Smith v. Kansa Technology, LLC et al
Filing
105
ORDER AND REASONS denying 94 Motion for relief from judgment. Signed by Judge Lance M Africk on 7/2/2018. (blg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHAMBRIA NECOLE SMITH
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
No. 16-16597
KANSA TECHNOLOGY, L.L.C.
SECTION I
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a motion 1 for relief from judgment 2 pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) filed by plaintiff Shambria Necole Smith (“Smith”). For
the following reasons, the motion is denied.
I.
In 2015, Smith was injured at work while using a newspaper inserter
manufactured by defendant Kansa Technology, L.L.C. (“Kansa”). 3 At the time, Smith
was employed by Hammond Daily Star Publishing Company, Inc. (“the Hammond
Daily Star”). 4 Smith filed a lawsuit against Kansa and the Hammond Daily Star in
Louisiana state court. 5 The case was eventually removed to federal court and tried
by another section of this Court. The sole defendant at trial was Kansa because the
Court had previously granted a motion for summary judgment dismissing Smith’s
claims against the Hammond Daily Star. 6
R. Doc. No. 94.
R. Doc. No. 87.
3 R. Doc. No. 1-3, at 1; R. Doc. No. 32-1, at 2.
4 R. Doc. No. 12-1, at 1.
5 R. Doc. No. 1, at 1–2.
6 R. Doc. No. 1; R. Doc. No. 13.
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2
At the conclusion of trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Kansa, finding
that the inserter that injured Smith was not unreasonably dangerous. 7 Smith then
timely filed a motion for new trial, which the Court denied. 8 Shortly thereafter, the
case was reassigned to this section, which now considers Smith’s motion for relief
from the earlier judgment.
II.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides for relief from a final judgment,
order, or proceeding in the following limited circumstances:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,
could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is
based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) relief is “uncommon” and “will be afforded only in
‘unique circumstances.’” Lowry Dev., L.L.C. v. Groves & Assocs. Ins., Inc., 690 F.3d
382, 385 (5th Cir. 2012); Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 1985)
(quoting Wilson v. Atwood Group, 725 F.2d 255, 257, 258 (5th Cir. 1984)). “The Rule
7
8
R. Doc. No. 87; R. Doc. No. 85, at 1.
R. Doc. No. 89; R. Doc. No. 91.
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is to be ‘liberally construed in order to do substantial justice,’ but at the same time,
‘final judgments should [not] be lightly reopened.’” Lowry Dev., L.L.C., 690 F.3d at
385 (citation omitted).
III.
Smith argues that relief is warranted under Rule 60(b) for three reasons. First,
Smith contends that the Court erred in allowing the jury to “consider Hammond Daily
Star, by allowing Exhibit 7 to be used at trial.” 9 Second, Smith argues that the
evidence presented at trial could not possibly support the jury’s conclusion regarding
whether the inserter was unreasonably dangerous. And finally, Smith argues that
consideration of new information discovered after the conclusion of trial requires
granting her relief from the judgment. The Court addresses each of these arguments
in turn.
A.
According to Smith, the Court was mistaken to expose the jury to any reference
to workers’ compensation or the Hammond Daily Star at trial. 10 Specifically, Smith
refers to the Court’s decision to include any mention of the Hammond Daily Star on
the jury verdict form and the jury’s exposure to a report from the Hammond Daily
Star’s workers’ compensation insurer detailing the incident (marked as Exhibit 7 at
trial, “Exhibit 7”). 11 Smith argues that Exhibit 7 and the jury verdict form—which,
R. Doc. No. 94-1, at 7.
Id. at 5.
11 Id.; R. Doc. No. 94-2. In its opposition, Kansa notes that the version of Exhibit 7
attached to Smith’s motion (R. Doc. No. 94-2) is the unredacted version—not the
version introduced into evidence at trial. R. Doc. No. 103, at 6.
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as written, required the jury to assess whether the Hammond Daily Star was at fault
if it determined the inserter was unreasonably dangerous—“misled the jury [into
rendering] a verdict in favor of the defense.” 12
Smith asserts that these alleged mistakes permit the Court to grant her relief
under Rule 60(b)(1). Under that clause, a court may grant a moving party relief from
an earlier judgment because of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b)(1). However, “these terms are not wholly open-ended.
Gross carelessness is not enough.” Pryor, 769 F.2d at 287 (internal quotations and
citation omitted). Because Rule 60(b)(1) “affords extraordinary relief,” Smith must
“make a sufficient showing of unusual or unique circumstances justifying such relief.”
Id. at 286. The Court concludes that Smith has failed to make such a showing. 13
As the court that presided over the trial discussed in its order denying Smith’s
motion for a new trial (“Judge Engelhardt’s order”), 14 Louisiana’s comparative fault
statute requires apportioning fault among all tortfeasors, including those that are not
parties to the action. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2323; see also McAvey v. Lee, 58
F.Supp.2d 724, 725 (E.D. La. Oct. 30, 1998) (Lemmon, J.) (explaining that the 1996
amendment to Louisiana’s comparative fault statute “revised the substance and
R. Doc. No. 94-1, at 5.
Despite three full pages dedicated to “legal arguments” in her motion, Smith does
not cite one case to support her contention that the Court should grant her relief from
the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b).
14 R. Doc. No. 91, at 4 (noting that, contrary to Smith’s argument that the court should
not have included the Hammond Daily Star on the jury verdict form, Smith “cites a
Louisiana Supreme Court case recognizing that the 1996 revisions to Article 2323
require the Court to consider and quantify the fault of each non-intentional
tortfeasor”).
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procedure to require the allocation of fault to nonparties”). Any reference to the
Hammond Daily Star on the jury verdict form cannot be considered a “mistake,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect” under 60(b)(1): the reference was appropriate. 15
Moreover, Smith never objected to the final jury instructions or to the final jury
verdict form. 16
Smith’s brief makes it difficult for the Court to ascertain exactly what Smith
is arguing with respect to Exhibit 7; however, Smith does contend that its use at trial
was “prejudicial.” 17 In her motion, Smith refers to an April 24, 2018 written
objection—which predates the trial—filed in response to Kansa’s proposed jury
verdict form. 18 According to Smith, this objection evidences the fact that she objected
to Exhibit 7. 19 That document, however, never mentions Exhibit 7. To the contrary,
Exhibit 7 was listed in the joint pre-trial order proposed by both parties, which states
that the exhibit was “to be admitted without objection” (emphasis added). 20 Despite
being given multiple opportunities, Smith did not object to the admission of Exhibit
7 into evidence at trial. 21
Id. at 4 n.5.
Id. at 3–4.
17 R. Doc. No. 94-1, at 5.
18 R. Doc. No. 66.
19 R. Doc. No. 94-1, at 4.
20 R. Doc. No. 91, at 2 (citing R. Doc. No. 61, at 15). Additionally, Judge Engelhardt
ordered the parties not to mention workers’ compensation at trial, and Exhibit 7 was
redacted to exclude any workers’ compensation references.
21 Id. at 2–3. This Court independently reviewed Exhibit 7 as it was admitted into
evidence at trial. All references to workers’ compensation and the insurance company
were redacted.
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B.
Smith also argues that relief is proper because the jury’s findings were
“contrary to law.” 22 According to Smith, the jury could not have properly concluded
that the inserter was not unreasonably dangerous as a result of inadequate warning
because there was “no evidence of any warning labels on the . . . equipment.” 23 Smith
does not specify which Rule 60(b) clause provides a basis for relief encompassing this
alleged error, so the Court will assume that Smith is asserting that point under the
“catch-all” clause, Rule 60(b)(6). Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350,
357 (5th Cir. 1993).
Rule 60(b)(6) permits a court to grant relief from an earlier judgment for “any
other reason that justifies relief” besides those articulated in clauses (1) through (5).
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b)(6). This clause “provides a grand reservoir of equitable power
to do justice in a particular case.’” Government Fin. Servs. One Ltd. P’ship v. Peyton
Place, Inc., 62 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). However, relief may
only be granted “if extraordinary circumstances are present.” Hess v. Cockrell, 281
F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Batts v. Tow–Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743,
747 (5th Cir. 1995)). “[T]he movant must show ‘the initial judgment to have been
manifestly unjust.’” Edward H. Bohlin, 6 F.3d at 357.
Smith offers no evidence of “extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief
under Rule 60(b)(6). In Judge Engelhardt’s order, the Court concluded that it could
22
23
R. Doc. No. 94-1, at 2.
Id. at 8.
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not “find that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Upon
evaluating the evidence for itself, the Court finds sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s verdict.” 24 Judge Engelhardt conducted an independent review of the record,
and he was unable to conclude that the jury’s findings were unsubstantiated. That
court was undoubtedly in a better position than this Court is to now analyze the
issues presented at trial, evaluate the proffered evidence, and determine the
credibility to be given each witness. Consequently, this Court defers to the findings
in Judge Engelhardt’s order 25 and concludes that Smith has not established the
existence of “extraordinary circumstances” or shown that the judgment rendered
against her was “manifestly unjust.” Hess, 281 F.3d at 216; Edward H. Bohlin Co., 6
F.3d at 357.
C.
Finally, Smith claims that the jury was potentially “taint[ed]” during trial. 26
According to Smith, her expert witness observed one of defense counsel’s staff
R. Doc. No. 91, at 5.
See generally R. Doc. No. 91.
26
In a memorandum filed in support of her motion, Smith states that she seeks
relief “at a minimum under FRCP 60(b)1-3 and 6” without specifying which of her
arguments correspond with those four bases for relief. R. Doc. No. 94-1, at 7. Some of
Smith’s arguments use language taken directly from particular clauses.
For example, Smith argues that it was “mistake, inadvertence and/or
excusable neglect” for the court to allow the jury to consider the Hammond Daily Star
during its deliberations at trial. This language mirrors the language in Rule 60(b)(1),
so the Court is able to deduce that Smith seeks relief pursuant to clause (1) with
respect to that argument. Regarding her argument that the jury was possibly tainted,
however, Smith does not specify which clause warrants relief. Under “Legal Issues
Presented,” she asks, “Does the evidence support potential misconduct by the staff of
opposing counsel?” R. Doc. No. 94-1, at 2. This would seem to suggest Smith is
requesting relief under 60(b)(3) (fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
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members interacting with someone Smith identifies as “Ms. Hydel” (“Hydel”), a
supposed “courier” for one of the jurors. Kansa does not deny the interaction occurred,
but it argues that the conversation between its staff member, Tammi Miller
(“Miller”), and Hydel was not improper and that it did not influence any juror. 27
According to Miller’s affidavit, Hydel exited the courtroom into the hallway where
Miller was sitting, and she stated that she had been asked to leave Judge
Engelhardt’s courtroom because she was drinking from a water bottle. 28 Miller
asserts that she responded by commenting that Judge Engelhardt had instructed her
to sit down when she was handing defense counsel a document. 29 Smith contends that
this interaction is “new evidence” that warrants relief under Rule 60(b)(2). 30
“To succeed on a motion brought under 60(b)(2) based on newly discovered
evidence, the movant must demonstrate (1) that it exercised due diligence in
obtaining the information and (2) the evidence is material and controlling and clearly
would have produced a different result if presented before the original judgment.”
Government Fin. Servs., 62 F.3d at 770–71 (internal quotations and citations
opposing party). But in her concluding paragraph, she asserts that “the potential jury
taint could not have been discovered in time to move for a New Trial.” This borrows
language from 60(b)(2) (newly discovered evidence). Notwithstanding Smith’s poorly
written submission, the Court will address both bases for relief, but it urges Smith’s
counsel to better articulate his legal grounds in future filings.
27 R. Doc. No. 103, at 9.
28 R. Doc. No. 101-1, at 1.
29 Id.
30 The Court questions whether the fact that Smith’s witness allegedly observed a
defense counsel staff member speak to a “courier” for one of the jurors may be
considered “evidence” under Rule 60(b)(2). Smith has produced no support for such
contention, but the Court need not decide that issue because Smith’s argument fails
for other reasons.
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omitted). “As the party seeking relief, [Smith] must bear the burden of showing that
[the rule] applies.” Frew v. Janek, 780 F.3d 320, 327 (5th Cir. 2015).
Smith’s only issue with this alleged interaction is that it “potentially led to
influence and juror conduct” (emphasis in original). 31 She does not suggest that Miller
interacted with a juror. In fact, it is undisputed that whomever Miller spoke with was
not a member of the jury. 32 Even then, Smith does not argue that their conversation
was inappropriate or that it pertained to the trial. In Miller’s affidavit—submitted by
Kansa in support of its opposition to Smith’s motion—she states that she never
“discuss[ed] with [Hydel] any aspect of the trial proceedings.” 33 Smith has not refuted
that assertion or disputed any portion of Miller’s account. Accordingly, Smith has not
demonstrated that any evidence of the alleged interaction is “material” and
“controlling,” or that it would have produced a different result had it been presented
before the judgment. Government Fin. Servs., 62 F.3d at 771.
Alternatively, Smith argues that this new information suggesting possible jury
tampering warrants relief under 60(b)(3). Rule 60(b)(3) permits relief from a
judgment because of “fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
party.” A party is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(3) if (1) the opposing party
“engaged in fraud or misconduct” and (2) the misconduct “prevented the moving party
from fully and fairly presenting his case.” Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632,
641 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Government Fin. Servs., 62 F.3d at 772). The moving party
R. Doc. No. 94-1, at 6.
Id.
33 R. Doc. No. 101-1, at 2.
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bears the burden of proving the fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct “by clear and
convincing evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).
Smith has offered nothing—not even an anecdotal suggestion—to show that
Kansa or its attorneys engaged in misconduct. However, even assuming Smith can
establish misconduct or misrepresentation—which would require clear and
convincing evidence—Smith has not offered any evidence to establish that she was
unable to fully and fairly present her case as a result. Williams v. Thaler, 602 F.3d
291, 312 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming the district court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion
for reconsideration under 60(b)(3) because—even though the opposing party conceded
misconduct—the plaintiff did not “demonstrate[] how the violation prevented him
from fully and fairly presenting his case”). Her arguments under 60(b)(3) thus fail.
Having considered each of Smith’s arguments, the Court is unpersuaded that
it should exercise its discretion to grant her relief from the earlier judgment.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Smith’s motion is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, July 2, 2018.
_______________________________________
LANCE M. AFRICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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