Vo v. Gee, et al

Filing 77

OPINION: IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' 48 , 50 Motions to Transfer and 47 , 49 Motions to Dismiss are DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the 34 Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED. Signed by Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle on 3/23/2017. (mmv)

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 1 of 17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
VIET ANH VO

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

NO. 16-15639

REBEKAH E. GEE,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, ET AL

SECTION “B”(5)

OPINION
Before the court are Defendant Perret’s “Motion to Transfer
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C section 1404(a)” (Rec. Doc. 50), Plaintiff’s
“Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant
Louis J. Perret’s Motion to Transfer Venue” (Rec. Doc. 61),
Defendants Broussard and Thibodeaux’s “Motion to Transfer Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C section 1404(a)”( Rec. Doc. 48) and Plaintiff’s
“Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’
Diane Meaux Broussard and Michael Thibodeaux’s Motion to Transfer
Venue” (Rec. Doc. 62), Defendants Broussard and Thibodeaux’s “Rule
12

(b)(6)

Motion

to

Dismiss”

(Rec.

Doc.

47),

Plaintiff’s

“Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’
Broussard and Thibodeaux’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss” (Rec.
Doc. 59), Defendant Perret’s “Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss”
(Rec. Doc. 49), Plaintiff’s “Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s
Opposition to Defendant Perret’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss”
(Rec. Doc. 60),“Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction”

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Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 2 of 17

(Rec. Doc 37), Defendants Gee and George’s “Incorporated Pre-Trial
Brief and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary

Injunction”

(Rec.

Doc.

55),

Defendant

Perret’s

“Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction” (Rec Doc. 57), “Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (Rec. Doc. 66),
“Brief of Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction” (Rec.
Doc. 43), “Brief of Amicus Curiae the American Civil Liberties
Union Foundation of Louisiana in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction” (Rec. Doc. 44), “Brief of Amici Curiae
National

Center

for

Lesbian

Rights,

GLBTQ

Legal

Advocates

&

Defenders and LAMBDA Legal in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction” (Rec. Doc. 45). For the reasons set forth
below, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Transfer and
Motions to Dismiss are DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the
Motion for Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED.
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Plaintiff has brought a complaint for declaratory and

injunctive relief against Defendant Rebekah Gee, the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Hospitals for the State of Louisiana,
Defendant Devin George, State Registrar and Director of the Office
of Vital Records, Defendant Michael Thibodeaux, Clerk of Court for
Iberia Parish, Defendant Diane Meaux Broussard, Clerk of Court for
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Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 3 of 17

Vermilion Parish and Defendant Louis J. Perret, Clerk of Court for
Lafayette Parish.
Plaintiff, Viet “Victor” Anh Vo was born in an Indonesian
refugee camp after his parents (both Vietnamese nationals) fled
Vietnam

as

refugees

(Rec.

Doc.

1).

Given

this

circumstance,

Indonesian and Vietnamese authorities have never recognized his
birth and consequently he has never been issued a birth certificate
from a government entity (Rec. Doc. 1).

Plaintiff has resided in

Louisiana since he was three months old and became a naturalized
citizen when he was eight years old (Rec. Doc. 1). In 2016,
Plaintiff and his girlfriend (a fellow United States citizen)
decided to get married and applied for a marriage license from the
state of Louisiana (Rec. Doc. 1).
Plaintiff was denied a marriage license pursuant to Act 436
which requires that all applicants for a marriage license provide
a certified birth certificate, a valid and unexpired passport, or
an unexpired visa accompanied by a Form I-94 (Rec. Doc. 1). Act
436 has a waiver of the birth certificate requirement but in order
to qualify for the waiver an applicant must be a U.S. citizen that
was born in the United States or one of its territories. Plaintiff
was born outside of the United States and is naturalized citizen
and therefore did not qualify for the waiver (Rec. Doc. 1).
Plaintiff provided other official documents to the Clerk of Court
including a social security number and a Louisiana state driver’s
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Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 4 of 17

license, but without a birth certificate as required by Act 436,
the state of Louisiana refused to issue him a marriage license
(Rec. Doc. 1).
II.

FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS
A. Defendants’ Motions to Transfer
Defendants Brossard, Thibodeaux and Perret jointly bring a

motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a). Under
the statute venue may be transferred to any other district where
the action might have been brought for “the convenience of the
parties of witnesses and in the interest of justice.” Id. However,
“the plaintiff's privilege to choose, or not to be ousted from,
his chosen forum is highly esteemed. The burden of proof in a
motion to transfer is on the moving party. Unless the balance of
factors strongly favors the moving party, the plaintiff's choice
of forum generally should not be disturbed.” Carpenter v. Parker
Drilling Offshore United States, Case No. 05-365, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11979, at*5 (E.D. La. June 16, 2005).
In the Fifth Circuit the court looks at eight primary factors
when determining if a transfer is appropriate. In re Volkswagen of
Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008). There are four private
interest factors and four public interest factors. In re Volkswagen
of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304. The private interest factors are: “(1)
the

relative

ease

of

access

to

sources

of

proof;

(2)

the

availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of
4

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 5 of 17

witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and
(4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive.” Id. The four public interest factors
are:

“(1)

the

court congestion;

administrative
(2)

the

local

difficulties
interest

in

flowing

having

from

localized

interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with
the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of
unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application
of foreign law.” Id. None of the factors can be said to be of
dispositive

weight.

Id.

Nonetheless,

in

analyzing

the

eight

factors collectively, this Court finds that the Defendants’ motion
for a transfer is not appropriate.
1. The relative ease of access to sources of proof
The

instant

legal

dispute

does

not

require

intensive

fact

discovery and therefore access to sources of proof will not be a
significant factor in this case. Both the Plaintiff and Defendants
agree that the Plaintiff was denied a marriage license because of
Act 436. The controversy is entirely legal and therefore this
factor does not weigh in the favor of the Defendants motion to
transfer venue.
2. The

availability

of

compulsory

process

to

secure

the

attendance of witnesses
The Defendants argue that most of, if not all, of the witnesses
in this case are located in the Western District of Louisiana and
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Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 6 of 17

therefore in cities beyond the 100-mile subpoena power of this
Court. They further argue that for an unwilling witness, this could
be detrimental to the Defendants’ case. However, as Plaintiff
explains, a person can be compelled to testify anywhere in the
state where he or she resides or conducts business if the person
is a “party or a party’s officer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)(B)(i).
All of the witnesses in this case reside and conduct business in
Louisiana and therefore hailing them into court will not be an
issue. Furthermore, this case does not hinge upon disputed facts
but whether or not the law itself is unconstitutional. Therefore
witnesses will not be a large concern as this case proceeds towards
trial.

This

factor

weighs

against

the

Defendants’

motion

to

would

be

transfer venue.
3. The cost of attendance for willing witnesses
Defendants

argue

that

the

costs

for

witnesses

significant if the case is not transferred to the Western District.
However, the Defendants have not explained with specificity why
the Eastern District would be a burden and what key witnesses would
be

impacted.

In

a

recent

Eastern

District

case

a

Defendant

similarly argued that “the costs for willing witnesses from Lake
Charles to attend proceedings in Lake Charles would be minimal,
but costs for their travel 205 miles to New Orleans would be
significant.” Broussard v. First Tower Loan, LLC, 135 F. Supp. 3d
540, 547(E.D. La. 2015).

However the court ruled that “this
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Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 7 of 17

allegation is not sufficient to meet the movant's burden. Thus,
this factor supports maintaining venue in the Eastern District.”
Id. This Court follows this logic as well and given the Defendants’
lack of specificity, this factor also weighs in favor of denying
the motion to transfer.
4. All other practical factors that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive
There is no indication that a transfer will have any impact on
the trial of this case. This factor is neutral and therefore does
not weigh in favor of the Defendants’ motion to transfer.
5. The administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion
Defendants state that there are no known differences between
the Western District and the Eastern District regarding court
congestion. Plaintiff however cites compelling evidence from the
Administrative Office of the United States Court. The Western
District has a significantly longer resolution timeline than the
Eastern District. This factor weighs heavily against a transfer in
venue as it would lead to a protracted litigation schedule.
6. The local interest in having localized interests decided at
home
The Defendants contend that because the three clerks reside in
the Western District that the case should be transferred there
because

of

a

particularized

local

interest.

However,

as

the

Plaintiff points out, the actions of these clerks have nothing to
7

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 8 of 17

do with their residence in the Western District. They are merely
complying with the plain language of a statute that is uniformly
enforced across the entire state of Louisiana. This factor does
not weigh in favor of granting the Defendants’ motion to transfer.
7. The familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern
the case
Judges in the Eastern District and the Western District are both
familiar with the forum law and therefore this factor does not
support the Defendant’s motion to transfer.
8. The avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of law or
in the application of foreign law
This Court does not find that there are any issues regarding
conflict of law between the Eastern and Western Districts. This
factor does not weigh in favor of the Defendants’ motion. None of
the factors that the Fifth Circuit analyzes convinces this Court
that the matter should be transferred to the Western District of
Louisiana.
B. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such a motion is rarely
granted because it is viewed with disfavor. See Lowrey v. Tex. A
& M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir.1997) (quoting Kaiser

8

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 9 of 17

Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d
1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982)).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts must accept all
well-pleaded

facts

as

true

and

view

them

in

the

light

most

favorable to the non-moving party. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190,
196 (5th Cir. 1996). However, “[f]actual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “To survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its

face.”

Gonzales

2009)(quoting

v.

Ashcroft

Kay,
v.

577
Iqbal,

F.3d
129

600,

603

S.Ct.

(5th
1937,

Cir.
1949

(2009))(internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court in
Iqbal explained that Twombly promulgated a “two-pronged approach”
to determine whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. First, courts must identify those
pleadings that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are
not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. Legal conclusions
“must

be

supported

by

factual

allegations.”

Id.

“Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 1949.
Upon identifying the well-pleaded factual allegations, courts
“assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Id. at 1950. A claim has
9

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 10 of 17

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows

the

court

to

draw

the

reasonable

inference

that

the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. This
is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw

on

its

plaintiffs

judicial

must

experience

“nudge[]

their

and
claims

common
across

sense.”
the

Id.

line

The
from

conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Defendants Brossard, Thibodeaux and Perret jointly bring a
motion to dismiss on the basis that they lack Monell liability.
The Defendants argues that under the Supreme Court’s holding in
Monell that they can only be sued if they were a moving force of
the alleged unlawful constitutional deprivation at issue. City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). The clerks of the
various parishes in the instant litigation argue that there is no
allegation that the clerks engaged in any unlawful conduct or any
unconstitutional custom, policy, or procedure that would permit
Monell liability. In their motion to dismiss the clerks argue that
even though they are responsible for the actual implementation of
Act’s 436’s requirements, they had no choice but to follow the
mandates of state law. In other words, the clerks argue that they
were “just doing their job.”
The Plaintiff argues, and this Court agrees, that this is
precisely why these clerks are appropriate parties to the instant
lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit explained, “the State cannot dissociate
10

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 11 of 17

itself from actions taken under its laws by labeling those it
commands to act as local officials. A county official pursues his
duties as a state agent when he is enforcing state law or policy.
He acts as a county agent when he is enforcing county law or
policy. It may be possible for the officer to wear both state and
county hats at the same time, but when a state statute directs the
actions of an official, as here, the officer, be he state or local,
is acting as a state official.” Echols v. Parker, 909 F.2d 795,
801(5th Cir. 1990).
Furthermore, as Plaintiff points out, the Monell requirements
that the defendants reference apply where a municipal official
acts in a local capacity, not where the official preforms as a
state actor. Cain v. City of New Orleans, Case No. 15-4479, 2017
U.S.

Dist.

LEXIS

15124,

at*53

(E.D.

La.

Feb.

3,

2017).

The

appropriate standard that should be used in the instant matter is
the one found in Ex Parte Young. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
155-156 (1908); Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 411 (5th Cir.
2001). This standard is appropriate because (1) the clerks are
acting as state officials when they enforce Act 436; (2) the
constitutional violations are ongoing; and (3) the Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief. Cain v. City of New Orleans, U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15124, at*52-53. Other Circuits have also found liability under Ex
Parte Young to be appropriate in similar factual scenarios. Bostic
v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 371 n.3. (4th Cir. 2014)(City clerk that
11

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 12 of 17

issued marriage licenses was a proper defendant under Ex Parte
Young for suit challenging state law). Given that the Defendants
are still liable under the relevant standard, this Court finds
their motions to dismiss to be inappropriate. Nonetheless, given
the factual allegations in the complaint this Court finds that it
may be appropriate to amend the complaint to include 42 U.S. Code
§ 1983 jurisdictional claims. Any amendments to the complaint
should be filed within 14 days from the issuance of this order.
C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
A threshold issue in the Defendant’s Opposition to the Motion
for Preliminary Injunction is that the Plaintiff lacks standing.
The Defendants contend that the particular facts of this case, the
denial of a marriage license, do not confer article III standing
to the Plaintiff. Nonetheless, in the Fifth Circuit, the very act
of denying a marriage license to a plaintiff in contravention of
their constitutional rights has been held to constitute article
III standing. De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 646 (W.D.
Tex. 2014). The Plaintiff in the instant matter was denied a
marriage license on three separate occasions by each of the Clerk
Defendants. This Court finds these facts sufficient to establish
article III standing.
To

secure

a

preliminary

injunction

a

Plaintiff

must

establish: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits
;(2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction
12

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 13 of 17

is not issued; (3) that the threated injury if the injunction is
denied outweighs any harm that will result is the injunction is
granted; and (4) that the grant of the injunction will not disserve
the public interest. Sells v. Livingston, 750 F.3d 478, 480 (5th
Cir. 2014).
1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
In the Fifth Circuit in order “to assess the likelihood of
success on the merits, we look to standards provided by the
substantive law.” Jordan v. Fisher, 823 F.3d 805, 809 (5th Cir.
2016). Furthermore, “to show a likelihood of success, the plaintiff
must present a prima facie case, but need not prove that he is
entitled

to

summary

judgment.”

Daniels

Health

Scis.,

LLC

v.

Vascular Health Scis., LLC, 710 F.3d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 2013). In
the instant matter Plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a
likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiff has established a
prima facie case that the effects of the statute are likely
unconstitutional under the Equal Protect Clause since it adversely
treats naturalized citizens differently from citizens born in the
United States.

Specifically, the birth certificate provisions

impermissibly discriminate against the Plaintiff based on his
national origin and deny him, a naturalized U.S. citizen, the
fundamental right to marry.
The Equal Protection Clause protects all individuals from
state discrimination. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
13

The

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 14 of 17

Supreme Court has clarified that “these provisions are universal
in

their

application,

to

all

persons

within

the

territorial

jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color,
or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge
of the protection of equal laws. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369 (1886). Even though states retain a broad power to classify
individuals under an Equal Protection analysis, “classifications
based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.” Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
Classifications,

such

as

the

one

made

by

the

state

of

Louisiana pursuant to Act 436 “must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny, that is, such classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that
further compelling governmental interests.” Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 105 (2001). The birth certificate
provisions that the Louisiana legislature enacted creates adverse
classifications that distinguish between United States citizens on
the basis of their national origin. If the Plaintiff was born in
the United States and lacked a birth certification he could apply
for the waiver and the state of Louisiana would grant him a
marriage license. However, because the Plaintiff was born overseas
and then became a naturalized citizen he is ineligible to apply
for the waiver. The state of Louisiana would have to demonstrate
14

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 15 of 17

that

these

interest

classifications

that

justify

further

treating

compelling

the

U.S.

governmental

citizen

Plaintiff

differently from other U.S. citizens merely because of where he
was born.
In addition, the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case
that Act 436 is unconstitutional by denying him a fundamental
right, the right to marriage. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2602-2603 (2015). Even though states may impose reasonable
regulations on marriage, the Supreme Court has applied a strict
scrutiny

test

when

regulations

“interfere

directly

and

substantially with the right to marry.” Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 387 (1978). The current birth certificate provisions
completely bar the Plaintiff from obtaining a marriage license.
Given the heighted level of scrutiny that classifications based on
national origin require, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has
a likelihood of success on the merits of his equal protection
claims

and

therefore

satisfies

the

first

requirement

of

the

Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.
2. Threat of Irreparable Injury
In

order

to

meet

this

requirement

for

the

preliminary

injunction the Plaintiff must demonstrate that he is “likely to
suffer irreparable harm, that is, harm for which there is no
adequate remedy at law.” Daniels Health Scis., LLC, 710 F.3d 579,
585 (internal quotations omitted). The Fifth Circuit clarified and
15

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 16 of 17

explained, “an injury is irreparable only if it cannot be undone
through monetary remedies.” Deerfield Medical Center v. Deerfield
Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338, (5th Cir. 1981) (internal quotations
omitted). Under Louisiana state law the Plaintiff is currently
being denied the right to marriage. There is no monetary award
that can provide him that right and therefore he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm. In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held
that the denial of constitutional rights “for even minimal periods
of time constitutes irreparable injury justifying the grant of a
preliminary injunction.” Deerfield Medical Center, 661 F.2d 328,
338. The Plaintiff has been denied the right to marry since early
2016. Act 436’s deprivation of the Plaintiff’s fundamental right
to marriage satisfies the requirement that the Plaintiff face the
threat of irreparable harm.
3. Weighing of the harms
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction the Plaintiff
must demonstrate that the threatened injuries outweigh any damage
that the injunction will cause the defendant. Sells, 750 F.3d 478,
480. This Court finds that the balancing analysis weighs heavily
in the favor of the Plaintiff. The state of Louisiana is not harmed
by having to issue a marriage license to, in this case, a United
States

citizen

who

merely

lacks

a

birth

certificate

due

to

circumstances beyond his control. Louisiana’s enjoinment from
enforcing a likely unconstitutional law does not outweigh the
16

Case 2:16-cv-15639-ILRL-MBN Document 77 Filed 03/23/17 Page 17 of 17

Plaintiff’s fundamental right to marriage. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1145 (10th Cir. 2013).
4. Whether the injunction will disserve the public interest
The

Fifth

constitutional

Circuit

has

freedoms

are

held

that

always

injunctions

in

the

public

protecting
interest.

Texans for Free Enter. v. Tex. Ethics Comm'n, 732 F.3d 535, 539,
(5th Cir. 2013). In the instant matter the preliminary injunction
would protect the fundamental right to marriage and the right to
be free from unconstitutional discriminatory classifications based
on national origin. Consequently, this factor also weighs in favor
of the Plaintiff.
The

Plaintiff’s

Motion

for

Preliminary

Injunction

is

appropriate and applies to all individuals whose constitutional
rights would be curtailed by Act 436. As a nation we should welcome
all

United

States

citizens,

born

in

the

United

States

or

naturalized, to enjoy all of the rights and privileges that are
bestowed upon them through their citizenship. These rights should
not

be

abridged

just

because

a

United

States

citizen

was

naturalized instead of being born on our soil.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 23rd day of March, 2017.

__________________________________
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

17