denying the
allegations in the complaint. 33
On May 9, 2017, Suard Barge Service and Premier Services each filed
notices of bankruptcy.34 The Court stayed this matter as to Suard Barge
Service and Premier Services only.35 On May 19, 2017, the Suard 70, the
Suard 71, the Suard 72, the Suard 73, and the Suard 76 were sold and the
bankruptcy trustee distributed proceeds from this sale to plaintiff in the
amount of $254,587.50.36
Plaintiff now seeks a default judgment against Mr. Suard.37 Mr. Suard
has not filed an opposition to this motion.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, the Court may enter a default

judgment against a party when it fails to plead or otherwise respond to the
plaintiff’s complaint within the required time period. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. A

32
33
34
35
36
37

R. Doc. 9.
R. Doc. 20.
R. Doc. 13; R. Doc. 14.
R. Doc. 15.
R. Doc. 19 at 2.
R. Doc. 11; R. Doc. 19.
5

plaintiff who seeks a default judgment against an unresponsive defendant
must proceed through two steps. First, the plaintiff must petition the court
for an entry of default, which is simply “a notation of the party’s default on
the clerk’s record of the case.” Dow Chem. Pac. Ltd. v. Rascator Mar. S.A.,
782 F.2d 329, 335 (2d Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Hansen, 795 F.2d
35, 37 (7th Cir. 1986). Before the clerk may enter the default, the plaintiff
must show “by affidavit or otherwise” that the defendant “has failed to plead
or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
After the defendant’s default has been entered, the plaintiff may
request a default judgment from the court. At this stage, the court deems the
plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations admitted. See Nishimatsu Constr.
Co., Ltd. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975). At the
same time, “the defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded
or to admit conclusions of law.” Id.

The default judgment “must be

supported by well-pleaded allegations and must have a sufficient basis in the
pleadings.” Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs, Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 498
(5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted).
No party is entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right. Ganther
v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996). The disposition of a motion for
entry of default judgment rests within the sound discretion of the district
6

court. Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977). In deciding
whether to grant default judgment, the court will consider factors such as the
existence of disputed material facts, the clarity of the grounds for default,
whether there has been substantial prejudice, the harshness of a default
judgment, whether default was caused by a good faith mistake or excusable
neglect, and whether the court would feel obliged to set aside the default on
the defendant’s motion. See Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th
Cir. 1998) (citing 10 Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2685
(2d ed. 1983)).

III. DISCUSSION
A.

Effect of Bankruptcy Stay

This matter is automatically stayed as to defendants Suard Barge
Service and Premier Services because they are in bankruptcy proceedings. 38
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (providing for automatic stay of judicial proceedings
after bankruptcy petition is filed). This stay also extends to actions to obtain
possession of property of the estate or to enforce liens against property of the
debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), (a)(5). The preferred fleet mortgages
submitted to the Court indicate that the vessels the M/V Captain Suard and

38

R. Doc. 15.
7

the Suard XXI are property of Suard Barge Service 39 and that the vessels the
Suard 70, the Suard 71, the Suard 72, the Suard 73, the Suard 76, and the
Suard XV are property of Premier Services. 40 Plaintiff’s claims relating to
these vessels are therefore also stayed pending the resolution of the
bankruptcy proceedings.
This matter has not been stayed as to Defendant Louis O’Neil Suard.
See In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc., 817 F.2d 1142, 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining
that 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) does not stay proceedings against nonbankrupt
codefendants); In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-3408, 2001 WL 536305,
at *2-3 (E.D. La. 2001). The Court will consider plaintiff’s motion for default
judgment against Mr. Suard in his individual capacity.
B.

Jurisdiction

Before entering a default judgment, a district court must “look into its
jurisdiction both over the subject matter and the parties.” Sys. Pipe &
Supply, Inc. v. M/V Viktor Kurnatovskiy, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2001)
(internal citations omitted). Judgment entered in the absence of jurisdiction

R. Doc. 11-14 at 1-2.
R. Doc. 11-15 at 1-2. As noted above, plaintiff represents that the
Suards 70, 71, 72, 73, and 76 have been sold as part of Premier Services’
bankruptcy proceedings. See R. Doc. 19-1. at 3.
8
39

40

is void, and the Court must therefore refrain from entering judgment if its
jurisdiction is uncertain. Id.
The Court finds that it has jurisdiction to enter this default judgment.
The Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is founded upon federal admiralty
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333.41 Preferred ship mortgages fall within
federal admiralty jurisdiction. See United States v. Trident Crusader, 366
F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2004); Jack Neilson, Inc. v. Tug Peggy, 428 F.2d 54,
57 (5th Cir. 1970). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court also has personal
jurisdiction over Mr. Suard. Mr. Suard waived service of process,42 and is a
resident of Houma, Louisiana. 43
C.

Entry of Default Judgment

The Court finds that default judgment against Mr. Suard is warranted.
The record indicates that Mr. Suard waived service of process44 but did not
timely “plead or otherwise defend himself” in this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
The clerk entered default against him on November 30, 2016. 45 Plaintiff

41
42
43
44
45

R. Doc. 1 at 3.
R. Doc. 6.
R. Doc. 1 at 2; R. Doc. 1-14 at 1.
R. Doc. 6.
R. Doc. 9.
9

moved for entry of default judgment on April 13, 2017.46 Mr. Suard did not
file an answer until August 30, 2017, one year after the filing of plaintiff’s
complaint. 47 Because the clerk has entered default against Mr. Suard, he
cannot contest plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations unless his default
is set aside.

See Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d at 1206 (“Attempts by a

defendant to escape the effects of his default should be strictly
circumscribed; he should not be given the opportunity to litigate what has
already been considered admitted in law.”).
Mr. Suard has neither filed a motion to set aside the entry of default
nor otherwise responded to plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment.
In deciding whether default judgment is appropriate, the Court considers
whether it “would think itself obliged to set aside the default on the
defendant’s motion.” Lindsey, 161 F.3d at 893. The Court has discretion to
set aside a clerk’s entry of default for “good cause.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
Factors relevant to good cause include “whether the default was willful,
whether setting it aside would prejudice the adversary, and whether a
meritorious defense is presented.” CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, Inc.,
979 F.2d 60, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1992). The Court need not consider all of these

46
47

R. Doc. 11.
R. Doc. 20.
10

factors, and “[w]illful failure alone may constitute sufficient cause for the
court to deny” a motion to set aside an entry of default. Matter of Dierschke,
975 F.2d 181, 184-185 (5th Cir. 1992); see also CJC Holdings, Inc., 979 F.2d
at 64.
The Court perceives no good cause to set aside Mr. Suard’s default. Mr.
Suard personally executed a waiver of service that clearly stated that he was
required to file an answer or motion within 60 days from September 2, 2016,
or risk default.48 The record before the Court does not reveal any excuse for
Mr. Suard’s delay in answering the complaint. The Court therefore finds that
his failure to timely answer was willful and not the result of excusable
neglect. See CJC Holdings, Inc., 979 F.2d at 63-64 (affirming district court’s
finding of willful failure to answer where defendant missed deadline to
answer by less than one month). Additionally, although Mr. Suard’s answer
generally denies plaintiff’s allegations, he does not present any specific
disputed facts or meritorious legal defenses.49 Finally, the plaintiff will be
prejudiced by any further delay in its ability to recover the amount due on its
loan to Suard Barge Service. Although judgments by default are generally
disfavored, Mr. Suard’s failure to timely defend has made it impossible to

48
49

R. Doc. 6 at 3.
R. Doc. 20.
11

achieve a “just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition” of this case on the
merits. Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274,
276 (5th Cir. 1989).
As described above, after entry of default, plaintiff’s well-pleaded
factual allegations are deemed admitted. See Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d at
1206. In a suit on a promissory note under Louisiana law, “the plaintiff must
merely produce the note in question to make out a prima facie case.” Long
v. Long, 895 So. 2d 34, 39 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2005). Plaintiff has provided the
Court with the promissory note executed by Suard Barge Service on January
12, 2010, promising to repay plaintiff the principal and interest on a
$3,950,000 loan.50 The complaint further outlines and documents Suard
Barge Service’s default on the loan agreement. 51 The Court therefore finds
that plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that Suard Barge Service owes it
a valid debt.
Plaintiff has also provided satisfactory documentation that Mr. Suard
personally guaranteed plaintiff’s loan to Suard Barge Service.52

Under

Louisiana law, guaranty agreements must be clearly expressed but “are
subject to the same rules of interpretation as contracts in general.” Comar

50
51
52

R. Doc. 11-4.
R. Doc. 1 at 13-15; R. Doc. 1-16; R. Doc 1-17.
R. Doc. 1-14; R. Doc. 11-3.
12

Marine, Corp. v. Raider Marine Logistics, L.L.C., 792 F.3d 564, 578 (5th Cir.
2015) (quoting Ferrell v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 403 So. 2d 698, 700 (La.
1981)). Courts must give legal effect to the intent of the parties as expressed
in their written agreement. Id. The commercial guaranty signed by Mr.
Suard in his individual capacity expresses a clear intent to be bound to repay
all Suard Barge Service’s debts to plaintiff “arising from any and all present
and future loans,” and including but not limited to the principal amount,
“accrued unpaid interest thereon and all collection costs and legal
expenses.”53

The guaranty agreement permits plaintiff to enforce the

guaranty against Mr. Suard before exhausting its remedies against Suard
Barge Service, other guarantors, or any collateral securing its loan. 54
Further, plaintiff has shown that Mr. Suard granted it a valid security
interest in Mr. Suard’s boat named Awesome, bearing Louisiana Wildlife and
Fisheries registration number LA-1345-EX and decal number 087039-04.55
Plaintiff provided the Court with the commercial security agreement, which
names Mr. Suard as the grantor and is signed by Mr. Suard in his individual
capacity.56 Because Mr. Suard has not challenged plaintiff’s documents, the

53
54
55
56

R. Doc. 1-14 at 1.
Id.
R. Doc. 11-5.
Id. at 1, 5.
13

Court presumes his signature on these agreements to be authentic. See La.
R.S. 10:3-308 (providing that the validity of a signature on a negotiable
instrument is admitted unless specifically denied). Accordingly, the Court
finds sufficient basis in the pleadings to enter default judgment against Mr.
Suard.
D.

Relief Requested

Under the terms of Mr. Suard’s personal guaranty, plaintiff is entitled
to recover from him the full amount of Suard Barge Service’s indebtedness,
including the principal of the loan, accrued interest, and costs of collection
and reasonable attorneys’ fees.57 Plaintiff requests damages against Mr.
Suard in the principal amount of $3,006,077.03, accrued interest in the
amount of $789,468.17, interest of $535.33 per day from August 24, 2017,
life insurance premium payments in the amount of $3,507.30, vessel survey
costs in the amount of $8,500.00, and costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees. 58
After granting default judgment, it is the Court's duty “to fix the
amount which the plaintiff is lawfully entitled to recover and to give
judgment accordingly.” Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944). The
plaintiff is not entitled to have its allegations regarding damages accepted as

57
58

R. Doc. 1-14 at 1.
R. Doc. 19 at 2-3.
14

true. See United States v. Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir.
1987) (“After a default judgment, the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual
allegations are taken as true, except regarding damages.”). In the default
judgment context, the Fifth Circuit has stated that “unliquidated damages
normally are not awarded without an evidentiary hearing,” but this rule “is
subject to an exception where the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or one
capable of mathematical calculation.” James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th
Cir. 1993). A sum capable of mathematical calculation is one that can be
“computed with certainty by reference to the pleadings and supporting
documents alone.” Id. at 311 (internal citation omitted). The district court
has “wide latitude” to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary.
Id. at 310.
The Court finds that the amount owed by Mr. Suard is capable of
mathematical calculation. Plaintiff provided the Court with documentation
of the original $3,950,000 loan agreement, 59 plaintiff’s demand letters to
defendants regarding default on the loan,60 updates on proceeds received by
plaintiff from the sale of vessels owned by Suard Barge Service and Premier
Services,61 and the affidavits of Barton Blanco, plaintiff’s Executive Vice

59
60
61

R. Doc. 11-3; R. Doc. 11-4.
R. Doc. 1-16, 1-17.
R. Doc. 1 at 15; R. Doc. 19-1 at 3.
15

President, outlining the amounts still due under the loan. 62 Mr. Blanco
represents that he has reviewed the loan documents and plaintiff’s business
records and that, as of August 24, 2017, Mr. Suard owed plaintiff
$3,006,077.03 in principal, $789,468.17 in accrued interest, interest of
$535.33 per day from August 24, 2017, and costs, expenses, and attorneys’
fees.63
Plaintiff also requests reimbursement of life insurance premium
payments and vessel survey costs.64 The assignment of life insurance policy
between plaintiff and Suard Barge Service states that any premium paid by
plaintiff as assignee “shall become a part of the Liabilities hereby secured.”65
Mr. Blanco attests that the assignment of life insurance policy presented to
the Court is a true and accurate copy of the insurance assignment agreement
and that plaintiff is due $3,507.30 in life insurance premiums.66 Under the
term loan agreement, Suard Barge Service is also responsible for any
reasonable expenses, costs, and charges related to a default on the
agreement.67 The preferred fleet mortgages allow plaintiff to survey the

62
63
64
65
66
67

R. Doc. 1 at 22-24; R. Doc. 11-2; R. Doc. 19-1.
R. Doc. 19-1 at 3-4.
Id.
R. Doc. 11-13 at 3.
R. Doc. 11-2 at 5, 7.
R. Doc. 11-3 at 10.
16

mortgaged vessels.68 Mr. Blanco attests that plaintiff is owed $8,500.00 in
vessel survey costs.69
Defendant has not specifically contested plaintiff’s calculations of the
amount due, and the Court finds sufficient evidence in the record to support
the amounts requested by plaintiff. See In re The Home Rests., Inc., 285 F.3d
111, 114 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding no uncertainty about amounts due where
complaint included specific dollar figures that were supported by affidavits);
Int’l Painters and Allied Trades Industry Pension Fund v. Brighton Painting
Co., 267 F.R.D. 426, 428 (D.D.C. 2010) (“In ruling on such a motion [for a
default judgment], the court may rely on detailed affidavits or documentary
evidence to determine the appropriate sum for the default judgment.”).
Plaintiff is also entitled to recover its collection costs and reasonable
attorneys’ fees from Mr. Suard. 70 Plaintiff has indicated that it plans to file a
motion after judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) to
establish the amount of its attorneys’ fees. 71 The Court will therefore defer
its consideration of the amount of attorneys’ fees at this time.

68
69
70
71

R. Doc. 11-14 at 4; R. Doc. 11-15 at 3.
R. Doc. 11-2 at 7.
R Doc. 1-14.
R. Doc. 21.
17

E.

Partial Final Judgment

Plaintiff requests partial final judgment against Mr. Suard under Rule
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.72 When multiple parties are
involved in a civil action, Rule 54(b) permits a court to enter final judgment
“as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court
expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b). The determination of whether “there is no just reason for delay” is
within the sound discretion of the district court. See Ackerman v. FDIC, 973
F.2d 1221, 1224 (5th Cir.1992).

The district court must weigh “the

inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger
of denying justice by delay on the other.” Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union
v. Continental Sprinkler Co., 967 F.2d 145, 148 (5th Cir.1992) (internal
quotation omitted).
The Court finds that partial final judgment is appropriate in this
matter. Plaintiff filed its complaint over one year ago. 73 Defendants Suard
Barge Service and Premier Services have filed petitions for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7, 74 which provides for a liquidation of assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a).
Moreover, Mr. Suard’s guaranty agreement expressly allows plaintiff to

72
73
74

R. Doc. 19-2 at 6.
R. Doc. 1.
R. Doc. 13; R. Doc. 14.
18

enforce the guaranty against Mr. Suard before exhausting its remedies
against Suard Barge Service. 75 Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no
just reason for delay.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for

entry of default judgment. IT IS ORDERED that there be a judgment in favor
of plaintiff against Defendant Louis O’Neil Suard, Jr. in the amount of
$3,006,077.03 in principal, $789,468.17 in accrued interest, $3,507.30 in
reimbursement for life insurance premiums, $8,500.00 for vessel survey
costs, and interest in the sum of $535.33 per day from August 24, 2017.
Plaintiff is also entitled to costs, expenses and reasonable attorneys’ fees in
an amount to be determined by the Court at a later date.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there be a judgment in favor of
plaintiff against Louis O’Neil Suard, Jr. recognizing plaintiff as the holder of
a valid and enforceable commercial security agreement dated December 20,
2001, under which plaintiff was granted a security interest in a certain 28foot pleasure boat named Awesome and bearing Louisiana Wildlife and
Fisheries registration number LA-1345-EX and decal number 087039-04.

75

R. Doc. 1-14 at 1.
19

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, because there is no just reason for
delay, this judgment constitutes a final judgment against Louis O’Neil Suard
Jr. under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff’s
claims against Suard Barge Service, Inc., Premier Services, Inc. and the
vessels named as defendants in this matter are reserved and preserved.

11th
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _____ day of September, 2017.

_____________________
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

20